The Potomac-SAIS report on North Africa: Paid Analysis, Partisan Fear Mongering, Bad Policy

Machiavelli by the Checkbook

At the end of March, a relatively obscure Washington, D.C., think tank called the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies published a report — in conjunction with the conflict management program of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University — arguing largely in support of Morocco’s 2007 autonomy proposal to solve the Western Sahara dispute. Framed in terms of US policy towards North Africa (Why the Maghreb Matters (PDF)), the report is a thinly veiled effort to provide academic and political legitimacy to a one-sided view of the Western Sahara issue. It precipitated a detailed response from the Western Saharan Union of Writers and Journalists.

The Potomac-SAIS ‘task force’ was likely an initiative organized by the Moroccan-American Center for Policy (MACP), a registered agent of the Kingdom of Morocco. Though MACP’s fingerprints are nowhere to be found in the report, it is an open secret in Washington that this project, culminating in the Potomac-SAIS report, has been in the works for several months. And little surprise, then, that the report’s recommendations attempt to equate US interests with those of the Moroccan Monarchy. Paying for policy is quite normal in Washington.

The Potomac-SAIS report boasts that it is ‘the result of an independent task force on an issue of critical importance to US foreign policy, where it seems that a group diverse in backgrounds and perspectives may nonetheless be able to reach a meaningful consensus’. On the other hand, ‘Task force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation’. So while they all apparently agree, we cannot necessarily hold each individual signatory responsible for the content of the report.

Apart from Dr. I William Zartman — Professor Emeritus at SAIS, whose pro-Moroccan views are well known — there is no other recognized expert on the task force who has an extensive scholarly publishing record on the Western Sahara conflict. The effects of Zartman’s partisan bias are quite clear in the report. Yet the arguments suffer from a debilitating series of misrepresentation, fallacies and contradictions. If translated into actual policy, they would prove counter productive at best, disastrous at worst.

Two other names attached to the Potomac-SAIS report, however, suggest the real agenda behind it: General Wesley Clark and Madeline Albright, two leading figures in the Democratic Party. While Morocco’s autonomy initiate played very well with the previous Republican controlled White House, the Obama administration has yet to outline a clear policy towards the dispute. On the same day that the Potomac-SAIS report was published, Edward Kennedy urged his good friend Obama to uphold Western Sahara’s right to self-determination under international law, which Morocco staunchly opposes. With names like Clark and Albright, the Moroccan lobby is obviously seeking to make inroads into the Democratic establishment.

Background

Before examining the shortfalls of the Potomac-SAIS report, it is necessary to background some of the salient historical realities of Western Sahara. The conflict dates back to November 1975, when a Moroccan threat to invade what was then a Spanish colony drove out Madrid lest it face a ‘colonial war’. The native people of Western Sahara had already developed a nationalist conscience and, according to a 1975 UN report, rallied behind the pro-independence Polisario Front, founded in 1973. Since the early 1960s, the United Nations has called for Western Sahara’s self-determination, including independence, and the UN still considers the Western Sahara a Non-Self-Governing Territory — a colony. For this reason, no country in the world yet recognizes Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, a clear indication of the international census backing self-determination. And given the fact that Morocco refuses to hold a referendum on independence, it is easy enough to deduce the fact that most Western Saharans would likely opt for independence.

Algeria has supported Western Sahara for ideological reasons (self-determination) and regional security interests (keeping Moroccan ambitions in check). Morocco, of course, denies the existence of an authentic Western Saharan nationalism and sees an independent Western Sahara only as an expansion of Algeria’s regional hegemony. France and the United States have traditionally supported Morocco because Morocco furthers Franco-American interests in the Mediterranean, Africa and the Middle East, and because a referendum on independence in Western Sahara could destabilize Morocco by de-legitimizing the Monarchy. Still, a UN mission arrived in 1991, putting an end to the Morocco-Polisario war so that a referendum on independence could finally be held. Morocco’s previous King, Hassan II, had committed to a referendum in 1981, but when he died in 1999, the new King, Mohamed VI, dropped that commitment. In 2007, Morocco proposed a final status solution based on autonomy for Western Sahara within Moroccan sovereignty while Polisario put forward a series of bridging proposals to allow for a referendum. Four rounds of negotiations in 2007 and 2008 produced zero progress towards a solution. In early 2009, a new UN envoy to Western Sahara, former US ambassador Christopher Ross, made his first tour of North Africa. He will report to the Security Council at the end of April.

Sovereignty versus Self-Determination or Sovereignty and Self-Determination?

The Potomac-SAIS report makes the case that the Obama administration should take more interest in North Africa. The primary reason is predictable: terrorism. The broader Northwest Africa region, especially the Sahara-Sahel, the report argues, faces significant security challenges. One of the best ways to achieve security in North Africa is to help create the conditions for regional cooperation. And so resolving the Western Sahara conflict, which prevents inter-regional cooperation, especially between Morocco and Algeria, is key.

The Potomac-SAIS report supports a solution to the Western Sahara conflict based upon ‘autonomy within Moroccan sovereignty’, as proposed by Morocco in 2007. There are two positive reasons put forward for endorsing Morocco’s initiative. One, its alleged status as the ‘only current proposal for a compromise’ (a partisan dismissal of Polisario’s 2007 bridging proposals); two, if implemented, it would rid Morocco and Algeria of a major point of contention, paving the way for renewal of the Arab Maghrib Union (UMA) trading bloc. The latter point is addressed later.

The Potomac-SAIS report also provides some cautionary reasons to support Morocco’s autonomy initiative. An independent Western Sahara ‘likely would remain a source of acrimony and tension between Morocco and Algeria as well as the other bordering states’. The report furthermore alleges that Western Sahara would not constitute a viable independent state on the grounds of its low population and limited natural resources. While the report’s authors are pessimistic for a near term solution given alleged Algerian and Russian obstruction, they claim that U.S. support for Morocco’s autonomy initiative will help build a new consensus for peace.

As we can see, the best arguments in favor of Morocco’s autonomy proposal are, in fact, merely arguments against self-determination for Western Sahara. To say that autonomy is good because independence is bad is not only fallacious, it seeks to posit a false opposition between self-determination and power sharing that would preemptively bind the imagination of mediators. The three decades old impasse in Western Sahara demonstrates that mediators need to get beyond the old dichotomy of sovereignty versus self-determination.

To suggest that an independent Western Sahara will become a failed state or a terrorist safe haven falls back on Bush-style fear mongering and does very little to get the parties to the table where this issue will eventually have to be sorted out. Demonizing and alienating one of the parties to the conflict (i.e., Polisario) is not a recipe for creating trust and mutual respect, it is a recipe for further stagnation. It is surprising that conflict resolution expert such as Chester Crocker would put his good name to these counter productive, highly biased proposals.

Western fears of a failed state in Western Sahara can be easily allayed if the focus of the peace process turns away from highly speculative, distant outcomes. Instead, the focus needs to be on realistic, achievable processes in the here and now. Too much time has been wasted in Western Sahara developing final status solutions and not enough time developing a framework for negotiations that will (1) get the parties to the table and (2) produce substantive talks bridging both of their red-lines: sovereignty and self-determination. Choosing one side in this framework — Moroccan sovereignty — will not make the United States and honest broker; it will only further exacerbate the status quo the Potomac-SAIS report finds so intolerable. The report is as self-contradictory to its own aims as it is partisan.

The current Security Council mandate for Western Sahara seeks ‘achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara’. A non-partisan approach would simply require that the parties commit to this mandate. Polisario would commit to negotiating a power sharing agreement with Morocco and Morocco would commit to putting any agreement to a referendum including the option of independence. Morocco’s autonomy proposal certainly constitutes a serious and credible starting point for negotiations towards a comprehensive power sharing agreement, but Polisario will never discuss it openly unless the Security Council secures Morocco’s commitment to a referendum.

Algeria and Autonomy

The Potomac-SAIS report describes the Western Sahara conflict as a dispute primarily pitting Moroccan and Algerian interests, rather than the UN description, which holds that the two parties to the dispute are Morocco, the de facto administering power, and the people of Western Sahara, represented by Polisario. The report attempts to place some doubt over Polisario’s credibility, not only as a partner for peace, but also as the legitimate representative of Western Sahara. Regarding the latter, one need only answer this question: If Polisario does not represent the interests of the Western Saharan people, then why is Morocco so afraid to hold a referendum on independence? Morocco claims widespread support among native Western Saharans for its forced annexation, yet Morocco is unwilling to put it to a vote. A referendum, not autonomy, would literally end the conflict tomorrow as far as the international community is concerned.

The problem is that Morocco would not win the referendum, so it wants to have the Security Council impose autonomy at the maximum parameters for negotiations on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Rather than Polisario, the Potomac-SAIS report attempts to portray Algeria as the bad guy in the conflict, a view consistent with a Moroccan perspective and Zartman’s scholarship [1]. Yet Algeria did not even get seriously involved in the conflict until after Morocco invaded Spanish/Western Sahara in 1975. This was six years after the first Western Saharan independence movement came into being and nearly a decade after the UN first started calling for Western Sahara’s independence from Madrid. For Algeria, it was Morocco’s unilateral attempt to redraw the map of North Africa in 1975 by annexing Western Sahara — just as Morocco had attempted to annex parts of Algeria in 1963 — that precipitated Algerian support for Polisario. From Algeria’s point of view, its regional security interests dictate that Morocco’s demonstrated history of aggressive irredentism must be kept in check. To adopt a Moroccan reading of the conflict, as the Potomac-SAIS report does, produces poor analysis and impoverishes diplomatic objectivity.

