The Crisis of the Opposition in Morocco

The political alliances that drove the Moroccan opposition parties to power have reversed their wager. More than 10 years after their coexistence in power, they seem to be expending their role which was hoped to bring about the desired reforms.

The accusations leveled by Hamid Chabat, the mayor of the city of Fez, against the historic leader of the opposition National Union of Popular Forces, the late Mehdi Ben-Barka, were enough to sparkle a crisis between the grandchildren of the national movement, specifically between the Socialist Union and the Independence Party, on the eve of the municipal elections which also coincided with a protest movement paralyzing the transportation sector.

The mayor of Fez triggered the crisis at a moment of discord between the brothers-enemies who have struggled and coexisted for long periods of the political and trade union history in Morocco. The National Union sprang from the Independence Party amidst an ideological struggle between the elites of the national movement. From the contradictions of the National Union, the Socialist Union came out with a completely different vision that rests on change from within through the ballot boxes. Influenced by these ideas and inclinations, the two Parties (Independence and Socialist Union) fought endless wars among each other and against the authorities for several years.

Only the late King Hassan II could see the whole scene on board an Algeria-bound ship. The political distance between Morocco and its eastern neighbor was much farther. When he realized that nothing could separate countries that are bound to coexist, he whispered to the leaders of the opposition to unite their ranks.

During the first years of King Hassan II’s term in office, fire broke out between the national movement parties and trade unions. Thus Mehdi Ben-Barka paid with his life the price for the power struggle. It was difficult for the opposition parties to cross the desert until Hassan II realized that historic harmony between the parties and the royal palace could protect Morocco against "sunstrokes."

The King found in the socialist leader Abdul Rahman Al-Youssefi the right man to end the struggle. The Independence Party in turn embraced the formula of consensual rotation of power as a prelude to redress some of the historic mistakes. Yet this formula, which started at the end of the 1990s on the backdrop of a regional consensus over the internal struggle in Algeria, and a domestic wager to contain social chaos, does not seem to have closed off all loopholes to vent out steam. 10 years later, this experience does not seem to have exhausted all its political reasons. Yet, it has weakened as a result of faulty mechanisms. Reviving the struggles of the past only portends a faulty vision for the future.

The Independence Party has changed with its leader Abbas Al-Fassi taking office as prime minister. So has the Socialist Union which lost its clout after the 2007 elections. But nothing justifies their return to clashing except if there are hidden hands pulling the strings from behind. It will be regrettable for the two parties to surrender now to the ghosts of the past which haunted them in bygone times, ghosts which do not seem to have left for good.

The mystery still engulfs the identity of who assassinated the Moroccan opposition figure Mehdi Ben-Barka in Paris. Human rights organizations were formed and political trials were held. Yet grey areas remained concerning the tale of the man’s assassination. Only the street named after him in a classy neighborhood in Rabat highlights the official and popular esteem held for this man, even though all the investigations have yet to help his family find his grave to visit it.

What wind is this that diverted the investigation into his death to another issue which concerns the accusations leveled by his political enemies, who hold him responsible for struggles and events? It is no coincidence. History alone can distinguish the good deeds of men from their mistakes. With no doubt, the necessary harmony is not aimed at opening the wounds of the past but at looking towards the future. For there are generations concerned with reading the open pages of history to draw conclusions about what is happening today and what will happen tomorrow on the ground of reality.

Mauritania’s internet media under fire

Abbass Ould Braham, a University of Nouakchott professor and writer for Taqadoumy — the leftist Mauritanian news website often cited here — was arrested this Monday after writing a lengthly piece accosting the junta. Ould Braham was taken into custody in a cafe in the capital, though no official warrant was put out for his arrest: Taqadoumy reports that “When his friend asked why they were taking Abbass away, the police answered that in was in relation to the articles he writes regularly for Taqadoumy“. Reporters held a sit in to show solidarity with Ould Braham, to which the authorities responded with tear gas, beating some protestors with batons. Taqadoumy, likely the second largest news site in Mauritania, has now been blocked and banned by Chinguitel and Mauritel servers, on the orders of the General Prosecutor. The spokesman of junta-leader Mohamed Abdel Aziz apologized today for both the arrest of Ould Braham and the “inappropriate” treatment of journalists’ protest but stopped short of anything else. Ould Braham’s case, he said, was not the president’s responsibility but rather that of the judiciary. In other words, do not expect anything much. The Justice Ministry has said that it pursued Taqadoumy after receiving numerous complaints alleging that “the newspaper published false rumors increasingly detrimental to the public and private interests and the values and morality” and that Taqadoumy has “come so far out of the limits of the freedom of the press law and offers to set the community, security and stability at risk.” There is pressure building.

A few words on Taqadoumy. Taqadoumy’s (”Progressive”) general disposition is left-leaning. Since the August coup it has been especially critical of Mohamed Abdel Aziz and his clique, and was critical of the corruption and mismanagement that characterized Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi’s brief term. It is entirely web-based and is a rather low budget affair from a technological point of view. Since its recent opening it has become one of Mauritania’s leading news sources. It is the brainchild of Hanafi Dahah, and has plowed through with a strong line against the coup.

It also has ties to the underground Consience et Résistance (CR) movement (whose leader became Human Rights minister after the coup, to the grave irritation of the membership). While it cannot be said that Taqadoumy is CR’s mouth piece, one staffer gave me a hyperbolic, though not unbelievable (from anecdotal experience), percentage that indicates at least a great number of Taqadoumy’s staff are members or somehow involved with CR. CR is known for being the most effective opposition group outside of Mauritania, and for driving the anti-slavery agenda, as well as for being among the most vociferous opponents of the Ould Taya regime. It is widely disliked by the authorities and many in traditional society because of its radicalism and its secularism: Its battle cry is, after all, لنفرض التغير ”Let us impose change”. Not only were the groups members heavily persecuted in previous years, but so were those with even the slightest association. So there is a history of opposition both on Taqadoumy and within it.

