sexta-feira, 10 de setembro de 2010

¿Qué relación tiene Marruecos con el terrorismo en el Sahel?


El ministro Moratinos ha hecho una declaración gravísima y que exige una explicación. Esa declaración suscita muchos interrogantes sobre el terrorismo en el Sahel y la llamada "Aqmi". La ha hecho tras una importante entrevista con su homólogo francés en Madrid. Un encuentro, insisto que muy importante, donde Francia y España quieren impulsar una política de apoyo a la pretensión marroquí de anexionarse el Sahara Occidental.

I. UN ENCUENTRO IMPORTANTÍSIMO AL QUE EN ESPAÑA SE HA QUERIDO DAR POCA PUBLICIDAD.
La entrevista de Moratinos y Kouchner, en Madrid, el día 3 de septiembre debe ser cuidadosamente analizada. Existen varios indicios que dan que pensar que este encuentro es importante, muy importante.

Sendos despachos oficiales muy escuetos... e incompletos.
Tanto el despacho emitido por el Ministerio de exteriores francés, como el emitido por el Ministerio español, omiten un asunto tratado en la conversación: el Sahara Occidental.
Aún más extraño es que "El País" no haya informado sobre este encuentro. Tampoco lo hizo "La Razón", ni el "ABC".

II. UN ENCUENTRO EN EL QUE SE TRATÓ SOBRE EL SAHARA EN UN MOMENTO DELICADO...
Sin embargo, gracias al despacho de la agencia EFE (recogido por El Mundo) sabemos que se trató del Sahara Occidental. De hecho, ESE FUE EL ASUNTO PRINCIPAL.

Según el ministro Moratinos:
- ambos países mantienen una visión similar sobre el conflicto del Sahara Occidental
- ambos han defendido la vía diplomática como "única solución", una negociación bajo mandato de Naciones Unidas y la libre autodeterminación del pueblo saharaui.

Ahora bien, hay que recordar que Moratinos, en una comparecencia en el Congreso de los Diputados, el día 17 de marzo de 2009 (de la que me hice eco en este blog en un artículo titulado "Moratinos viola el Derecho Internacional"), en una sesión verdaderamente grave, defendió que:

el referéndum no está incluido en la resolución del Consejo de Seguridad. Puede ser, las partes lo pueden decidir; no decimos que no (página 23 del Diario de Sesiones)

Primeras interrogantes:
- ¿Por qué los despachos oficiales francés y español OMITEN que se trató del Sahara Occidental?
- ¿Por qué un periódico tan cercano al Gobierno español... y al francés... cual es "El País" OMITIÓ totalmente la noticia de este encuentro?
- ¿cuál es esa "única" solución?

III. ... Y EN EL QUE SE HIZO UNA GRAVÍSIMA AFIRMACIÓN SOBRE EL TERRORISMO EN EL SAHEL
En este blog he venido defendiendo, repetidamente, que la llamada "Al Qaida del magreb islámico", que de "Al qaida" sólo tiene el nombre, es una organización sobre la que se han formulado sospechas acerca de su instrumentalización por el servicio secreto marroquí.

Por contra, el servicio secreto marroquí y ciertos personajes del lobby pro-marroquí intentan transmitir la idea de que el Frente Polisario tiene conexiones con "Aqmi" aunque no exista ni una sola prueba de ello. Por cierto, esos mismos individuos que sustentan su tesis en la nunca probada intervención de saharauis en las filas de "Aqmi", no extraen la que debiera ser consecuencia lógica de su "argumento" cuando se descubre que en "Aqmi" hay, y esto sí es una realidad probada, numerosos marroquíes enrolados en la organización. Como dije en un análisis publicado el 2 de junio de este año:

Es previsible que Marruecos trate de recuperar la iniciativa utilizando la carta terrorista. Dado que el Frente Polisario no está implicado en actividades terroristas, es previsible que haya círculos cercanos a Marruecos, o del propio poder marroquí, que fabriquen amenazas terroristas con el objetivo de imputar la responsabilidad al Frente Polisario.

Este es el contexto en el que Moratinos ha dicho una GRAVÍSIMA AFIRMACIÓN, recogida por la agencia EFE, tras comentar que, como se recogió en los despachos oficiales, se trató sobre la seguridad en el Sahel:

"si se resuelve el Sahara también se resuelve el Sahel".

Y aquí surgen nuevos y más graves interrogantes:

- Dado que el "Sahel" es la región SUR del desierto del Sahara (que incluye territorios de Mauritania, Argelia, Malí, Níger y Chad) lindante con la sabana y que ni Marruecos ni el Sahara Occidental forman parte del Sahel, ¿por qué hay una conexión entre ambos?
- ¿insinúa el ministro Moratinos que la inseguridad en el Sahel la provoca el Frente Polisario, aunque ningún miembro del Frente Polisario se haya visto involucrado en las actividades que provocan inseguridad en el Sahel?
- ¿insinúa el ministro Moratinos que esa inseguridad en el Sahel la provoca Argelia, el principal apoyo del Frente Polisario, a pesar de ser el país que más sufre las consecuencias de la actividad de la llamada "Aqmi"?
- ¿insinúa, por contra, que la inseguridad en el Sahel la provoca Marruecos (sólo o en compañía de otro u otros) para chantajear en favor de una solución al conflicto del Sahara favorable a sus intereses?
- ¿ha tenido algo que ver Marruecos con el secuestro de los cooperantes españoles... producido en plena crisis por el "caso Haidar" y concluido tras la crisis fronteriza hispano-marroquí en Melilla?
- ¿por qué Rubalcaba en su visita a Mohamed VI agradeció al servicio secreto marroquí su "ayuda" para la liberación de los cooperantes [http://www.rim24.info/suite-info.php?var=888]?
- ¿por qué este agradecimiento no fue recogido por ningún medio de comunicación en España?
- Insisto, ¿por qué razón "si se resuelve el (conflicto del) Sahara también se resuelve el (problema de inseguridad en el) Sahel"?

El verdadero rostro del poder marroquí


La reciente crisis hispano-marroquí se ha originado porque el gobierno marroquí, OFICIALMENTE, calumnia a las fuerzas de seguridad españolas acusándolas de "racistas" y de abandonar emigrantes, entre otras lindezas. Después de la brutal agresión contra ciudadanos españoles en El Aaiún (Sahara Occidental ocupado), el gobierno español se descuelga dando la razón a la policía marroquí frente al testimonio de los ciudadanos españoles. ¿Cuál es el verdadero rostro marroquí?

I. EL MAJZÉN INICIA UNA CAMPAÑA DE CALUMNIAS E INSULTOS CONTRA ESPAÑA... CON LA AQUIESCENCIA DEL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL
El día 22 de junio, en este blog, se advertía de que Marruecos preparaba una campaña de odio contra España.
Esa campaña se desencadena en julio. Marruecos instiga a unos agentes con apariencia de civiles, para humillar y desobedecer las órdenes de agentes femeninos de policía en la frontera de España con Marruecos, en Melilla.

Siguió luego una diarrea de comunicados oficiales marroquíes que:
- injuriaban a las fuerzas de seguridad españolas llegando a llamarlas "racistas" y las acusaban de abandonar emigrantes (pese a que fue Marruecos quien asesinó a negros africanos en la frontera hispano-marroquí con balazos por la espalda y fue Marruecos quien abandonó en el desierto a negros africanos);
- injuriaban a la Nación española calificando parte de nuestro territorio como "ocupado" (pese a que Ceuta y Melilla forman parte del territorio español según la legalidad constitucional e internacional).

Aquella crisis fue patéticamente negada por el Gobierno y el PSOE.

II. LA MONARQUÍA MARROQUÍ PASA DEL INSULTO A LA AGRESIÓN ... CON LA AQUIESCENCIA DEL GOBIERNO ESPAÑOL
En este contexto, en el que el Gobierno español no quiso rechazar los insultos del gobierno marroquí a las fuerzas de seguridad españolas, el majzén sube un peldaño en la tensión.

El día 23 de agosto, de madrugada, la policía marroquí agredió a dos mujeres españolas y un joven mexicano que se hallaban en el Sahara Occidental acompañando a defensores saharauis de los derechos humanos.
El ministro Rubalcaba viajó ese día a Marruecos, se entrevistó con su homólogo y con el rey. Allí, el Gobierno implícitamente dejó "vendidos" a los ciudadanos españoles pues no sólo no salió en su defensa, sino que firmó un comunicado conjunto que decía que ambos países "comparten su adhesión a los valores de la democracia, la libertad y la tolerancia".

Luego, el 28 de agosto, la policía marroquí volvió a agredir a ciudadanos españoles, disfrazando a los policías como civiles. Una táctica ya conocida que utilizó Indonesia en su brutal ocupación de Timor Oriental. El PSOE primero y el Gobierno después, esta vez explícitamente, dejaron abandonados a los ciudadanos españoles dando más crédito a la policía marroquí que a los ciudadanos españoles.

III. CÓMO SON LAS "INTERPELACIONES" DE LA POLICÍA MARROQUÍ

La red de derechos de los emigrantes "Migrant's rights network" acaba de publicar que, al día siguiente de la brutal agresión contra los ciudadanos españoles en El Aaiún ocupado, la policía marroquí se "desahogó" con sus métodos habituales contra emigrantes negros en el norte del país, cerca de la frontera con Argelia.
Traduzco:

El domingo 29 de agosto, las fuerzas de seguridad marroquíes llevaron a cabo un duro ataque contra más de cien refugiados en Uxda. Destrozaron o quemaron sus cabañas en el bosque y todas sus pertenencias. Más de cien refugiados -entre los que había mujeres con niños pequeños y personas heridas- fueron recluídos en minúsculas celdas durante el día; la policía tomó sus huellas digitales y les fotografió a todos ellos.
Después fueron llevados a una zona desértica en la frontera de Argelia y Marruecos. Los refugiados que consiguieron volver a Uxda informaron que el ataque fue extraordinariamente violento.

Naturalmente, el majzén no ve las cosas así.
El diario que es portavoz oficioso del ministro de Exteriores marroquí y que lidera la campaña de odio anti-español en Marruecos describe así el asunto:

Uxda: interpelación de 109 subsaharauianos.