Even if we assume, as the Potomac-SAIS report does, that Algeria has a dog in the fight, how are Algeria’s interests served by an autonomous Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty? Algeria’s regional and geo-strategic interests are not addressed by Morocco’s autonomy proposal, nor does it provide any room for Algeria to save face given Algiers’ longstanding support for Western Sahara’s right to a vote on independence. Without first going through an internationally sanctioned act of self-determination, an autonomous Western Sahara would, logically, become just as much ‘a source of acrimony and tension between Morocco and Algeria’.

The political and intellectual defenders of Morocco’s autonomy proposal continuously trumpet its virtues as a non-zero-sum or win-win solution. Because it is a compromise, they argue, it contains incentives to make peace. Yet from Algeria’s point of view (as described in the Potomac-SAIS report), autonomy is very much a zero-sum, win-lose outcome. If Algeria is so important to the Western Sahara deadlock, as suggested by the Potomac/SAIS report, why then support a solution that does not respect Algeria’s interests but rather boldly defies them? Zartman’s own ground breaking work in the fields of conflict resolution and game theory should tell him this, yet he defends a solution that his own theories would reject.

It is also bizarre to claim that an independent Western Sahara is Algeria’s idea but then to claim that Algeria would allow an independent Western Sahara to become a failed state. Why would Algeria back Polisario’s cause for over thirty years, only to see Western Sahara become a ‘Somalia on the Atlantic coast of North Africa’? Let’s be clear: preventing a failed state in Western Sahara is everyone’s interests. Morocco and the United States do not monopolize this concern. If anyone has a vested interest in a viable Western Sahara, it is, first and foremost, the Western Saharans, followed by Algeria, who has championed their cause. Mauritania, sharing the longest border with Western Sahara and undergoing its own bouts with political instability, is likely a close third ahead of Morocco.

To claim that Algeria is so cynically motivated as to see Western Sahara only as a means to destabilize Morocco — in its current form as a haphazard occupation or in a possible form as a failed state — is unjustified by the record. Not only does Algeria, sadly, have more direct experience with political instability and armed violence than Morocco, it has been intensively engaged in recent efforts to contain unrest in the northern areas of Niger and Mali on Algeria’s southern flank in the Sahara. Likewise, Algeria offered the United States significant cooperation during the early years after 11 September. Relations only cooled after the George W. Bush administration double-crossed Algeria on Western Sahara. In early 2003, the White House asked Algeria to pressure Polisario to accept the 2003 plan, devised by none other than James Baker. Bush also promised Algeria that Washington would press Morocco to accept it too. Though Algeria delivered Polisario, Washington refused to put pressure on Rabat to accept the plan. The Bush administration then went on to support Morocco’s autonomy initiative, which showed further disrespect to Algeria’s interests and dignity.

Algeria and Polisario are well aware of Western fears of a failed state in an independent Western Sahara, one that could become a safe haven for trans-national terrorist groups. For that reason, Polisario put forward its own set of compromise proposals in April 2007, when Morocco also put its autonomy plan on the table. Polisario has offered Morocco significant economic, political and security guarantees should a referendum result in independence. These included the option of allowing Moroccan settlers to remain in Western Sahara. In 2003, Polisario made the significant concession of allowing Moroccan settlers to vote in a referendum on independence. Polisario is also willing to have Morocco’s 2007 autonomy proposal placed on any referendum ballot so long as it includes independence. Morocco and its supporters have never even attempted to explain why this democratic solution is not viable. Polisario’s leadership is acutely aware of the fact that broad regional cooperation with Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria will be a necessity for a sustainable peace, security and prosperity. Like the Potomac/SAIS report, they often speak of the day when the Arab Maghrib Union will dissolve all the old colonial boundaries and unite North Africa.

Whether out of ignorance or deliberate deception, the Potomac-SAIS report also underestimates the economic viability of Western Sahara. As an independent state, Polisario is willing to maintain the Moroccan settler population, which will boost the population and create natural, social, economic, political and security ties with Morocco. Its main resources, phosphates and fish, are precious dwindling commodities world wide; last summer actually saw phosphate prices increase six-fold over its historic price. Additionally, since 2001, Morocco has engaged several companies to search for hydrocarbon and mineral resources in Western Sahara, suggesting other sources of revenue for an independent Western Sahara. In terms of security, Polisario has proven highly cooperative with the UN mission, foreign governments and, as a full member of the African Union, has participated in joint security exercises with other African states.

What is the way forward?

Contrary to what Morocco and its intellectual supporters say, there is no contradiction between the Security Council taking a strong stance in favor of both power sharing and self-determination. Instead of endorsing a particular final status, the Security Council should endorse a specific framework for negotiations based upon mutual respect for each side. Indeed, recent Security Council resolutions have said as much in their calls for a political solution that respects the right of Western Sahara to self-determination. But the Council needs to make this clearer to the parties. To Morocco, the Council needs to state firmly that its claim on Western Sahara will never be legitimated unless it first passes through a referendum. To Polisario, the Council needs to state clearly that it will never get its referendum unless it is willing to discuss power-sharing with Morocco. Substantive negotiations should be seen as the means to, not the result of, self-determination. This approach has the advantage of addressing the interests of Morocco, Polisario and Algeria without prejudice or favor. Peace in Western Sahara will never be achieved until the parties build the necessary confidence in each other and the Security Council. That trust and respect has to be built at the negotiating table, not through imposed solutions. The Obama administration should choose peace not partisanship.

Notes
1. In a recent article, Zartman described the two ‘interested parties’ as Morocco and Algeria. See Zartman, I.W., 2007, Time for a Solution in the Western Sahara Conflict, Middle East Policy, 14, p.181.
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SOURCE: http://concernedafricascholars.org/the-potomac-sais-report-on-north-africa/

USA reconoce la conexión de "Al Qaeda" con los servicios secretos pakistaníes

Una nueva confirmación de la vinculación del terrorismo con los servicios de inteligencia. Esta vez, quien lo dice es el ex-agente de la CIA, Bruce Riedel, consejero del presidente Obama para asuntos de Oriente Medio. La conexión de "Al Qaeda" con los "talibanes" y con los servicios secretos de Pakistán (ISI) es ya un secreto a voces. Aunque en España algunos sigan alimentando la teoría de Al Qaeda como un grupo terrorista "autónomo" de un (o varios) Estado (-s). Por lo demás, Riedel reconoce la conexión de la CIA con estos grupos terroristas... "en el pasado".

La prensa española ha publicado la conexión del servicio secreto pakistaní con los "talibanes" y la prensa suiza denunció que el servicio secreto pakistaní (ISI) es un "Estado dentro del Estado" (Tages Anzeiger, 30-III-2009).

Pero no recuerdo que nunca antes se denunciara, por un responsable político, la conexión de los "talibanes" y de Al Qaeda con el servicio secreto pakistaní con tanta claridad como lo acaba de hacer Bruce Riedel en una entrevista a Der Spiegel de la que traduciré algunos extractos.

Riedel deja clara la conexión "Al Qaeda" y "talibanes":

En los últimos meses hemos visto cómo las conexiones entre estos grupos (Al Qaeda y "talibanes") se hace más estrecha y entrelazada.
(...)

Así como la conexión de estos grupos con los servicios secretos pakistaníes.
Tras decir que

El santuario de Al Qaeda es Pakistán
(...)

Encontramos este diálogo con el entrevistador:

SPIEGEL: Actualmente hay muchos informes sobre cuán entrelazado está el servicio secreto pakistaní (ISI) con grupos terroristas. ¿Proporciona realemente el ISI municiones, transporte y reclutamiento a los "talibanes"?
Riedel: Son cuestiones serias. Las estamos planteando a los pakistaníes. El jefe del ISI estuvo aquí (en USA) en febrero. Hemos puesto estas cuestiones sobre la mesa y esperamos ver una respuesta seria. En nuestro compromiso con Pakistán creo que nuestro lema debe ser uno muy viejo: confía, pero verifica.

SPIEGEL: ¿Qué espera obtener el ISI con su influencia sobre estos grupos?
Riedel: En las últimas tres décadas, el ISI usó estas relaciones para tener una palanca contra India e influencia en Afganistán. Cada vez más pakistaníes reconocen que han creado un Frankenstein que amenaza al propio Estado de Pakistán. Ahora necesitamos ayudarles a tener bajo control a este monstruo.

SPIEGEL: Los Estados Unidos también jugaron un papel en la creación de estos grupos, allá por los años ochenta, cuando la Unión Soviética ocupaba Afganistán. El actual Secretario de Defensa, Robert Gates, que entonces era el número 2 de la CIA, estaba implicado.
Riedel: Sí, pero no podemos volver atrás y cambiar la historia. Tenemos que vivir con la realidad que afrontamos hoy.