The junta — and this must not be forgotten — has its own roots from within Ould Taya’s apparatus, and fully understands this context. It attempted to set up a website soon after taking power, which was met with shrugs. Having lost the internet media war — most of the online Mauritanian news is critical of the junta — the junta is lashing out at those who have won. It took early swipes at Sahara Media and Anbaa, as well. The junta is less and less popular as General Abdel Aziz’s naked ambition for power becomes more apparent, and as its international efforts continue to be ineffective in allowing the regime to muster any legitimacy in African, European or Arab circles. There are few, if any, internet laws on the books in Mauritania, and as one Taqadoumyista asks, “who is next?”

Update: Ould Braham was released shortly after detention, and Taqadoumy allowed back online.

The Qadhafi Virus Strikes Mauritania

Some points in the wake of Qadhafi’s visit to Mauritania.

1. The opposition is increasingly united in it irritation with Qadhafi’s mediation, which has been characterized variously as biased, “reckless,” and “dangerous”. His speech was in typical fashion: Harkening to Fatimid glory, the role of Mauritania in spreading Islam through Africa, the folly of democracy and the Mauritanian project in particular: “There is no difference between elections and coups” claiming that “elections lead to undermining the stability of countries, which is the most important thing in nations’ lives”. Opposition leaders Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, Ahmed Ould Daddah and others walked out. Mauritanians appear to have dismissed Qadhafi’s seven point plan for the resolution of the crisis: His remarks in support of the junta have rendered it without credibility. Instead of resolving the crisis, Qadhafi’s arrival seems to have brought opposition elements closer together in their opposition to the junta and to Libya’s attempt to move in. Despite his own appeals to the contrary it is widely believed that the visit was intended to aggrandize Qadhafi rather than to solve anything in Mauritania. According to elements from the opposition who were contacted by Qadhafi, Aziz told the Brother Leader flat out that he intends to run for president in this year’s election. Irritation with the junta’s external backers — at present Libya is the strongest — has turned a great deal of opinion, both within the opposition and among the people, against the junta. Factions within Ould Boulkheir’s party (e.g. Nasserists) have been working to bring the APP to Abdel Aziz, with little luck.
2. The American policy holds increasing relevance in Mauritania, especially in the wake of the visit. Opposition figures wonder what the American position is, how or if it will change. A general sense is growing that the Europeans will compromise for a legal return to the status quo ante, without a resolution or reform of the country’s structural problems, that the African Union has let the country down (and that that it is incapable of doing anything else with Qadhafi at its head), and that the Arabs have used the country as a means of displaying their recurrent irrelevance (a former Mauritanian diplomat involved with the Arab League described the body as “an empty shell”). The United States’ uncompromising position that some Mauritanians are beginning to associate with a way out of the crisis and with a stand for legitimate rule. More on this in a later post, however. If this visit is any indication of how Qadhafi will handle crises as AU chairman going forward, the African Union is in for serious trouble: Like a certain virus, Qadhafi’s strategic ambitions generally require a host body (or institution) — be it of Arab nationalist or pan-Africanist form — and once the course has been run, the host institution dies, with chaos in its wake.
3. Ironically, the country’s most fiercely anti-US political organization, the Islamist Tawassoul, is one of the prime beneficiaries of the stand against the junta. It should also be mentioned that the junta, having aped one of Tawassoul’s main issues — relations with Israel — has taken away much of its relevance from a populist standpoint. It is also notable that the responses to the closing of the Israeli embassy from the eastern Arabs — KSA, Jordan and Egypt — were especially muted. Even leftists seem to have ignored the move. The point was firstly for domestic consumption and secondarily a means of securing support from the better monied radical states like Libya and Iran. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, for its part, has blamed Algeria, Libya and Iran for Mauritania’s sour attitude: Naming Algeria does little to help their cause, as Algiers has been active in working to undermine the junta in Africa and abroad.
4. A note on turn out. It must be said that Qadhafi’s personnel took over security in the Nouakchott’s Olympic Stadium during the visit. A Mauritanian related a story in which he was asked somewhat gruffly by a Libyan security guard if he wanted to enter the stadium to see Qadhafi’s speech. He said no. Others were invited in, and many went on their way. Those who were in attendance, aside from the regular political jumble, were mostly poor locals, often paid to show up to [state-sponsored] political rallies or to greet foreign dignitaries in throngs at the airport or roadside. The mood was not described as hot with wonder at the robbed Libyan’s arrival. Rather, his arrival was described in terms of indignation — how dare the Libyans come into Mauritania with their guards and soldiers, try to impose a solution in support of an illegitimate military regime. “Another foreigner trying to outsmart us” is how one termed the visit. As for why Qadhafi turned in Nouakchott and not Azougui as was originally planned, the best bet is that he changed his mind at the last minute (Libya’s foreign policy seems to be made half from rational calculation and half on the basis of Qadhafi’s mood), considering the harshness and obscurity of that locale (a Mauritanian grumbled that “he is no real bedouin”) and that the capital would deliver his message more clearly.

Security Council adopts resolution 1871 (2009), extending mandate of United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara

Security Council

6117th Meeting (PM)


The Security Council today extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by one year, until 30 April 2010.

Unanimously adopting resolution 1871 (2009), as orally amended, the Council called upon the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Council welcomed the parties’ agreement with the Personal Envoy’s suggestion to hold small, informal talks in preparation for a fifth round of negotiations, recalling its endorsement of the previous report’s recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties were essential to achieve progress in negotiations. It called upon the parties to continue to work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations.

