Prostitution, l'autre industrie au Maroc

La prostitution gagngrène la société marocaine. Et cette gangrène se projette à l'extérieur des frotnières du royaume au point de devenir un trait caractéristique de la femme marocaine vivant en terre d'exil.

Les prostituées ne se cachent pas au Maroc. On en trouve partout, des rabatteurs, des clients, des hotels propose leurs chambres, les macros encaissent, c'est une veritable industrie qui fait le succès du tourisme au Maroc.

La banalisation de la prostitution au Maroc ne permet plus de distinguer ce fléau comme une déviance nocive du corps social. Marrakech est une des plus grandes villes du pays. Que son économie soit exclusivement fondée sur le proxénétisme ne semble plus déranger personne.

A Rabat , la fille d'un ex-conseiller et ancien ministre du roi Hassan II, accusée de diriger un réseau de prostitution de luxe, d'écouler de la cocaïne au profit de ses clients, des dignitaires du Makhzen et étrangers, dont de grandes personnalités de la politique et du milieu des affaires, aurait bénéficié de la "protection" des cadres des services de la police, dont le Préfet de Police, ainsi qu'un responsable à la Direction générale de sûreté Nationale (DGSN). Elle en est sortie indemne.

A Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech, Fès, Tanger, Agadir, le commerce de la chair fait florès. C'est une activité comme une autre. Une donnée, encore une fois. Un attribut de l'espace urbain marocain. Des villes de tolérance, avec des réseaux, des filières, des clients, des fournisseurs, des circuits institutionnalisés, des appels d'offres et des cahiers de charges.


Une enquête de l’Organisation Panafricaine de Lutte contre le Sida au Maroc (OPALS-Maroc) auprès de 500 prostituées marocaines, dans sept villes du pays, Azrou, Khénifra, Béni Mellal, Meknès, Fès, Agadir et Rabat, dévoilée en janvier 2008, met en lumière un phénomène peu évoqué au Maroc. Une partie des résultats est tristement prévisible mais beaucoup sont très surprenants. 13% des prostituées interrogées sont des « célibataires vierges » qui ont toujours leur hymen. Ce chiffre met en lumière le problème de la sacro-sainte virginité demandée avant le mariage et les pratiques exercées par certaines femmes pour avoir malgré tout une activité sexuelle.

Les fondements de la société marocaine sont à nouveau ébranlés dans cette étude lorsqu’on apprend que 59,4% de ces femmes ont eu leur premier rapport sexuel rémunéré entre 9 et 15 ans. Une femme interrogée avoue même avoir eu son premier rapport à 9 ans. Par ailleurs 32,6% des femmes ont pratiqué ou subi un acte sexuel entre 6 et 15 ans. La faible probabilité que l’enfant de 6 ans soit consentant renvoie encore une fois aux problèmes de la pédophilie et aux violences sexuelles infligées aux jeunes filles, dans un pays où la sexualité est taboue. Tout comme le cas des mineurs qui errent à longueur de journée pour vendre leurs corps sans aucune protection contre les maladies. Ainsi se dessine la cruauté d'un destin pitoyable pour beaucoup d'adolescents marocains.

Un autre phénomène alarmant qui sévit depuis longtemps : La prostitution en milieu estudiantin. Lycéennes ou étudiantes, de jeunes Marocaines se livrent, contre des cadeaux ou de l'argent, à un commerce du sexe qu'elles refusent toutefois d'appeler prostitution. En Europe, les témoignages et alertes se multiplient face au phénomène des jeunes filles marocaines qui se prostituent et dont la principale cause est la pauvreté.

Pourquoi le ministre de l'intérieur a refusé l'installation d'un bureau local de l'association française "Ni Putes Ni Soumises"? Pour la seule raison que cela risque de déranger l'institution de la prostitution au Maroc, que cette association fasse l’état des lieux de la prostitution et le tourisme sexuel extrêmement grave au royaume alaouite.

