The Sahrawi Republic turns 33

Front POLISARIO, the Western Saharan independence movement, has held its annual celebrations of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The SADR was announced on February 27, 1976, and so this is its 33rd anniversary; that most dangerous year. The celebrations seem to have been unremarkable, or in fact indistinguishable from earlier years -- a military parade in the "liberated territories", combined with some political and social stunts to make the yearly journalists' trek pay in pictures and headlines. But three things caught my eye:

1. Troop levels: "Bashir Mustapha Saeed, the deputy leader of the exiled Saharawi government, based in neighboring Algeria, said the Polisario Front had 12,000 to 18,000 regular troops and could mobilize many more reservists if needed." -- It is very rare to hear POLISARIO announce troop numbers for their armed wing, the Sahrawi People's Liberation Army. 12,000 to 18,000 seems too high to be credible, with most observers putting the figure closer to 6-7,000 active troops, but that figure is also guesswork. El Bashir's number was probably accurate during the 80s, but since the cease-fire in 1991, training has slipped, and is no longer universal in the camps. At the same time, POLISARIO claims to have stepped up preparations for war again, and training apparently continues to churn out hundreds of new fighters every year -- 500 graduated during the celebrations alone, some of them seen here.


2. El Bashir Mustafa El Seyyid ran the event. This is not significant in itself, if it were not for the fact that there's a line of argument in Morocco that this man -- El Ouali's brother, and a chef historique -- is in fact held as prisoner by the leadership of Mohammed Abdelaziz. Allegedly he wants to make up with Morocco, and is therefore held under strict surveillance by POLISARIO authorities. This may or may not be true, but there's very little or no evidence to back it up; even so, it's slowly becoming an established fact that "everybody knows". TelQuel, the Moroccan magazine, presented its interview with El Bashir in 2008 as a groundbreaking event with a virtual prisoner. In fact, and whatever the level of marginalization he may be suffering, he has been highly involved in politics in the movement both before and after that interview. He was among the top vote winners at the POLISARIO's congress in 2007, and now schmoozes with journalists on the Feb. 27 celebrations. I can't claim to know anything of POLISARIO's inner workings, but that's hardly behavior befitting a dissident in house arrest.

3. Repopulation of the "liberated territories": This strategy, begun discreetly a couple of years ago, is now fully public. POLISARIO wants to establish a permanent civilian settlement at Tifariti (pictured right) in its section of Western Sahara, to bolster its infrastructure there and make the semi-permanent division of the territory more of a political and psychological embarrassment for Morocco. (Until now, there have only been military camps and nomadic movement in the areas held by POLISARIO, while Morocco's part has all the settled population.) It's actually quite clever, since it pokes a hole in Morocco's propaganda to its population about these areas being a UN-patrolled "buffer zone", rather than territory legally -- if not in any way physically -- on par with Smara and El Aaiún. On the other hand, it totally undermines the sabre-rattling that POLISARIO habitually engages in. If you think war is the least bit likely, you don't spend your precious resources building civilian housing on the front line.

Libya calls for referendum in W. Sahara

The Libyan General Popular Congress is the closest thing that country has to a parliament. It has just held its session, and out of the steaming heaps of praise for the Brother Leader, one can extract the following:

- "The GPC hopes that reason, logic, geographical unity and historical ties will prevail between the brothers in Algeria and Morocco. It calls for the return of normal brotherly relations between the two brotherly countries and to the consolidation of ties of fraternity which bond their people through the opening of borders to facilitate the movement of people and the flow of goods and services."

- "The GPC maintains that a referendum for the population of the Western Sahara is the only practical solution for this crisis which had a negative effect on the efforts of the region's countries to realize a broader integration."

Libya was one of POLISARIO's strongest backers until 1984, when it joined in a short-lived union with Morocco designed partially to extract itself from the whole Western Sahara affair. Since then, it has ambiguously wavered to and fro, and tailored its Sahara-related messages to the audience, but when now calling for a referendum -- as opposed to some vague exhortation of self-determination -- that effectively aligns the country with POLISARIO's and Algeria's position on how the process must work. On the other hand, the GPC also calls for open borders between Algeria and Morocco, which Algeria is presently refusing.

Of course, Libyan policy is always subject to the whims of Qadhafi, so this need not be taken as a firm and final decision in either direction.

The Qadhafi Virus Strikes Mauritania

Some points in the wake of Qadhafi’s visit to Mauritania.


1.The opposition is increasingly united in it irritation with Qadhafi’s mediation, which has been characterized variously as biased, “reckless,” and “dangerous”. His speech was in typical fashion: Harkening to Fatimid glory, the role of Mauritania in spreading Islam through Africa, the folly of democracy and the Mauritanian project in particular: “There is no difference between elections and coups” claiming that “elections lead to undermining the stability of countries, which is the most important thing in nations’ lives”. Opposition leaders Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, Ahmed Ould Daddah and others walked out. Mauritanians appear to have dismissed Qadhafi’s seven point plan for the resolution of the crisis: His remarks in support of the junta have rendered it without credibility. Instead of resolving the crisis, Qadhafi’s arrival seems to have brought opposition elements closer together in their opposition to the junta and to Libya’s attempt to move in. Despite his own appeals to the contrary it is widely believed that the visit was intended to aggrandize Qadhafi rather than to solve anything in Mauritania. According to elements from the opposition who were contacted by Qadhafi, Aziz told the Brother Leader flat out that he intends to run for president in this year’s election. Irritation with the junta’s external backers — at present Libya is the strongest — has turned a great deal of opinion, both within the opposition and among the people, against the junta. Factions within Ould Boulkheir’s party (e.g. Nasserists) have been working to bring the APP to Abdel Aziz, with little luck.


2.The American policy holds increasing relevance in Mauritania, especially in the wake of the visit. Opposition figures wonder what the American position is, how or if it will change. A general sense is growing that the Europeans will compromise for a legal return to the status quo ante, without a resolution or reform of the country’s structural problems, that the African Union has let the country down (and that that it is incapable of doing anything else with Qadhafi at its head), and that the Arabs have used the country as a means of displaying their recurrent irrelevance (a former Mauritanian diplomat involved with the Arab League described the body as “an empty shell”). The United States’ uncompromising position that some Mauritanians are beginning to associate with a way out of the crisis and with a stand for legitimate rule. More on this in a later post, however. If this visit is any indication of how Qadhafi will handle crises as AU chairman going forward, the African Union is in for serious trouble: Like a certain virus, Qadhafi’s strategic ambitions generally require a host body (or institution) — be it of Arab nationalist or pan-Africanist form — and once the course has been run, the host institution dies, with chaos in its wake.


3.Ironically, the country’s most fiercely anti-US political organization, the Islamist Tawassoul, is one of the prime beneficiaries of the stand against the junta. It should also be mentioned that the junta, having aped one of Tawassoul’s main issues — relations with Israel — has taken away much of its relevance from a populist standpoint. It is also notable that the responses to the closing of the Israeli embassy from the eastern Arabs — KSA, Jordan and Egypt — were especially muted. Even leftists seem to have ignored the move. The point was firstly for domestic consumption and secondarily a means of securing support from the better monied radical states like Libya and Iran. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, for its part, has blamed Algeria, Libya and Iran for Mauritania’s sour attitude: Naming Algeria does little to help their cause, as Algiers has been active in working to undermine the junta in Africa and abroad.


4.A note on turn out. It must be said that Qadhafi’s personnel took over security in the Nouakchott’s Olympic Stadium during the visit. A Mauritanian related a story in which he was asked somewhat gruffly by a Libyan security guard if he wanted to enter the stadium to see Qadhafi’s speech. He said no. Others were invited in, and many went on their way. Those who were in attendance, aside from the regular political jumble, were mostly poor locals, often paid to show up to [state-sponsored] political rallies or to greet foreign dignitaries in throngs at the airport or roadside. The mood was not described as hot with wonder at the robbed Libyan’s arrival. Rather, his arrival was described in terms of indignation — how dare the Libyans come into Mauritania with their guards and soldiers, try to impose a solution in support of an illegitimate military regime. “Another foreigner trying to outsmart us” is how one termed the visit. As for why Qadhafi turned in Nouakchott and not Azougui as was originally planned, the best bet is that he changed his mind at the last minute (Libya’s foreign policy seems to be made half from rational calculation and half on the basis of Qadhafi’s mood), considering the harshness and obscurity of that locale (a Mauritanian grumbled that “he is no real bedouin”) and that the capital would deliver his message more clearly.

POLITICAL TRANSITION IN MAURITANIA: IN FOR ANOTHER COUP?

Although Mauritania is witnessing a reconfiguration of the political arena following the collapse of Ould al-Taya’s regime

that lasted almost twenty years, a number of factors have contributed to making civilian rule a short term experiment. The country’s ninth coup d’état, on August 6th 2008, came as no surprise to those who had been following the acute crisis that had befallen former President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi’s regime during the previous months.

Following the overthrow of Ould al-Taya’s regime in August 2005, the transitional period was administered by a military junta. Backed by the military establishment, Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi ran for presidential elections. In April 2008, his inauguration as President was initially accepted by all sides: proof that the first peaceful transfer of power in their country’s history was taking place.

It remains to be seen whether the military has succeeded in tightening its grip over the situation, despite the ferocity of domestic and international opposition to their coup. If so, the chances are higher that either a general will stand in presidential elections and rule the country in civilian garb, or that Mauritania is destined to experience a tenth coup.

THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD: BUILDING ON WEAK FOUNDATIONS

The transitional period that followed the military overthrow of Ould al-Taya’s regime in August 2005 lasted for nineteen months, during which the country’s affairs were administered by a military junta. The junta arranged for “consultation days” with all the country’s political forces, which resulted in an agreement over a reform package, featuring a constitutional amendment and a timetable for elections.

The military gave guarantees that helped bolster Mauritanians’ confidence in the credibility of their discourse, most significantly by enacting a law that banned members of the military junta and the transitional government from standing for election. International support, in the form of funds and election monitoring, helped lend it further legitimacy.