After adoption, speakers expressed satisfaction with the unanimity of the vote, which sent a message to the parties that progress in negotiations should be made. In that regard, they expressed support for the Special Envoy’s proposal to hold small, informal talks before a fifth round of negotiations in Manhasset would begin.

Some speakers emphasized the importance of respect for human rights and welcomed in that regard preambular paragraphs 7 and 8, as orally amended. The representative of Costa Rica, however, emphasizing that political will to reach results was the foundation of mediation, which must be based on absolute respect for the United Nations Charter and for human rights, expressed regret that his proposal to ask for a report on the efforts of the High Commissioner of Human Rights in Western Sahara had not been reflected in the text. That proposal was based on the Secretary-General’s recommendations in his last two reports.

France’s representative, stressing that was no solution to the situation in Western Sahara other than a negotiated political settlement that was inclusive of the concerns of the parties and benefited the whole of the Maghreb region, said that Morocco’s 2007 proposal deserved serious consideration by the parties.

Statements were also made by representatives of United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Austria and Mexico.

The meeting started at 4:47 p.m. and adjourned at 5:12 p.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 1871 (2009) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

“Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007) and 1813 (2008),

“Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

“Reiterating its call upon the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations and with each other to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,

“Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,

“Taking note of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and welcoming the progress made by the parties to enter into direct negotiations,

“Stressing the importance of making progress on the human dimension of the conflict as a means to promote transparency and mutual confidence through constructive dialogue and humanitarian confidence-building measures,

“Welcoming in this context the agreement of the parties expressed in the Communiqué of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara of 18 March 2008 to explore the establishment of family visits by land, which would be in addition to the existing programme by air, and encouraging them to do so in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

“Welcoming the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through United Nations-sponsored talks,

“Noting the Secretary-General’s view that the consolidation of the status quo is not an acceptable outcome of the current process of negotiations, and noting further that progress in the negotiations will have a positive impact on the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

“Welcoming the appointment of the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Ambassador Christopher Ross, and also welcoming his recent visit to the region and ongoing consultations with the parties,

“Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 April 2009 (S/2009/200),

“1. Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) with regard to the ceasefire;

“2. Welcomes the parties’ agreement with the Personal Envoy’s suggestion to hold small, informal talks in preparation for a fifth round of negotiations, and recalls its endorsement of the previous report’s recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in negotiations;

“3. Calls upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007) and 1813 (2008) and the success of negotiations; and affirms its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context;

“4. Calls upon the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;

“5. Invites Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;

“6. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on a regular basis on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices and expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his report;

“7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;

“8. Urges Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund confidence-building measures that allow for increased contact between separated family members, especially family visits, as well as for other confidence-building measures that may be agreed between parties;

“9. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2010;

“10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including pre-deployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

“11. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Background

The Security Council had before it the report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (document S/2009/200), which covers developments since his report of 14 April 2008 (document S/2008/251) and in which he recommends a mandate extension for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2010.

According to the report, the situation in the Territory remains calm. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) marked its thirty-fifth anniversary on 20 May 2008, and on 22 January 2009, it declared an exclusive economic zone for Western Sahara, extending 200 nautical miles from the coast to protect the Territory’s permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. Polisario Front called for the suspension of a 2005 fisheries agreement between Morocco and the on the European Union, whose Commissioner for External Relations met with the leader of the Polisario Front for the first time in December 2008.

The report states that Christopher Ross, the newly appointed Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, met with several high-level representatives of the parties, and with the King of Morocco and the President of Algeria. All his interlocutors confirmed their commitment to cooperation with the United Nations with a view to reaching a solution as soon as possible. However, the Personal Envoy informed the Secretary-General that the positions of the parties have not changed since the fourth round of negotiations, held in Manhasset, New York, from 16 to 18 March 2008, and remain far apart on ways to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution leading to self-determination for the people of Western Sahara.

Welcoming the parties’ commitment to continuing the negotiation process, the Secretary-General recommends that the Council reiterate its call upon Morocco and the Polisario Front to negotiate in good faith, without preconditions, show the political will to enter into substantive discussions and ensure the success of the negotiations.

According to the report, the Secretary-General welcomes the progress made in mine clearing and encourages the parties to continue working with the Mission to establish direct cooperation and communication through a joint military verification commission so as to facilitate their work on mine clearance and other issues of common interest. The continuing exchanges of family visits between the Territory and the refugee camps in the Tindouf area are also welcome, and the parties should continue to work with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and MINURSO to explore the possibility of expanding the confidence-building programme.

Strongly urging the donor community to contribute funds to expand the programme, the Secretary-General concludes by observing that, given the existing circumstances on the ground, and in light of the Personal Envoy’s continuing efforts, the presence of MINURSO remains indispensable for the maintenance of the ceasefire in Western Sahara.

Statements

SUSAN RICE ( United States) said her country fully supported the Secretary-General and his new Personal Envoy in their efforts to find a solution to the question of Western Sahara. The problem had gone on for too long, and as a consequence, poor relations between Morocco and Algeria had prevented cooperation on issues of urgency for North Africa. On the Personal Envoy’s recent trip to the region, all interlocutors had confirmed their commitment to cooperate with the United Nations and concurred with his assessment that informal preparatory talks might help pave the way for formal and more substantive talks. Given the current situation on the ground, the presence of MINURSO remained indispensable.

JEAN-MAURICE RIPERT (France) said there was no solution to the situation in Western Sahara other than a negotiated political settlement that was inclusive of the concerns of the parties and which benefited the whole of the Maghreb region. France would call on the parties to return to the negotiating table as soon as possible in a spirit of realism and compromise, and with the political will finally to reach a just and lasting decision. Morocco’s 2007 proposal deserved serious consideration. France backed the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, as well as the idea of a round of informal talks ahead of formal negotiations.