Quand on additionne à ce fleau évolutif qu'est la prostitution des temps modernes (complicité de la famille, tourisme sexuel, pédophilie.....) à l'industrie des stupefiants bien encadree par les decideurs et les barons de la cours royale (le Maroc est le premier producteur mondial de cannabis et premier fournisseur de l'Europe) non obstant des autres fléaux socio-economiques endémiques, on est en droit de se poser la question suivante : Où va le Maroc de Sa Majesté le roi Mohamed VI?

Malheureusement pour la population sahraouie, ce fléau n'a pas épargné les territoires occupés du Sahara Occidental, où la présence de plus de 160.000 soldats, le long du mur de défense, fait de ce métier l'un des plus lucratifs après le trafic de drogue dirigé par les généraux de l'armée marocaine.

La mythomanie marocaine

On ment pour cacher une réalité ou en créer une, pour s’économiser l’effort d’une explication, pour se protéger soi-même ou un autre, pour obtenir des privilèges, des faveurs, des avantages, on ment pour se valoriser, entretenir chez les autres une image idéalisée de soi-même, souvent très loin de la réalité. Parfois l’illusion construite dans le mensonge est si parfaite qu’on commence à y croire, comme menteur. On se ment alors à soi-même. À ce stade, on glisse vers la pathologie: la mythomanie. C’est le système maniaque de la menterie qui s’énonce sans contrôle. Les mythomanes demeurent de mauvais menteurs car les bons savent doser.

La tâche qui le goubernement s'est donnée dans le but de projetter une image extérieure d'un Maroc moderne, stable, démocratique et respectueux des droits de l'homme est une mission qui s'est avérée impossible à cause de la réalité quotiedienne. Cela a conduit les responsables marocains à devenir des véritables professionnels de la mythomanie.


Premier mensonge : "Le Maroc change"

"Le Maroc change!". Depuis quelque années, cette formule qui ressemble étrangement à un slogan de campagne électorale est sur toutes les lèvres. Le gouvernement et les autorités du pays l'utilisent sans cesse. Selon eux, grâce à l'avènement du nouveau millénaire et le changement de monarque, le Maroc serait entré de plein-pied dans la modernité. Les experts internationaux usent également sans modération de cette affirmation. Chaque fois qu'ils sont interrogés, ils n'hésitent pas à déclarer que le progrès répand désormais ses bienfaits sur l'ensemble du pays. Dès lors, l'information se propage dans toutes les rédactions. Repris avec empressement par la presse et les médias, relayé et diffusé à toute la planète via Internet, ce mensonge est en passe de devenir une vérité absolue. Alors que la réalité vécue par les citoyens est faite de misère criante, d'inégalités sociales flagrantes et d'injustices évidentes. La justice incarcère des citoyens pour outrage à la personne du roi, la police frappe et arrête systématiquement les participants aux manifestations, la RTM, même devenue Al Aoula, continue d'ouvrir invariablement ses journaux d'informations sur les activités royales (avant, dans le générique du téléjournal on voyait Hassan II sur son cheval blanc. Mais comme Mohamed VI n'aime pas beaucoup les chavaux, ils pourraient mettre son image sur un jetski). La pratique de la torture est largement répandue dans les prisons et les commissariats du pays. Les autorités marocaines accusées de participer au programme américain de transferts illégaux de prisonniers. Sinistre réalité ! Le Maroc est toujours considéré comme un pays où les services de sécurité pratiquent la torture. Tout le monde est unanime là-dessus : amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Commission NNUU à Génève, Parlement Européen…) Les sites webs du Journal Hebdo, Nichane, Al Watan alan, Youtube… censurés. Ceux qui croient ou qui prétendent croire que le Maroc change mettent sur le compte des vieilles habitudes toute atteinte aux libertés fondamentales. Ils expliquent qu'il est difficile de changer les mentalités. Ils tentent de démontrer combien les réflexes du passé, dont eux aussi affirment vouloir se débarrasser, sont ancrés dans la société. Ils oublient qu'à force de se répéter, les réflexes finissent par devenir des habitudes. Chaque année, la justice prononce des interdictions de parution et condamne des journalistes à des peines de prison et des amendes exhorbitantes conduisant directement à la faillite. Les plus optimistes, ceux qui ne perdent pas espoir et persistent à croire en des jours meilleurs – y voient une embellie quand les peines prononcées sont assorties de sursis. Bien maigre consolation !