Y, mientras tanto... los hay que, inasequibles al desaliento, prosiguen su tarea de desinformación al servicio de la tesis "oficialista".
No importa que el Tribunal Supremo declarara que en el atentado de Madrid no había intervención de Al Qaida (lógico si tenemos en cuenta que España no tiene problemas con Pakistán)... ni que el mismo Obama excluyera a Madrid de los atentados de Al Qaida...

Uno de los expertos que colaboraron con el ministero Rubalcaba, en un encuentro organizado por el Centro internacional Woodrow Wilson y la Universidad de Georgetown, dice esto en la prensa marroquí

'Después de los atentados del 11 de marzo en Madrid, la cooperación entre Marruecos y España en materia de lucha contra el terrorismo se ha hecho muy buena, gracias a los esfuerzos desplegados por las dos partes' ha indicado (el lunes 6 de abril) a la MAP (agencia oficial de prensa marroquí) el Sr. Reinares, con ocasión de un encuentro que ha animado en el Edificio Ronald Reagan sobre el tema 'Los atentados del 11 de marzo, cinco años después'
(...)
Algunas semanas antes de los ataques producidos en la capital española, las autoridades marroquíes habían expresado sus 'preocupaciones' acerca de algunos individuos ligados a la red de Casablanca que se demostró que eran 'miembros centrales' de la red terrorista de los atentados de Madrid, indicó.
(...)
Insistiendo, por otro lado, sobre el hecho de que los atentados de Madrid no pueden 'ser atribuidos a una célula local independiente inspirada en Al Qaida', el conferenciante ha explicado que estos atentados no forman parte de un hecho aislado, sino que corresponden a la realidad compleja de la globalización del fenómeno terrorista. La red de Madrid, prosigue el experto, tenía 'conexiones internacionales' en diversas regiones del mundo, especialmente en Europa y Oriente Medio
(...)

Ahora que hasta los máximos responsables americanos reconocen la vinculación del ISI pakistaní con "Al Qaeda", si Reinares sigue manteniendo que lo de Madrid fue obra de "Al Qaeda", ¿no sería conveniente que los jueces españoles interrogaran sobre el particular a los responsables del servicio secreto pakistaní?
Claro, siempre y cuando se siga manteniendo que era "Al Qaeda" la que estaba detrás....

La historia sin marcha atrás

"No es la primera vez que tras el 11-M se habla de lo mucho que nos conviene llevarnos bien con el régimen marroquí para evitar amenazas islamistas, porque entre los terroristas había marroquíes pero no saharauis."



"La historia no tiene marcha atrás", dijo el candidato a las elecciones europeas socialista, Juan Fernando López Aguilar. Cuando un progresista como él habla del movimiento de la historia en estos términos tan solemnes, lo normal es asociarlo con la antesala de un movimiento de imparable marcha hacia delante, hacia el cambio que exige la reparación de los errores y las injusticias. Pues no, porque en este caso lo dijo refiriéndose al Sáhara y quien haya seguido mínimamente la política buenista de Zapatero sabe muy bien que la colonia española es el único punto en el planeta donde el progresismo socialista considera que lo suyo no es enderezar los entuertos como el que hace 33 años propició que Marruecos invadiese esa tierra en un flagrante desafío a la comunidad internacional.

Lo más apropiado en las circunstancias del candidato canario hubiese sido decir: "La historia en el Sáhara no tiene marcha atrás y de eso nos encargamos nosotros, los del PSOE". Él, por ejemplo, es responsable de una contribución impagable para la monarquía alauita: mover los hilos para iniciar un proceso de sorprendente memoria histórica que puede acabar etiquetando al Frente Polisario de movimiento terrorista. Gracias a ello, el régimen marroquí se está mostrando complaciente con los planes que, con mucho apoyo francés, se están perfilando con dinero procedente de Bruselas, para que las islas Canarias puedan ampliar su horizonte de inversiones y expansión económica (algo saturada) sobre el territorio que se extiende a menos de media hora de vuelo desde sus costas.

Sólo por eso López Aguilar debería llevarse la palma de oro al cinismo y la perversión política. Pero tiene duros competidores dentro de su partido. El ministro Moratinos, por ejemplo, le sigue muy de cerca en el ranking de los amigos socialistas de Mohamed VI gracias a los puntos logrados en las categorías de intriga e hipocresía. Ahí lo tenemos, por ejemplo, en su actuación en el Congreso el pasado día 17, haciéndose pasar por un siervo abnegado del derecho internacional y, a la vez, proponiendo a sus señorías ser sensatas y dar puerta de una vez al engorro del Sáhara con una solución que le da una patada en el cielo del paladar a la doctrina de la ONU sobre el asunto: presionar a los saharauis para que acepten la anexión a Marruecos sin necesidad de que se organice un referéndum para el ejercicio de su autodeterminación. ¿Que la historia no tiene marcha atrás? Pues más retroceso que ese, imposible, como mínimo hasta 1975, cuando el franquismo intentó lo mismo con los acuerdos que entregaron el Sáhara a Marruecos violando el derecho internacional.

Lo más llamativo de esa sesión parlamentaria, sin embargo, fue la escasa resistencia que el resto de las fuerzas políticas opusieron al canto de sirena con el que Moratinos les vendió la burra asegurándoles que con su plan se cumple con la legalidad de la ONU y se contribuye a la paz internacional. En general dieron por bueno el argumento de que la solución debe satisfacer a las dos partes por igual, como si se pudiese poner en una misma balanza al ladrón y la víctima. Alguna de sus señorías incluso llegó a alegar que así tiene que ser para que Mohamed preste esa colaboración que tanto necesitamos en materia de seguridad si queremos evitar un nuevo 11-M.

Ningún diputado sin embargo igualó la oratoria del responsable de política exterior en el Congreso del PP, Gustavo de Arístegui, para convencer a sus señorías de la gran razón que tiene Moratinos al pedirles que no le hagan caso a los que no se pliegan al engaño y que se adhieran a su plan a favor de una aplicación del derecho internacional flexible y realista. Es decir, de entrega del Sáhara a Mohamed VI. Y es que ahora el apoyo a la autodeterminación es un asunto facha, dicen los gobernantes marroquíes –famosos por su ejemplar progresismo– y sus amigos socialistas en Madrid, de modo que lo normal es que el PP centrista, moderado y reformista, que quiere abjurar de la crispación de la que le acusa la izquierda, haya acabado por apuntarse también a la progresía proalauita.

En cualquier caso, Arístegui demostró lo bien merecida que tiene la medalla con la que Mohamed VI ha premiado la metamorfosis del PP, al dejar de ser para la monarquía alauita un reputado islamófobo en los tiempos del PP de Aznar, para volver a ser un amigo y hermano del pueblo marroquí. Vamos como en los tiempos de la derecha de Arias Navarro, Solís y Fraga. El portavoz del PP bordó su intervención con dos argumentos definitivos: no debemos inquietarnos tanto por la suerte de un pueblo saharaui sometido a sus invasores porque el régimen marroquí ya no mata como antes, sólo maltrata lo normal por esas latitudes; y segundo, hay que liquidar el problema del Sáhara lo antes posible o el islamismo aprovechará la confusión que reina en la zona para hacerse fuerte y actuar en nuestra contra.

No es la primera vez que tras el 11-M se habla de lo mucho que nos conviene llevarnos bien con el régimen marroquí para evitar amenazas islamistas, porque entre los terroristas había marroquíes pero no saharauis. Pero hasta ahora la única relación probada entre Sáhara, 11-M y fallos en la colaboración hispano-marroquí está en el enfado morrocotudo que Mohamed VI tenía con Aznar, entre otras cosas por haber apoyado en la ONU el derecho a la autodeterminación del pueblo saharaui.

Elecciones en Argelia: la cuestión de principio

El próximo jueves, 9 de abril, se celebran elecciones presidenciales en Argelia. Salvo mayúscula sorpresa el vencedor será el actual presidente, Abdelaziz Buteflika. Algunos se quedan en el hecho de que, si vence, Buteflika se va a "eternizar" en el poder. Pero a mi juicio eso es una cuestión secundaria que hace olvidar lo principal. Y lo principal es que se reconoce que el origen del poder viene del pueblo.

Buteflika está concluyendo ahora su segundo mandato presidencial. Precisamente su segunda reelección, producida el jueves 8 de abril de 2004, fue reconocida como legítima por los observadores europeos y americanos que asistieron al proceso electoral así como por USA, el Parlamento Europeo, la Otan, Francia....
La explicación es muy simple: la mayoría del pueblo argelino prefiere a Buteflika como presidente.

Resulta algo lamentable que algunos den una visión distorsionada de lo que es la política de Buteflika

Tampoco variará en lo fundamental la política exterior del régimen pro-islámico, africanista, "anticapitalista" y antinorteamericano.

Teniendo en cuenta que es quien ha acabado prácticamente con el terrorismo islamista, es quien ha promovido la política de privatizaciones y pretende introducir a Argelia en la OMC (organización mundial del comercio) y mantiene una importante colaboración con USA en terrenos como los hidrocarburos o la lucha contra el terrorismo.
Pero qué se puede esperar de quien repite dos veces que Buteflika pretende un "cuarto" mandato, cuando lo que hace es presentarse al tercero.