VITALY CHURKIN ( Russian Federation) said the unanimous adoption of the resolution sent a message to the parties of the need for progress in the negotiations and it could help assist the Personal Envoy’s endeavours to give new life to the peace process. The Russian Federation attached great importance to direct dialogue in the negotiations.

JOHN SAWERS ( United Kingdom) welcomed the unanimous adoption of the resolution as it sent an important message of support for Personal Envoy Ross as he embarked on his new role. The fresh approach provided a real opportunity for the parties to take an equally fresh approach. The United Kingdom strongly urged all the parties to seize the opportunity and undertake talks in the sprit of openness. They should work towards a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution that would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Regarding the resolution’s reference to the “human dimension” of the situation, the United Kingdom firmly believed that an expansion of humanitarian confidence-building measures would do much to restore trust between the parties.

JORGE URBINA ( Costa Rica) said that, while he had voted in favour of the resolution because it was important to lend unanimous Council support to the plan presented by the Personal Envoy, he was not satisfied with the text. As an active advocate of the peaceful settlements of disputes, Costa Rica was sorry that its delegation’s proposals and concerns were not reflected in the text, in particular a proposal to ask for a report on the efforts of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Western Sahara, as requested in the Secretary-General’s last two reports. Unfortunately, the Council had not endorsed the Secretary-General’s conclusions.

PATRICK MUGOYA ( Uganda) said he had voted in favour of renewing the mandate but remained concerned by a number of issues raised in the Secretary-General’s report regarding the human rights situation in the Western Sahara. One of the key areas of concern for the United Nations was human rights, and Uganda was aware that MINURSO’s mandate contained no human rights mechanisms. Uganda, therefore, welcomed the Secretary-General’s reference to the “human dimension” of the situation in Western Sahara and looked forward to concrete action to address the issue on the ground.

PAUL ROBERT TIENDRÉBÉOGO ( Burkina Faso) said the Council should pursue clear objectives and spare no effort to promote a rapid resumption of the Manhasset process. Those objectives were reflected in the resolution, which was the best possible compromise at the present stage.

THOMAS MAYR-HARTING ( Austria) said he hoped a new approach to the Western Sahara question would lead to progress in the Territory and in the refugee camps. To that end, Austria supported the recommendation on consultations between the parties and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the promotion of confidence-building measures.

Council President CLAUDE HELLER (Mexico), speaking in his national capacity, said he was gratified by the adoption of the resolution, in particular the unanimity of the vote, which reflected support for MINURSO’s work and for the initiatives taken by the new Personal Envoy. Mexico also supported the Personal Envoy’s suggestion that small preparatory meetings be organized before a fifth meeting in Manhasset was convened, and trusted that the parties would attend in good faith and without preconditions. Because the Council could not neglect the topic of human rights in its consideration of the situation, Mexico welcomed preambular paragraph 7 of the resolution, which stressed the importance of progress in that regard.

MINURSO mandate extended, rights proposal buried

The UN Security Council just passed its resolution on the mandate of MINURSO, Western Sahara’s peacekeeping mission, granting it a routine extension for a full year. There was little political input, but three points merit mention:

1. According to the Washington Post, the USA did not, as has been public ritual under the last years of the Bush admin, bring up and specifically endorse Morocco’s autonomy plan. France of course did, but was now alone in doing so. This might have been just a random omission, but a curious one still.

2. The Council did not include a human rights component in MINURSO’s mandate, which Morocco opposes (see MPR & Huffington Post). It did add vague language noting “the importance of making progress on the human dimension of the conflict,” but that means nothing. Even so, again according to the Washington Post, “France initially resisted the word ‘human,’ preferring ‘humanitarian.’” (Me, I’m resisting the use of another word.)

3. Finally, the Council endorsed Special Envoy Christopher Ross’s suggestion for informal meetings before proceeding to round five in the official Manhasset negotiations. Both parties had already agreed, even if POLISARIO has said they don’t really see the point (they want spotlight time, not negotiations). The idea of such meetings is to build negotiator confidence and try to get real talks going, since the previous four rounds were made up of nothing but good wine and uncomfortable silences.

The UN-watchers at Inner City Press were, as usual, on the scene, and had a short chat with Ross in which he diplomatically avoided saying anything at all. ICP also suggests that France’s position on Western Sahara may have been used as a bargaining chip to secure another proposal on Sudan. That’s about it. If you’re interested in the dreary spectacle of both sides celebrating this clinically content-free resolution as an outstanding victory for their own side of the war.

Change We Don’t Believe In

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have both, separately, called for a human rights monitoring function to be added to MINURSO’s peacekeeping mandate in Western Sahara, when the issue comes up for discussion in the Security Council tomorrow.


Human rights have not been part of MINURSO’s mandate so far, although they’re very much part of the Western Sahara question. POLISARIO has for a few years now tried to raise the issue, demanding that MINURSO observers be stationed on both sides of the berm, i.e. both in Tindouf (POLISARIO-ruled) and Western Sahara proper (Morocco-ruled). Such an arrangement would be non-political in its setup, in that both sides would be subject to the same scrutiny, and only the bigger offender would have something to fear. But that is of course the problem, since on human rights, there’s not really any question who is the bigger offender — it’s Morocco. As HRW writes about their recent report:

We found a pattern of violations by Moroccan authorities of the right of Sahrawis to speak, associate and assemble peacefully in support of self-determination. The report describes how security forces arbitrarily arrest demonstrators and suspected Sahrawi activists, sometimes beating them and subjecting them to torture, and force them to sign incriminating police statements, all with virtual impunity; the courts then convict and imprison them after unfair trials.