Ciento nuevo subsaharianos, candidatos a la emigración clandestina han sido detenidos, el domingo, en la ciudad de Uxda y sus alrededores, según se ha sabido el lunes de fuentes próximas a las autoridades locales.
Estas personas han sido detenidas en el curso de una vasta operación de rastreo llevada a cabo conjuntamente por elementos de la Gendarmería real, la seguridad nacional, las fuerzas auxiliares y las autoridades locales de Uxda.
De diferentes nacionalidades, han entado clandestinamente en Marruecos y han encontrado refugio especialmente en las zonas boscosas y periféricas y en los alrededores del campus universitario de la ciudad de Uxda.

El concepto de "interpelación" parece ser diferente en Marruecos que en el resto del mundo.
En efecto,
- no sólo ocurre que el majzén denomina "interpelación" a lo que Migrant's rights network califica como "ataque extraordinariamente violento", ....
- es que el majzén ¡¡¡también ha calificado como "interpelación" la brutal agresión contra ciudadanos españoles!!!

Desconozco la nacionalidad de los emigrantes negros.
Desconozco si en sus países va a haber una polémica por esta bárbara agresión.
Pero de lo que estoy seguro es de que ningún gobierno africano publicará una nota como la firmada por Juan Pablo de la Iglesia diciendo:

Por su parte, las autoridades marroquíes, han respondido que los refugiados participaron en una manifestación ilegal y no
autorizada durante la cual se produjeron enfrentamientos entre los
manifestantes y ciudadanos marroquíes y que las agresiones a
algunos de los refugiados se produjeron como consecuencia
de estos altercados. Han precisado que la intervención de la
policía marroquí tuvo como principal objetivo poner fin a estos
enfrentamientos.
El gobierno de Ghana, comprometido con la defensa de los derechos
de sus ciudadanos en el extranjero, reitera la necesidad de respetar
la legislación vigente, y confía que estos incidentes no vuelvan a
producirse.

[Me he permitido susituir algunas expresiones:
- "manifestantes" y "activistas" españoles por "refugiados"
- "gobierno español" por "gobierno de Ghana".]

A este extremo ha llevado la política exterior española el ministro Moratinos y el gobierno de Rodríguez Zapatero.

sábado, 28 de novembro de 2009

Moratinos tiende una trampa a Aminatu Haidar


Aminatu Haidar sólo pide que se respete su derecho, violado por España y Marruecos. La "solución" del ministro Moratinos no es respetar su derecho, sino concederle un privilegio, "una excepción". Las circunstancias en las que se hace esta oferta dan la verdadera dimensión de lo insidioso que es Moratinos.

I. LA NACIONALIDAD ESPAÑOLA DE LOS SAHARAUIS ANTES DE 1976.
He tenido ocasión de publicar en 1999 dos artículos en los que he argumentado que el Real Decreto 2258/1976, de 10 de agosto de 1976 que daba a los saharauis un plazo de un año para optar por la nacionalidad española era contrario a la ley española. Por eso, he argumentado que a todos los saharauis que tenían la nacionalidad española antes de esa fecha se les debe reconocer la nacionalidad española de origen, sin excepción, mientras no suceda alguna de estas hipótesis:
- que España reconozca a la RASD y, por tanto, la nacionalidad que esta república pueda atribuir a los habitantes de la antigua colonia española; o
- que se haya concluido el proceso de descolonización y los saharais hayan votado en referéndum su anexión a Marruecos, dejando en ese momento el Sahara Occidental de ser un territorio no autónomo.

Descarto, de entrada, la tercera hipótesis, a saber, que España considere que la descolonización ya ha concluido con la anexión del Sahara Occidental por Marruecos. Y la descarto porque el Gobierno de España, en carta dirigida a las Naciones Unidas el 26 de febrero de 1976, manifestó oficialmente que:

La descolonización del Sahara occidental culminará cuando la opinión de la población saharaui se haya expresado válidamente

II. EL ORIGEN DEL CASO HAIDAR
El origen del caso Haidar es la expulsión arbitraria de Haidar de su país, el Sahara Occidental, por las autoridades de ocupación marroquíes. Después de ser expulsada del Sahara Occidental por Marruecos, España la impide embarcar rumbo al Sahara Occidental.
Esto es una violación, por Marruecos y España, del derecho que el Pacto Internacional de los Derechos Civiles y Políticos, que ambos Estados han ratificado, que reconoce a Aminatu Haidar para entrar y salir libremente de su país, el territorio no autónomo del Sahara Occidental.

Artículo 12
1. Toda persona que se halle legalmente en el territorio de un Estado tendrá derecho a circular libremente por él y a escoger libremente en él su residencia.
2. Toda persona tendrá derecho a salir libremente de cualquier país, incluso del propio.
3. Los derechos antes mencionados no podrán ser objeto de restricciones salvo cuando éstas se hallen previstas en la ley, sean necesarias para proteger la seguridad nacional, el orden público, la salud o la moral públicas o los derechos y libertades de terceros, y sean compatibles con los demás derechos reconocidos en el presente Pacto.
4. Nadie podrá ser arbitrariamente privado del derecho a entrar en su propio país.

III. LO QUE PIDE AMINATU HAIDAR
Lo que pide Aminatu Haidar es, pura y simplemente, que España y Marruecos cumplan el Derecho Internacional. Que cumplan el tratado que libremente firmaron y ratificaron.
¿Tan difícil es exigir que se cumpla un tratado?

IV. EL GOBIERNO DE RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO QUIERE EVITAR A TODA COSTA EL CUMPLIMIENTO DEL DERECHO
La posición del ministro Moratinos en la crisis abierta por la violación de los derechos humanos de Aminatu Haidar es la de "arreglar" el asunto por cualquier vía diferente del reconocimiento a Aminatu Haidar de su derecho a entrar y salir libremente de su propio país.
Para ello, le ha ofrecido diversas "soluciones". La última, la de reconocerle, como concesión graciosa hecha a título de "excepción" y por motivos "humanitarios" algo a lo que Haidar tiene derecho: la nacionalidad española.
Con ello, Moratinos, aprovechándose de la gravedad del estado de Aminatu Haidar tras la prolongada huelga de hambre, consigue dos objetivos:
- que Aminatu Haidar acepte que no tiene derecho a "entrar y salir libremente" de su propio país, el Sahara Occidental;
- que Aminatu Haidar reconozca que los saharauis nacidos españoles no tienen derecho a la nacionalidad española, que pasa a ser una concesión excepcional.

Y todo esto por una razón muy simple.
Porque el Gobierno español no quiere permitir a Aminatu Haidar salir, ahora mismo, en un avión rumbo al Sahara Occidental, como es su derecho.
Porque el Gobierno español no quiere presionar a Marruecos para que respete el derecho de Aminatu Haidar a entrar libremente en el Sahara Occidental.

V. LO QUE NOS HA DESCUBIERTO AMINATU HAIDAR
Aminatu Haidar nos ha descubierto dos cosas importantes:
- que exigir el cumplimiento de un derecho reconocido es algo que pone muy nervioso al ministro Moratinos
- que Marruecos no respeta los acuerdos internacionales que suscribe.

A partir de ahí, que cada uno extraiga sus propias consecuencias.

Zapatero: entre De Juana y Aminatu Haidar


Rodríguez Zapatero, conocido por su astucia, no es más astuto que la razón. Y es que las mentiras del que presumía de pacifista y feminista han quedado crudamente de manifiesto por una mujer pacífica: Aminatu Haidar. El coro de Rodríguez Zapatero, bien intenta distraer a la opinión pública (Valenciano, López Aguilar), bien mira para otro lado (Pajín), bien se ensaña (Moratinos). Pero no se puede evitar lo inevitable: si Rodríguez no permite que Aminatu vuelva a su tierra y ésta muere, ésta se llevará consigo, sin pegar ni un grito ni un tiro al presidente que presumía de pacifista y feminista. Es la astucia de la razón

Hablaba Hegel de la "astucia de la razón": aunque algunos hombres intenten engañar a otros para torcer el curso de la historia, al final la razón, por vías inesperadas pone las cosas en su sitio.

Rodríguez Zapatero ha hecho de la "paz" y del "feminismo" sus banderas. Muchos lo creyeron.
Pero la astucia de la razón es así. Una mujer pacífica ha dejado en evidencia a Rodríguez.

I. ZAPATERO ES CÓMPLICE DE UNA VIOLACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS COMETIDA POR MOHAMED VI
Recordemos los hechos.
1º. Aminatu Haidar es originaria del Sahara Occidental.
2º. El Sahara Occidental es un territorio no autónomo, en su mayor parte ocupado por Marruecos y pendiente de descolonización.
3º. El Sahara Occidental, nunca ha sido parte de Marruecos y la legalidad internacional obliga a que se mantenga un status jurídico diferente del de la potencia que lo administre o lo ocupe.
4º. Aminatu Haidar quiso entrar en su tierra, el Sahara Occidental, tras recibir en los Estados Unidos un premio de reconomiento a su lucha pacífica por los derechos humanos en el Sahara Occidental ocupado.
5º. Marruecos le impidió entrar en su tierra y le quitó el pasaporte de la potencia ocupante, Marruecos, que se le concedió para permitirla salir al extranjero.
6º. Contra su voluntad fue embarcada en un avión con destino a España.
7º. Contra su voluntad el gobierno español le impide ir a su tierra, el Sahara Occidental.

Y recordemos el Derecho.
1º. España y Marruecos han ratificado el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos que reconoce, en su artículo 12 el derecho a entrar libremente en su propio país. Así, lo he dejado dicho en este blog y así lo han dicho después Human Rights Watch y Amnistía Internacional.
2º. El Derecho Español, compatible con lo dispuesto en el Pacto Internacional antecitado, permite que un extranjero pueda salir de España aun sin su documentación, pues tal y como ha recordado Amnistía Internacional, así lo establece el artículo 19.3 del Reglamento de Extranjería.