Nevertheless, Mauritanians were quick to detect an unwillingness on the part of the military leaders to address a number of issues that they considered fundamental, such as holding accountable those who misappropriated public funds; eradicating the human legacy left by the waves of oppression against Blacks; and tackling the vestiges of slavery. This deliberate disregard encouraged accusations that the primary motive behind the coup had not been to make a clean break with Ould al-Taya’s style of governance, but merely to salvage whatever possible of the old regime, and to contain the popular anger that had begun to grow dangerously towards the end of Ould al-Taya’s reign, and which had been the driving force behind destabilizing, abortive coups like that of June 2003.

During the transitional period the military refused to discuss any proposal to restrict the role of the army and military establishment within the democratic regime. Moreover, the professed neutrality of the army did not prevent members of the Military Council from interfering and instructing politicians to take certain actions. During the campaign that preceded the legislative elections, many politicians left their parties at the direction of those Council members, to form what subsequently became known as the “bloc of independents”. At the start of the presidential election campaign these independents formed the nucleus of supporters of the independent candidate Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. Many spoke of pressures that were exerted on the traditional notables to support his candidacy, though the military establishment continued to deny such intervention until the last minute, and to re-reiterate that it was keeping its promise of remaining neutral.

It was only recently that Mauritanians discovered the accuracy of the rumors at that time. This happened as a consequence of a television interview a few days prior to the last coup, during which President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi admitted that two members of the Military Council had backed his candidacy. Despite this support, strong competition forced him to run a second round of elections, one which he would not have won, were it not for alliances he forged with two main candidates, one of whom was Messaoud Ould Belkheir who represented the Harateen community (former slaves), and the second, Zine Ould Zidane, who enjoyed support from the eastern regions-his place of origin. In return, the former was appointed President of the National Assembly (NA), while the latter became First Minister.

When this process resulted, in April 2006, in the inauguration of Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, the result was accepted by all, and it seemed that all sides were prepared to leave past events behind. Mauritanians were also captivated by the first peaceful transfer of power in their history, and the weight given by the media to what was portrayed as a precedent in the Arab world. It also gave Mauritanians a huge sense of pride and hope for a better future.

THE PERIOD OF CIVILIAN RULE: APRIL 2006 TO AUGUST 6TH, 2008

When Ould Cheikh Abdallahi assumed office, he was already burdened with the debts and promises of his campaign. Besides the obligations that he owed to the political alliances that had enabled his victory in the second round of elections, those who had backed him expected him to return the “favor”. As anticipated, he charged Zine Ould Zidane with forming the first civilian government. However, rather than including the spectrum of political forces that had supported the president within the government, Zidane chose new faces that were not considered representative of the political leaders who had supported him.

Most members of the Military Council continued to occupy their positions within the army, notably the two most powerful officers, Ould Abdel Aziz and Ould El-Ghazouani. Both were promoted to the rank of general by the president, with the former being appointed as Special Chief of Staff and the latter as Chief of Armed Forces.

It should be recalled that these two officers had played a major role in planning the coup that ousted Ould al-Taya. They managed to hold onto power, due to their relatively long experience and the sensitive nature of the positions that they occupied, all of which allowed them to exercise absolute control over the armed forces and the security apparatus.

Despite the brevity of Ould Cheikh Abdallahi’s spell in power, his regime witnessed some considerable achievements. Discussions were held for the first time on major issues that have long posed an imminent danger to the country.

For example, an Islamic party was licensed for the first time in order both to bring it within the parameters of legitimate politics, and to prevent exclusion from political participation from radicalizing its members. In response to the demands of a large section of society, a law was promulgated to criminalize slavery, which had been undermining social peace and stability.

The president had also decided to confront the legacy of decades of tension between the Arab and Black constituencies. An official apology was made by him on behalf of Mauritania to the victims of the wave of oppression that had followed the events of 1989 and 1990. Consultation days were also held to discuss the possible repatriation of Mauritanian refugees from abroad and an agency was established to help them to reclaim their rights. The country then started receiving the first waves of returning refugees.

In the field of financial administration a number of reforms were announced, including the enactment of a transparency law that obligated senior government employees to declare their wealth prior to taking on public office. The country’s positive image abroad also made it attractive to stability-seeking foreign investors, and diplomatic activity helped to draw in capital.

However, this short period was not without problems. The global food crisis cast its shadow over Mauritania, a country that is heavily dependent on international aid for its food. The collapse in oil production dashed hopes of producing a surplus that would allow the deficit generated by decades of poor governance to be addressed. All this coincided with a rising insecurity resulting from growing crime rates, which branches of al-Qaeda exploited to launch terror attacks against elements within the army and foreign tourists. Vast quantities of drugs were confiscated and members of several smuggling networks were arrested.

The crisis soon began to have an impact on the daily lives of ordinary citizens in the form of soaring food prices, which sparked demonstrations in several Mauritanian cities and created a general feeling of popular discontent. The president later attempted to contain this sedition by announcing a series of measures including a wage increase and an emergency intervention plan to assist vulnerable social groups.

At the political level, figures close to the president began to voice the need for a political framework that would succeed in including the groups that had backed his rise to power. Many interpreted this as an attempt to re-form the state party.

Efforts made with the blessing the president and overseen by figures close to him led to the formation of the National Pact for Democracy and Development party (NPDD), which brought together the independents and parties that had supported the president’s candidacy. After the party’s inaugural conference, many noted the return to the forefront of many leading figures from Ould al-Taya’s regime, with several winning seats in the parliamentary elections and others entrusted by the president with major state responsibilities. Their reinstatement led to public frustration, and dashed hopes that the political system could be renewed, leaving those who had backed the coup to overthrow Ould al-Taya fearful of the return of his regime, their potential dismissal and even punishment.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CRISIS: MAY 2008

One of the main demands made by the founders of the NPDD, a party to which a majority of MPs belonged, was to dispose with Zine Ould Zidane’s technocrat government and put together a party-based government composed of Ould Cheikh Abdallahi’s supporters. In compliance with this demand, the president dismissed the Zidane government and appointed a new government headed by Ould El-Ouakef, who simultaneously held the position of NPDD leader.

Faced with the pressure of a wave of public discontent over the economic situation, which some opposition elements were beginning to turn to their advantage, the president ordered the First Minister-designate to hold consultations over the formation of the new government, and to include the opposition. Two opposition parties joined the government, namely Tawasul (Islamic) and the Union of Forces of Progress (leftist). Once the formation of the new government was declared, many were surprised to find that it included individuals that were considered “symbols of corruption”, and who were former ministers and officials from Ould al-Taya’s governments accused of embezzling public funds.

Directly after the government was formed, members of the parliamentary majority rushed to express their disappointment. In addition to the fact that the ruling party coalition viewed the inclusion of opposition parties as an attempt to reduce their designated number of seats, it also raised the indignation of some members of the NPDD at their exclusion from the government. First there was a wave of resignations from the party, including most of the deputies in parliament who had helped to found it. They then submitted a motion of no-confidence against the government.

From the outset, it was apparent that the MPs who sought the no-confidence motion and the NPDD party members who supported them were linked to generals Ould Abdel Aziz and Ould Elghazouani. The declared reason for seeking such a motion was that the government included figures associated with the regime of Ould al-Taya.

Initially, President Ould Cheikh Abdallahi attempted to open a dialogue with those MPs and later, in a speech to the nation, threatened to use his powers to dissolve the NA. However, he withdrew this threat, dismissed the government and charged the same first minister (Ould El-Waghef) with forming a new one. To mitigate the MPs’ indignation, Ould El-Waghef excluded the most prominent members of Ould al-Taya’s regime from the new setup and apologized to the opposition parties for having included them.

All sides hoped this would mark the end of the crisis. However, tensions persisted and some of those who had resigned from the NPDD began to demand the resignation of Ould Cheikh Abdallahi for what they claimed to be his inability to manage state affairs. Others began to hint that the army’s intervention might be necessary to end Ould Cheikh Abdallahi’s rule.

In the ensuing war of statements, NA members demanded the convening of an emergency session to discuss a number of legislations, most notably the law establishing the high court of justice authorized to try the president of the republic and senior officials, and the formation of a parliamentary commission of inquiry into allegations that a charitable organization run by the president’s wife had received state privileges. However, the government refused the request to hold an emergency session on the pretext that it had not been submitted by the President of the NA.

It was clear from the atmosphere surrounding the crisis that the president had reached a deadlock in his conflict with the MPs and their political supporters, and military men who were inciting rebellion, and that his only options were either to resign or to take on his opponents. This meant one of two things: either the dissolution of the NA and a call for early legislative elections or the dismissal of the two generals and a confrontation with the powerful military establishment. Evidently, the president chose to risk a direct confrontation with the military and at dawn on 6 August 2008, he issued a presidential decree to dismiss the four Chiefs of Staff.

Mauritanians did not have to wait long for the army’s response: two hours after the decree was published the dismissed officers declared that they had seized power, removed the president and cancelled the decree.

POST-COUP REACTIONS

Following the coup, the domestic political arena was split into three camps:

• The first supported and welcomed the coup. It included the deputies who had defected from the NPDD, and who constituted a majority of deputies in both chambers (the NA and the Senate), and most of the political groupings that had made up the pro-Ould Cheikh Abdallahi majority.

• The Democratic Forces Bloc (DFB), the largest opposition party, announced that it supported the coup, along with HATEM, a party represented in the parliament, and the Alliance for Justice and Democracy, which represents Black nationalists. These parties held President Ould Cheikh Abdallahi responsible for the political impasse and the failure of civilian rule. They demanded that the military be guided by the experience of the previous transitional period, a deadline for organizing a fresh round of presidential elections, and that the military remain neutral.

• The NPDD, the Islamic party Tawasul, the Progressive Popular Alliance, whose leader Messaoud Ould Belkheir was NA President, and the leftist Forces of the Progress party all rejected the coup and formed what is currently referred to as the National Front for the Defence of Democracy (NFDD). This front called for the reinstatement of Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi and refused to deal with the military.