Todo esto son cuestiones accesorias.

Lo importante, a mi juicio, es otra cosa, una cuestión de principio que es clave para entender el mundo árabo-musulmán.
Y esa cuestión es que dentro de ese mundo complejo se pueden distinguir dos tipos de regímenes políticos, los monárquico-teocráticos y los republicanos.
En los primeros el origen del poder se ubica en la voluntad de Dios (Alá, en este caso) y en una legitimación dinástica.
En los segundos, el origen del poder se halla en el pueblo.

Entre los primeros se pueden citar a Marruecos, Arabia Saudí, Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Kuwait, Bahrein, Omán, Qatar, Jordania...
En ellos las "elecciones" que se llevan a cabo son para elegir órganos que no ejercen el poder político.

Entre los segundos, se pueden citar a Argelia, Mauritania (antes del golpe de Estado), Egipto, Siria, Líbano, Iraq, Túnez, Yemen, ....
En estos, el órgano que de verdad ejerce el poder político es designado mediante elecciones. En algunos casos, esas elecciones no tienen garantías: serían los casos de Egipto, Siria, Túnez.... pero en otros casos, como en Mauritania las elecciones eran sin duda fiables.
Sean las elecciones limpias o no lo importante es que se reconoce la necesidad de que el poder venga avalado por el pueblo. Y esto introduce una diferencia cualitativa respecto a los regímenes monárquico-teocráticos. El principio es que el poder debe ser designado por el pueblo. Distinto, y secundario, es la aplicación de ese principio que no se discute.

El hecho de que se afirme el principio de que es el pueblo argelino quien debe designar al jefe del Estado establece una proximidad de Argelia con España y Europa en el terreno de los principios que no aparece en los regímenes monárquico-teocráticos. Los que construyen la política exterior sobre cuestiones de ideología debieran extraer las consecuencias oportunas: ¿de qué régimen se es más cercano: de uno que reconoce al pueblo como titular de la soberanía (Argelia) o de otro que no (Marruecos)?
En la respuesta está la clave de la sinceridad de las convicciones democráticas que se profesan.

Point of order

It’s Arab League summit in Doha, and the Qatari Emir is just finishing his opening address when - khhzzzrrk, Brother Leader Qadhafi grabs the mike. As the assembled stare in wonder, he goes off on a long garbled rant (video) accusing the king of Saudi Arabia of being a British-American puppet on his way to the grave, as a belated follow-up to a public spat they had six years ago. Then in the next second he changes his mind and declares that, well, that’s all in the past and he’s now ready to make up. During the whole monologue, the Qatari chairman can be heard chirping in the background: “Oh, Brother Mouammar? Brother Mouammar! Brother Mouammar, a point of order please? A point of order!”

Since Brother Mouammar clearly isn’t listening, the organizers resort to cutting his mike instead. Qadhafi angrily remarks that this is no way to treat the foremost Arab leader, the King of Kings of Africa and Imam of the Muslims; he then storms out of the meeting, and apparently somehow ends up spending his afternoon at the Islamic Art Museum of Qatar. All in a good day’s work.

People sometimes ask, is Qadhafi crazy or is he just acting? There’s something to be said for the theory that he is playing up his eccentricity for political purposes — that he must be, considering how long he’s been in power and how much influence he still has in the neighbourhood. But moments such as these lead me to believe that, granting a certain ruthless instinct of self-preservation, he’s just mad as a hatter.

Iran & Western Sahara (translation)

As you know, Morocco recently cut diplomatic ties with Iran, presumably to curry favor with Washington and Riyadh by appearing their most faithful ally in the power-struggle with Teheran. However, that doesn’t necessarily play well with ordinary Moroccans, who arguably agree more with Iran’s radical foreign policy than with Rabat’s own pro-US variety. So, to remove attention from the sphere of politics and portray Iran as having attacked those quintessentially Moroccan values of God, Country, King, the foreign policy establishment has gone into overdrive trying to conjure up alternate excuses. Reasons cited for the diplomatic rupture include claims of Iranian Shiite subversion of Islam in Morocco, to make it a religious rather than political dispute, and an alleged Iranian project of anti-Arab expansionism (dovetailing nicely with the wahhabi paranoia prevailing in Riyadh). Less prominently, but still, there is the question of Western Sahara, around the Moroccanity of which there is a strong shared consensus of state and people. Consequently, speculation on Iranian ties to the pro-independence POLISARIO Front and its main backer, Algeria, is being played up in the media.

Below the fold is an example, a translated piece from el-Massa’, which brings up the story of an official Iranian visit to POLISARIO in … 1984. Clearly, this Iranian scheme to undermine Morocco has been going on for some time. (The article also, as you’ll notice, highlights POLISARIO’s disgracefully cruel treatment of its former Moroccan prisoners-of-war.)

Khomeini’s foreign minister visited Tindouf
and insulted Morocco’s state and political parties

Ali Nejab met him in 1984 as a prisoner in the Rabouni internment camp

By: Idriss el-Kenbouri

Is it possible that the Iranians, in their attempts to counter Morocco after diplomatic ties were cut, will provide support to POLISARIO? This is a question often heard these days. Some underline the importance of the matter by pointing to the visit that Ahmadinejad, the president of the Islamic Republic, conducted to Algeria in August 2007. The exclusion of Morocco from that trip had a political content that necessitates analysis, and there is a certain distancing towards Morocco among the Iranian functionaries that truly rule the country. Prime among them is the Guardian Council [?], whose members brought the era of Mohammed Khatami and openness, to its end like a passing summer cloud, to come in its stead the opposite, Ahmadinejad.

Iran’s rivalry with Morocco is old. Ali Nejab is a Moroccan pilot who spent 25 years as prisoner-of-war with POLISARIO in the dark prisons of Tindouf between 1978 and 2003. He tells us that Ali Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister in Khomeini’s era, visited the Tindouf camps in 1984 by invitation of the POLISARIO leadership, in the framework of cooperation between the parties that then existed, in defiance of the late King Hassan II. (I)

The POLISARIO leaders brought the Moroccan POWs to the Iranian top functionary as a sort of proof of their victory over Morocco. Nejab had spent eight months of the year 1973 in military flight training in southern Teheran, as part of the coordination with the Shah’s regime. For this reason, the POLISARIO leaders brought him to Velayati as one of the Moroccans who had been trained in Iran before the revolution, which kindled the interest of the former Iranian foreign minister, who asked to meet him. He was accompanied by el-Idrissi Bilali, a former POLISARIO foreign representative who would later join Morocco.

Nejab tells el-Massa’: “When Velayati stood before me he started, without posing any questions, to insult Moroccan institutions and parties and the Moroccan state generally. I lost my cool and cursed at him. One of the men accompanying him told me that we were brothers in religion, to which I responded that I don’t want to be your brother in religion, I want to be your brother in politics. They understood that I wanted to say to him that they should support our position on the Sahara, and I said that if Khomeini is Islam then I will leave Islam. Velayati immediately cut short the visit. As soon as he left the area close to Rabouni (II), and vanished from sight, the POLISARIO men started beating me with kicks and punches, finally leaving me covered in my own blood.”

As punishment he was put in solitary confinement next to Ali Jouhar, one of the Moroccan officers that had been captured by POLISARIO. The two remained there for eleven months, given a small piece of dry bread and a litre of water every 24 hours. After that, says Nejabi, a POLISARIO leader asked him to write a two-page letter “condemning Hassan II’s treatment of the Moroccans”, which he refused. He was punished with 48 hours of torture – like Sisyphus in Greek mythology – by an order to move, together with Ali Jouhar, a pile of rocks each weighing about 15 kilograms, a distance of 200 meter. This was in Rabouni, where Nejab spent his POW years in the Hamdi Ba Cheikh center, the main prison center of POLISARIO, known also by the name of the “Red Center” for being built of red mud. (III)

Some remarks:

(I) Iran began supporting POLISARIO after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, when the Shah’s regime fell, as part of its break with western-backed Arab states and in line with the new regime’s general support for third world liberation movements. The Shah had had good relations with King Hassan, and lived for some time in Morocco after his downfall, contributing to Iranian ill-will towards Morocco. Iranian support for the Sahrawis was never important, however, essentially some verbal political backing and a formal recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, their government-in-exile. However, as Iranian politics turned more realist over the 1980s, the distant Western Sahara issue became a function of Teheran’s relations with POLISARIO’s main sponsor, Algeria. Support for POLISARIO therefore ended in 1992-1993 when Iran’s relations with Algeria broke down, after the Algerian military quashed an Islamic electoral win and blamed Iran for supporting Islamist rebels. After Algerian-Iranian ties were restored, Iran has been more or less neutral on the conflict, trying to please both Moroccan and Algerian officials by tailoring their message to the audience.

(II) Rabouni is a base camp in the Tindouf province, serving as the main HQ for POLISARIO and housing various government institutions.

(III) The last Moroccan POWs — originally a couple of thousand — were released by POLISARIO in 2005, following increased attention to their case by human rights groups. Numerous people remain “disappeared” in the conflict, however, the vast majority of them Sahrawi civilians abducted by Moroccan police/army forces in the 1970s and 1980s.