II. EL PSOE QUIERE "ECHAR EL MUERTO" A MARRUECOS, SIN CULPAR A MORATINOS Y A RODRÍGUEZ
La situación es tan escandalosa que el PSOE ha tenido que recurrir al viejo truco del "poli bueno" y el "poli malo".
Primero fue la secretaria de relaciones internacionales del PSOE, Elena Valenciano que dijo el día 20 de noviembre que Marruecos incumplía la legalidad internacional al expulsar y no admitir a Aminatu Haidar en el territorio ocupado del Sahara Occidental. Pero lo hizo de un modo calculadamente informal para restar trascendencia al caso Haidar.

Valenciano podía haber optado por emitir un comunicado, pero eligió hacerlo con menos realce. Llamó a la agencia EFE y le hizo una declaración en la que pide a Marruecos que "acepte la vuelta" de Haidar a su casa.

Elena Valenciano, siempre hábil e inteligente, pedía a Marruecos que cumpliera la ley, pero a sabiendas de lo que hay, prefirió no calificar el comportamiento del gobierno español.

Menos prudente ha sido su compañero de partido, Juan Fernando López Aguilar, cabeza de lista del PSOE en las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo que un día después, como Valenciano, ha dicho que el comportamiento de Marruecos es una "injusticia". Sin embargo, ha ido más allá que ésta y también se ha atrevido a decir que el comportamiento del Gobierno español con Haidar ha sido "correcto".

Otros destacados miembros del PSOE, como la secretaria de organización, Leyre Pajín, no han dicho ni pío. Pajín viajaba a los campamentos de refugiados saharauis en Tinduf para apoyar la causa de la libertad del Sahara Occidental. Pajín es mujer y, me parece que siguiendo el guión debe ser también pacifista: ¿Es que no tiene nada que decir sobre Aminatu Haidar?

Pero es difícil negar dos realidades:
- Aminatu Haidar no quiso ir a España y el gobierno español la ha obligado a entrar aquí contra su voluntad y violando el ordenamiento jurídico.
- Aminatu Haidar quiere irse de España al Sahara Occidental y el gobierno español se lo impide violando un tratado internacional.

Ambos hechos, convierten a España en cómplice de Marruecos en la violación de los derechos de Aminatu Haidar. Luego no se puede condenar a Marruecos y no condenar la conducta del Gobierno Rodríguez y su ministro Moratinos.

Es más, para que no haya dudas, el Ministerio que dirige Moratinos, el día 20 de noviembre emitió un comunicado, absolutamente intolerable en el que intenta volver a jugar a la ambigüedad.
Y así, al mismo tiempo que decía que hay que respetar "el derecho a la libre determinación del pueblo del Sahara Occidental"
dijo que:

El Gobierno no tiene competencia sobre la decisión de terceros Estados de rechazar la entrada en su territorio

Dicho de otro modo: Moratinos en esa frase dice que el Sahara Occidental es territorio del Estado marroquí.

Pero la ambigüedad se acabó. La huelga de hambre de Aminatu Haidar pone a cada uno en su sitio. No es tiempo de farsa, sino de tragedia.

III. ZAPATERO, DÉBIL ANTE EL HOMBRE VIOLENTO (DE JUANA) E INFLEXIBLE ANTE LA MUJER PACÍFICA (HAIDAR)
Hace poco más de tres años, en octubre de 2006, el sanguinario asesino José Ignacio De Juana Chaos, hizo una huelga de hambre. Zapatero cedió ante ETA.
Ahora, en noviembre de 2009, una mujer pacífica, Aminatu Haidar, hace una huelga de hambre por la defensa de sus derechos humanos. Zapatero ni la ha llamado por teléfono. Zapatero cede ante Marruecos.
La astucia de la razón.

POST-DATA (27-XI-2009)
La Plataforma de solidaridad con Aminetu Haidar ha creado un blog cuya lectura resulta indispensable para seguir la crisis actual:
Todos con Aminetu.

Sahara-Caso de Haidar : Zapatero ejecuta la última voluntad del franquismo


El último acto del franquismo, el 19 de noviembre de 1975 fue la aprobación de la llamada "ley de descolonización del Sahara" firmada por el jefe del Estado en funciones, "Juan Carlos de Borbón, Príncipe de España". Aquella ley, pretendió dar cobertura jurídica a la entrega del Sahara a Marruecos, pactada en secreto un 14 de noviembre de 1975. Por una ironía de la historia, un 14 de noviembre, pero de 2009, ha visto como el tándem Rodríguez Zapatero-Moratinos Cuyaubé, imita el desprecio a la legalidad que tuvo el último gobierno franquista para conseguir los mismos objetivos. El ministro Moratinos, con el beneplácito de Rodríguez da por buena la expulsión de Aminatu Haidar de su propio país, el territorio no autónomo del Sahara Occidental, y para complacer al ocupante marroquí la retiene en España.

I. EN UN 14 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1975: MANIOBRA ILEGAL PARA ENTREGAR EL SAHARA A MARRUECOS
El 14 de noviembre de 1975, en secreto, a espaldas de la opinión pública, el presidente del Gobierno Arias Navarro, siguiendo las instrucciones del jefe de Estado en funciones, Juan Carlos de Borbón, firmó el llamado "Acuerdo de Madrid" que establecía una "administración temporal" tripartita (España-Marruecos-Mauritania) en el Sahara Español hasta el 28 de febrero de 1976. Se trataba de intentar dar a Marruecos el status de "potencia administradora" del Sahara Occidental.

El último acto del franquismo, el 19 de noviembre de 1975 fue la aprobación de la llamada ley de "descolonización" del Sahara, firmada por el jefe del Estado en funciones, "Juan Carlos de Borbón, Príncipe de España". Aquella ley, defendida en las Cortes por una persona que aún sobrevive, Antonio Carro Martínez, pretendió dar cobertura jurídica a la entrega del Sahara a Marruecos que de modo sibilino se pretendió en el acuerdo de Madrid, firmado en secreto el 14 de noviembre.

La llamada ley de "descolonización" dice en su artículo único que:

se autoriza al Gobierno para que realice los actos y adopte las medidas que sean precisas para llevar a cabo la descolonización del territorio no autónomo del Sahara, salvaguardando los intereses españoles

De lo cual se deduce que el acuerdo de Madrid, firmado antes, se hizo sin autorización de las Cortes. Un motivo más por el cual no es válido en el Derecho interno.
Pero el acuerdo tampoco es válido en el Derecho Internacional porque las Naciones Unidas no consideran a Marruecos como la "potencia administradora" del territorio. Antes bien, ha sido calificado como "potencia ocupante" del mismo (resolución 34/37 de la Asamblea General)

II. Y EN OTRO 14 DE NOVIEMBRE: AVAL ILEGAL A LA OCUPACIÓN ILEGAL
En otro 14 de noviembre, esta vez de 2009, una mujer saharaui, Aminatu Haidar, intenta volver a su patria, ocupada por Marruecos. Haidar había solicitado una documentación marroquí para poder salir a recoger varios reconocimientos internacionales a favor de su lucha pacífica por los derechos del pueblo saharaui. La potencia ocupante la priva del pasaporte a Haidar y la expulsa del Sahara Occidental en un avión de una compañía española destino a España. La compañía aérea embarca a la pasajera rumbo a España. Y una vez llegada a España, se le niega la posibilidad de embarcarse rumbo a su patria, el territorio no autónomo del Sahara Occidental. Ha empezado una huelga de hambre.

Marruecos y España han ratificado un convenio, el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, cuyos artículos 12 y 13 dicen:

Artículo 12

1. Toda persona que se halle legalmente en el territorio de un Estado tendrá derecho a circular libremente por él y a escoger libremente en él su residencia.
2. Toda persona tendrá derecho a salir libremente de cualquier país, incluso del propio.
3. Los derechos antes mencionados no podrán ser objeto de restricciones salvo cuando éstas se hallen previstas en la ley, sean necesarias para proteger la seguridad nacional, el orden público, la salud o la moral públicas o los derechos y libertades de terceros, y sean compatibles con los demás derechos reconocidos en el presente Pacto.
4. Nadie podrá ser arbitrariamente privado del derecho a entrar en su propio país.

Artículo 13

El extranjero que se halle legalmente en el territorio de un Estado Parte en el presente Pacto sólo podrá ser expulsado de él en cumplimiento de una decisión adoptada conforme a la ley; y, a menos que razones imperiosas de seguridad nacional se opongan a ello, se permitirá a tal extranjero exponer las razones que lo asistan en contra de su expulsión, así como someter su caso a revisión ante la autoridad competente o bien ante la persona o personas designadas especialmente por dicha autoridad competente, y hacerse representar con tal fin ante ellas.

El Derecho Internacional dispone, por tanto que:
1º. Aminatu Haidar tiene derecho a salir de cualquier país, incluido España.
2º. Aminatu Haidar es originaria del territorio no autónomo del Sahara Occidental ocupado por Marruecos
3º. Siendo el Sahara Occidental un territorio no autónomo, pendiente de descolonización, no forma parte del territorio de Marruecos.
4º. Aminatu Haidar está siendo privada del derecho a entrar en su país, el territorio no autónomo del Sahara Occidental.

La conclusión evidente es que el gobierno español, al haber acogido a una mujer expulsada por Marruecos del territorio ocupado del Sahara Occidental y al impedirla entrar en el mismo, que es su propio país, está haciéndose cómplice de una violación de un derecho humano básico. Está haciéndose cómplice de la afirmación marroquí de que el Sahara Occidental forma parte de Marruecos y de que por ello puede expulsar de allí a quien no tiene o renuncia a la nacionalidad marroquí.

No resulta sorprendente, en consecuencia, que la Directora General de Coordinación Jurídica del Gobierno española haya dicho, dos días después de la expulsión de Aminatu Haidar de su propio país, que Marruecos y España son “dos países que comparten la misma cultura de los derechos humanos”.

Sí resulta algo más sorprendente, sin embargo, que la oposición no haya dicho nada. Sería hermoso ver al diputado Gustavo de Arístegui, con tan buenos contactos en Marruecos, intervenir en favor de Aminatu Haidar criticando la violación de los derechos humanos que el ministro Moratinos, con el aval del presidente Rodríguez, están consumando en complicidad con Marruecos.