Human Rights Watch devotes a substantial portion of its report to human rights in the Polisario-run refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. While we did not find systematic violations of human rights at the present time, the concerns we noted, including the absence of open debate on fundamental political issues and the survival, in a limited number of cases, of practices related to slavery, heighten our concern that the rights of the Sahrawis living in these camps are vulnerable due to the camps’ extreme isolation, the lack of regular, on-the-ground human rights monitoring, and the lack of oversight by the host country of Algeria.

Add to that Morocco’s blood-soaked history in the region, with hundreds of “disappeared” in the 1970s and 1980s, and the contrast gets even starker. So, it’s easy to understand why POLISARIO feels this is a win-win issue for them. Either they will embarrass Morocco internationally by publicizing its opposition to human rights monitoring, or they get that monitoring and thereby help protect their relatives in the territory, plus add a burden of international criticism to Morocco.

Still, I’m not sure that equation would hold all the way. POLISARIO’s international support has always leaned very heavily on human rights activism and solidarity movements, and it could potentially come to find this arrangement a good less comfortable than they imagine now. They do have some serious human rights violations of their own to deal with, and their talk about having a functioning democracy in Tindouf is shallow propaganda. While it is true that Morocco will be criticized harder than POLISARIO, and for good reason, it will also hurt much less, since Morocco has virtually no human rights-based support to lose. They do have substantial international backing, of course, but that’s all about realpolitik and lobbying, and neither Riyadh nor the Quai d’Orsay nor the White House is likely to pay any attention to what some MINURSO rapporteur writes about arbitrary detention in Dakhla.

International support for Morocco’s position on this issue (the MINURSO mandate), on the other hand, is pretty weak, but probably sufficient. Banning human rights monitors is a difficult position to defend for democratic nations, and even the Bush admin, at the height of its love-fest with Morocco over Western Sahara, seemed ready to approve them. However, France is as always less squeamish about such things, and public opinion couldn’t care less what they do in Africa. In 2006, the Council debated the issue and ended up deadlocked on a tally of 14-1 (everyone vs. France). At that point the US and other nations folded and let it slide rather than bringing the dispute into the open and risk embarrassing Morocco.

This time around, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is trying to fudge the issue in his report to the Council, by just stating in general terms that everyone needs to be nice to each other, without addressing the specific request for a HR component to MINURSO’s mandate. But, it’s up to the Council to decide — tomorrow. It’s certainly no major international issue, but precisely because of that, it will be interesting to see how the US turns under Obama, who ran much of his campaign on promises of a new deal in foreign policy — Change We Can Believe in and all of that. Will Washington be prepared to confront an ally over what should theoretically be a minor non-political human rights problem? My guess is they won’t, and that no one will notice it either, except this fine blog.

Mauritania Brief

Below is a quick roundup of a few relevant points on Mauritania, readers are encouraged to contribute their thoughts and insights. The presidential “race” appears to be shaping up quite predictably, but how the opposition and wider society responds may yet reveal something more substantial.

1. General Abdel Aziz’s resignation is meaningless. This much anyone even glancing at Mauritania should know. The junta leader resigned from the HCE and from his position as head of state. He did not, however, resign from the military as doing so would have separated him from the crucial BASEP unit, which functions essentially as his personal praetorian guard (authority over which he achieved from Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi). It is the basis of his political relevance and power and he will not give it up, meaning that his candidacy and potential presidency will be illegal, though in his mind and that of those behind behind him this matters very little.

2. A merger of forces between RFD/FNDD towards a boycott of the polls and a massive civil disobedience campaign seems likely. The junta has made efforts to divide the opposition parties, employing familiar tactics (see below), opposition members increasingly see the necessity of a common front against the junta in de-legitimizing it and rendering its ability to carry on. Messaoud discusses his relationships with Abdel Aziz and Sidioca in an interview with Al-Akhbar, where he also describes his meetings with Ahmed Ould Daddah.

3. Efforts at collapsing the opposition were dealt setbacks recently. The Constitutional Council rejected the application of Hamidou Baba for candidacy on the RFD ticket, finding no evidence that he was in fact backed by the RFD, which is, after all, boycotting the process. He will have to run as an independent. In the second place, a member of the Council resigned, a slap in the junta’s face.

4. Libya’s personality cult will not extend into one part of Mauritania, contrary to the ambitions of some. The Nouakchott Urban Council refused to re-name a street after Muamar al-Qadhafi, citing his failure to settle the country’s crisis. This adds to junta’s trouble: The agent of the junta’s current circumstance cannot find Mauritanians to honor him, and it will be likely that down the line the junta will grumble for the same reason. For a discussion of Libyco-Mauritanian relations, see this interview with former Mauritanian minister and ambassador Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Weddady. He also provides insight into the RFD’s position.

Advance information (updated)

To spare you the trouble, and prevent MPR from lapsing into an Algeria blog, here are the results of the June 6, 2009 Mauritanian presidential elections:


Winner:

MAURITANIA-POLITICS-COUP-AZIZ- Mohamed ould Abdelaziz. The leader of the 2008 coup against President Abdellahi, and strongman of ever since. He recently resigned from the junta just to run in the elections, but only an idiot would believe that he has truly cut ties with it. The original plan following the coup was to hold elections quickly and resume business as usual. However, strong foreign and domestic resistance has prevented the legitimization of his rule, and by now opposition to junta-rigged elections is such that this might in fact aggravate the crisis. Gen. Abdelaziz has shown himself an expert at coups — both suppressing them (2003, 2004) and organizing them (2005, 2008) — but distinctly less agile as a politician. Nevertheless, even he can win an election organized by himself and boycotted by the opposition.


Also-rans:

Ibrahima Mokhtar Sarr. Leader of AJD/mr, a Peul-majority party representing the grievances of the South and more particularly the personal ambition of Mr. Sarr. Last time he ran, Sarr, a veteran Black Nationalist, scored 8% in the first round of the 2007 elections. His personal following should guarantee him something similar this time, and then — even if the mainstream opposition will boycott — there might be a a significant add-on for not being Gen. Abdelaziz. But note that Sarr has been in favor of the coup since day one.