Mauritania, Qadhafi, and the Arab world

At The Moor Next Door, MPR’s fearsome strongman, Kal, adds up the results of Muammar el-Qadhafi’s recent visit to Nouakchott, where he tried to mediate the Mauritanian crisis by unreservedly siding with the putschists. This didn’t quite pan out, and his blatant partisanship surprised those who had seen Libya’s previously intensive and consistent effort to come across as a possible bridge-builder — the deposed president Abdellahi was given a head-of-state welcome in Sirte, and so on, to signify that Qadhafi was on good terms with both sides.As Kal argues — and I agree — the end result of Libya’s move from the middle to the fringe seems to be that the US/European position is strengthened. Washington has been militantly against the coup, while Europe under French leadership was equally vocal, but also hinted openly at a search for whatever pragmatic exit existed. If they would pool their resources to push hard for a solution alongside those local players that agree, they could probably make a real difference.


The Arab world, with a couple of prominent exceptions, remains negative or indifferent to the junta. Mauritania has gained some rare popular acclaim among Arabs for cutting ties with Israel, but on balance it didn’t help to swing Arab states. Among the so-called ‘radical’ Arab states, Algeria (not terribly radical, under Bouteflika) was already firmly invested in the anti-coup camp, while Syria and Sudan have been too preoccupied with their own troubles to notice, and are unable to extend any help anyhow. (Yemen is also habitually railing against Israel, but I don’t think Mauritania can expect any financial contributions from there…) It gained some limited applause from Qatar, and now there is this with Libya, although it’s not obvious that the cut ties with Israel were behind Qadhafi’s swing to full-blown partisanship. Among the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states, the non-Qatari Gulf crowd, where the money is, all viewed this radical grandstanding very negatively, since they are presently under KSA leadership engaged in promoting a compromise line on Israel. For Egypt and Jordan, it’s an absolute embarrassment — it increases pressure on them to break their own ties with Israel. In Morocco, the government must have been quietly upset about the cut ties with Israel, given the back-breaking acrobatics that Rabat is presently performing to please Riyadh & Washington. But the government is, like Algeria’s, much too invested in the situation to change sides or even punish the junta for the move.

Summing the Arab scene up, it’s possible that Mauritania’s Israel move was designed only to gain Qadhafi’s total backing. If so, it seems to have succeeded (for what it’s worth). If the embassy closure was designed to break its larger isolation, it’s a failure, since it further alienated the West and a couple of Arab heavyweights, and didn’t bring about change anywhere else. Finally, however, one shouldn’t ignore the domestic factor: the Mauritanian public has opposed Israel’s embassy since the day it opened, and despite the segmented nature of the Mauritanian polity, there’s still a good political buck in wielding the Israel card.

At any rate, Qadhafi’s first international action as head of the African Union ended in a serious anti-climax for him, depriving Libya of the swing role it had hoped for but adding a semi-powerful — if double-edged — support for the junta. With Qadhafi at the head of the AU, its previously stiff legalistic stand on the coup could also be in danger, given the flimsyness of its institutions and the Brother Leader’s general disregard for, precisely, institutions. This could prove important, since the AU has so far been used as the international community’s sanction canary, moving one step ahead of the rest. (About the AU, see also Ibn Kafka on MPR detaling the world of difference between a coup and a coup.)

Now, the ball is in the court of the US and Europe, and the quest to find another mediator is on. Let me guess that someone will sooner or later call on either Qatar, the UN or some African country to step in and work something out. It’s either that or to wait for another coup, which given today’s logjam would risk seriously destabilising the country, and also spoil the slim but intriguing chance that there could actually be a day when an African/Arab coup is overturned peacefully by foreign and internal pressure.

Fake faith and epic crimes

1 April 2009


In his latest column for the New Statesman, John Pilger describes a worldwide movement that is 'challenging the once-sacrosanct notion that imperial politicians can destroy countless lives and retain an immunity from justice'. In Tony Blair's case, justice inches closer.

These are extraordinary times. With the United States and Britain on the verge of bankruptcy and committing to an endless colonial war, pressure is building for their crimes to be prosecuted at a tribunal similar to that which tried the Nazis at Nuremberg. This defined rapacious invasion as “the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole”. International law would be mere farce, said the chief US chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, Supreme Court justice Robert Jackson, “if, in future, we do not apply its principles to ourselves”.

That is now happening. Spain, Germany, Belgium, France and Britain have long had “universal jurisdiction” statutes, which allow their national courts to pursue and prosecute prima facie war criminals. What has changed is an unspoken rule never to use international law against “ourselves”, or “our” allies or clients. In 1998, Spain, supported by France, Switzerland and Belgium, indicted the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, client and executioner of the West, and sought his extradition from Britain, where he happened to be at the time. Had he been sent for trial he almost certainly would have implicated at least one British prime minister and two US presidents in crimes against humanity. Home Secretary Jack Straw let him escape back to Chile.

The Pinochet case was the ignition. On 19 January last, the George Washington University law professor Jonathan Turley compared the status of George W. Bush with that of Pinochet. “Outside [the United States] there is not the ambiguity about what to do about a war crime,” he said. “So if you try to travel, most people abroad are going to view you not as ‘former President George Bush’ [but] as a current war criminal.” For this reason, Bush’s former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who demanded an invasion of Iraq in 2001 and personally approved torture techniques in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, no longer travels. Rumsfeld has twice been indicted for war crimes in Germany. On 26 January, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, said, “We have clear evidence that Mr. Rumsfeld knew what he was doing but nevertheless he ordered torture.”

The Spanish high court is currently investigating a former Israeli defence minister and six other top Israeli officials for their role in the killing of civilians, mostly children, in Gaza. Henry Kissinger, who was largely responsible for bombing to death 600,000 peasants in Cambodia in 1969-73, is wanted for questioning in France, Chile and Argentina. Yet, on 8 February, as if demonstrating the continuity of American power, President Barack Obama’s national security adviser, James Jones, said, “I take my daily orders from Dr. Kissinger.”

Like them, Tony Blair may soon be a fugitive. The International Criminal Court, to which Britain is a signatory, has received a record number of petitions related to Blair’s wars. Spain’s celebrated Judge Baltasar Garzon, who indicted Pinochet and the leaders of the Argentinian military junta, has called for George W. Bush, Blair and former Spanish prime minister Jose Maria Aznar to be prosecuted for the invasion of Iraq - “one of the most sordid and unjustifiable episodes in recent human history: a devastating attack on the rule of law” that had left the UN “in tatters”. He said, “There is enough of an argument in 650,000 deaths for this investigation to start without delay.”

This is not to say Blair is about to be collared and marched to The Hague, where Serbs and Sudanese dictators are far more likely to face a political court set up by the West. However, an international agenda is forming and a process has begun which is as much about legitimacy as the letter of the law, and a reminder from history that the powerful lose wars and empires when legitimacy evaporates. This can happen quickly, as in the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of apartheid South Africa – the latter a spectre for apartheid Israel.

Today, the unreported “good news” is that a worldwide movement is challenging the once sacrosanct notion that imperial politicians can destroy countless lives in the cause of an ancient piracy, often at remove in distance and culture, and retain their respectability and immunity from justice. In his masterly Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde R.L. Stevenson writes in the character of Jekyll: “Men have before hired bravos to transact their crimes, while their own person and reputation sat under shelter ... I could thus plod in the public eye with a load of genial respectability, and, in a moment, like a schoolboy, strip off these lendings and spring headlong into the sea of liberty. But for me, in my impenetrable mantle, the safety was complete.”

Blair, too, is safe – but for how long? He and his collaborators face a new determination on the part of tenacious non-government bodies that are amassing “an impressive documentary record as to criminal charges”, according to international law authority Richard Falk, who cites the World Tribunal on Iraq, held in Istanbul in 2005, which heard evidence from 54 witnesses and published rigorous indictments against Blair, Bush and others. Currently, the Brussels War Crimes Tribunal and the newly established Blair War Crimes Foundation are building a case for Blair’s prosecution under the Nuremberg Principle and the 1949 Geneva Convention. In a separate indictment, former Judge of the New Zealand Supreme Court E.W. Thomas wrote: “My pre-disposition was to believe that Mr. Blair was deluded, but sincere in his belief. After considerable reading and much reflection, however, my final conclusion is that Mr. Blair deliberately ands repeatedly misled Cabinet, the British Labour Party and the people in a number of respects. It is not possible to hold that he was simply deluded but sincere: a victim of his own self-deception. His deception was deliberate.”

Protected by the fake sinecure of Middle East Envoy for the Quartet (the US, EU, UN and Russia), Blair operates largely from a small fortress in the American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem, where he is an apologist for the US in the Middle East and Israel, a difficult task following the bloodbath in Gaza. To assist his mortgages, he recently received an Israeli “peace prize” worth a million dollars. He, too, is careful where he travels; and it is instructive to watch how he now uses the media. Having concentrated his post-Downing Street apologetics on a BBC series of obsequious interviews with David Aaronovitch, Blair has all but slipped from view in Britain, where polls have long revealed a remarkable loathing for a former prime minister – a sentiment now shared by those in the liberal media elite whose previous promotion of his “project” and crimes is an embarrassment and preferably forgotten.