Le retour massif des Marocains résidents à l'étranger lors de la période estivale attisera les envies de départs de ceux, nombreux, qui ne se voient plus vivre chez eux. Au bout du compte, un changement majeur s'opère : à défaut d'éclaircie, le ciel s'assombrit. Les petits métiers – porteurs de précarité – se développent. Le "système D" et la solidarité pour échapper à la pauvreté demeurent les seules solutions pour lutter contre la paupérisation. Pis, des diplômés "Bac + 2" et même "Bac + 4" finissent comme opérateurs téléphoniques dans des centrales d'appels. Et Tandis que les partis traditionnels n'ont plus aucune crédibilité chez le citoyen marocain, les partis islamistes sont entrés en scène et s'engouffrent en promettant remporter les élections communales. A moins que l'entrée spectaculaire du PAM fasse de vrais miracles.


Deuxième mensonge : le terrorisme

N'importe quelle manifestation pacifique reprimée par la force, ses participants sont immédiatement dénoncés comme des fauteurs de trouble-fêtes. Le militant des droits humain Amazigh, victime de la grossière accusation de complot avec les services secreta espagnols. Un vif souvenir de l'époque de Hassan II! Les militants sahraouis sont accusés de pratiquer le terrorisme dans les universités et dans les villes occupés du Sahara Occidental et condamnés à des années de prison parmi les délinquants d'ordre commun. Les fausses accusations sont le seul moyen que l'administration a trouvées pour réprimer l'Intifada dans les villes sahraouies.

La mythomanie marocaine va plus loin encore jusqu'à prétendre que le Front Polisario a des liaisons avec la nébuleuses d'Al Qaida dans le Sahel. Une nébuleuse qui ne va pas au-delà d'une poignée de trafiquants de cigarettes "Marlboro" dont le seul but est l'enrichissement à travers le kidnapping de touristes européens.

Le Maroc, en accusant les sahraouis de terroristes, veut faire croire au monde que la stabilité et la sécurité du pays passe par l'occupation du Sahara Occidental alors que la réalité c'est que le terreau favori de l'intégrisme est la pauvreté et l'injustice, les deux maladies chroniques du Maroc de Mohamed VI.

La menace integriste (réelle ou inventée)est un alibi pour imposer le fait accompli de l'occupation illégale du Sahara Occidental et pour effrayer les forces libérales et progressistes et de se poser en rempart contre des forces politiques que ces mêmes régimes ont parfois soutenu.

Mais les responsables marocains oublient que celui qui dit un mensonge ne prévoit point le travail qu'il entreprend; car il faudra qu'il en invente mille autres pour soutenir le premier.

D'autres mensonges ? La série de démantèlements de réseaux terroristes. Ma menace communiste à Sidi Ifni. La spécifité marocaine, plat chaud servi pour accéder au statut avancé avec l'UE. La crise financière internationale n'a eu que de faibles répercussions sur le Maroc. En 2010 il n’y aura plus de chômeur, plus de mendiants, tous les marocains vont travailler dans le tourisme, ils auront tous accès aux soins gratuits...etc…etc…

Cependant, le menteur finit toujours par être dépassé par ses mensonges, comme le dit si bien un certain poète anonyme : Le menteur finit par être dépassé par tous les mensonges qu’il a forgés , laissant entrevoir les contradictions, de toutes ses erreurs d’inattention, les cartes truquées vont bientôt s’écrouler, et le menteur sera enfin dévoilé.

Le mensonge de l'autonomie

En 1952, la résolution 637(VIII) de l’Onu déclare que le droit des peuples et des nations à disposer d’eux-mêmes est une condition préalable de tous les droits fondamentaux de l’Homme. Le 14 décembre 1960, la résolution 1514 de l’Assemblée Générale déclare que "tous les peuples ont le droit de libre détermination ; en vertu de ce droit ils déterminent librement leur statut politique"...