III. SE ACABÓ LA AMBIGÜEDAD
Ha llegado el momento decisivo.
No sabemos lo que va a hacer Aminatu Haidar.
Quizá continúe su huelga de hambre.
Quizá en lugar de una denuncia que la policía puede archivar sin necesidad de comunicárselo, presente una querella contra la compañía aérea y las autoridades españolas.
Quizá solicite asilo político en España.
Quizá solicite a Suecia, país que preside la Unión Europea que intervenga, pues la violación de los derechos humanos supone una la infracción del compromiso de respetar los derechos humanos que ha asumido por Marruecos en el Acuerdo de Asociación que le vincula a la Comunidad Europea.
Quizá solicite a Naciones Unidas un documento de viaje para ir a su país, el territorio no autónomo del Sahara Occidental, en cuyo caso habría que ver si Marruecos se atreve a desafiar a la ONU impidiendo su entrada... De momento, Haidar ha solicitado la intervención del SG de la ONU, Ban Ki Mun, para asegurar su protección personal.

Pero sí sabemos lo que podemos hacer nosotros.
El 17 de noviembre de 2009 la Mesa del Congreso ha calificado una iniciativa presentada por el Grupo Parlamentario Mixto (en concreto, la diputada de UPyD, Rosa Díez). Se trata de una Proposición no de Ley para modificar la Ley 40/1975, de 19 de noviembre, sobre descolonización del Sáhara en la que se facultaba al Gobierno incorporando los principios que deberán regir la política exterior del Reino de España en relación con la descolonización del Sáhara Occidental. (162/000522).

Ya sabemos lo que supuso esa ley, la última del franquismo. A partir de ahora, ya no caben ambigüedades. El Grupo Parlamentario Socialista, el grupo parlamentario popular, igual que otros grupos como el de ERC o el nacionalismo vasco tendrán que pronunciarse. Todos tienen que pronunciarse:
¿están o no de acuerdo con la última ley del franquismo?
Yo no.

POST-DATA (20-XI-2009)
Hoy, aniversario de la muerte de Franco y de la publicación en el BOE de la llamada ley de "descolonización" del Sahara se producen tres noticias importantes:
- Aminetu Haidar, con una fortaleza moral fuera de lo común ha dicho que rechaza el estatus de refugiada política que le ha ofrecido Moratinos. Ha dicho que tiene derecho a ir a su tierra y exige que se respete ese derecho que ella tiene. Eso se llama dignidad.
- Magnífico artículo en La Voz de Lanzarote denunciando las declaraciones de Moratinos que dijo, en el colomo del cinismo, que España había "facilitado" la entrada en España a Haidar... cuando como es notorio vino obligada. Eso se llama indignidad.
- Human Rights Watch condena a España y a Marruecos por violar el artículo 12 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos. Exactamente tal y como he argumentado en este artículo.
- Comienza la marea de solidaridad con Aminetu Haidar:
* Treinta eurodiputados firman un escrito exigiendo que Aminetu Haidar vuelva a su patria, el Sahara Occidental, derecho que se le reconoce por la legalidad internacional.
* El actor Guillermo Toledo ha ido este jueves a Lanzarote a solidarizarse con Aminetu Haidar. Como tiene que ser: de las palabras a los hechos.

POST-DATA (27-XI-2009)
La Plataforma de solidaridad con Aminetu Haidar ha creado un blog cuya lectura resulta indispensable para seguir la crisis actual:
Todos con Aminetu.

terça-feira, 20 de outubro de 2009

Statement on Western Sahara Prepared for Delivery to the United Nations Fourth Committee:John M. Miller, National Coordinator, ETAN



United Nations, New York, October 2009

Petitioner: John M. Miller, National Coordinator, ETAN

Mr. Chairperson, distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of the East Timor and Indonesia Action Network on Western Sahara. I also serve as the U.N. representative for the International Federation for East Timor. Both organizations were long active in support of the struggle of the East Timorese people for self-determination.

Five weeks ago, I was in the independent Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the "popular consultation" that brought 24 years of illegal Indonesian occupation to an end. Timor-Leste is now a member of the United Nations and addressed this committee in support of Western Sahara earlier this week.

Ten years ago, on August 30, the East Timorese people belatedly exercised their right to self-determination. – They voted in massive numbers, defying the bloody campaign of the Indonesian military and its militia proxies. In the face of threats of destructive retaliation that were soon realized, they expressed their preferred choice of independence.

In doing so, the people of Timor-Leste exercised their inalienable right and expressed their "passionate yearning for freedom" described by the UN General Assembly nearly 50 years ago in its 1960 declaration (1514 (XV)) on decolonization, which unambiguously declared that "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine political status…"

It should embarrass this institution – and all of you as representatives of United Nations member states – that this committee must continue to discuss the situation of Western Sahara. The discussion should have ended long ago, and its people should have exercised their right to self-determination.

The parallels between the situations of Timor-Leste and Western Sahara are clear. In 1975, within weeks, larger neighbors, defying international law and the UN Charter, invaded both countries as they were on the verge of decolonization. For decades, Morocco and Indonesia continued to brutally occupy and illegally exploit the resources of Timor-Leste and Western Sahara in defiance of UN resolutions. The invaders received weapons and diplomatic support from the United States and other powerful countries. Both colonies remained on the General Assembly agenda as non-self-governing territories. Both invasions were clearly condemned by the Security Council. Both peoples suffered horrendous human rights crimes, including torture, disappearances, displacement, and rape. Those who organized and ordered these crimes have yet to be brought to justice. This only encourages others to defy international law.

While in Timor-Leste, I participated in a conference, "Hametin Solidaridade: Luta Nafatin Ba Justisa," in English: "Strengthening Solidarity: The Struggle for Justice Continues." More than 200 people from 18 countries discussed the continuing need for justice and accountability for human rights crimes committed during the Indonesian occupation. Many of those attending had long been active in Timor-Leste's struggle for self-determination both inside and outside the country; others were young students enthusiastic to learn more about their own country's and others' struggles. The conference expressed strong support for an ad hoc international tribunal for Timor-Leste.

However, the focus of the conference was not only on the recently independent country. We also looked outward to ask where we and the East Timorese people should extend our solidarity to others struggling for self-determination, justice and peace. We felt strongly that others should benefit from the international solidarity extended to Timor-Leste over the decades. The Conference "enthusiastically endorsed" self-determination for Western Sahara.

I was recently forwarded a statement by the Timorese organization, MEC-TL (Movimento Estudante Cristaun Timor-Leste). They reject the Moroccan presence in Western Sahara. They call on France and Spain to consider the Saharawi voice for independence and call on the United Nations to give Western Sahara its referendum on independence.

The people of Timor-Leste have much in common with the people of Western Sahara. They – and those of us who supported Timor's campaign for self-determination -- hope those common experiences will soon include a genuine act of self-determination.

We urge Morocco and its allies to end their delaying tactics. The United Nations and its member states should fulfill its promise to support decolonization worldwide and more forward with Western Sahara's referendum

There is a truism: "Justice delayed is justice denied." The paraphrase, "Self-determination delayed is self-determination denied," is certainly as true. The people of Timor-Leste had their right self-determination denied for nearly two and one-half decades. The people of Western Sahara have been denied their rights for 34 years and counting. They should not have to wait any longer.

Thank you.

Statement on Western Sahara to the Special Political and Decolonization Committee by: International Platform of Jurists for East Timor






by:

International Platform of Jurists for East Timor

and

Stichting Zelfbeschikking West-Sahara

October 2009

Petitioner: Pedro Pinto Leite



Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates,

I wish to thank you for the opportunity to speak before this Committee on behalf of the International Platform of Jurists for East Timor; an NGO made up of 650 law professors, judges, attorneys and other jurists from more than 80 countries. I am also speaking on behalf of the Stichting Zelfbeschikking West-Sahara; an association established under Dutch law for the defense of the right to self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

Mr. Chairman,

Last year at this Committee I noticed a smile on the face of many of the delegates when two petitioners for Morocco accused Polisario of “genocide and even cannibalism”. It is indeed amazing how far can Moroccan propaganda go, how ridiculous it can be.

Nick Brooks, a researcher in the field of climatic change of the Tyndall Centre, University of East Anglia, who works in the Sahara and the Sahel, became target of the hate of Rabat and of the supporters of the occupation since he started to turn his attention to the Moroccan propaganda machine. I vividly recommend everyone to read his blog ‘Sand & Dust’, where he analyses the key principles of such propaganda. The pro-Morocco petitions at this Committee scrupulously follow those key principles:

- they avoid the issue of Morocco’s occupation, they don’t mention the referendum, but instead they portray Polisario as a separatist group driven by Marxist or Islamist ideology;

- they try to discredit Polisario through accusations of slavery, terrorism, fundamentalism (and, as said, accusations of “genocide and even cannibalism”), while Morocco is portrayed as a very democratic regime;

- they emphasise that independence is not realistic and that we are seeking to prolong the conflict, that we are thus prolonging the suffering of the people in the Tindouf camps;

- they state that the people in the Tindouf camps want to be Moroccan and are being held against their will;

- they portray the conflict as one between Algeria and Morocco, rather than between Morocco and Polisario, and insist on Algeria’s links to terrorists, communists and fundamentalists;

- they emphasize the “eastern-block” nature of the countries that have historically supported the idea of independence, hoping that this will help to discredit the idea of a referendum on independence;

- they accuse us, the Western Sahara solidarity groups, of being paid by Algeria, and portray us as a tiny minority whose views do not count;

- they emphasize the alleged benefits that Morocco is bringing to the occupied territory and accuse us of being ill informed extremists who are against development;

- they deny that Polisario controls a significant part of Western Sahara, portray this as a buffer zone set up by Morocco in cooperation with the UN and accuse anyone talking about the Free Zone of propaganda;

- they give the impression that the UN supports Morocco’s position and insist that Morocco’s autonomy plan is compatible with the right to self-determination;

- they invoke the views of the few who support the Moroccan position (the case of van Walsum), but dismiss views from international bodies when they appear to support the holding of a referendum or the idea of independence: for instance, they see the original UN resolutions on Western Sahara as irrelevant;

- they dismiss countries that recognise the Saharawi Republic as irrelevant, usually Marxist, regimes and, needless to say, they are silent about the position of the African Union;

- they portray the conflict as a hangover from the Cold War rather than a conflict about decolonisation.