On 8 February, Andrew Rawnsley, the Observer’s former leading Blair fan, declared that “this shameful period will not be so smoothly and simply buried”. He demanded, “Did Blair never ask what was going on?”. This is an excellent question made relevant with a slight word change: “Did the Andrew Rawnsleys never ask what was going on?”. In 2001, Rawnsley alerted his readers to Iraq’s “contribution to international terrorism” and Saddam Hussein’s “frightening appetite to possess weapons of mass destruction”. Both assertions were false and echoed official Anglo-American propaganda. In 2003, when the destruction of Iraq was launched, Rawnsley described it as a “point of principle” for Blair who, he later wrote, was “fated to be right”. He lamented, “Yes, too many people died in the war. Too many people always die in war. War is nasty and brutish, but at least this conflict was mercifully short.” In the subsequent six years at least a million people have been killed. According to the Red Cross, Iraq is now a country of widows and orphans. Yes, war is nasty and brutish, but never for the Blairs and the Rawnsleys.

Far from the carping turncoats at home, Blair has lately found a safe media harbour – in Australia, the original murdochracy. His interviewers exude an unction reminiscent of the promoters of the “mystical” Blair in the Guardian of than a decade ago, though they also bring to mind Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times during the 1930s, who wrote of his infamous groveling to the Nazis: “I spend my nights taking out anything which will hurt their susceptibilities and dropping in little things which are intended to sooth them.”

With his words as a citation, the finalists for the Geoffrey Dawson Prize for Journalism (Antipodes) are announced. On 8 February, in an interview on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Geraldine Doogue described Blair as “a man who brought religion into power and is now bringing power to religion”. She asked him: “What would the perception be that faith would bring towards a greater stability... [sic]?”. A bemused and clearly delighted Blair was allowed to waffle about “values”. Doogue said to him that “it was the bifurcation about right and wrong that what I thought the British found really hard” [sic], to which Blair replied that “in relation to Iraq I tried every other option [to invasion] there was”. It was his classic lie, which passed unchallenged.

However, the clear winner of the Geoffrey Dawson Prize is Ginny Dougary of the Sydney Morning Herald and the Times. Dougary recently accompanied Blair on what she described as his “James Bondish-ish Gulfstream” where she was privy to his “bionic energy levels”. She wrote, “I ask him the childlike question: does he want to save the world?”. Blair replied, well, more or less, aw shucks, yes. The murderous assault on Gaza, which was under way during the interview, was mentioned in passing. “That is war, I’m afraid,” said Blair, “and war is horrible”. No counter came that Gaza was not a war but a massacre by any measure. As for the Palestinians, noted Dougary, it was Blair’s task to “prepare them for statehood”. The Palestinians will be surprised to hear that. But enough gravitas; her man “has the glow of the newly-in-love: in love with the world and, for the most part, the feeling is reciprocated”. The evidence she offered for this absurdity was that “women from both sides of politics have confessed to me to having the hots for him”.

These are extraordinary times. Blair, a perpetrator of the epic crime of the 21st century, shares a “prayer breakfast” with President Obama, the yes-we-can-man now launching more war. “We pray,” said Blair, “that in acting we do God’s work and follow God’s will.” To decent people, such pronouncements about Blair’s “faith” represent a contortion of morality and intellect that is a profanation on the basic teachings of Christianity. Those who aided and abetted his great crime and now wish the rest of us to forget their part - or, like Alistair Campbell, his “communications director”, offer their bloody notoriety for the vicarious pleasure of some – might read the first indictment proposed by the Blair War Crimes Foundation: “Deceit and conspiracy for war, and providing false news to incite passions for war, causing in the order of one million deaths, 4 million refugees, countless maiming and traumas.”

These are indeed extraordinary times.

Marroquíes: unos vienen en patera... y otros en su avión

No todos los marroquíes que vienen ilegalmente a Europa lo hacen igual. Unos vienen en patera ... pero otros lo hacen en su propio avión. Lo malo es que a veces la Fuerza Aérea interrumpe la excursión. Es lo que le ha ocurrido al misterioso personaje que vino en avión desde Marruecos y fue interceptado por la fuerza aérea portuguesa. Un personaje que, según mis fuentes, es un sujeto importante de la dinastía alauita.

La noticia aparece en la prensa portuguesa del día 27 de marzo. El diario Público de Portugal publicó la siguiente noticia:

Piloto de aeronave civil interceptada por la Fuerza Aérea está fugado

27.03.2009 16'38h
Idálio Revez, Romana Borja-Santos, Mariana Oliveira

El piloto de la avioneta forzada a aterrizar en el Algarve por una de las aeronaves de combate F-16 de la Fuerza Aérea Portuguesa consiguió escapar.
(...)
De acuerdo con una fuene militar citada por la agencia Lusa, la aeronave civil fue interceptada por "sospecharse que transportaba droga" y fue obligada por la Fuerza Aérea Portuguesa (FAP) a aterrizar en el aérodromo de Playa Verde, en el sotavento algarvino. Según averiguó Público de fuentes de la Policía Judicial, "la aeronave entró en el espacio aéreo nacional sin haber pedido previamente autorización para hacerlo y sin haber presentado el plan de vuelo". La Policía Judicial habría buscado en el avión pero no se encontró ningún producto ilícito, refirió la misma fuente.

A pesar de eso se sabe que fueron las autoridades españolas, acostumbradas a esta forma de transporte de droga, las que dieron la alerta sobre la situación y que el individuo, proveniente de Marruecos, tendría apoyo en tierra esperándole. A dos kilómetros del lugar pasa una carretera principal adonde es probable que se haya dirigido el sospchoso.

La FAP actuó siguiendo una alerta dada por las autoridades españolas del ámbito de la defensa aérea integrada para Europa de la OTAN Según el sistema de defensa aérea español, Portugal tendría en su territorio una situación sospechosa con una aeronave civil que "habría venido del norte de África y, después de haber volado por el espacio aéreo español, se dirigía hacia el espacio aéreo portugués, estando acompañada de aviones de combate Eurofighter españoles, se lee en un comunicado de la Fuerza Aérea Portuguesa.

De acuerdo con la misma nota, la aeronave fue seguida por radares españoles y portugueses y, cuando entró en territorio nacional, la FAP "activó las aeronaves de combate F-16 que están de alerta permanente en la Base Aérea de Monte Real" y que forzaron a los sospechosos a aterrizar en el aeródromo de Playa Verde, cerca del Monte Gordo.

De acordo com a mesma nota, a aeronave foi seguida por radares espanhóis e portugueses e, quando entrou em território nacional, a FAP “activou as aeronaves de combate F-16, que estão de alerta permanente na Base Aérea de Monte Real” e que forçaram os suspeitos a aterrar no aeródromo da Praia Verde, perto de Monte Gordo.

Según el teniente coronel Paulo Gonçalves, citado por la agencia Lusa, la avioneta primero entró en el espacio aéreo español, habiendo "maniobrado en aquél territorio" y después se dirigió hacia Portugal, momento en elaque se envió la alerta. Después del aterrizaje de la aeronave en la pisa de tierra batida del aérodromo de Playa Verde, con cerca de 730 metros de pista, el piloto de la avioneta huyó del aparato, lo que llevó a las autoridades a cercar aquella región.

Según el Correio da Manha, la avioneta era una Cessna 212 com registo español.

La noticia me parece importante.
Sin embargo, a los dos días... la noticia desapareció de los medios.
¿Por qué?

Existe una hipótesis. Según una fuente confidencial el sujeto huido sí fue capturado por la Guardia Nacional Republicana, pero no me ha precisado si después del 27-28 de marzo.
Y, lo más interesante, el sujeto que pilotaba la avioneta era.... el hermano de Mohamed VI, el príncipe Mulay Rachid, que volaba junto a una joven a la que quería dar un paseíto en avión.

Si esta fuente está en lo cierto, estaríamos ante un hecho asombroso: y es que la dinastía alauita considera el sur de Europa como su lugar de recreo. Mientras los pobres ven en la tierra y el mar del sur de Europa el lugar donde salir de la miseria... para la dinastía alauita el espacio aéreo de ese mismo lugar es ocasión de entretenimiento.... Eso sí, tanto los de las pateras como el de la dinastía alauita vienen sin avisar. Vamos, como si estuvieran en su casa.

Un regalito para la hija de Mohamed VI

Mohamed VI es un buen padre. Los saharauis, los presos torturados en las cárceles marroquíes, los pobres que viajan en pateras deberían saber que es una persona que quiere a los niños (los de él) y a los animales. Las autoridades de la Unión Europea deberían tomar buena nota de en qué se gasta el dinero "su majestad". Y e que para contentar a su hija y a los animales que le distraen no hay crisis que valga.

Los presos de Guantánamos torturados en Marrruecos, los presos saharauis en huelga de hambre, los misioneros cristianos expulsados, los chiitas perseguidos... todos ellos ignoran que Mohamed VI es una persona con un gran amor por los animales. ¡Vaya, como Hitler!