Afin de refuser la violence et la violation des droits fondamentaux de l’Homme et des peuples, afin également de redonner sa légitimité à l’ONU, il n’y a pas d’autre choix qu’un retour aux valeurs fondatrices de l’Organisation.

La résolution 1871 du Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU, adoptée à l'unanimité au mois d'avril 2009, évoque les droits inaliénables du peuple sahraoui à l’autodétermination sans ingérence extérieure et son droit à l’indépendance et à la souveraineté. Mais ce droit, envisagé par les accords de 1991, tarde à se réaliser. Les sahraouis, dans le désespoir de créer leur propre Etat, redoublent de manifestations contre l'occupation , et subissent de plein fouet les exactions des forces de sécurité marocaines. Les droits de l'homme les plus élémentaires ne sont pas respectés et ils sont même bafoués de la manière la plus officielle qui soit. Les manifestants pacifistes sont reprimés et emprisonnés comme des criminels au nom de la "défense de l'intégrité territoriale".

Dans ce climat peu serein, l'ONU demande au Front Polisario de négocier avec le Maroc, de croire en sa bonne volonté. Seulement cette bonne volonté est accompagnée par une obsession malsaine de l'usage de la force et la violence contre des civils désarmés et pacifiques dont le seul crime est d'exprimer leur besoin de se prononcer sur leur avenir.



Aujourd'hui, les sahraouis se trouvent face à des défis importants : Rétablir la légalité internationale et poursuivre les négociations, même en étant conscient de la stéritlité de cette voie du fait que le Maroc n'a d'autre proposition que l'autonomie. Une autonomie qui ne peut être qu'utopique, puisque le pouvoir au Maroc continue d'être concentré dans des insitutions défiant tout processus démocratique et la presse reste à la merci de la classe dirigeante. Qui dit autonomie dit déconcentration du pouvoir et transfert des compétences du centre aux infrastructures locales et régionales. Le roi Mohamed VI sait que le projet d'autonomie deviendra un choix d'organisation de l'Etat marocain et ne concernera pas uniquement le Sahara Occidental, ce qui veut dire un consentement à l'avance d'une limitation géante de ses pouvoirs et renforcement des rôles des autres intervenants. Les partis politiques n'ont pas été à la hauteur de saisir cette occasion pour étendre leurs revendications démocratiques parce qu'ils savent que cette déconcentration de la gestion du pays n'aura pas lieu. Tout simplement parce qu'il n'y a pas de transition démocraitque non plus. La transition a lieu après un changement de régime. Au Maroc, le même régime est toujours surplace et le paysage politique est toujours le même. The Economiste Intelligence Unit Unit a fait un classement pour l'année 2008. sur 167 pays examinés, le Maroc figure à la 121ème place, dans la catégorie régimes autoritaires. Le classement est basé sur cinq indicateurs: Processus électoral et pluralisme, libertés civiles, fonctionnement du gouvernement, participation politique et culture politique.

Nous ne devons pas craindre d'emprunter la voie des négociations et continuer à lever les obstacles que l'autre partie sèmera, au fur et à mesure que nous progressons dans notre marche inéluctable vers l'indépendance. La résistance des militants sahraouis, partout où ils sont, consistera à brandir l'arme de la résistance pacifique et accumuler davantage de soutien politique et humain à notre cause et incitera les dirigeants marocains à renoncer à l'usage de la violence contre les jeunes manifestants dans les territoires occupés de la RASD. Toutefois, les combattants sahraouis reprendront les armes le jour où il sera établi que la voie des négociations s'est avéré infructueuse.

Pour une cause juste, comme la libération de son pays, le retour aux armes est légitime surtout lorsqu'il est la seule voie de recours. Nous espérons que les pays que se disent démocratiques comprendront que le soutien aux entêtements du royaume chérifien n'aidera pas à éteindre la flamme de l'instabilité dans cette région et ne réussira pas à faire taire les voix indépendentistes sahraouis.