Mr. Chairman,

Unfortunately for Morocco and its supporters, facts are stubborn things:

* the fact is that part of the territory of Western Sahara is illegally occupied by Morocco and another part is under the total control of Polisario;
* the fact is that more than 80 states recognise the Saharawi Republic;
* the fact is that the Saharawi Republic is a member of the African Union and it was even elected as its vice-president;
* the fact is that more than 100 UN resolutions supported the right to self-determination of the Saharawi people;
* the fact is that Morocco refuses a referendum that would solve the problem once and forever;
* the fact is that an autonomy plan without the option of independence is contrary to international law;
* the fact is that many Moroccans are involved in terrorist attacks, and no Saharawi;
* the fact is that the report of Human Rights Watch of December 2008 denounced once more the violations committed by Morocco in the occupied territory, disproved Rabat’s accusation that the Saharawi refugees of Tindouf are hostages of Polisario and recommended the UN Security Council to expand the mandate of MINURSO to include human rights monitoring;
* the fact is that the Amnesty International report of 2009 also denounced the serious human rights violations committed by Morocco in Western Sahara;
* the fact is that the report of the European Parliament ad hoc delegation that visited the occupied territory and the refugee camps recognized the reality of systematic violations of human rights committed by Morocco, considered the denial of the Saharawis’ right to self-determination as the root of all those violations and also proposed that MINURSO’s mandate include human rights monitoring;
* the fact is that this conflict is a matter of decolonisation, if not it would not be discussed in this Committee.



Thank you, Mr. Chairman

domingo, 4 de outubro de 2009

Mapping of the Conflict in Western Sahara



By: Dr. Sidi M. Omar

Introduction

The conflict in Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO has lasted for over three decades, and continues to pose a potential danger for stability and security in the entire region of North Africa. Despite the successive efforts of the international community to resolve the conflict, a mutually agreed solution remains elusive.

Drawing on theories of conflict resolution, I will present in the paper a roadmap of the conflict in Western Sahara by analysing its history and context, primary parties, core issues and the positions and interests of the parties involved as well as the conflict dynamics. The aim of mapping the conflict is to provide a clearer understanding of the root causes, nature, dynamics and the possibilities for resolving the dispute.

Various conflict analysis tools are employed to map out conflicts. However, I will draw on the model of “conflict mapping”, which was proposed by Paul Wehr (1979) and then developed by other peace and conflict researchers.

The paper will begin with the discussion of the history and context of the conflict in order to determine the setting in which it started and evolved. The analysis will focus on the factors that made the conflict emerge in the first place, and then escalate in 1975 to reach varying degrees of violence in the following years.

The primary parties to the conflict in question will be identified and the nature of power relations between them will be analysed. Interested parties and “third parties” will also be considered, with special emphasis on their forms of involvement in the conflict. After identifying the primary parties, the analysis will focus on the core issues around which the conflict has developed and how they are perceived and articulated by the two parties.

The paper will analyse the dynamics of the conflict including the precipitating events and the stages of escalation and de-escalation through which the conflict has passed. Finally, a set of possibilities for resolving the conflict will be outlined.

Before presenting a roadmap of the conflict, it is important to say a few words about the nature of the dispute in question. As will be made clear later, the conflict in Western Sahara is not a societal, communal, ethnic, religious or class conflict. Rather, it is an international conflict of a political nature between a state and a national liberation movement. From a conflict resolution perspective, it is framed within the context of what Edward Rice calls “wars of the third kind” (quoted in Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999:69). This category refers to conflicts in which communities seek to create their own states in wars of national liberation (Holsti, 1996:27). Moreover, the question of Western Sahara is considered by the United Nations as a decolonisation issue. This explains the fact that the territory is still on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories still to be decolonised.

Overall, my main aim in this paper is to demonstrate that the peaceful and sustainable solution to the conflict in Western Sahara necessarily entails the exercise by the people of the territory of their internationally recognised and inalienable right to self-determination through a negotiated, democratic and free process consistent with international legality and norms.

Conflict History and Context

To set the background of the conflict situation, it is important to examine the key historical and political elements that shaped the setting in which the violent conflict emerged and evolved. This contextualisation is also useful in determining the origins and the root causes of the dispute.

One key element of analysis is the existing political and decision-making structures of the parties. It is hence necessary to examine the nature of the political regime ruling in Morocco at the time. As will be made clear later, the nature of this political regime had a significant bearing on how the conflict emerged in the first place.

All Moroccan constitutions[1] stipulate that the country is “a democratic, social, constitutional monarchy”. However, unlike modern constitutional monarchies, where the monarch “reigns but does not rule”, the king in Morocco is the one who appoints the prime minister and other cabinet members and terminates their services. He is also both a temporal and spiritual ruler (Amir Al-Mu’minin or Commander of the Faithful) who rules by decrees, and is not answerable to any state institution. Moreover, the monarchical system of the state is one of the “red zones” that cannot be subject to any constitutional revision.

Because of its authoritarian nature[2], the Moroccan regime oftentimes has had to contain and counter the mounting opposition of many Moroccans who wanted a more democratic system of government. One of the most disturbing examples of the regime’s intolerance of opposition was the 1965 riots in which hundreds of protesters were killed by government forces.[3] The riots symbolised the growing rift between the monarchy and the opposing groups that were calling for an end to the monarchical rule. Opposition to the monarchy continued and developed into other riots in 1981, 1984, 1990 and 1999, which were crushed by state security forces.[4]

To restore its challenged legitimacy, the regime has also resorted to mobilisation techniques by creating the false impression of a “national unanimity” around some “sacred causes” (Hammoudi, 1997: xiv) that serve to saturate the political spectrum and refocus the public attention and resources. One prime example, in this regard, was the expansionist policy that the regime set in motion in the mid-1950s. The significance of this policy lies in the fact that it brought to the surface a latent conflict of interests, which would ultimately develop into a manifest, violent confrontation.

In the historical narrative of the conflict in Western Sahara, the year 1957 has special importance. It was precisely in that year (14 October 1957) that Morocco, for the first time, declared officially at the UN that Mauritania, the then Spanish Sahara and Ifni “were integral parts of the Moroccan territory”, and hence they were not entitled to decolonisation (Soroeta Liceras, 2001:38). As will be discussed later, Morocco’s argument, as explained by King Mohamed V in September 1958, was that the peoples of these territories were historically Moroccans and “will always be part of the Moroccan community” (Villar, 1982: 65).

There is ample evidence that Morocco’s territorial claims to its neighbours originated in the expansionist ideology of the “Greater Morocco”, which was advanced in the late 1950s by Allal el-Fassi, the leader of the ultranationalist Istiqlal party, shortly after Morocco gained its independence from France in March 1956.[5] This ideology, which was fully embraced by the monarchy[6], asserted that the then Spanish Sahara, all of Mauritania, a large part of western Algeria and even St. Louis du Sénégal and a slice of northern Mali (including Timbuktu) all belonged historically to Morocco (Villar 1982; Hodges 1983; Pazzanita 2006—to cite just a few authors).

However, in practice Morocco’s numerous claims were fraught with contradictions. For instance, as early as 1966, Morocco publicly recognised the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination at the UN VI committee. This position was reiterated consistently until 1974. By the early 1960s, Morocco had quietly dropped its claims to parts of Mali and Senegal. The claim to Mauritania was upheld throughout the 1960s, until 1969 when Morocco finally recognised the country as an independent state.[7] As for Algeria, Morocco launched a failed military campaign to take forcefully part of the Algerian western desert in 1963 in what came to be known as the “Sand War”.

After dropping its territorial claims to the other countries, Morocco centred its attention on the then Spanish Sahara. When Spain announced that it would hold a self-determination referendum in the territory by mid 1975, Morocco tried to frustrate the promised referendum. Morocco, who was then joined by Mauritania, requested the UN General Assembly to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 13 December 1974, the General Assembly requested the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the status of Western Sahara prior to Spanish colonisation, and called on Spain to postpone the referendum. [8]

In its historic advisory opinion on Western Sahara, issued on 16 October 1975, the ICJ very clearly established that there never existed “any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity”. It also endorsed “the decolonisation of Western Sahara” by means of the exercise of “self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory”.[9]

Morocco was hoping that its claim to the territory would be legally endorsed by the ICJ. The advisory opinion, however, dealt a heavy blow to its plans and put the monarchical regime in a very difficult situation. It is significant to note at this point that the rule of King Hassan II of Morocco was challenged by two coup d’état in July 1971 and August 1972. Although the king survived both attempts, the mounting discontent in the country, particularly amid the Moroccan military, made it even more difficult for the monarchy.

Another major element of the historical narrative of Western Sahara was the decolonisation process of the 1960s thanks to which almost all African countries gained their independence form the colonial powers. In the context of this process, the United Nations called on Spain, as early as 1965, to put an end to its colonial domination of the then Spanish Sahara, and to allow its people to exercise their right to self-determination. Obviously, all these elements went against Morocco’s territorial claims to the territory.

Finally, another significant element to take into account was the emergence of the Frente POLISARIO in 1973 as a nationalist and anti-colonial movement representing the Sahrawi people and their collective will to freedom and national independence (Cisteró Bahima and Freixes Sanjuán, 1987: 26; De Piniés, 1990: 62).

In view of the discussion above, it is clear that, by 1975, the monarchy in Morocco was in an increasingly difficult situation and in a dire need for an outlet for its domestic problems. This explains the decision taken by King Hassan II, a few days after the issue of the ICJ ruling, to order a so-called “Green March” of 350,000 Moroccans to “peacefully” march into Western Sahara. Furthermore, by 31 October 1975, Moroccan forces were already advancing and invading the northern part of the territory. Although the “Green March” had been prepared well before the ICJ issued its verdict[10], it was the major event that triggered a set of events that led to the outbreak of the violent conflict in Western Sahara.