Kane Hamidou Baba. Defector from the RFD, Ahmed ould Daddah’s party. The RFD was pro-coup (in alliance with AJD/mr), but soured on the thought of elections once it dawned on Daddah that the military wasn’t interested in helping him win. RFD Vice President Kane Hamidou Baba was then kicked out once it became clear he was allying himself with the army and wanted to present himself in the elections. I don’t know how big a chunk of the party he brought with him, but it won’t be enough to let him win, had that ever been anyone’s intention. Oh, and he once blogged.

— — —

So, three candidates. Have there ever been this few people running in a Mauritanian presidential election before? (Except the single-candidate ones back in Mokhtar ould Daddah’s day.) There’s a little bit of time left for others to sign up, but I guess this looks like Abdelaziz is gearing up for a first-round victory. Can’t honestly see how something so blatantly fraudulent will help solve his legitimacy problem.

UPDATE (I): Taqadoumy, whose correspondents in good journalistic fashion sat outside the gates until the registration deadline had passed, tells us that three others found time to file last-minute candidacies, and Tahalil confirms their names. The names of the three are:

- Sghaïr ould M’Bareck, a former prime minister under President ould Tayaa, from 2003 until the 2005 coup. He is also the only Hartani (ex-slave/”black Moor”) candidate, formerly with a background in the el-Hor emancipation movement (from which, famously, opposition leader Messoud ould Boulkheïr launched his career). Since then, a persistent hanger-on apparatchik who has managed to attach himself to three successive, mutually hostile administrations: ould el-Tayaa, Abdellahi and now Abdelaziz.

- Isselmou ould el-Mustapha, chief of a microscopic party (Parti de la convergence démocratique, no seats in parliament) who ran in 2007 as well and scored 0,24%. But hey, quitters never win, and winners never quit.

- Sidi Mohamed ould Ghaouth (who according to the scrupulous staff of Taqadoumy arrived one minute late) is some random guy working in the port office of Nouakchott. My prediction is he will be working there in July 2009 as well.

UPDATE (II): The last two were rejected for filing deficient candidacy applications.

Unlocking the Conflict in Western Sahara

At the end of April, the UN Security Council will have the opportunity to make the right choice or the safe choice when it renews the authorization for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The right choice would be to give the new UN envoy a mandate for peace. To do this, the Security Council would have to secure the commitment of both sides of the conflict, Morocco and the pro-independence Polisario Front, to power-sharing and self-determination. The safe choice, meanwhile, would be to continue under the weak mandate that contributed to the failure of the previous UN envoy.

Though the UN has ritually reauthorized MINURSO since its creation in April 1991, this will be the first time under the Obama administration and its new UN envoy to Western Sahara, Christopher Ross. With an extensive diplomatic background in Middle East and North Africa posts as ambassador to Algeria and Syria, Ross is already quite familiar with the dynamics underlying the conflict.

But will he and the Obama administration back the right choice or the safe choice?

Background to the Dispute
In 1975, Morocco took over Western Sahara, which had been a Spanish colony. The Polisario Front, representing Western Sahara s nascent nationalism, contested Rabat s claim, receiving support from Morocco s regional adversary, Algeria. Their war lasted until 1991, when MINURSO arrived to organize a referendum on independence.

In 1997, Kofi Annan called in former Secretary of State James Baker to clean up the mess. But when Morocco s King Hassan II died in 1999, the new King, Mohammed VI, soon dropped Morocco s support for a referendum. Baker resigned in 2004, largely as a result of weak, often contradictory, support from the Security Council.

Starting in summer 2007, Morocco and Polisario engaged in four rounds of negotiations in Manhasset, New York. The mandate of then-UN Envoy Peter Van Walsum, a former Dutch diplomat, was to lead negotiations "with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara." On the face of it, Van Walsum s mandate seemed contradictory. How can the Security Council expect to achieve a mutually acceptable solution if Morocco rejects a referendum on independence while Polisario demands it?

The Obama administration is well placed to make a clear break with the past habits of the Security Council when it comes to the question of Western Sahara. The most important thing the administration can do is provide the leadership and the political will to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. Western Sahara isn t a problem of imagination; it s a problem of political will, at the level of the parties and the Security Council.

Considering the arc of peace in Western Sahara, waiting for the parties by themselves to develop the political will to enter into good-faith negotiations is decades — not years — away. The prospect of letting the issue of Western Sahara drag on for one or two more generations isn t only morally intolerable, but potentially dangerous.

This, however, does not necessitate taking a partisan position. Rather, it requires that the Security Council act upon its own words to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for self-determination. Peace in Western Sahara will require that both Morocco and Polisario accept something they don t like. Polisario must accept that the achievement of a comprehensive power-sharing agreement with Morocco is a prerequisite for the holding of a referendum. Morocco, on the other hand, must commit to a self-determination referendum as a necessary condition for power-sharing negotiations to start.

Instead of hoping for the situation to ripen the UN envoy should, at the next round of negotiations, secure the commitment of the parties — in writing — to the Security Council resolutions that have guided the previous Manhasset negotiations. Both sides will have to commit to negotiating a political solution and a referendum. This approach not only balances the interests of the parties but also unblocks the commitment problem currently stalling negotiations.

Learning from Baker
The ideological impasse that governs the broader conflict — independence versus integration — was compounded during the 2007-08 Manhasset rounds by a commitment problem. Nether side will take a step until the other does so first. Until Polisario engages in substantive discussions of autonomy, Morocco is unlikely to make concessions for a referendum. But Polisario won t talk autonomy until Morocco first concedes a vote including independence.