Hausse de la pédophilie au royaume de Mohamed VI

L’augmentation du nombre d’agressions sexuelles sur les enfants au Maroc est «effarante», selon l’ONG marocaine «Touche pas à mon enfant», qui cite un taux de progression «choquant et dangereux» par rapport à 2007. L’association affirme avoir recensé 306 cas d’agressions sexuelles sur des enfants en 2008, un chiffre six fois supérieur à celui contenu dans un document de la «Coalition contre les abus sexuels sur les enfants» (collectif d’ONG des Droits de l’Homme) pour le premier semestre 2007.
Dans un rapport rendu public le 19/05/2008, «Touche pas à mon enfant» souligne que «les cas déclarés par les familles des victimes (...) ne constituent qu’un infime pourcentage des abus commis». Cela s’explique, ajoute l’ONG, par «la sensibilité de cette question au sein d’une société conservatrice comme la nôtre».
«Les agressions sexuelles sont, au Maroc, comme dans beaucoup d’autres sociétés, entourées d’une chape de silence quasi total» car elles sont considérées comme «un sujet tabou», note le rapport, et «même les victimes des sévices sexuels et leurs proches n’osent pas en parler».
L’augmentation des chiffres déclarés de la pédophilie au Maroc ne signifie pas une augmentation des victimes mais (le fait) qu’on est en train de casser des tabous», a pour sa part relativisé la ministre du Développement social, de la famille et de la solidarité Nouzha Skalli.
«La pédophilie a toujours existé au Maroc, a-t-elle déclaré à l’AFP. Le fait qu’elle soit révélée au grand jour par les medias et les ONG (...) ne signifie nullement une augmentation directe du nombre des victimes de la pédophilie».
Selon Najat Anwar, présidente fondatrice de l’ONG, «l’augmentation des chiffres de la pédophilie en 2008 est due au développement d’Internet, de la persistance du phénomène des ‘petites bonnes’ et au tourisme sexuel». «Les données du rapport ont été recueillies par l’Association, a-t-elle insisté dans un entretien à l’AFP, et ne reflètent en aucun cas la réalité au Maroc. Ce ne sont que les cas que l’association a rencontrés».
«Les enfants issus de familles marocaines pauvres sont la cible la plus exposée et convoitée des agressions», ajoute ce rapport, le premier du genre depuis la création de «Touche pas à mon enfant» en 2004.
Il apparaît également que les filles «sont plus exposées aux agressions sexuelles que les garçons» et que la tranche d’âge la plus vulnérable est celle des 0 à 8 ans, selon l’étude. Les agressions «ont souvent lieu dans le milieu familial» et en des endroits réputés sûrs comme la maison, l’école ou un club sportif. «Les grandes villes sont les foyers des agressions et exploitation sexuelles sous toutes leurs formes en raison du tourisme sexuel, du travail des enfants, de la croissance du nombre d’enfants abandonnés», indique encore le rapport. «Touche pas à mon enfant» estime que «les faibles sanctions» prises par la justice à l’encontre des agresseurs d’enfants «encouragent la pérennité des agressions». L’ONG recommande «une implication des autorités compétentes, telles que la police et autres organismes» ainsi que «l’adoption de lois adaptées pour éradiquer ce phénomène».
«Touche pas à mon enfant» appelle aussi au «renforcement des sanctions» dans la législation pénale marocaine. Ce genre de comportement est monnaie courante, explique Najat Anouar, présidente de l’association « Touche pas à mon enfant » aux journalistes français. Et d’ajouter : « Pour l’heure, la police marocaine procède à des arrestations efficaces mais ce n’est pas assez. Pis encore, les procédures contre les étrangers restent très rares, du fait que les autorités craignent de porter préjudice au tourisme en ternissant la réputation du pays. » Là où le bât blesse, c’est que des associations qui oeuvrent pour sauver les enfants marocains de la dépravation existent, mais elles restent impuissantes toutes seules face à cette situation alarmante. Il est grand temps de sortir la ville ocre et Agadir de la débauche patente qui y sévit en se prémunissant d’outils juridiques à même de combattre ces abus et vices.
La réalité vécue par les enfants marocains issus de familles citadines ou rurales défavorisées est donc bien éloignée de l'idéal énoncé par l'ONU. La violence, les enfants la subissent sous plusieurs formes : selon l'Organisation Internationale du Travail, le Maroc reste aux côtés de la Chine et de l'Inde "l'un des pays présentant les pires formes de travail des enfants". Leur nombre est évalué à 600.000, dont l'âge s'échelonne entre 6 et 15 ans. les salaires se situent en dessous de toutes les normes, les heures ne sont aucunement réglementées. Les garçons occupent des emplois dans les commerces ou des entreprises.Les filles sont employées dans le textile et de nombreuses autres, entre 7 et 10 ans, recrutées dans les campagnes et littéralement achetées à des parents très pauvres, deviennent les "petites bonnes" taillables et corvéables à merci dans les familles citadines. Des tentatives pour scolariser quelques heures par semaines ces enfants travailleurs restent des exceptions.Ceux qui ne peuvent plus supporter les conditions de travail accompagnées assez souvent de brutalités commises par l'employeur, s'enfuient et vont grossir le flot des "enfants des rues" issus de familles pauvres déstructurées, enfants de mères célibataires, enfants abandonnés.Ces enfants, certains très jeunes, vivent dans l'insécurité totale de la rue, sans aucune hygiène, mal nourris, exposés à l'exploitation sexuelle dès dix ans, aux rafles de la police, emprisonnés souvent puisque le vagabondage est un délit...