At the international level, most states denounced the coup that deposed an elected president and some international actors translated their criticism into punitive measures. For example, the African Union suspended Mauritania’s membership, the US administration froze non-humanitarian aid, and the European Union signaled that it would impose sanctions unless a solution was found.

Within the Arab world, it is worth noting that the Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League Mr. Ahmed Ben Hali had, during an official visit, expressed understanding, and had refrained from criticizing the coup, stating that the League’s primary concern was to preserve stability in Mauritania.

The position of the Arab League reflected divisions among Arab states in their positions towards the coup. Thus while Morocco has shown implicit support for the coup instigators, Algeria has been leading diplomatic efforts to step up sanctions against them.

THE GRIDLOCK CONTINUES

Today, a few months after the coup of the 6th of August, the political arena remains in gridlock and there have been few developments, other than the DFB’s refusal to participate in the military-appointed civilian government. The party justified its rejection by claiming that the assurances it had received from the High Council of State (Al Majlis Al Ala Lidawwla) over the impartiality of the presidential elections were inadequate. An extraordinary parliamentary session was convened that was boycotted by NFDD deputies, including NA President Messaoud Ould Belkheir. The President of the Senate was also absent.

International pressure continued to be exerted by the African Union, which succeeded in having a UN Security Council statement passed condemning the coup. The African Peace and Security Council was given a deadline for the release of Ould Cheikh Abdallahi and his restoration to power. This deadline expired on 6th October.

The American Secretary of State announced the imposition of sanctions in the form of a ban on entry visas to the US for persons who had “obstructed the restoration of the constitutional order”. According to the American Embassy in Nouakchott, this applied to members of the Military Council and the government members appointed by them, to MPs who had supported the coup, and to a number of businessmen and other influential figures.

The European Union invited Mauritania’s military rulers to hold negotiations with them under a procedure set out in Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, which regulates partnership relations between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Article 96 of the agreement stipulates negotiations if one of its member states commits a breach of democratic principles or human rights. However, in case the issue remains unresolved the agreement stipulates that the dialogue may not last longer than 120 days, and that it should be followed by the imposition of sanctions on the states concerned.

The first round of these negotiations was held in Paris on October 20th 2008 and ended in failure. According to the other side, the Mauritanian delegation had not offered any new proposals for ending the crisis. The EU announced that if the coup’s instigators did not release President Ould Cheikh Abdallahi within one month, it would impose economic sanctions on Mauritania.

In many ways the coup of 2008 can be considered different from the previous coups that have been staged in the country since its independence. The experiment with civilian rule did not for any reason warrant the use of force against it, which suggests that the military seized power in order to revoke the decree by which they were dismissed. Moreover, the coup of 2008 does not seem to have been directed against all elements within the political regime but was limited to suspending the institution of the presidency, while all other constitutional institutions were left in place.

The fact that political parties were allowed to continue functioning and that a minimum level of public freedoms was preserved contributed to the emergence of a domestic bloc opposed to the coup. This bloc was initially permitted to express its views through demonstrations, though it was banned from making use of the official media. However, the military later issued an order banning all demonstrations on the pretext of maintaining security.

Furthermore, the few individuals who had been arrested in the aftermath of the coup were released several days later, with the exception of President Ould Cheikh Abdallahi and his First Minister, of whom the latter was first released but subsequently placed under house arrest.

Generally speaking, the coup was not followed by the wave of oppression that usually follows military coups, and each side has continued to make use of the available margins of freedom of expression, leading some foreigners to joke that Mauritanians are living democracy in the shadow of the coup.

A WAY OUT OF THE DEADLOCK

The road map presented by pro-coup NA members during the extraordinary session of parliament that was held is the only document that provides an indication of the coup’s leaders’ political vision. It proposes a number of measures, the most significant of which are a transitional period of twelve to fourteen months and the holding of presidential elections.

The largest opposition parties (the DFB) boycotted the session during which this document was approved, on the grounds that its demand for the insertion of a clause that would forbid the members of the High Council of State from standing in the presidential elections had not been met.

The anti-coup bloc refused to recognize the extraordinary session, and following the publication of the road map, declared its rejection of the document in toto. It also proclaimed its loyalty to whom it considered to be the legitimate president and insisted on a return to the pre-August 5th state of affairs.

Messaoud Ould Belkheir announced an initiative to reinstate temporarily President Ould Cheikh Abdallahi in order to oversee the organization of presidential elections, and to form a ruling council that would include the leaders of the houses of parliament and a number of other high standing figures, in addition to representatives of the military. The council members would be commissioned with formulating a plan for how to avoid a repetition of the same events, and with considering future relations between the army and other state authorities.

Several proposals were made at the international level. The most significant, made by the EU ambassadors, stipulates a solution that is based on the provisions of the Mauritanian constitution. According to this proposal, the Senate President would assume the presidency for a period of 45 days, during which presidential elections would be held. However, one obstacle facing this proposition is the fact that the president’s position can only be filled in the case of his death or resignation, or in the case of an impediment preventing him from carrying out his functions. Moreover, for the president to resign he must first be restored to his position, an eventuality that was firmly rejected by the military and its political supporters, both of whom considered it a “red line” that could not be crossed.

Assuming one agrees that this crisis represents a conflict between elites who have yet to reach political maturity, (which only serves to emphasize the personal rivalries at play in this conflict), there can be no fundamental solution to this problem. The army will realize that its role in politics is over, that the world is no longer willing simply to tolerate military coups, and that the use of force outside the legitimate political framework is ethically and legally difficult to justify.

If the coup’s instigators succeed in containing the wave of domestic and internal opposition to their rule, it is highly likely that one of the army generals may run for presidential elections. If he wins, this would allow him to exchange his military uniform for civilian garb and to remain in power - until Mauritanians wake up one morning to witness the tenth coup d’état.

Iran & Western Sahara

As you know, Morocco recently cut diplomatic ties with Iran, presumably to curry favor with Washington and Riyadh by appearing their most faithful ally in the power-struggle with Teheran. However, that doesn’t necessarily play well with ordinary Moroccans, who arguably agree more with Iran’s radical foreign policy than with Rabat’s own pro-US variety. So, to remove attention from the sphere of politics and portray Iran as having attacked those quintessentially Moroccan values of God, Country, King, the foreign policy establishment has gone into overdrive trying to conjure up alternate excuses. Reasons cited for the diplomatic rupture include claims of Iranian Shiite subversion of Islam in Morocco, to make it a religious rather than political dispute, and an alleged Iranian project of anti-Arab expansionism (dovetailing nicely with the wahhabi paranoia prevailing in Riyadh). Less prominently, but still, there is the question of Western Sahara, around the Moroccanity of which there is a strong shared consensus of state and people. Consequently, speculation on Iranian ties to the pro-independence POLISARIO Front and its main backer, Algeria, is being played up in the media.

Below the fold is an example, a translated piece from el-Massa’, which brings up the story of an official Iranian visit to POLISARIO in … 1984. Clearly, this Iranian scheme to undermine Morocco has been going on for some time. (The article also, as you’ll notice, highlights POLISARIO’s disgracefully cruel treatment of its former Moroccan prisoners-of-war.)

Khomeini’s foreign minister visited Tindouf
and insulted Morocco’s state and political parties

Ali Nejab met him in 1984 as a prisoner in the Rabouni internment camp

By: Idriss el-Kenbouri

Is it possible that the Iranians, in their attempts to counter Morocco after diplomatic ties were cut, will provide support to POLISARIO? This is a question often heard these days. Some underline the importance of the matter by pointing to the visit that Ahmadinejad, the president of the Islamic Republic, conducted to Algeria in August 2007. The exclusion of Morocco from that trip had a political content that necessitates analysis, and there is a certain distancing towards Morocco among the Iranian functionaries that truly rule the country. Prime among them is the Guardian Council [?], whose members brought the era of Mohammed Khatami and openness, to its end like a passing summer cloud, to come in its stead the opposite, Ahmadinejad.

Iran’s rivalry with Morocco is old. Ali Nejab is a Moroccan pilot who spent 25 years as prisoner-of-war with POLISARIO in the dark prisons of Tindouf between 1978 and 2003. He tells us that Ali Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister in Khomeini’s era, visited the Tindouf camps in 1984 by invitation of the POLISARIO leadership, in the framework of cooperation between the parties that then existed, in defiance of the late King Hassan II. (I)

The POLISARIO leaders brought the Moroccan POWs to the Iranian top functionary as a sort of proof of their victory over Morocco. Nejab had spent eight months of the year 1973 in military flight training in southern Teheran, as part of the coordination with the Shah’s regime. For this reason, the POLISARIO leaders brought him to Velayati as one of the Moroccans who had been trained in Iran before the revolution, which kindled the interest of the former Iranian foreign minister, who asked to meet him. He was accompanied by el-Idrissi Bilali, a former POLISARIO foreign representative who would later join Morocco.

Nejab tells el-Massa’: “When Velayati stood before me he started, without posing any questions, to insult Moroccan institutions and parties and the Moroccan state generally. I lost my cool and cursed at him. One of the men accompanying him told me that we were brothers in religion, to which I responded that I don’t want to be your brother in religion, I want to be your brother in politics. They understood that I wanted to say to him that they should support our position on the Sahara, and I said that if Khomeini is Islam then I will leave Islam. Velayati immediately cut short the visit. As soon as he left the area close to Rabouni (II), and vanished from sight, the POLISARIO men started beating me with kicks and punches, finally leaving me covered in my own blood.”