Is there a way to break this jam? During the 1997 Morocco-Polisario negotiations that led to the Houston Accords, one of Baker s negotiating tactics was to guarantee that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed. This enabled Morocco and Polisario to engage in detailed negotiations on the particulars of one element of the 1991 Settlement Plan without fear of prejudicing their position on other parts of it. This helped to alleviate the commitment problem while allowing negotiations to progress at a relatively fast pace.

Could such an approach work again for Western Sahara? It s highly unlikely, given the nature of the current ideological impasse. The major difference between 1997 and 2009 is that Morocco is no longer committed to a referendum on independence. In 2001, King Mohammed VI renounced his father s 1981 pledge to allow a self-determination referendum in Western Sahara. Baker was unable to find a formula that would entice Morocco to participate in a referendum on independence. Baker even proposed in 2003 that Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara could vote in referendum on independence alongside the native Sahrawis. Even though Moroccan settlers now outnumber the native Western Saharans by as much as three to one, Polisario was willing to accept this concession for peace. Morocco, on the other hand, staunchly refused to put its claim on Western Sahara to a popular vote, even one that Morocco would likely win hands down.

Baker didn t fail because he was unable to find the magic formula. Western Sahara does not suffer for lack of creative proposals. It is and always has been a problem of political will. Having secured the commitment of Algeria and Polisario to his 2003 proposal, Baker called on the Security Council to commit to its implementation as the only possible compromise between the interests of the parties and international legality. Yet France backed Morocco s rejection of the proposal and successfully watered down Security Council support for the Baker plan. This was the same Security Council that, in 2002, mandated Baker to devise a proposal that would provide for self-determination (Resolution 1429). A year later, it refused to support Baker when he delivered on that requirement. The lesson of Baker s seven-year intervention (1997-2004) is that the Security Council needs to exercise the political will necessary for the UN envoy to achieve peace.

Yet instead of learning the right lesson, the Security Council came away from the Baker experience blaming the parties — if not Baker as well. Peace, the Council assumed, would have to come from Morocco and Polisario voluntarily and not, it seemed, from a strong-handed envoy. The subsequent three-year effort of Van Walsum (2005-8) was predicated on the idea that peace in Western Sahara required the parties to do it themselves. While such an approach relieves the Security Council of having to exercise any overt pressure, it has proven as unproductive as it is quixotic. Van Walsum was able to arrange the first face-to-face negotiations between Morocco and Polisario because the parties feared the repercussions of boycott, not because a breakthrough was on the table. Indeed, there were no talks at Manhasset, only statements of position.

Power Sharing and Self-determination
The Security Council must first realize that prevailing notions of sovereignty are unhelpful. As the work of political scientist Stephen Krasner has vividly shown, sovereignty is rarely absolute in the Westphalian sense. Very few nations have all the attributes of sovereignty. Shared sovereignty and semi-sovereignty are the norm, rather than the exception, in world affairs. The list of such entities is extensive, suggesting that autonomy does not have to be within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty only. It is not only possible for Morocco and Polisario to share sovereignty, it would be quite normal for them to do so. If the choice is presented as power-sharing within Moroccan sovereignty, what dignity does that offer Western Saharan nationalism or Algeria s support for it? Instead, the UN envoy should endorse power sharing without prejudice to either side s claim of sovereignty.

Morocco now seems committed to power-sharing, but what about Polisario? During secret negotiations in late 1996, Polisario was willing to discuss power-sharing within the framework of self-determination. And, likewise in 2003, Polisario committed to a peace plan that involved five years of power-sharing, followed by a referendum that could make the autonomy permanent. And in its 2007 proposals, Polisario further accepted the reality of Moroccan settlers as a permanent fixture in Western Sahara and the need for robust cooperation with Morocco in all areas. Polisario seems willing to consider power-sharing but only in the context of self-determination.

This brings us to the second step: a referendum on self-determination. A referendum including, but not limited to, the option of independence isn t only legally necessary within the current UN framework, but also politically essential. Until Morocco recommits to a self-determination referendum, negotiations in Western Sahara will remain at a standstill. Otherwise, there will be no incentive for Polisario to engage in substantive negotiations over power-sharing. Indeed, one of Polisario s fears is that if they engage in power-sharing talks, the Security Council will back away from its current commitment to self-determination.

The promise of a referendum will encourage the good-faith participation of Polisario, while Morocco will finally be able to negotiate the nitty-gritty of power-sharing. The point is not necessarily to give both sides what they want, but rather to get them talking. The hope is that, by the time Morocco and Polisario hammer out a comprehensive power-sharing agreement, nothing more than a confirmatory referendum will be necessary because a mutually acceptable negotiated solution has been obtained.

The Way Out
There is no contradiction between the Security Council taking a strong stance in favor of both power-sharing and self-determination. Indeed, recent Security Council resolutions have said as much in their calls for a political solution that respects the right of Western Sahara to self-determination. But the Council needs to make this clearer to the parties. To Morocco, the Council needs to state firmly that its claim on Western Sahara will never be legitimated unless it first passes through a referendum. To Polisario, the Council needs to state clearly that it will never get its referendum unless it s willing to discuss power-sharing with Morocco. Substantive negotiations should be seen as the means to, not the result of, self-determination. This approach has the advantage of addressing the interests of Morocco, Polisario, and Algeria without prejudice or favor.

At the next Manhasset round, the UN envoy should secure an agreement between Morocco and Polisario to engage in substantive power-sharing negotiations that will result in a referendum on self-determination. This should be backed up by the April 2009 Security Council resolution reauthorizing MINURSO. The resolution should require the parties agreement to previous resolutions of the council calling for "a mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara."