Britain: the depth of corruption

In his latest column for the New Statesman, John Pilger describes how the current scandal of MPs' tax evasion and phantom mortgages conceals a deeper corruption that is traced back to the political monoculture of the United States.

The theft of public money by members of parliament, including government ministers, has given Britons a rare glimpse inside the tent of power and privilege. It is rare because not one political reporter or commentator, those who fill tombstones of column inches and dominate broadcast journalism, revealed a shred of this scandal. It was left to a public relations man to sell the “leak”. Why?

The answer lies in a deeper corruption, which tales of tax evasion and phantom mortgages touch upon but also conceal. Since Margaret Thatcher, British parliamentary democracy has been progressively destroyed as the two main parties have converged into a single-ideology business state, each with almost identical social, economic and foreign policies. This “project” was completed by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, inspired by the political monoculture of the United States. That so many Labour and Tory politicians are now revealed as personally crooked is no more than a metaphor for the anti-democratic system they have forged together.

Their accomplices have been those journalists who report Parliament as "lobby correspondents" and their editors, who have “played the game” wilfully, and have deluded the public (and sometimes themselves) that vital, democratic differences exist between the parties. Media-designed opinion polls based on absurdly small samplings, along with a tsunami of comment on personalities and their specious crises, have reduced the “national conversation” to a series of media events, in which the withdrawal of popular consent – as the historically low electoral turnouts under Blair demonstrated – has been abused as apathy.

Having fixed the boundaries of political debate and possibility, self-important paladins, notably liberals, promoted the naked emperor Blair and championed his “values” that would allow “the mind [to] range in search of a better Britain”. And when the bloodstains showed, they ran for cover. All of it had been, as Larry David once described an erstwhile crony, “a babbling brook of bullshit”.

How contrite their former heroes now seem. On 17 May, the Leader of the House of Commons, Harriet Harman, who is alleged to have spent £10,000 of taxpayers’ money on “media training”, called on MPs to “rebuild cross-party trust”. The unintended irony of her words recalls one of her first acts as social security secretary more than a decade ago – cutting the benefits of single mothers. This was spun and reported as if there was a “revolt” among Labour backbenchers, which was false. None of Blair’s new female MPs, who had been elected “to end male-dominated, Conservative policies”, spoke up against this attack on the poorest of poor women. All voted for it.