As punishment he was put in solitary confinement next to Ali Jouhar, one of the Moroccan officers that had been captured by POLISARIO. The two remained there for eleven months, given a small piece of dry bread and a litre of water every 24 hours. After that, says Nejabi, a POLISARIO leader asked him to write a two-page letter “condemning Hassan II’s treatment of the Moroccans”, which he refused. He was punished with 48 hours of torture – like Sisyphus in Greek mythology – by an order to move, together with Ali Jouhar, a pile of rocks each weighing about 15 kilograms, a distance of 200 meter. This was in Rabouni, where Nejab spent his POW years in the Hamdi Ba Cheikh center, the main prison center of POLISARIO, known also by the name of the “Red Center” for being built of red mud. (III)

Some remarks:

(I) Iran began supporting POLISARIO after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, when the Shah’s regime fell, as part of its break with western-backed Arab states and in line with the new regime’s general support for third world liberation movements. The Shah had had good relations with King Hassan, and lived for some time in Morocco after his downfall, contributing to Iranian ill-will towards Morocco. Iranian support for the Sahrawis was never important, however, essentially some verbal political backing and a formal recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, their government-in-exile. However, as Iranian politics turned more realist over the 1980s, the distant Western Sahara issue became a function of Teheran’s relations with POLISARIO’s main sponsor, Algeria. Support for POLISARIO therefore ended in 1992-1993 when Iran’s relations with Algeria broke down, after the Algerian military quashed an Islamic electoral win and blamed Iran for supporting Islamist rebels. After Algerian-Iranian ties were restored, Iran has been more or less neutral on the conflict, trying to please both Moroccan and Algerian officials by tailoring their message to the audience.

(II) Rabouni is a base camp in the Tindouf province, serving as the main HQ for POLISARIO and housing various government institutions.

(III) The last Moroccan POWs — originally a couple of thousand — were released by POLISARIO in 2005, following increased attention to their case by human rights groups. Numerous people remain “disappeared” in the conflict, however, the vast majority of them Sahrawi civilians abducted by Moroccan police/army forces in the 1970s and 1980s.

Morocco breaks off with Iran - some background and speculation

More than a month ago, seasoned Morocco observers raised an eyebrow or two over Morocco’s decision to break off diplomatic relations with close down its embassy in Venezuela - ostensibly on account of a visit in Tindouf made by Venezuela’s ambassador in Algeria to Mohamed Abdelaziz el Marrakchi, Polisario’s long-time leader and “president” of the “Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic“, a break-away entity recognised by Venezuela… twenty-seven years earlier, in 1982. Outside Morocco, and even among critically minded Moroccans, the move was seen as a way for Morocco to ingratiate itself with its US and Israeli patrons - Venezuela had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel over the war on Gaza just a few days earlier (for a fuller account of these events, see “Maroc/Venezuela: Honni soit qui mal y pense“, “Maroc, Algérie & Vénezuela: let me get this straight…” and “Morocco out of touch with the emerging left-wing Latin America“)…

The turn has now come to Iran. The pretext has been the Bahraïn-Iran border feud. As you may remember, an adviser to Supreme Leader grand ayatollah Ali Khameneï (his official website is quite slick), ayatollah Ali Akbar Ategh al Nouri, allegedly declared, on February 11, that Bahraïn used to be Iran’s fourteenth province. The initial source having been fiercely pro-Saudi and anti-Iranian Asharq al Awsat, some caution is perhaps called for as to the real extent of al Nouri’s declarations - he has predictably claimed to have been misunderstood. That claim may not be totally unfounded: Nouri alleges that he simply compared the Islamic Republic’s record on territorial losses (none so far) to that of the shah régime - under which the British departure from Bahraïn in 1971 didn’t imply its return to Iranian sovereignty (as had been the case in the 18thy century) but rather its independence under a sunni dynasty, the Al Khalifa (Bahrain’s population is two thirds shia):

“My purpose in presenting Bahrain issue was restating the history to compare the Islamic Republic era and Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties,” he noted on the sidelines of the international conference on Palestine when asked about the remarks.

“I believe the two dynasties of Qajar and Pahlavi gave parts of the country to foreigners out of incompetence, but during 8 years of war and resistance we did not allow even one handful of the country to fall under enemies’ control.”

Be that as it may, the Iranian leadership quickly went into damage control mode - as it drew massive fire from not only the usual sunni suspects but also from Russia and Turkey - with Ahmedinejad personally reassuring Bahrain that Iran had nothing but the most brotherly and friendly feelings towards it. Before the end of February, the feud had apparently petered out, with both countries vowing eternal friendship and brotherhood. All fine then?

Er, not really. As almost all other Arab (and sunni) countries, Morocco lost no time in condemning Iran - rightly so, as few other Arab countries have staked so much on their defense of territorial integrity. Furthermore, Morocco’s close connections with most Gulf States made a stern Moroccan reaction a diplomatic necessity - you may recall that Morocco in 2008 alone received 800 million dollars in public donations from the United Arab Emirates (300 million dollars) and Saudi Arabia (500 million dollars) - i.e. three times more than it received that year from the EU (228 million euros) and more than it is due to receive from the US Millenium Challenge Account over five years (697,5 million dollars).

The turns and twists of the Morocco-Iran spat deserve a proper timeline. Here are the main events, as far as I have been able to track them:

February 11: Nouri makes his comments on Bahrain, causing widespread condemnation - Morocco joins the chorus.

February 20: Iran summons Morocco’s chargé d’affairesin Teheran, Mohamed Darif, over “the stances taken by the Moroccan king“. In a message to his Bahraini counterpart, Mohammed VI had described Nouri’s declarations as “abject” as well as “absurd“: «Ces déclarations abjectes à l’endroit d’un pays arabe frère et membre actif dans son environnement régional et au sein de la communauté internationale ont suscité notre fort étonnement et notre profonde inquiétude (…) Nous considérons de même que ces déclarations absurdes sont en contradiction flagrante avec les principes et les règles du droit international, ainsi qu’avec les valeurs de coexistence et de bon voisinage auxquelles incite Notre religion islamique tolérante». The Moroccan chargé d’affaires allegedly took a low profile during that meeting, replying that “Morocco is interested in expanding relations with Iran, which he called a regional power with an ancient civilization“. A communiqué by the official Iranian press agency IRNA is allegedly published (I haven’t found it though), evoking that call-up and criticising Morocco for its reaction.

February 22: Morocco’s foreign minister, Taïeb Fassi Fihri, travels to Bahrain to convey a personal message from King Mohammed VI to King Hamad Ibn Aissa Al Khalifa, a gesture widely publicised in Moroccan media as well as on the Moroccan foreign ministry’s website.

February 23: Taïeb Fassi Fihri meets with Bahraini prime minister Sheikh Khalifa Ben Salman Al-Khalifa.

February 25: On his return from Bahrain, Taïeb Fassi Fihri summons Iranian ambassador to Morocco, Vahid Ahmadi, to convey him Morocco’s displeasure at Iran’s call-up of Morocco’s chargé d’affaires and strong rejection of the wording of the IRNA communiqué mentioned earlier. Morocco’s chargé d’affaires is called back for consultations in Rabat for one week on the same day.

February 26: Taïeb Fassi Fihri reiterates Morocco’s “astonishment” at being allegedly singled out by Iran over its support for Bahrain’s territorial integrity - Morocco’s chargé d’affaires would apparently have been the only foreign head of mission to have been summoned to the Iranian ministry of foreign affairsover the issue, despite the many other Arab and non-Arab countries taking a similar stance - at least if we are to believe Morocco’s MAEC.

March 6: Morocco decides to break off diplomatic relations with Iran - if the diplomatic spat over the Bahrain affair is still mentioned, the sectarian aspect is given much larger proeminence - Iran’s embassy is accused of having meddled in internal Moroccan affairs by proselytising - claims that had never been raised previously on an official level. The spat has continued thereafter, with Iran chiding Morocco over its decision, and Morocco asserting its sovereign right to break off diplomatic relations with whomever it wants.

Some remarks are in order: while Iran initiated this diplomatic tit-for-tat, Morocco upped the ante considerably by recalling its chargé d’affaires - a step no other Arab country (1) has taken over this dispute, not even Bahrain. This is quite an escalade in diplomatic terms. It may be recalled that Morocco undertook the same step - recalling its ambassador - when Spain’s Juan Carlos made an official visit in November 2007 to the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Sebta and Mlilia, over which Morocco claims sovereignty. Bahrain’s territorial integrity - if one accepts that Nouri’s statements could reasonably be perceived as a threat - would thus appear as equally worthy of diplomatic action as Sebta and Mlilia, which might come as news to Morocco’s public - not that anyone bothered to consult them over this issue…

What then? Well, Morocco’s troops being tied down in the Sahara, it resorted to the next best alternative to declaration of war, namely breaking off diplomatic relations. The official communiqué from the MAEC mentions the perceived slights over Iran’s reaction to Morocco’s declaration of support to Bahrain, and ads on, for good measure, an alleged Iranian plot to “convert” Moroccans to Shia islam:

Le Maroc décide de rompre ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Iran

Rabat le : 06/03/2009

Le Royaume du Maroc a décidé la rupture, à partir de ce vendredi, des relations diplomatiques avec la République islamique d’Iran, indique un communiqué du ministère des Affaires étrangères et de la coopération. Le 25 février dernier, le Royaume du Maroc avait rappelé, en consultations pour une semaine, son chargé d’affaires par intérim à Téhéran, rappelle le communiqué. La même source précise que le Maroc avait également demandé des explications aux autorités iraniennes qui ont cru devoir singulariser le Maroc, dans le cadre d’une démarche inamicale, et publier un communiqué comprenant des expressions inacceptables, à la suite de la solidarité exprimée par le Maroc, à l’instar de très nombreux pays, à l’intégrité territoriale et la souveraineté du Royaume de Bahreïn. Le délai d’une semaine ayant expiré, le Royaume n’a reçu aucune explication à ces actes, ajoute le communiqué.

Selon le ministère, cette attitude inadmissible, dirigée contre le seul Maroc, est doublée au demeurant, d’un activisme avéré des autorités de ce pays, et notamment de sa représentation diplomatique à Rabat, visant à altérer les fondamentaux religieux du Royaume, à s’attaquer aux fondements de l’identité ancestrale du peuple marocain et à tenter de menacer l’unicité du culte musulman et le Rite Malékite Sunnite au Maroc, dont est le Garant SM le Roi Mohammed VI, Amir Al Mouminine. Ce type d’actions structurées et soutenues, ajoute le ministère, constituent une ingérence intolérable dans les affaires intérieures du Royaume et sont contraires aux règles et à la déontologie de l’action diplomatique. Pour l’ensemble de ces considérations, conclut le communiqué, le Royaume du Maroc a décidé la rupture, à partir de ce jour, des relations diplomatiques avec la République islamique d’Iran.