The monarchy’s search for a “sacred cause” to divert the attention from its growing domestic problems was therefore the main reason behind Morocco’s decision to invade and annex Western Sahara in 1975 in violation of UN resolutions and the ICJ ruling. Another key factor was clearly Morocco’s increased interest in the abundant natural resources of the territory particularly fish and phosphate. The Cold War geostrategic considerations also had a significant bearing on Morocco’s move into Western Sahara. It is an open secret that, before and after the outbreak of the conflict, Morocco received huge political and military support from major Western powers, particularly the US and France. As some commentators have observed, the support was “an act of political expediency grounded in East–West political alliances” (Franck cited in Mundy, 2006: 291).
In the main, Morocco’s expansionist ideology of the “Greater Morocco” and its political implications on the regional level was the major element that set up the context in which the conflict in Western Sahara emerged and evolved. Other elements have also contributed, in varying degrees, to shaping the conflict context. Conflicts change and their contexts change as well, but it is essential to gain a full understanding of the key elements that constitute the settings in which conflicts emerge in the first place.

Conflict Parties

A key element of conflict analysis is evidently the parties that openly oppose each other and have a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict.

In the case of Western Sahara, the two conflicting parties[11] are: first, the Kingdom of Morocco and mainly the ruling regime that has mobilised the army and security services to carry on its policies and achieve its goals in the conflict. It has also managed to win the support of some political parties and ordinary people for its annexation of Western Sahara. Second, the Frente POLISARIO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people[12], which has equally mobilised its army to carry on the struggle against Morocco. It has moreover gained massive support for its cause among Sahrawis in the territories under Moroccan occupation, in the Sahrawi refugee camps in south-western Algeria and in the diaspora.

As indicated above, the conflict is essentially an international conflict of a political nature between a state and a liberation movement. This fact puts the two parties into a situation of clear asymmetry in terms not only of power and resources but also of international alliances.

The mainly interested parties in the conflict are the two neighbouring countries to Western Sahara, Algeria and Mauritania. Algeria’s interest in the conflict is due to a number of reasons. First, it has always supported the internationally recognised right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination, and has remained faithful to this position. This stance is also reinforced by Algeria’s opposition to the use of force to alter the “borders inherited from colonialism”, a principle sanctioned by the African organisation. Second, Algeria was the only neighbouring country that did not take part in Madrid accords that led to the partition of Western Sahara. Third, it hosts over 150,000 Sahrawi refugees who were driven out of their land because of the Moroccan-Mauritanian invasion of the territory. Fourth, it is interested in the restoration of peace and stability in the whole region. As for Mauritania, which was once claimed by Morocco, its interest lies in its concern for peace and stability of a neighbouring country. This is why the two countries are invited, as “neighbouring countries”, to the UN-sponsored negotiations on the future of Western Sahara.

As indicated earlier, Morocco received huge political and military support from Western powers during and after the Cold War. A key power that has unreservedly supported Morocco is France, which was the only external party that intervened militarily in the war in the 1970s on the Moroccan-Mauritanian side. Moreover, it has played a crucial role at the Security Council in support of Morocco’s position.[13]

Another key party is Spain, the former colonial power of Western Sahara and the de jure administering power of the territory. Many observers have indicated that now the US and France may hold the key to resolving the conflict given their close ties with Morocco and their influence at the Security Council. However, Spain still has legal obligations towards Western Sahara and its people ensuing from its failure to decolonise the territory in line with the UN doctrine. According to Ruiz Miguel (2008), Spain is still under the obligation to observe, respect and promote the right to self-determination of the people of the territory and to maintain the separate and distinct character of the latter with a view to avoiding any obstacle to the future self-determination.[14] Yet, all Spanish successive governments have failed to assume their responsibilities vis-à-vis the decolonisation of Western Sahara. Furthermore, the current Socialist-led Spanish government has been lately engaged in diplomatic actions that, despite their rhetoric, have only complicated the situation and cast more doubts over Spain’s role as an impartial facilitator in the conflict resolution process.

Other third parties include the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union) and the United Nations that intervened, at different stages of the conflict, to settle the dispute.

Causes and Core Issues of the Conflict

After identifying the primary parties, the analysis will now focus on determining the causes that underlie the conflict and the core issues around which it has developed, and then how they are perceived and articulated by the two parties. Without doubt, identifying the causes of a certain conflict helps us both to understand the nature of the conflict and to deal with it.

The root causes of any given conflict are typically the situations and factors that make a social conflict escalate and reach varying degrees of violence. Conflicts are obviously never mono-causal, but are underpinned by a variety of causes that dynamically interact over the span of the conflict.

My focus however will be on what I consider the structural causes of the conflict in Western Sahara. By structural causes, I mean the “underlying reasons” of the violent conflict that set the global context in which the parties interact, pursue their goals and use the means to achieve them. As outlined above, the structural direct cause of the conflict in Western Sahara is thus Morocco’s military invasion and annexation of the territory in 1975, which provoked resistance on the part of the Sahrawi people under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO. This situation has led to more than 16 years of outright war and so far other 17 years of war, but by other means.

Goals of the Parties

To understand the nature of the conflict, it is also important to identify the goals of the conflict parties, or their desirable outcomes of the conflict, and to place these issues within the context of the dispute.

In analysing the goals of the parties, it is also useful to make a distinction between their positions and interests, where the first describes the specific demands publicly articulated by the disputants, and the second refers to the underlying needs that drive them.

Positions of the parties

In any conflict situation, the goals of the parties and the way in which they articulate them (positions) are typically described as diametric opposites. As regards the conflict in question, Morocco’s recourse to violence (in the form of invasion and forced annexation) was prompted, first, by its intention to recover what it perceived as a “despoiled” land, and then (in the face of the Sahrawi resistance) to defend the “territorial integrity” of the Kingdom. By contrast, the goal of the Frente POLISARIO is to defend the country (over which Morocco has no legal sovereignty) and liberate it from foreign occupation as a prerequisite for the Sahrawi people to be able to exercise their internationally recognised and inalienable right to self-determination.

The positions of the conflicting parties are usually framed in the form of either a status-quo maintaining or status-quo changing (Sandole, 2007). In this case, Morocco intends to maintain its de facto control of the territory, although no country or international organisation recognises de jure this situation. In contrast, the Frente POLISARIO is engaged in status-quo changing by seeking to put an end to the occupation and institute an independent state as a result of a self-determination referendum.

Interests of the parties

Whilst positions are articulated in visible forms and could be assessed objectively, needs and interests are subjective and hence hard to gauge accurately. However, this does not mean that these self-perceived elements cannot be analysed, but any analysis requires some caution. Caution is essential, not least in the case of third parties that seek to intervene to help settle a given conflict. This is because they have to take into account the parties’ own needs instead of imposing their visions of those needs on the parties.

Unlike the parties’ positions, interests refer to the desires, concerns and fears that underlie those positions. Many theorists contrast interests with positions (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 1991: 40). It is suggested that when framed in terms of positions, conflicts often appear to be highly intractable, since one party may want something that the other party diametrically opposes. It is also argued that redefining the conflict situation in terms of the reasons that underlie the parties’ positions may enable the parties to identify win-win solutions.

Some conflict theorists combine the concepts of interests and needs. However, human needs theorists distinguish between the two, arguing that one of the primary causes of intractable conflicts is people’s unyielding drive to meet their unmet needs on the individual, group and societal level (Northrup, 1989). Interests in this sense may represent tangible things that could be traded and bargained for, whereas needs are intangible things such as identity, security and recognition, which cannot be compromised. Human needs theorists, however, argue that, although needs cannot be traded, they could be addressed in a generally win-win situation (Rothman, 1997) that is beneficial to the parties concerned.

In terms of the conflict in question, the main concern for the Moroccan Kingdom is to preserve the monarchical establishment itself and to sustain its nationalist prestige and, in part, its legitimacy that has inextricably been linked with the issue of Western Sahara. Another key concern lies in maintaining the individual and collective interests of other shareholders that have big stakes in the conflict. These include the military establishment of which bulk is stationed in Western Sahara, and the political and business class that form part of the Makhzen system. [15]

As far as the Sahrawis are concerned, it is their collective feeling that their national identity is being attacked and denied by the Moroccan state that has prompted their involvement in the conflict in the first place. For them, Morocco does not only claim their land, but also denies the existence of a Sahrawi people. The translation of this denial in the realm of politics was the bombardment of Sahrawi civilians with napalm and white phosphorus in 1975, and the scorched-earth policy pursued by Moroccan occupying forces in Western Sahara. It is also reflected in the various forms of violence practiced nowadays against civilians in the territories under Morocco’s occupation, and the deliberate destruction of Sahrawi cultural heritage.

Some commentators describe the conflict in Western Sahara as the case of two nationalisms pitted against each other. However, unlike the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where two national identities fight for establishing themselves on the same land, the Moroccan-Sahrawi conflict was originally triggered by a ruling elite making use of an ultranationalist ideology for rallying support for its cause. It is true that the official discourse of the Moroccan regime about the “morrocanity” of Western Sahara has been embraced and widely diffused by all state apparatuses to the extent that it has purportedly become the first national cause. Yet the realties on the ground demonstrate that, notwithstanding the timid opening taking place under the new king, the question of Western Sahara is still the exclusive domain of the ruling elite. It is little wonder bearing in mind the incalculable consequences that a possible solution to this question may have on the existence of the monarchy itself.

It is this context of confrontation of interests and needs that has largely shaped the way in which the parties have related to each other, which has been characterised by a great deal of hostility and suspicion mainly during the violent stage of the conflict. Even though the feelings of enmity may have been lessened following the cease-fire of 1991, suspicion is still there especially after Morocco unilaterally backed out from the mutually agreed and UN-sanctioned agreements. The persistence of human rights violations in the territories under Moroccan occupation has also sparked strong feelings of resentment and rejection amid Sahrawi population. If these violations continue, they may lead to further violence, and the situation may slide again into the spiral of violent conflict.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990:282) have suggested that when conflicts escalate, the aggressor, rather than taking the blame itself, tends to place the blame on the victim because it challenges its aggression. By doing this, the aggressor shapes its own reality and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that the victim is malevolent. A prime example of this behaviour is the Moroccan official and media discourse that repeatedly describes the Frente POLISARIO as a “secessionist movement” in order to justify its aggressive conduct.