Until such an agreement is secured and put into writing with the parties signatures, negotiations will remain in an interminable deadlock as they have for the past nine years. Without good-faith negotiations between Polisario and Morocco, there is no other way for the Security Council to create the necessary environment for a durable, self-implementing peace. To move the Western Sahara peace process forward, the Security Council must endorse, and be willing to enforce, a new framework for negotiations based upon mutual respect for the positions of Polisario and Morocco.


Foreign Policy In Focus contributor Jacob Mundy is a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter, and a former fellow with the Center for Maghrib Studies in Algeria. He is co-author of Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution and the 2007 Middle East Report Online report "Western Sahara Between Autonomy and Intifada."

Obama's 100 days - the mad men did well

In his latest column for the New Statesman, John Pilger describes the power of advertising - from the effects of smoking to politics - as he reaches behind the facade of of the first 100 days President Barack Obama.

The BBC's American television soap Mad Men offers a rare glimpse of the power of corporate advertising. The promotion of smoking half a century ago by the “smart” people of Madison Avenue, who knew the truth, led to countless deaths. Advertising and its twin, public relations, became a way of deceiving dreamt up by those who had read Freud and applied mass psychology to anything from cigarettes to politics. Just as Marlboro Man was virility itself, so politicians could be branded, packaged and sold.

It is more than 100 days since Barack Obama was elected president of the United States. The “Obama brand” has been named “Advertising Age’s marketer of the year for 2008”, easily beating Apple computers. David Fenton of MoveOn.org describes Obama’s election campaign as “an institutionalised mass-level automated technological community organising that has never existed before and is a very, very powerful force”. Deploying the internet and a slogan plagiarised from the Latino union organiser César Chávez – “Sí, se puede!” or “Yes, we can” – the mass-level automated technological community marketed its brand to victory in a country desperate to be rid of George W Bush.

No one knew what the new brand actually stood for. So accomplished was the advertising (a record $75m was spent on television commercials alone) that many Americans actually believed Obama shared their opposition to Bush’s wars. In fact, he had repeatedly backed Bush’s warmongering and its congressional funding. Many Americans also believed he was the heir to Martin Luther King’s legacy of anti-colonialism. Yet if Obama had a theme at all, apart from the vacuous “Change you can believe in”, it was the renewal of America as a dominant, avaricious bully. “We will be the most powerful,” he often declared.

Perhaps the Obama brand’s most effective advertising was supplied free of charge by those journalists who, as courtiers of a rapacious system, promote shining knights. They depoliticised him, spinning his platitudinous speeches as “adroit literary creations, rich, like those Doric columns, with allusion...” (Charlotte Higgins in the Guardian). The San Francisco Chronicle columnist Mark Morford wrote: “Many spiritually advanced people I know... identify Obama as a Lightworker, that rare kind of attuned being who... can actually help usher in a new way of being on the planet.”

In his first 100 days, Obama has excused torture, opposed habeas corpus and demanded more secret government. He has kept Bush’s gulag intact and at least 17,000 prisoners beyond the reach of justice. On 24 April, his lawyers won an appeal that ruled Guantanamo Bay prisoners were not “persons”, and therefore had no right not to be tortured. His national intelligence director, Admiral Dennis Blair, says he believes torture works. One of his senior US intelligence officials in Latin America is accused of covering up the torture of an American nun in Guatemala in 1989; another is a Pinochet apologist. As Daniel Ellsberg has pointed out, the US experienced a military coup under Bush, whose secretary of “defence”, Robert Gates, along with the same warmaking officials, has been retained by Obama.

All over the world, America’s violent assault on innocent people, directly or by agents, has been stepped up. During the recent massacre in Gaza, reports Seymour Hersh, “the Obama team let it be known that it would not object to the planned resupply of ‘smart bombs’ and other hi-tech ordnance that was already flowing to Israel” and being used to slaughter mostly women and children. In Pakistan, the number of civilians killed by US missiles called drones has more than doubled since Obama took office.

In Afghanistan, the US “strategy” of killing Pashtun tribespeople (the “Taliban”) has been extended by Obama to give the Pentagon time to build a series of permanent bases right across the devastated country where, says Secretary Gates, the US military will remain indefinitely. Obama’s policy, one unchanged since the Cold War, is to intimidate Russia and China, now an imperial rival. He is proceeding with Bush’s provocation of placing missiles on Russia’s western border, justifying it as a counter to Iran, which he accuses, absurdly, of posing “a real threat” to Europe and the US. On 5 April in Prague, he made a speech reported as “anti-nuclear”. It was nothing of the kind. Under the Pentagon’s Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, the US is building new “tactical” nuclear weapons designed to blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional war.

Perhaps the biggest lie – the equivalent of smoking is good for you – is Obama’s announcement that the US is leaving Iraq, the country it has reduced to a river of blood. According to unabashed US army planners, as many as 70,000 troops will remain “for the next 15 to 20 years”. On 25 April, his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, alluded to this. It is not surprising that the polls are showing that a growing number of Americans believe they have been suckered – especially as the nation’s economy has been entrusted to the same fraudsters who destroyed it. Lawrence Summers, Obama’s principal economic adviser, is throwing $3trn at the same banks that paid him more than $8m last year, including $135,000 for one speech. Change you can believe in.

Much of the American establishment loathed Bush and Cheney for exposing, and threatening, the onward march of America’s “grand design”, as Henry Kissinger, war criminal and now Obama adviser, calls it. In advertising terms, Bush was a “brand collapse” whereas Obama, with his toothpaste advertisement smile and righteous clichés, is a godsend. At a stroke, he has seen off serious domestic dissent to war, and he brings tears to the eyes, from Washington to Whitehall. He is the BBC’s man, and CNN’s man, and Murdoch’s man, and Wall Street’s man, and the CIA’s man. The Madmen did well.