This beggars belief.

Breaking off diplomatic relations over such a slender slight would seem to me to be a première in diplomatic practice, at least in modern, post-colonial times (the French allegedly invaded Algeria in 1830 over the infamous “fan affair” three years earlier). You do not break off diplomatic relations because you’ve had your chargé d’affaires summoned to the ministry of foreign affairs, even if a critical communiqué is issued at the end of that meeting.

As for an ultimatum not being answered in time - ultimatums are a big no-no in normal diplomatic intercourse. The latest ultimatums I can remember are those adressed to Iraq in 1991 and 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001 - and they were framed in such a way as to guarantee rejection and war. Even if Morocco’s ultimatum - the Iranians were given one week to respond from the day of Morocco’s chargé d’affaires’ departure from Teheran on February 25 - wasn’t made public, its drafters knew or should have known that Iran would not be submitting to it. None of this makes any sense.

To get an idea of what countries usually break off diplomatic relations over, Egypt and Iran broke off their diplomatic ties in 1979 when then president Sadate hosted the exiled and deposed Shah in spite of the Khomeiny’s objections - and relations have remained brokenon account of Iranian statements hailing Sadate’s assassin. More recently, Bolivia, Venezuela and Mauritania broke off their diplomatic relations with Israel in light of the atrocities committed by the latter in Gaza; Georgia broke off its diplomatic relations with Russia after last summer’s small-scale war between the two countries. Ecuador broke off relations with Colombia after a hot pursuit by Colombian military against Colombian rebels based in Ecuador, and Nicaragua broke off its relations in solidarity with Ecuador. Tiny St Lucia broke off its relations with China as a consequence from establishing relations with Taïwan, as China considers Taïwan a Chinese province. Ethiopia apparently broke off its relations with Qatar over Al Jazeera’s coverage of Ethiopia’s occupation of Somalia. Rwanda cut off its diplomatic ties with France over criminal investigations launched in France against Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame. Chad broke off its relations with Sudan in 2008 over armed incursions in its territory.

Granted, from a legal point of view, every country is free to decide by itself which other countries it wishes to entertain diplomatic relations with - from that point of view, Morocco’s decision is unassailable. Furthermore, the lack of diplomatic relations between two countries does not necessarily imply a situation of enmity between the two - it may simply indicate that the two countries are far away from each other or/and lack bilateral commercial and personal (immigration, tourism) relations - the fact that Morocco has no diplomatic relations with Iceland must probably be interpreted this way…

In the present case, cutting off relations is a markedly hostile gesture on Morocco’s part. The reason usually invoked by Morocco when breaking off or downgrading its diplomatic relations with other countries is unsurprisingly related to its claims to territorial integrity. When Moroccan ambassador to Madrid Omar Azziman was recalled to Rabat in November 2007, it was over Spanish King Juan Carlos’ official visit to the Spanish enclaves in Northern Morocco, Sebta and Mlilya (he returned two months later). When Morocco improbably recalled its ambassador to Dakar - a long-time ally on the Sahara issue - just a few weeks later, it was over a Senegalese opposition politician’s presence at a Polisario meeting. More recently, when Morocco closed its embassy in Venezuela (contrary to what I believed previously, Morocco merely closed its embassy in Caracas, with Morocco’s embassy in Dominica now in charge of defending the Kingdom’s interests in Venezuela).

None of that here: no mention has been made by Morocco of any Iranian action or declaration that could be construed as hostile to Morocco’s territorial integrity. With very good cause: on February 13, less than three weeks before the rupture of diplomatic relations, the Iranian ambassador to Morocco had made very positive statements about his country’s relations to Polisario. In an interview given to the state-run Moroccan news agency MAP, he stated that Iran had no longer any whatsoever relations with the separatist movement for seventeen years (that would be 1992) (2):

“Nous n’entretenons aucune relation ou lien avec le ‘polisario’“, a indiqué le diplomate iranien, ajoutant que cette position constante “émane de notre considération pour le peuple et le gouvernement du Royaume chérifien“.

That interview is significant: the MAP usually gives sycophancy a bad name and is not known - to put it mildly - to interview persons hostile or even reserved towards the Moroccan government’s policies. That interview was furthermore given a proeminent place in Saudi-owned “Le Matin du Sahara“, the Palace’s unofficial mouthpiece. What this means is that on February 13, no signs existed that Iran proved a threat to Morocco’s religious monochromy (the unfortunate Jewish exodus has made the sunni demographical dominance nearly all-embracing - and contrary to Tunisia and Algeria, all Moroccan sunni are nominally maliki), as has been alleged by Moroccan officials and mainstream media after the diplomatic rupture.

Some claims had been made previously by security sources, and given some credence in mainstream media, as to the alleged security threat - never explained fully - of Sunni Moroccans turning Shia - the late King Hassan II had famously spoken of the bloody 1984 riots as a “Zionist-Khomeinist plot“. The 1971 census is the last one where people’s religious affiliation was part of the questionnaire - and then only for Moroccans, whose only choice was between “Jewish” or “Muslim” - and for the latter, no choice of affiliation was fiven. In fact, all Muslim Moroccans are presumed to be Sunni of the maliki school - see for instance article 400 of the Family Code(formerly known as Moudawana):

Article 400For all issues not addressed by a text in the present code, reference may be made to the Malikite School of Jurisprudence and to ijtihad (juridical reasoning) which strive to fulfil and enhance Islamic values, notably justice, equality and amicable social relations.



Media sources - citing US government sources (!) - put the figure of Shia “converts“ (the term is arguably improper) in Morocco at around three thousand (others speak of several hundred), mostly former students in Iran and admirers of the Iranian Revolution, and lately of Hezbollah (possibly the most popular political movement in Morocco). Their alleged “leader”, or rather spokesperson, is Driss Hani, who has publicly argued that Morocco is Shia country. Of course, the Moroccan government, with its closeness to the USA, Saudi Arabia and Israel, has tried, in isolated cases, to capitalise on the anti-Iranian sentiments of its allies. One recent exemple was the alleged Belliraj terror network- some of its alleged members were initially said to have links with the Hezbollah, and one of its alleged members is a Moroccan Shia, correspondent in Morocco for Hezbollah’s Al Manar TV channel. Slightly loony Iranian opposition sites alleged that Iran was involved in this murky affair. But Interior minister backtracked early on, refuting any attempt to involve either the Hezbollah or Iran in the alleged plot.

Overall then, the reasons publicly advanced to justify Morocco’s dramatic decision make no sense, whether we look at those relating to the diplomatic spat between Morocco and Iran over Bahrain, or at the supposed security threat posed by proselytising Iranian diplomats in Rabat. It is therefore necessary to look beyond the official version.

As with the closure of Morocco’s embassy in Venezuela, many have been tempted to look at Morocco’s Washington and Tel Aviv ties for some guidance. While Morocco will certainly not suffer from either decisions - the Caracas closure or the Teheran break-off - with its Washington and Tel Aviv friends, it is exceedingly improbable that this latest step has been taken on their prompting. Granted, neither Obama nor Netanyahu will cry tears of blood over this sudden downturn in Moroccan-Iranian relations. Times have changed however, and we’re no longer in 2003 nor even 2008: while Israel is still foaming at the mouth against Iran, the White House, while still ambivalent, is no longer warmongering against Iran.

As for Israel - the difference between Netanyahu, Livni, Olmert and Barak is of nuance and degrees here - such a decision certainly reinforces the fanciful narrative of the Sunni/Shia conflict overtaking the Arab/Israeli, but with Israel having been under a caretaker government for months and with Netanyahu not yet in power, it is very unlikely that Israel was the driving force behind Morocco’s decision.

I see two explaining factors standing out: the Saudi/khaleeji (3) link, and possibly a perceived personal slight to Mohammed VI. While Morocco has always had close relations with khaleeji countries - on a personal level as well, since King Fahd and Sheikh Zayed were close to the late Hassan II - these links seem today to be the only relations of substance between Morocco and other Arab states. The evident disinterest of Mohammed VI for the foreign policy ventures which his father reveled in mean that Morocco’s contemporary foreign policy is run exclusively along the lines of personal likes and dislikes.

These are very substantive relations: as mentioned above, in 2008 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates gave more than the US plans to give over five years, and more than three times more than what the EU has granted Morocco that same year. It is therefore not surprising that Morocco was one of the so-called “moderate Arab countries” (shorthand for US and Israel allies) participating in a meeting with EU and US officials at Sharm el Sheikh last November, expressing their “fear” of Iran and pressing the US to stay firm. Being more Bahraini than Bahrain on Nouri’s declarations fits in quite well with this

Another intriguing detail could also explain the violent Moroccan reaction. In his public message to Bahrain’s ruler, Mohammed VI had used very strong and unusual words for messages of such a dignity - “abject” and “absurd” characterising in his words Nouri’s declarations, seen as representing the Iranian leadership’s views. It was at that stage that Iran summoned Morocco’s chargé d’affaires, and issued a communiqué explicitly criticising the King’s “stance“. This might be the “inappropriate” language later denounced by the Moroccan foreign ministry. And this perceived personal slight - prompted by the King’s extremely strong language - is probably what carried the day.

See also my previous post, “Le Maroc rompt ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Iran“, on my blog.

(1) Egypt has no diplomatic relations with Iran since many years ago.

(2) Admittedly, Algerian El Moudjahid had published a statement attributed to the Iranian ambassador to Alger on February 6 - one week prior to Ahmadi’s interview with the MAP - in which he maintained that Iran still recognised the Polisario: “A propos du problème du Sahara occidental, M. Abyaneh dira que l’Iran a reconnu la République arabe sahraouie démocratique et reste sur cette position“.