The search for a mutually negotiated solution to the conflict would primarily require restoration of trust between the two conflicting parties. This may involve attempts to break the psychological barriers, which have been erected in the course of the conflict, through incremental confidence-building measures (CBMs). A few initiatives have been made in this regard including, for instance, visits by Moroccan journalists to the Sahrawi refugee camps, and the publication in some Moroccan newspapers of interviews and articles penned by Sahrawi activists and officials of the Frente POLISARIO. The United Nations has also been engaged in a series of CBMs and it is willing to expand those measures, but Morocco is still unwilling to accept the proposed arrangements.[16]

Conflict Dynamics

Conflict is “something ever-changing, ever dynamic” (Galtung, 1996:89). Even if the parties are at a stalemate, aspects of the conflict context keep on shifting. Moreover, the ways in which the parties respond to conflict and the means by which they attempt to achieve their goals influence and direct the course of the conflict. The action of one party determines to some extent the responding action of the other party, and it is this action-reaction pattern that typically shapes conflict dynamics.

As outlined above, the “Green March” and the subsequent invasion by Moroccan forces of the northern parts of Western Sahara in October 1975 were “triggering events” that marked the start of the manifest conflict between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO.

Since its beginning, the conflict witnessed a rapid escalation of violence with destructive consequences for both parties. However, by the early 1980s, the intensity of the conflict was reduced due to the construction of the Moroccan defensive walls (the berm) and the huge cost that Morocco was incurring to continue the war. By that time, the two parties came to realise that neither side was able to achieve a military solution to the conflict. This situation provoked a stalemate, which gave the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union) and the United Nations an opportunity to intervene by brokering a peace deal that the two parties accepted. With the entry into force of the UN-supervised cease-fire in September 1991, which is still in place, the violent conflict was completely de-escalated. This de-escalation phase, which some would describe as one of “no war, no peace”, is what prevails now and no one is certain of what it may lead to. Will it lead to a final solution, the continuation of the status quo, or, what is worse, the resumption of hostilities? This question cannot be easily answered.

Possibilities for Solution

In the context of the previous discussion, I will now outline the prospects for resolving the conflict and the possibilities to which they may lead. I will mention these possibilities in an order of likelihood.

1. In my view[17], it seems more likely now that the impasse will continue for some time. Given the already known positions of the two parties and the lack of interest by the key powers in the Security Council to press for any solution to this low intensity conflict, there seems to be no way out in the near future. The status quo is likely to continue for many months or years to come. Obviously, the maintenance of the status quo has thus far benefited Morocco, which continues to control three-quarters of Western Sahara, whilst seeking to obtain international recognition for its de facto annexation of the territory.

2. Another possibility is that the two parties engage in direct negotiations in good faith, without preconditions, to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution as requested by the Security Council in its latest resolutions on Western Sahara. However, given the history of negotiations between the two parties, where agreements were concluded and sanctioned by the UN and then violated with impunity by Morocco, negotiations may not lead to any substantive results unless new factors are brought into play.

2.1. Among these factors may be the intensification of the Sahrawi peaceful uprising in the occupied territories that began in May 2005, which may make the situation much harder for Morocco, compelling it then to consider negotiating for a settlement. However, it is still too early to assess what impact the uprising may have on the situation in Morocco in the long run.

2.2. Another related factor is the possibility of drastic internal changes taking place in one side that may compel it to go to the negotiating table. What happened in Indonesia in 1998 in relation to the case of East Timor is an example of how significant changes in one camp could lead to the settlement of a protracted conflict.

2.3. Another important factor, which has until now been clearly absent, is a stronger involvement by the UN in the resolution of the conflict and a greater interest by key powers in exerting considerable pressure on Morocco to allow the self-determination referendum to take place. For the UN to engage very actively in the issue it may have to resort to Chapter VII of its Charter, which provides for enforcement measures. However, it is very likely that France will oppose any resolution imposing an unfavourable solution on Morocco.

3. Another possibility is that the two parties voluntarily, with or without the assistance of the UN, reach a mutually agreed arrangement leading to a just, lasting, and viable solution consistent with international legality. For this to happen, however, it requires a genuine political will on the part of the elite currently ruling in Morocco that has not yet showed any interest in any solution, not least in the context of international legality and norms.
4. Lastly, should all these factors fail to bring about a solution to the conflict, the likelihood of active hostilities between the two parties would be greater. Obviously, the resumption of violent conflict in Western Sahara will be in nobody’s interest, and it is certain that it will be a source of extreme instability not only in northwest Africa but also in the whole Mediterranean region.

Conclusion

The discussion above has made it clear that the direct, structural cause that underlies the ongoing conflict in Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO is Morocco’s military invasion and annexation of the territory in 1975. The origins of this action, however, lie in the expansionist ideology of the “Greater Morocco” and the subsequent territorial claims that the Moroccan regime has laid on its neighbours. As expected, Morocco’s military invasion provoked a reaction and resistance on the part of the Sahrawi people led by the Frente POLISARIO.

This situation has led to a protracted conflict that has lasted for over three decades, which continues to pose a potential danger for stability and security in the entire region of North Africa. Despite the successive efforts of the international community to resolve the conflict, a mutually agreed solution remains elusive. Yet, for the peoples of the region to achieve their aspirations to integration, development and peace, a rapid, just and sustainable solution to the conflict has become more urgent than ever.

In this context, I believe that a peaceful, just and lasting solution to conflict in Western Sahara necessarily entails the exercise by the Sahrawi people of their internationally recognised and inalienable right to self-determination through a negotiated, democratic and free process that is consistent with international legality and norms. In this process, they could decide their political future, either to be independent, integrate into Morocco or settle for another arrangement. In any case, the final word should be theirs.

I also believe that the success of the UN-led negotiation process will depend not only on the political will on both sides to achieve a mutually acceptable solution consistent with international legality, but also on their ability to think seriously about their relations in the post-conflict context. This process of cooperative thinking will imply, among other things, determining the mutual guarantees in all vital areas, which each party would be willing to grant to the other with a view to achiving not only a win-win solution, but also one that will address the core issues around which the conflict has developed. The proposal presented by the Frente Polisario to the UN in April 2007 contains significant elements to be considered in this regard. What is needed, therefore, is not only a settlement of the conflict that addresses the publically articulated positions of the parties, bus also a transformaion of the root conflict in the first place. In other words, what is needed is a solution that does not only end the hostilities but also seeks to address the structural causes of the violent conflict in order to create the underlying conditions for a sustainable peace in the whole region.

Notas
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[1] Since its independence in 1956, Morocco has had five constitutions promulgated respectively in 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996.
[2] Many works have been written about the authoritarian nature of the monarchical system in Morocco. One important historical study on this subject is done by the Moroccan scholar, Abdellah Hammoudi’s, in his book Master and Disciple: the Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism (University of Chicago Press, 1997).
[3] Patricia Campbell “Morocco in Transition: Overcoming the Democratic and Human Rights Legacy of King Hassan II”. African Studies Quarterly 7, no. 1, , accessed 2 March 2004.
[4] Because of its repressive history, Morocco has often been listed among the world’s most repressive regimes. See, for instance, “Freedom in the World 2003: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties”, A Special Report to the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 2003.
[5] On 7 July 1956, the Istiqlal daily newspaper, Al Alam, published a map of the “Greater Morocco”, and a month later, the expansionist policy was endorsed by the party’s congress.
[6] In 1957, a new department was created at the Moroccan Interior Ministry called “General Directorate for Saharan and Frontier Affairs” and a cousin of Allal el-Fassi, Abdelkebir, was named head of the department (Pazzanita, 2006).
[7] On 8 June 1970, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed in Casablanca between Morocco and Mauritania.
[8] GA resolution 3292 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974.
[9] ICJ (1975) Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975, ICJ 12ICJ, < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum = 323&code = sa&p1 = 3&p2 = 4&case = 61&k = 69&p3 = 5>, accessed 20 November 2008.
[10] In August 1975, two months before the ICJ issued its ruling, King Hassan II stated that “whatever the result, Morocco will recover its rights over its despoiled provinces no later than toward the end of this year” (quoted in Hodges, 1983: 207).
[11] Mauritania joined Morocco in invading and partitioning Western Sahara by virtue of Madrid accords of 14 November 1975. However, in 1979, it formally abandoned its claim to Western Sahara, and signed a peace agreement with the Frente POLISARIO. Morocco immediately moved to annex the portion previously claimed by Mauritania.
[12] See, for instance, A/RES/34/37 of 21 November 1979.
[13] The Frente POLISARIO publicly voiced great concern about France’s position at the Security Council in April 2008, which rejected any reference to human rights in the Council’s resolution on Western Sahara. The position was described as “contrary to the international community’s efforts for peace in the region.” , accessed 14 July 2009.
[14] See Carlos Ruiz Miguel (2008): “Spain’s Legal Obligations as Administering Power of Western Sahara” a paper delivered at the International Conference on Multilateralism and International Law, with Western Sahara as a Case Study, Pretoria, South Africa (4- 5 December 2008), , accessed 20 July 2009.
[15] Makhzen is a specific form of authority that is present throughout the governing class in Morocco with the king as its linchpin, and it is considered the “power behind the throne”.
[16] One case in point was the reluctance of the Moroccan delegation to discuss and accept the package of CBMs proposed during the UN-sponsored negotiations held in Manhasset last year.
[17] Similar views were expressed in my article Omar, Sidi M. (2008): “The Right to Self-determination and the Indigenous People of Western Sahara”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21-1, 41-57.

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Source: http://www.gees.org/articulo/6705/

sábado, 3 de outubro de 2009

Extract from President Obama speech before the UN General Assembly 2009


...This Assembly’s Charter commits each of us -- and I quote -- "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." Among those rights is the freedom to speak your mind and worship as you please; the promise of equality of the races, and the opportunity for women and girls to pursue their own potential; the ability of citizens to have a say in how you are governed, and to have confidence in the administration of justice. For just as no nation should be forced to accept the tyranny of another nation, no individual should be forced to accept the tyranny of their own people. (Applause.)