Es un misterio como los tiranos capaces de ordenar y permitir cualquier atrocidad muestran un extraño amor por los animales o por algunas personas de su entorno. Los biógrafos de Hitler se sorprenden al constatar este dato. Pero para entenderlo podrían intentar psicoanalizar también a Mohamed VI.

Reproduzco, traducida, esta noticia publicada por el diario canadiense 24H:

Un mago quebequés como regalo para la princesa de Marruecos
Stéphane Tremblay

El rey de Marruecos ha ofrecido un regalo puramente quebequés y muy particular a su alteza real la princesa Lalla Jadiya para su segundo cumpleaños el fin de semana pasado. El mago de Montreal Mario Choinière ha hecho el viaje a Marruecos para presentar su espectáculo de misterio e ilusiones... con animales vivos.

El rey Mohamed VI no ha ahorrado medios para contentar a su hija, que adora a los animales. Ha ordenado al embajador de Marruecos en Nueva York que encuentre un número verdaderamente especial.

Mago desde hace más de 30 años, Mario Choinière es uno de los pocos en su profesión que hace aparecer palomas, patos y otros animales vivos, una ilusión excepcional que provoca las reacciones más vivas.

"La pequeña ha disfrutado, sobre todo cuando he hecho aparecer un conejo. Era como una fiesta familiar, con unas cincuenta personas, de las que veinte eran niños, pero con medios desmesurados" ha confesado el hombre de 50 años, aún visiblemente impactado por este 'contrato excepcional'.
He viajado en primera clase con mis animales. El rey no quería que los animales viajaran en el compartimento de carga. Desde mi llegada al aeropuerto he tenido chófer particular. Me he alojado en Rabat, la capital de Marruecos, en el hotel Sofitel.
Era impresionante ver como todos estaban a los pies del rey. En una palabra, me acordaré de esto toda mi vida"

Es la empresa 'Animation Sélect' de Montreal, especializada en la planificación y la estructura de estos acontecimientos quien ha controlado esta experiencia "memorable".

Una logística en la que nada se ha olvidado.

"He debido contactar con la Escuela de Veterinaria de San Jacinto para obtener un carné médico para los animales, y poderme asegurar de su buena salud" ha explicado Georges Lemire, director de la empresa que organiza anualmene unas 600 actividades de todo tipo, que van desde bodas a fiestas de empresa pasando por noches de gala.

Invitado a desvelarnos lo que cobró, el mago no ha querido mojarse. Sin embargo, ha dicho que "por un número de 15 minutos, estaba muy bien pagado. 300 veces más" que si el espectáculo hubiera sido presentado en Québec.

Es otra prueba de que la recesión no golpea por igual a todos: las familias marroquíes cuyo cumpleaños de sus hijos coincida con el de la princesa Lalla, el 28 de febrero, son gratificadas con regalos reales.

Con ocasión del nacimiento de su alteza real, hace dos años, el rey había querido que su gozo fuera el del conjunto de sus fieles súbditos otorgando el indulto a 8.000 prisioneros mientras que otros 24.000 veían reducidas sus penas.

stephane.tremblay@24-heures.ca

Sahara: Moratinos viola el Derecho Internacional

Moratinos se acaba de cargar la política exterior española sobre el Sahara Occidental. Ha sido el 17 de marzo. Con mentiras. Con engaños. Y no pasa nada. El PP, mira para otro lado. El movimiento "solidario" hace como que no ve. Y el Frente Polisario... responde, pero bajito.

Los hechos han ocurrido en la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores del Congreso de los Diputados el 17 de marzo de 2009. La gravedad de los mismos es extrema. Es una ruptura, en toda regla, con la política de España desde el 26 de febrero de 1976. 33 años de política exterior que tira a la basura Miguel Ángel Moratinos. Y además, mintiendo, manipulando y contradiciéndose.

1. Moratinos miente sobre la propuesta marroquí
Moratinos ha mentido al Congreso al decir:

La propuesta marroquí (de 11 de abril de 2007) suponía la concreción de un paso anunciado desde hacía tiempo pero hasta entonces no realizado: una oferta de negociación y un esquema de autonomía sustantiva. (página 13 del Diario de Sesiones)

Esto es FALSO, porque Marruecos, durante el gobierno de Aznar, en diciembre de 2003 presentó una propuesta de "autonomía" mucho más generosa que la que presentó en 2007. Y la presentó el ministro de Interior marroquí, Mustafá el Sahel, después de la cumbre hispano-marroquí de Marrakech de diciembre de 2003, ante el gobierno de Aznar.

2. Moratinos se contradice sobre el referéndum
Por un lado, para oponerse a exigir un referéndum de autodeterminación, dice Moratinos:

el referéndum no está incluido en la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad. Puede ser, las partes lo pueden decidir; no decimos que no (página 23 del Diario de Sesiones)

Por otro, para oponerse al reconocimiento de la RASD, afirma:

No obliguen a un Estado a reconocer a un Estado cuando no se sabe si los saharauis van a decidir crear un Estado, ser independientes, integrarse en Marruecos o tener una autonomía (...) Hay que dejar al pueblo saharaui que decida por sí mismo, libremente, lo que quiere ser. (página 24 del Diario de Sesiones)

El Sr. Moratinos, como se ve, se contradice a sí mismo... y se niega a contestar a la siguiente pregunta: ¿y qué ocurre si no se les deja a los saharauis decidir por sí mismos lo que quieren ser?
Sudáfrica dio la respuesta: Reconoció a la RASD precisamente porque Marruecos se opone a celebrar un referéndum sobre el destino de los saharauis.

3. Moratinos manipula y oculta la realidad del Plan Baker
El ministro trata de poner en el mismo plano el "plan Baker I" (propuesta de autonomía de 2001) y el "plan Baker II" (autonomía de 5 años seguida de referéndum de 2003):

Es verdad que muchos hablan de este plan (el plan Baker II), pero si hablan de este plan es porque ha habido un Plan Baker I, y lo que no dice la gente es que el primero lo aceptó Marruecos y el segundo lo aceptaron los saharauis pero no los marroquíes. Son esfuerzos diplomáticos. Baker empezó con un primer plan, lo rechazaron los saharauis; empezó con el segundo plan y lo rechazaron los marroquíes. (página 26 del Diario de Sesiones)

Cualquiera que oiga al ministro Moratinos pensará que ambos planes tienen el mismo rango, pero...
no es así. El primer plan Baker (la "propuesta de Acuerdo marco" de 2001) no fue aprobado por el Consejo de Seguridad. Es más, ni siquiera se llegó a presentar al Consejo de Seguridad. El segundo Plan Baker fue presentado al Consejo de Seguridad, fue discutido y después apoyado, por unanimidad, por el Consejo de Seguridad en la resolución 1495 que lo calificó como "solución política óptima". Por tanto, el "plan Baker" no es un "mero esfuerzo diplomático" comparable al plan de autonomía de 2001... la diferencia entre ambos es cualitativa.

4. Moratinos miente sobre la autodeterminación
Después de haber dicho que el "referéndum" no era obligatorio, afirma:

el Consejo de Seguridad establece (que) ninguna solución será completa y aceptable si no permite respetar el principio de autodeterminación (...) pero también aquí cabe aplicar el método de la negociación para definir los contornos precisos de la manera en que una solución negociada entre las partes pudiera reconocer que este principio de autodeterminación se ha alcanzado. (página 14 del Diario de sesiones)

Curioso, el mismo individuo que hacía la propaganda del "Referendum plus" es el que dice que "autodeterminación" es algo que puede hacerse sin referéndum.
La tesis del ministro es que la "negociación" de las partes fija las normas que se les deben aplicar.... pero silencia que el Frente Polisario ya ha dicho que no acepta la propuesta marroquí.
Es la perversión, deliberada, del Derecho. Porque las negociaciones son para buscar el modo de QUE LAS PARTES APLIQUEN una norma que ha sido CREADA, no por ellas, sino POR LA COMUNIDAD INTERNACIONAL. Es más, la autodeterminación es una norma obligatoria para todos los Estados (ius cogens) Moratinos promueve la confusión entre "creación" y "aplicación" de las normas. Sabe que no son lo mismo, pero quiere engañar a los diputados y a la opinión pública.
Lo que el Consejo de Seguridad pide es que Marruecos y Frente Polisario busquen un acuerdo para "aplicar" la autodeterminación pero no para que "definan" lo que es autodeterminación. La razón es muy sencilla y Moratinos parece mentira que no lo sepa: quien define lo que es autodeterminación es, y no puede ser otro, Naciones Unidas. Y así lo ha hecho en sus resoluciones 1514 y 2625 de la Asamblea General y en todos los casos conocidos de descolonización de un pueblo.

El refrán dice que "la cabra siempre tira al monte". Al Gobierno Rodríguez el Derecho le molesta. Mucho.
El Gobierno de Rodríguez Zapatero quiere destruir el Derecho Internacional igual que ha destruido la Constitución mediante el proceso que culminó con el nuevo Estatuto de Cataluña.
Pretenden hacer con la autodeterminación del Sahara Occidental lo que hicieron en España con el derecho a usar el español o la definición de la Nación.
Pretende que las Naciones Unidas, que tratan la descolonización del Sahara Occidental desde 1965, violen, conscientemente, las normas que las propias Naciones Unidas han creado.
Pero nos queda la esperanza de que ese gobierno no tiene, en los organismos internacionales, la capacidad de "influencia" que posee en el Tribunal Constitucional.