(3) Qatar of course excluded…

Informe del Parlamento Europeo sobre los derechos humanos en el Sahara Occidental: virtudes y carencias

El informe del Parlamento Europeo sobre los derechos humanos en el Sahara Occidental, aunque mejorable, es bastante equilibrado y aparece en un momento especialmente oportuno. En este breve análisis, partiendo de cuáles son los derechos humanos de los saharauis, expondremos cuáles eran los riesgos a los que se enfrentaba el Parlamento Europeo al hacer su informe, para después analizar las virtudes y carencias del documento.

No es de extrañar, a la vista del mismo, que el poder marroquí (majzén) esté activando sus resortes para intentar desvirtuarlo. Y es que este informe, en este momento, desmonta la estrategia política del majzén.

Cuáles son los Derechos Humanos de los saharauis

La delegación del Parlamento Europeo trataba de investigar el respeto de los derechos humanos en el Sahara Occidental.

Los tratados fundamentales para conocer cuáles son los derechos fundamentales de los saharauis son:
- el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (PIDCP).
- el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales(PIDESC)
- y los convenios de Ginebra, en especial el IV Convenio, que protege a las personas civiles en tiempo de guerra

El artículo 1 común para el PIDCP y del PIDESC, tratados ambos ratificados por Marruecos, dice:

1. Todos los pueblos tienen el derecho de libre determinación. En virtud de este derecho establecen libremente su condición política y proveen asimismo a su desarrollo económico, social y cultural.

2. Para el logro de sus fines, todos los pueblos pueden disponer libremente de sus riquezas y recursos naturales, sin perjuicio de las obligaciones que derivan de la cooperación económica internacional basada en el principio de beneficio recíproco, así como del derecho internacional. En ningún caso podrá privarse a un pueblo de sus propios medios de subsistencia.

3. Los Estados Partes en el presente Pacto, incluso los que tienen la responsabilidad de administrar territorios no autónomos y territorios en fideicomiso, promoverán el ejercicio del derecho de libre determinación, y respetarán este derecho de conformidad con las disposiciones de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.

Los riesgos que amenazaban al informe

En su momento me hice eco del informe que debía elaborar el Parlamento Europeo tras la visita de una delegación suya al Sahara Occidental para evaluar la situación de los derechos humanos.

En aquel momento expuse las preocupaciones fundamentales que, a mi juicio, debería tratar este informe:

1. Evitar reducir un conflicto de descolonización a una cuestión "humanitaria", haciendo abstracción de que el respeto al derecho a la autodeterminación de un pueblo colonial es condición previa para el respeto de los demás derechos humanos de los individuos de ese pueblo.

2. Denunciar la explotación ilegal de recursos naturales y cuantificar lo que supone los Acuerdos de Pesca y otros que hubo entre la Unión Europea y Marruecos y catalogarlo como deuda de la Unión Europea hacia la población saharaui (y los refugiados en particular)

3. No hacer pronunciamientos en favor del plan de "autonomía" presentado por Marruecos ya que enturbian el proceso de negociación y suponen una auténtica "mala fe" porque quieren condicionar a la baja la posición negociadora de una de las partes

Como veremos, de estos tres peligros, dos se han conjurado, aunque no del modo más ortodoxo posible.

Virtudes y carencias del informe del Parlamento Europeo

El texto inicial del informe se publicó en una importante exclusiva por El País , pero tras fortísimas presiones de Marruecos el 17 de marzo recibió una nueva redacción con ligeros cambios.

Asombrosamente, el Informe del Parlamento Europeo, tal y como ha sido conocido, no tiene en cuenta estos tratados (páginas 8 y 9 del informe). A pesar de esta carencia esencial, el informe conjura la primera y tercera preocupaciones que yo señalé, pero no así la segunda.

Por un lado, y en la línea del informe del Alto Comisariado de Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos de 8 de septiembre de 2006, al decir (página 3):

El Sahara Occidental está inscrito desde 1963 en la lista de la ONU de territorios no autónomos pendientes de descolonización. Conforme al Derecho Internacional, el estatuto de territorio no autónomo sólo cesa mediante el ejercicio del derecho de autodeterminación. La situación de los derechos humanos de los saharauis está intrínsecamente ligada a la imposibilidad, hasta hoy, de resolver esta cuestión del ejercicio de la autodeterminación del pueblo del Sahara Occidental.

No es extraño que desde los sectores más próximos al "Majzén" se halla "denunciado" que el informe está muy politizado" y “totalmente desviado de su papel humanitario" (Aujourd'hui le Maroc, 17-III-2009). Por otro lado, la tercera preocupación se ha conjurado al evitar instrumentalizar este informe para cantar las "excelencias" del plan de "autonomía" marroquí para el Sahara Occidental y constatar que sobre la mesa de negociaciones hay dos propuestas, una por cada parte, y que la propuesta saharaui es incluso anterior a la marroquí (página 3):

Desde la creación de la Delegación ad hoc en 2005, se ha impreso una cierta dinámica a la cuestión del Sahara Occidental. El 11 de abril de 2007, Marruecos ha sometido al Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas una proposición de autonomía bajo soberanía marroquí. El 10 de abril de 2007, el Frente Polisario había transmitido su propuesta precisando que una autonomía sólo podría ser aceptada por vía de referéndum y proponiendo negociar garantías políticas, económicas y securitarias para la población marroquí residente en el Sahara Occidental en el caso de que el referéndum de autodeterminación desembocase en la independencia.

Ahora bien, el informe no dice ni una palabra sobre el derecho del pueblo saharaui "disponer libremente de sus riquezas y recursos naturales" reconocido en el artículo 1.2 del PIDCP y del PIDESC. Algo especialmente escandaloso teniendo en cuenta que la UE como tal (mediante el Acuerdo de Pesca) o sus Estados miembros con importaciones de determinados recursos (fosfatos, pescas y conservas, arena, tomates) son cómplices activos de la violación de este derecho humano.

Por otro lado, llama la atención que el informe haya aceptado la toponimia impuesta por el ocupante para la capital del Sahara Occidental, empleando el feo término "Laayoune" en lugar del más bello "El Aaiun" o "El Aayoune" (por utilizar la transcripción fonética francesa).

Las propuestas del informe y reacción del Majzén y sus agentes

Las propuestas del informe son varias. Alguna ya formulada por otras instancias, y otras más novedosas. De entre las recomendaciones del informe, a mi juicio, hay dos que resultan especialmente importantes. Por un lado, el informe del Parlamento Europeo hace suya una recomendación formulada por la importante organización Human Rights Watch en su informe sobre el Sahara Occidental de diciembre de 2008: proponer al Consejo de Seguridad que modifique el mandato de la MINURSO para atribuirla competencias para controlar el cumplimiento de los derechos humanos en el territorio. Ahora bien, mientras en la primera versión del informe decía que a este propósito las Naciones Unidas “deberían poder contar con el acuerdo de las partes afectadas”, en la segunda versión, tras las presiones marroquíes, dice que “necesitarán el acuerdo de las partes afectadas”.Una importante concesión a Marruecos.

Por otro lado, el informe pide a la Comisión Europea que, a través de su delegación en Marruecos, envíe periódicamente misiones informativas al territorio del Sahara Occidental y que envíe observadores oficiales a los juicios que se celebran contra activistas saharauis y que informe de ello al Parlamento Europeo.

Estas dos propuestas tienen importantes consecuencias. La primera constituye un elemento de presión más, especialmente importante, con vistas a que en la próxima resolución del Consejo de Seguridad (prevista para finales de abril) se modifique el mandato de la MINURSO de tal forma que incluya la competencia de vigilar el cumplimiento de los derechos humanos en el territorio. Habiendo sido ésta una propuesta, no sólo de una ONG (como "Human Rights Watch") sino del propio Parlamento Europeo, el eventual intento de veto a la propuesta por Francia (que ya vetó en el pasado cualquier alusión a los derechos humanos en las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad sobre el Sahara) se haría si no imposible, sí extremadamente escandaloso.

La segunda propuesta se produce en un momento especialmente importante para las relaciones entre la UE y Marruecos. La UE adoptó en octubre de 2008 la decisión política de otorgar a Marruecos un "estatuto avanzado" para las relaciones entre ambos. Se argumentaba para ello, que Marruecos había realizado unos no determinados "progresos" y "esfuerzos" en materia de derechos humanos. Las visitas periódicas al Sahara ocupado de la Comisión Europea para indagar la situación de los derechos humanos sin duda ofrecerían pruebas del escaso respeto que Marruecos presta a los derechos humanos, con la consecuencia de que la atribución del "estatuto avanzado" quedaría paralizada. La prensa marroquí ha alertado claramente del riesgo de que este informe del Parlamento Europeo lleve a reconsiderar la atribución a Marruecos de un "estatuto avanzado" para sus relaciones con la UE.

Siria: contradicciones y posibilidades de la política norteamericana en el Oriente Medio

Como era previsible, la sustitución de Bush por Obama tiene consecuencias en el Oriente Medio. Y esas consecuencias afectan a uno de los Estados políticamente centrales en la región, Siria. La política de "ninguneo" de Siria no podía dar resultado, porque su papel es central en diversas vertientes: Líbano, Israel-Palestina, mundo árabe. ¿Qué cambios se avecinan?

Varias informaciones recientes ponen de relieve el papel de Siria en la atormentada región del Oriente Medio:
- Qatar prevé organizar a finales de marzo una "mini-cumbre" árabe entre Arabia Saudí, Egipto y Siria en Doha, previa a la cumbre anual de la Liga Árabe.
- El diario "La Repubblica" publica hoy una importante entrevista al presidente sirio donde habla sobre Irán e Israel, entre otros temas.

Estas informaciones, como veremos, pone de manifiesto las contradicciones que tuvo la política de USA en el Oriente Medio... y abren una tímida esperanza de futuro.