As an African American, I will never forget that I would not be here today without the steady pursuit of a more perfect union in my country. And that guides my belief that no matter how dark the day may seem, transformative change can be forged by those who choose to side with justice. And I pledge that America will always stand with those who stand up for their dignity and their rights -- for the student who seeks to learn; the voter who demands to be heard; the innocent who longs to be free; the oppressed who yearns to be equal.

Democracy cannot be imposed on any nation from the outside. Each society must search for its own path, and no path is perfect. Each country will pursue a path rooted in the culture of its people and in its past traditions. And I admit that America has too often been selective in its promotion of democracy. But that does not weaken our commitment; it only reinforces it. There are basic principles that are universal; there are certain truths which are self-evident -- and the United States of America will never waver in our efforts to stand up for the right of people everywhere to determine their own destiny. (Applause.)

Philippe Mora opens his diary


I was in Sydney’s Chinatown, enjoying delicious steamed lobster with ginger and attending the recent Film Festival, when I got a dramatic phone call. An old friend and cameraman for three of my films, Carlos Gonzalez, was calling from Los Angeles to say that a West Saharan woman, Fetim, from Tindouf refugee camp in Algeria, was flying in to Sydney to denounce a film portraying her as a slave. Carlos was a friend of Fetim, and he asked me would I meet her at the airport. He said the family was very distressed at the allegations and felt betrayed by the Australian film-makers who had lived with them on the pretext they were making a documentary about a family reunion.

Frankly, after decades of battles I have issue fatigue. But I knew Carlos had impeccable credentials on this issue, known as the Forgotten Conflict. He had risked his life in 2006 to go into occupied Western Sahara to film interviews with indigenous children who had been allegedly tortured by the Moroccan occupiers. (Morocco had invaded in 1975.) He was arrested and interrogated for eight hours on 3 June 2006 by Moroccan police and intelligence officers, including the notorious alleged torturer Mohammed El Hassouni, known as ‘Moustache’. He was then promptly deported and denounced in the Moroccan press, to our great amusement, but not to his, as being a spy for Hugo Chavez and Mossad. Since I knew he was neither but a director of children’s shows for Nickelodeon in Hollywood and a generally standup fellow, I agreed to help his incoming ‘slave’ friends.

Fetim and her husband Baba arrived chainless early in the morning and I greeted them with Kamal Fadel, the Australian representative of the Polisario, the political organisation that had flown them out. Charismatic, smart and open, I immediately liked Kamal and his two guests. Slaves with passports! They headed for friends in Glebe, where all slaves hang out when they’re in Sydney.

Then the whole thing blew up. Fetim’s dramatic denunciation of the film Stolen that night at the festival ended up on the front page of the Sydney Morning Herald. The ABC’s 7.30 Report went after the flaws in the film. Stolen received a barrage of blistering criticism for mistranslations, re-enactments, lack of releases from leading participants, Mondo Cane-type sensationalism, blurring of facts, maps and history. One of the film-makers’ aunts vigorously defended the film on blogs. Meanwhile I had re-connected with old mate, wit, great writer and political connoisseur, Bob Ellis, and as an unlikely Poirot and Sherlock Holmes duo we made some inquiries. An angry UN interviewee cried foul at the film, as did a key translator. Ellis and I exchanged opinions on the film way too rude, if not obscene, for publication in this august magazine. The Morocco-Polisario conflict underlying the debate was not a left-right debate as the film-maker’s aunt tried to make out. In fact, James Baker, no pinko, had tried to help the Polisario with vigour in the Nineties.

Producer Tom Zubrycki announced people were trying to ‘do a job’ on the film. He backed out of an interview with me. We met tyro filmmakers Dan Fallshaw and Violeta Ayala in a bar and complained the problem was that people were jealous of them, that Ellis had fought with his wife (sic), that slavery is a state of mind, and other irrelevant inanities. Ellis, like a cultural Grim Reaper, said to Fallshaw, who blanched: ‘You are going to jail, son.’

The story continued last week when a revamped version, with piquant deletions, was shown at the Melbourne International Film Festival with a disclaimer belatedly added by co-financier Screen Australia. Questions about whether Polisario-haters in Morocco contributed funding to the film remain unanswered.

Other serious queries remain about this film, and as a sometime documentary film-maker I maintain that fakery and fraud, if that is what this is, hurts us all as film-makers, journalists and film-goers. It’s my opinion, for example, that it is either dishonesty, negligence or incompetence not to get releases from people one is portraying in a film making such grave allegations. I am no saint, but certain standards should be de rigueur. Perhaps there was acute First World arrogance in this situation. A few Australians pontificating about alleged slavery and really hurting people in the guise of helping them is a bit rich. An Italian NGO in the camp described Ayala as a ‘mythomaniac’.

By contrast, a recent positive highlight was vicariously going into orbit and repairing the Hubble telescope. My wife Pamela and I met six of the astronauts who fixed it in May at a special event at the Academy in Beverly Hills. The astronaut film-makers took up 30 cameras including an IMAX 3D camera that could only film for eight minutes. At a mission cost of US$1.1 billion to fix the Hubble, the eight-minute film element must be the most expensive movie ever made. The bemused astronauts, dressed in Jetsons-style retro blue overalls, mingled with us Hollywood types over drinks and snacks. We watched extraordinary footage of the mission with the jubilation of being in space popping out of the screen.

I am working on a 3D film about the life of Salvador Dali with producer Fred Bestall of Delux Films in Luxembourg, so I am immersed in notions of surrealism. I don’t think one needs to contrive surrealism because arguably life itself is often surreal. A Daliesque thought: perhaps molecules from the hands of refugees on my hand rubbed off on the Hubble mission astronaut’s hand? The Hubble is searching for the origin of the universe, the refugees search for justice and food for their children. Do these connections mean anything or are they random events? Is all this surreal? Dali himself said: ‘I don’t do drugs. I am drugs!’
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Source: http://www.spectator.co.uk/australia/5289343/diary.thtml

Western Sahara’s "Wall of Shame"


How the longest active military wall continues to divide the Saharawi people
By Timothy Kustusch — Special to GlobalPost

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ARABUNI CAMP, Algeria — It is almost half the size of the Great Wall of China, four times the length of the wall in the West Bank, and 16 times longer than the Berlin Wall ever was, but few have heard of the 1,600-mile-long Moroccan military wall that divides the Western Sahara.

On the western side of the wall, Morocco exerts de facto control over what the Saharawis call the “Occupied Territories.” On the eastern side, the Saharawis’ Polisario Front governs and maintains its military forces.

The Saharawis refer to the Moroccan barrier as the “Wall of Shame,” not only because it divides the 160,000 Saharawi refugees in Algeria from their families and friends in the Moroccan held territory, but also because it threatens the lives and livelihoods of the thousands of Saharawi nomads that still wander through the Western Sahara’s deserts.

Construction of the wall began in 1980. Since 1975, the Saharawi People’s Liberation Army (ALPS) had been battling the Moroccan and Mauritanian armies (until the latter’s defeat in 1979), using lightning-strike guerrilla tactics that exhausted their adversaries’ traditional armies.

In the face of ALPS victories, the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) began work on a long barrier of simple sand embankments meant to slow down the fast-moving Saharawi soldiers. Between 1980 and 1987, five heavily fortified walls were added to the east and south, completely cutting off the Saharawi soldiers and refugees from their home cities, such as Layoune and Smara.

A desert party near Timbuktu Today, despite a ceasefire signed in 1991, both parties actively patrol their respective sides of the wall. Along the western side, Morocco maintains about 160,000 troops, reinforced by heavy military installations every seven miles, which include radar, artillery and tanks.

The Polisario refuses to cite the number of units that patrol its seven military regions on the eastern side of the wall, claiming that if war is resumed, all Saharawis will come to the front lines to fight.

From afar, the Moroccan military wall appears to be a sandy hill with a few helmeted soldiers peering over the top. A more accurate depiction, however, is given by Hamdi, a 24-year-old Saharawi from Layoune who crossed the wall on foot in 2007 to escape imprisonment by Moroccan police for his pro-independence activities:

"First, I cross a small ditch, about one meter deep and one meter across. Then I arrive at a low wall of rocks. These rocks are loose, so when you try cross the berm, they fall and make noise, so the soldiers come. Then there is other, much bigger trench. When I climb out of that, I cross last wall of sand and rock, which is more than two meters up. I pull myself over, jump down to other side, jump over big barbed wire fence, and run across live field of mines in black of night. I am very afraid of step on mines, but I think, ‘If I make it this far, I have to trust Allah that I make it through the field of mines alive.’”

Hamdi is one of thousands of Saharawis who have crossed the wall to flee the Moroccan police and escape to the refugee camps outside of Tindouf, Algeria. Most cross the wall at night with a handful of belongings, a bag of dates, and a few liters of water. After traversing the barrier, they often must spend days walking through the desert before reaching a group of nomads or a Saharawi military company that will take them to the camps.

Of course, that is only if they survive the nighttime trek across the field of anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines. Though the exact number of mines on the eastern side of the wall is unknown, estimates range from one million to over 10 million, and the U.N. consistently ranks the Western Sahara as one of the top 10 territories most contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs).

In April, the true threat of these mines became very real for more than 1,200 international visitors who were participating in an annual protest march in front of the berm. During the protest, a group of young Saharawis charged towards the Moroccan soldiers on the other side of the wall, hurling both rocks and insults. A 19-year-old charged forward, and although others tried to restrain the youth, he stepped on a mine and blew off his right foot, injuring four others.

A desert party near Timbuktu “You have all seen in a very tangible way how easily Morocco’s wall can convert human life into death,” said Abdelkadar Taleb Omar, a senior member of the Polisario, the following day.

Muhamed Abdelaziz, the secretary general of the Polisario Front, expressed his desire for U.S. President Barack Obama to press Morocco to dismantle its wall, calling it a “grave violation of human rights.”

For the Saharawi people, however, the Western Saharan conflict is shrouded by another wall — what they refer to as “a media blockade.” The Saharawis insist that their decades-old conflict is painfully underreported in the international media. They say that until this media wall is torn down and the international community becomes interested in the Western Saharan conflict, it is likely that Morocco’s 1,600-mile berm will remain standing.

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Source: http://mobile.globalpost.com/dispatch/africa/090808/western-saharas-wall-shame