The Trunks Of Return

There is only one piece of furniture that my grandmother truly loved and cared for. It was not the gift that her beloved husband gave her as a reminder that despite the dark future, the terminal, political, and social condition of the country, he would always love her. It was not the present that her mother lovingly offered to remind her that whatever happened in her marriage, she would always have a family to support her. This piece of furniture was a big, ugly trunk homemade of metal and wood. I was wondering why my grandmother would have special feelings and unconditional commitment to a piece of metal. I wondered this for a long time before learning the blunt reality. In October 1991, right after the ceasefire agreement between Morocco and the Polisario Front, the United Nations gave the desperate Saharawi families hope for a referendum. They proposed to allow the local population of Western Sahara to vote on whether they declare their independence or integrate with Morocco. Through this referendum the UN promised the families living in the refugees’ camps in South Algeria that they would be able to happily return to their homeland. While the United Nations was working to convince the Moroccan authorities to accept the referendum as a peaceful solution to the bloody war, the Saharawi women were making metal trunks to safely carry their important belongings on their way home. Of course, Morocco refused the referendum and continued to stall it, leaving the UN helpless and the Western Sahara conflict a dead document in the international community files. The disappointment, rejection, and betrayal that every Saharawi woman experienced were the reasons that developed these mixed feelings towards their trunks. Now The Trunks of Return are not simply objects that store our food or valuable substances. They symbolize false hope and they present moments of joy and happiness. They remind every woman in Western Sahara of when she mistakenly believed that she could encounter justice and human compassion in this unmerciful world. Now I understand why my grandmother keeps an object that reminds her of frustrating memories; but she keeps it to remind all of us of our strong commitment to our legitimate rights of freedom and democracy. Despite the unpleasant history of The Trunks of Return, they proudly show our survival as a nation and they beautifully demonstrate that regardless of the brutality we suffered through war, hope is still alive in the hearts of the most forgotten people on earth.

Will Obama’s Hope Lead to a breakthrough in Western Sahara Deadlock?

“And so to all the other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and that we are ready to lead once more.” Barack Obama ------------------------ After the longest and the most expensive presidential campaign in the American history, Barack Hussein Obama won the race to the White House by defeating the Republican nominee Senator John McCain. I was very fortunate to witness America make history once again. When I first listened to Obama speaking, I realized that this man is a man of hope, dreams and inspiration. Reading his book The Audacity of Hope made me admire him even more. I believe that what he achieved in his life should be a perfect model for everyone willing to make a difference in their life and in the world. Nevertheless, while I was watching his Inauguration Speech three questions came to my mind: Will Obama continue to inspire me after he has been the 44th president of the United States for a while? Are we going to see a change in American foreign policy? And most importantly will he bring a just solution to the Western Sahara stalemate? Millions of oppressed people around the globe are expecting a better American leadership under the new administration led by Barack Hussein Obama. And among those people are the people of Western Sahara, Africa’s last colony. Western Sahara and Obama’s Hope: There is no doubt in my mind that the image of American leadership under Barack Obama will improve overseas. Many people around the world were inspired by his victory to the White House. He has already pointed out that he is willing to renew American diplomacy by solving international disputes through negotiations and diplomacy, an approach which is certainly welcomed abroad. Historically, The United States has been involved in the conflict of Western Sahara. Unfortunately, this involvement has always been in favor of Morocco due to strategic and geopolitical reasons: Morocco is a major ally in the Maghreb region. According to experts on this matter, the U.S’s role in this conflict started when it broke out in 1975. The Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations had provided financial and military support for Morocco’s invasion and occupation of Western Sahara from 1975 to 1991. The first Bush and Clinton administrations maintained a silent position on UN referendum process from 1992 to 1996. However, the highest level of U.S. connection was presented in the former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as the United Nations personal envoy to Western Sahara from 1997 to 2003. Even so, James Baker resigned after seven years without any major progress. Since 2003, the U.S government’s view towards the conflict has been to leave it to the parties to reach a mutual solution while maintaining undeclared support for the Moroccan Autonomy Plan: local self-rule for the Sahrawi people under the Moroccan sovereignty. Nonetheless, will this role change under the current administration of Barack Obama? A quick look at the happenings around the world and the American domestic politics gives the hint that the Western Sahara is not going to be the priority of Barack Obama’s foreign agenda any time soon. I do not want to sound pessimistic but history teaches us that American foreign policy regarding the North African region has always been based on geo-strategic interests and that the Western Sahara has been the victim of this approach. Western Sahara is not going to be one of Obama’s foreign policy concerns due to domestic and international reasons. I will briefly highlight those reasons. First, the Western Sahara conflict is barely known among the American public. There is no international media coverage of the conflict. Most of the key political players in the U.S have either not heard of it or deliberately ignored it for political reasons. Perhaps this situation of neither war nor peace does not pose a direct threat to the American interests in the region. Sadly though, the first people who are paying the price are the hundred of thousands of refugees living in the desert of Algeria for over three decades now. Secondly, Obama is faced with an internal economical crisis which means that his main concern will be to get America’s economy back on track. Internationally, Obama’s main concerns are the wars in Iraq and in Afghanistan, the Iranian Nuclear Weapons program, Israeli –Palestinian conflict, tensions between India and Pakistan and restoring America’s credibility and reputation in the world. All these indicators demonstrate that the question of Western Sahara is hardly going to be the priority of Obama’s administration foreign schema at least in the first two years of his presidency. In conclusion, I strongly believe that President Obama is an inspiration for me and for many Sahrawis on a personal level but I do not think that he will be a political hope for the Western Sahara due to the facts that I mentioned. Despite my firm conviction that the U.S can easily bring a just and peaceful solution to the table, I do not see that under the current circumstances, Obama’s leadership will lead to a breakthrough in this forgotten conflict. This means that the Western Saharan people are left alone again and this might lead to the breakout of war again in the region, a war which the majority of the Saharawi people have already started to consider seriously. However, the Western Saharan people may not find their hope for gaining their independence and freedom in Obama’s leadership, but they will never despair. They will continue to fight for their right of self-determination despite all the odds. And as the saying goes, “When the world says, "Give up," hope whispers, "Try it one more time” A Brief Background of the Western Sahara Conflict: Historically, Western Sahara was a Spanish colony until 1975, when the Spanish government divided the territories between the newly independent countries at that time, Mauritania and Morocco, under the provisions of a secret agreement known as Madrid Accord. The agreement was signed and ratified without the consent of the indigenous people of the concerned territories known as the Saharawi People. Consequently, a bloody war broke out in the region between the Polisario Front, a nationalist liberation movement that had begun fighting Spain in 1973, against Morocco North and Mauritania South. In 1978, Mauritania renounced its territorial claims but Morocco then took control over the entire territory. Polisario continued to fight against the Moroccan army until 1991, when the United Nations supervised a ceasefire and charted a settlement plan, calling for the right of the Western Saharan people to self-determination through a free, democratic and fair referendum. The UN also established MINURSO, the United Nations Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara, to monitor and implement the proposed plan. Even though both Morocco and the Polisario Front accepted the plan, the referendum never took place due to the disagreement between the two conflicting parties as well as due to the lack of seriousness of the UN, particularly the Security Council to enforce a just solution. Western Sahara and The international Law: The United Nations’ involvement in the Western Sahara issue began on December 16, 1965, when the General Assembly adopted its first resolution on what then was called Spanish Sahara. The resolution requested Spain to take all necessary measures to decolonize the territory by organizing a referendum that would allow the right to self determination for the Sahrawi people where they could choose between integration with Spain or independence. The Spanish government promised to organize a referendum, but she never kept her promise. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations states that everyone has the right to a national identity and that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of that right or denied the right to change nationality. Self-determination is viewed as right of people who have a territory to decide their own political status. For this reason, on December 13, 1974, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution (No. 3292) requesting the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion at an early date on the following questions: Was the Western Sahara (Saguia El-Hamra y Rio de Oro) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? If the answer to the first question is negative, What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?" However, the court found no evidence of any legal ties of territorial sovereignty between Western Sahara and Morocco. From 1975 until the present the UN has passed more than a hundred resolutions to solve this conflict. Yet the UN and the international law failed to achieve an accepted and just political solution. The question that should be asked is why the international legality has failed to solve this issue. In my view, the international legality has failed in the Western Sahara because of two main reasons. First, the weakness of the international law itself: There is no mechanism to enforce its resolutions and even if there were it cannot be applied in the case of the Western Sahara because this conflict is included under the act of the Security Council’s Chapter VI (pacific settlement of disputes) which implies that the Security Council cannot use force to advance a solution on the conflicting parties. Second, because France and the United States’ continuously political support for Morocco in the Security Council and their threatening veto powers. Morocco remains occupying the disputed territories illegally. Despite the 16 years of neither war nor peace the two conflicting parties still insist on resolving the problem within the framework of international law and international legality.