La presidencia de Bush difirió mucho, en su discurso, entre su primer y su segundo mandato: mientras que en el primero se decían defender unos "principios" (orientación "neoconservadora"), en el segundo se decían defender los intereses USA (orientación "realista"). A mi juicio, no fue verdad ni lo uno, ni lo otro... y mejor hubiera sido que se hubiese hecho, con coherencia, lo uno o lo otro.

Sea lo que fuere, en ese discurso, Siria fue marginada. Incluso se la llegó a incluir en un macabro "eje del mal" y se aprobaron numerosas sanciones económicas contra ella. Esa política, basada en presupuestos falsos, tuvo necesariamente que fracasar.
Los presupuestos eran falsos, tanto desde la perspectiva de los "principios" como de los "intereses".

Desde la perspectiva de los "principios neoconservadores" hay que partir de un dato: dejando al margen el caso del Líbano, no hay democracias liberales en el mundo árabe. Pero no todos los regímenes políticos árabes son iguales: unos son peores que otros, porque no todos son igual de malos. Y en ese ranking cualquier observador objetivo puede apreciar que Sira no era, ni mucho menos de los peores.
En Siria existen ciertas libertades sociales y económicas inimaginables en otros países árabes aliados de USA (Arabia Saudí, Kuwait, Emiratos, Libia).
Un examen de ciertas libertades especialmente apreciadas por los "neoconservadores" lleva a considerar a Siria por delante de otros países supuestamente "moderados" como por ejemplo, Marruecos. Dos datos: mientras en Marruecos está prohibido que los clérigos cristianos vistan públicamente como tales, en Siria no; mientras en Marruecos está prohibido que las iglesias hagan sonar las campanas, en Siria no. Detalles significativos.
Pues bien, la política USA se dedicó a denigrar la imagen de Siria mientras contemporizaba con, cuando no alababa los "progresos" de otros regímenes como el saudí, el egipcio o el marroquí.
El resultado tenía que ser el que ha sido: un fracaso.

Desde la perspectiva de los intereses es evidente que Siria tiene conexiones con importantes actores de la región (oposición libanesa y palestina, Irán, Iraq) y que tiene la legalidad de su parte en un conflicto regional (ocupación del Golán por Israel).
Un enfoque "realista" debiera haber llevado a negociar con quien tiene esas bazas.
Lejos de ello, se siguió la política de aislamiento del régimen sirio.
El resultado tenía que ser el que ha sido: un fracaso.

¿Qué perspectivas se presentan?
Commplicadas.
Por un lado, el presidente sirio ha revelado en su entrevista al diario "La Repubblica" que el primer ministro israelí, Olmert, estuvo a punto de llegar a un acuerdo con él para devolver el Golán. El acuerdo se frustró en el último momento por el ataque israelí a Gaza, revela Assad. Lo cual plantea si aquella ofensiva no fue dirigida precisamente a evitar el acuerdo con Siria...
Por otro, el presidente Assad da muestras de un profundo pragmatismo y de apertura para llegar a una conciliación interárabe y del mundo árabe y occidental con Irán.

¿Será este un camino exitoso? Es posible. Pero puede ocurrir que no lo sea. Conviene no olvidar que hay muchos, en el mundo árabe y fuera de él, que no quieren llegar a esos acuerdos: las líneas de tensión y fractura persisten: tradicionalistas árabes (monarquías del golfo) versus modernizadores (repúblicas); imperialistas árabes (Arabia Saudí) versus persas; chiitas versus sunnitas. Permanezcamos atentos.

Mentiras sobre el "Cougar": la manipulación de la violencia islamista

Por un lado, el Ejecutivo se inventa tramas de "yihadistas" que no existen. Pero por otro, se ocultan atentados islamistas que sí existen. Parece contradictorio, pero ambas mentiras sirven a una misma estrategia.

He insistido mucho aquí en que la supuesta "amenaza yihadista" en España es mayormente una invención. Eso sí, una invención que sirve a determinados intereses y permite dar cobertura a siniestras actuaciones.

Pero aunque no lo haya hecho en este blog, en el pasado he denunciado el ocultamiento que ha hecho el Ejecutivo de acciones terroristas islamistas contra España en el extranjero. Y uno de los casos más claros de acción armada islamista contra España en el extranjero es el derribo del helicóptero "Cougar" en Afganistan por los talibanes en agosto de 2005. El gobierno Rodríguez quiso vender aquel ataque islamista como un "accidente" o más insultantemente como un "fallo humano"

El 24 de agosto de 2005 publiqué (en un medio que borró el artículo de su archivo, pero cuya copia reproduje en otro blog) un artículo titulado "Afganistán: ¿qué oculta el gobierno?" donde creo que por primera vez en un medio de difusión nacional se afirmaba la teoría de que "a la (hipótesis de atentado terrorista) apuntan, contra lo que sostiene el Gobierno, casi todos los indicios". Para ello me basé en unas importantes informaciones aparecidas en "La Voz de Galicia", medio que contó con valiosa información aportada por soldados y familiares de soldados implicados en el accidente, gallegos en su mayoría. No es de lo menos notable observar, con estupor, que "La Voz de Galicia" nunca volvió a reivindicar la exclusiva más importante de su historia. En aquel artículo, dije:

La Voz de Galicia ha publicado entre los días 17 y 21 [de agosto] testimonios y análisis demoledores. Me limitaré a sintetizar algunas informaciones. "Un superviviente gallego confirma que los helicópteros fueron atacados"; "Un supuesto líder talibán reivindica el ataque, pero la OTAN pide no especular" (17-VIII-2005). "Bono no descarta el ataque, pero cree que el viento derribó el helicóptero"; "Karzai culpa a una tormenta de arena y un oficial afgano habla de un choque de aspas. Miscelánea de teorías"; "Expertos independientes cuestionan que una racha de aire pueda tirar un Cougar" (18-VIII-2005). "Militares gallegos en Herat dicen que sus mandos les han pedido silencio"; "Los Cougar le pueden al viento" (19-VIII-2005). "El CNI alertó al Gobierno hace dos meses de posibles ataques a naves"; "El comandante del helicóptero que no se estrelló dice que en la zona siempre sopla el viento"; "Soldados gallegos de la Brilat vigilan día y noche los dos helicópteros siniestrados"; "Los ocupantes del segundo aparato dispararon al temer que era un ataque" (20-VIII-2005). "Nuevos restos hallados en el lugar de los hechos serán incinerados" (22-VIII-2005). El mismo día 22 se nos informa que "hace unas semanas dos granadas de mano explotaron cerca de las oficinas del gobernador de Herat", "los clérigos sunníes no ocultan su desagrado esencial por la presencia de tropas extranjeras en su país".

El 15 de febrero de 2006 volví a insistir en esta idea en un artículo titulado "Afganistán pone al descubierto la mentira original de Irak" (en el mismo medio que ha borrado el artículo de su archivo, aunque su contenido fue reproducido en otras webs):

El Gobierno de Rodríguez Zapatero ha mentido sobre el fatal "accidente" del helicóptero Cougar en Afganistán. Pido perdón por la autocita, pero me parece que he sido el primero (o de los primeros) en defender en un medio nacional que aquel hecho se debió a un ataque y no a un accidente. Lo hice el 24 de agosto de 2005, en este mismo medio, en un artículo titulado "Afganistán: ¿qué oculta el Gobierno?". En aquel momento, escribí que "casi todos los indicios" apuntaban a un derribo en una acción de guerra. Es duro decirlo, pero entonces (24 de agosto) casi nadie (ni siquiera en los medios periodísticos antigubernamentales) dio crédito a esta hipótesis que para mí era evidente.

Los nuevos datos aparecidos hoy en la prensa fortalecen la tesis de que el gobierno del presidente Rodríguez ha mentido para ocultar un atentado islamista: en primer lugar, el empecinamiento del CNI en ocultar la realidad según publica hoy La Razón; y, en segundo lugar, la falsedad documental escandalosa según la cual el 'secretario' del atestado del Cougar sólo fue escolta de Bono según recoge El Mundo de hoy.

El empeño en el ocultamiento de la realidad nos da un indicio de la EXTREMA IMPORTANCIA que tiene el caso. En su momento expliqué por qué. Según afirmaba en un artículo titulado "11-M: Afganistán pone en peligro la coartada iraquí" publicado el 12 de julio de 2006 (que también desapareció del archivo del medio que lo publicó originalmente):

asistimos al escandaloso cierre del sumario del 11-M por un juez que reconoce ¡¡que hay datos clave no verificados!! El juez, incapaz de probar que el atentado fuera obra de Al Qaeda, dice que la presencia española en Iraq “influyó” en el atentado. Pero el juez, se olvida ¡ay! de Afganistán. Recordemos aquella portada de “El País” del 14 de marzo de 2004 (día de las elecciones generales): “Todos los indicios señalan a Al Qaeda” (cursiva mía). Y recordemos también el texto de la noticia de portada: la masacre de Madrid fue “una respuesta a la colaboración con Bush (...) en Irak y en Afganistán” (cursivas mías, de nuevo).

Ironías del destino. En el mismo momento en que se pone toda la carne en el asador de la “coartada iraquí”, la “mentira originaria” salta por los aires. El sábado 8 de julio (de 2006) un soldado español murió asesinado por un ataque integrista contra nuestras tropas en Afganistán. Ya en agosto de 2005, la “mentira originaria” sufrió un duro revés con el ocultado ataque al helicóptero Cougar en Afganistán.
Como ya dije en este mismo lugar , la presencia española en Iraq no se diferenciaba en nada, ni jurídica ni políticamente, de la presencia en Afganistán.
(...)
Ahora veremos si el juez Del Olmo en su auto dice que la intervención española en Afganistán “influyó” en los autores del atentado del 11-M

Estos son los hechos. Estas son las mentiras. El ocultamiento de los auténticos ataques islamistas en el exterior se hace por los mismos que inventan tramas "yihadistas" en el interior. Quede para otro artículo la argumentación de por qué. Pero avanzo que la lógica del "cui prodest" es exactamente la misma.

Marruecos-Irán: realidad y apariencia de una ruptura diplomática

Marruecos ha roto relaciones diplomáticas con Irán el viernes 6 de marzo. Aparentemente la razón es que Irán ha "atacado" al "mundo árabe" al cuestionar la "integridad territorial" de un país árabe, Bahrein, por el hecho de que un alto responsable persa dijera que Bahrein fue una provincia iraní. Pero hay razones para pensar que las cosas no son como parecen, como casi siempre ocurre cuando se habla de nuestro vecino del sur.

Los hechos son los siguientes.
1º. El ex-presidente del Parlamento iraní, Ali Akbar Nateg Nuri ha afirmado que ha habido una etapa histórica en la que Bahrein fue una provincia de Persia. El hecho es, históricamente, innegable.
2º. El Sha de Irán aceptó la celebración de un referéndum de secesión en Bahrein. Como resultado del mismo, en 1971 Bahrein adquirió su independencia. Irán fue uno de los primeros países que reconoció su independencia.
3º. Marruecos mantuvo excelentes relaciones con el sha de Persia hasta que fue destronado.
4º. El 22 de febrero de 2009 el embajador de Irán en Bahrein asegura al ministro de Exteriores de este principado que Irán respeta la independencia de Bahrein y no tiene intenciones anexionistas.
5º. El 4 de marzo de 2009, el ministro de Exteriores de Arabia Saudí, el gran adversario de Irán en la región, pedía a los países árabes que se "unieran" para afrontar el "desafío" iraní.

Primera tesis: solidaridad con Bahrein
Marruecos, país árabe como Bahrein responde de este modo a las declaraciones del dirigente iraní.
Esta tesis no deja de ser cuestionable. En efecto, algo raro hay en la decisión de la corte de Mohamed VI. Y digo que algo raro hay porque Mohamed VI parece ser más "bahreiní" que los bahreiníes, ya que éstos, primeros afectados por las declaraciones iraníes no han roto relaciones diplomáticas con Irán. Insisto, el asunto no es lo que parece.

Segunda tesis: el chiismo amenaza al sunnismo en Marruecos
El sábado día 7 de marzo, el ministro de Exteriores del majzén, Fassi-Fihri decía que el "activismo" iraní atentaba a la unidad del rito malakita en el norte de África. Algunos han acogido en España esta "explicación".
Sin embargo, basta constatar el escasísimo número de chiitas que hay en el norte de África para darse cuenta que esta medida es, en el mejor de los casos, desproporcionada.

Tercera tesis: Marruecos se alinea contra Irán para complacer a USA.
Algunos han avanzado esta tesis.
Sin embargo, resulta muy poco probable. ¿Tiene sentido romper con Irán... ¡justo en el momento en el que la nueva administración norteamericana quiere dialogar con Irán!?

Cuarta tesis: Marruecos se pliega a los deseos saudíes.
Marruecos es un país notoriamente enfeudado a Arabia Saudí desde antiguo. Conviene recordar, aunque muchos se esfuercen en olvidarlo, que fue la muy conservadora y reaccionaria Arabia Saudí quien en el conflicto del Sahara ofreció a Marruecos dinero para hacer la guerra al revolucionario Frente Polisario. Y no sólo dinero, sino un valioso apoyo diplomático especialmente importante en la Liga Arabe. La política marroquí lleva muchos años enfeudada a las causas saudíes. Las relaciones entre los monarcas absolutos de ambos países son constantes y fluidas.
Arabia Saudí e Irán mantienen una disputa no ya sólo religiosa, sino geopolítica en el Medio Oriente. Si Arabia Saudí apoya a los gobiernos de Líbano y de la Autoridad Palestina, Irán apoya a la oposición a ambos. Si Irán apoya a Siria, Arabia Saudí la ataca.... En este contexto no es, ni mucho menos improbable, que la medida marroquí haya sido dictada en Riad.

Quinta tesis: Respuesta a la decisión iraní de reconocer a la RASD.
Irán es uno de los países musulmanes que ha reconocido a la RASD. Fue en 1980. Al año de la caída del Sha Reza Pahlevi, gran amigo de Hassán II.
Marruecos ha intentado en numerosas ocasiones que Irán retire este reconocimiento. Sin éxito. Lo más que ha conseguido es que Irán, tras declarar (8-XII-2008) que mantienen el reconociendo de la RASD, haya dicho (12-II-2009)que mantiene congeladas sus relaciones con el Frente Polisario. Llama la atención, por tanto, que apenas unos días después de esta decisión iraní, Marruecos rompa relaciones con Irán.

A la luz de lo anterior, concluyo que, en mi opinión, la ruptura de las relaciones entre Marruecos e Irán se explica por las tesis cuarta y quinta, a saber, por una colusión entre, por un lado, el interés del aliado de Marruecos (Arabia Saudí) de aislar a su adversario (Irán) en la región y, por otro lado, la pataleta marroquí por la decisión de Irán de mantener su reconocimiento de la RASD.

War comes home to Britain

In his latest column for the New Statesman, John Pilger describes the basic freedoms being lost in Britain as the "national security state", imported from the United States by New Labour, takes effect.

Freedom is being lost in Britain. The land of Magna Carta is now the land of secret gagging orders, secret trials and imprisonment. The government will soon know about every phone call, every email, every text message. Police can wilfully shoot to death an innocent man, lie and expect to get away with it. Whole communities now fear the state. The foreign secretary routinely covers up allegations of torture; the justice secretary routinely prevents the release of critical cabinet minutes taken when Iraq was illegally invaded. The litany is cursory; there is much more.

Indeed, there is so much more that the erosion of liberal freedoms is symptomatic of an evolved criminal state. The haven for Russian oligarchs, together with corruption of the tax and banking systems and of once-admired public services such as the Post Office, is one side of the coin; the other is the invisible carnage of failed colonial wars. Historically, the pattern is familiar. As the colonial crimes in Algeria, Vietnam and Afghanistan blew back to their perpetrators, France, the United States and the Soviet Union, so the cancerous effects of Britain’s cynicism in Iraq and Afghanistan have come home.

The most obvious example is the bombing atrocities in London on 7 July 2005; no one in the British intelligence mandarinate doubts these were a gift of Blair. “Terrorism” describes only the few acts of individuals and groups, not the constant, industrial violence of great powers. Suppressing this truth is left to the credible media. On 27 February, the Guardian’s Washington correspondent, Ewen MacAskill, in reporting President Obama’s statement that America was finally leaving Iraq, as if it were fact, wrote: “For Iraq, the death toll is unknown, in the tens of thousands, victims of the war, a nationalist uprising, sectarian in-fighting and jihadists attracted by the US presence.” Thus, the Anglo-American invaders are merely a “presence” and not directly responsible for the “unknown” number of Iraqi deaths. Such contortion of intellect is impressive.

In January last year, a report by the respected Opinion Research Business (ORB) revised an earlier assessment of deaths in Iraq to 1,033,000. This followed an exhaustive, peer-reviewed study in 2006 by the world-renowned John Hopkins School of Public Health in the US, published in The Lancet, which found that 655,000 Iraqis had died as a result of the invasion. US and British officials immediately dismissed the report as “flawed” – a deliberate deception. Foreign Office papers obtained under Freedom of Information disclose a memo written by the government’s chief scientific adviser, Sir Roy Anderson, in which he praised The Lancet report, describing it as “robust and employs methods that are regarded as close to ‘best practice’ given [the conditions] in Iraq.” An adviser to the prime minister commented: “The survey methodology used here cannot be rubbished, it is a tried and tested way of measuring mortality in conflict zones”. Speaking a few days later, a Foreign Office minister, Lord Triesman, said, “The way in which data are extrapolated from samples to a general outcome is a matter of deep concern.”

The episode exemplifies the scale and deception of this state crime. Les Roberts, co-author of the Lancet study, has since argued that Britain and America might have caused in Iraq “an episode more deadly than the Rwandan genocide”. This is not news. Neither is it a critical reference in the freedoms campaign organised by the Observer columnist Henry Porter. At a conference in London on 28 February, Lord Goldsmith, Blair’s attorney-general, who notoriously changed his mind and advised the government the invasion was legal, when it wasn’t, was a speaker for freedom. So was Timothy Garton Ash, a “liberal interventionist”. On 9 April, 2003, shortly after the slaughter had begun in Iraq, a euphoric Garton Ash wrote in the Guardian: “America has never been the Great Satan. It has sometimes been the Great Gatsby: 'They were careless people, Tom and Daisy – they smashed up things...'. One of Britain’s jobs “is to keep reminding Tom and Daisy that they now have promises to keep”. Less frivolously, he lauded Blair for his “strong Gladstonian instincts for humanitarian intervention” and repeated the government’s propaganda about Saddam Hussein. In 2006, he wrote: “Now we face the next big test of the west after Iraq: Iran.” (I have italicized we). This also adheres precisely to the propaganda; David Milliband has declared Iran a “threat” in preparation for possibly the next war.

Like so many of New Labour’s Tonier-than-thou squad, Henry Porter celebrated Blair as an almost mystical politician who “presents himself as a harmoniser for all the opposing interests in British life, a conciliator of class differences and tribal antipathies, synthesiser of opposing beliefs”. Porter dismissed as “demonic nonsense” all analysis of the 9/11 attacks that suggested there were specific causes: the consequences of violent actions taken by the powerful in the Middle East. Such thinking, he wrote, “exactly matches the views of Osama bin Laden... with America’s haters, that’s all there is – hatred”. This, of course, was Blair’s view.

Freedoms are being lost in Britain because of the rapid growth of the “national security state”. This form of militarism was imported from the United States by New Labour. Totalitarian in essence, it relies upon fear mongering to entrench the executive with venal legal mechanisms that progressively diminish democracy and justice. “Security” is all, as is propaganda promoting rapacious colonial wars, even as honest mistakes. Take away this propaganda, and the wars are exposed for what they are, and fear evaporates. Take away the obeisance of many in Britain’s liberal elite to American power and you demote a profound colonial and crusader mentality that covers for epic criminals like Blair. Prosecute these criminals and change the system that breeds them and you have freedom.