The same was true of the lawless attack on Iraq in 2003, behind which the cross-party Establishment and the political media rallied. Andrew Marr stood in Downing Street and excitedly told BBC viewers that Blair had “said they would be able to take Baghdad without a bloodbath, and that in the end the Iraqis would be celebrating. And on both of those points he has been proved conclusively right.” When Blair’s army finally retreated from Basra in May, it left behind, according to scholarly estimates, more than a million people dead, a majority of stricken, sick children, a contaminated water supply, a crippled energy grid and four million refugees.

As for the “celebrating” Iraqis, the vast majority, say Whitehall’s own surveys, want the invader out. And when Blair finally departed the House of Commons, MPs gave him a standing ovation – they who had refused to hold a vote on his criminal invasion or even to set up an inquiry into its lies, which almost three-quarters of the British population wanted.

Such venality goes far beyond the greed of the uppity Hazel Blears.

“Normalising the unthinkable”, Edward Herman’s phrase from his essay The Banality of Evil, about the division of labour in state crime, is applicable here. On 18 May, the Guardian devoted the top of one page to a report headlined, “Blair awarded $1m prize for international relations work”. This prize, announced in Israel soon after the Gaza massacre, was for his “cultural and social impact on the world”. You looked in vain for evidence of a spoof or some recognition of the truth. Instead, there was his “optimism about the chance of bringing peace” and his work “designed to forge peace”.

This was the same Blair who committed the same crime – deliberately planning the invasion of a country, “the supreme international crime” – for which the Nazi foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was hanged at Nuremberg after proof of his guilt was located in German cabinet documents. Last February, Britain’s “Justice” Secretary, Jack Straw, blocked publication of crucial cabinet minutes from March 2003 about the planning of the invasion of Iraq, even though the Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, has ordered their release. For Blair, the unthinkable is both normalised and celebrated.

“How our corrupt MPs are playing into the hands of extremists,” said the cover of last week’s New Statesman. But is not their support for the epic crime in Iraq already extremism? And for the murderous imperial adventure in Afghanistan? And for the government’s collusion with torture?

It is as if our public language has finally become Orwellian. Using totalitarian laws approved by a majority of MPs, the police have set up secretive units to combat democratic dissent they call “extremism”. Their de facto partners are “security” journalists, a recent breed of state or “lobby” propagandist. On 9 April, the BBC’s Newsnight programme promoted the guilt of 12 “terrorists” arrested in a contrived media drama orchestrated by the Prime Minister himself. All were later released without charge.

Something is changing in Britain that gives cause for optimism. The British people have probably never been more politically aware and prepared to clear out decrepit myths and other rubbish while stepping angrily over the babbling brook of bullshit.

Morocco: The Municipal Elections As a Test

The upcoming Moroccan municipal elections scheduled for next June face a big challenge. The latter does not only have to do with the competition among the political partners to win the largest number of seats possible, but also with securing a broad participation that befits an event directly related to running public affairs.

Despite forecasts of a 50% turnout rate in social strata of more than 13 million voters, a previous experience of abstention during the 2007 parliamentary elections dominated the political scene, at least as some political groups - to whom the low turnout participation was a punishment - embarked on self-criticism.

The method [of conducting elections] was not very palatable. Failure to conduct fair and transparent elections reflective of the true partisan and political maps dominated the struggle for power, a period during which the political elites were tamed and their projects undermined. In the meantime, and given the numerous setbacks, the gap widened between the government and the opposition. However, ever since these relations, marred by precaution and lack of trust, were redressed when the political transition took shape in 1998, hopes were revived and assessments diverged, with political realism gaining upper hand and coexistence endorsed as an alternative to time-consuming struggles in the framework of an imposed pluralism.

Succumbing to the de facto situation was a consensual choice dictated by data of future dimensions. The political forces that barricaded behind the wall of the opposition mustered a courage no less aggressive than conjuring up the missing understandings between the palace and the opposition. However, this belated attempt did not help answer all the questions. Nor did it meet all aspirations. Hence, the huge abstention was a mere spontaneous expression of a different kind of chasm that was getting deeper between the street and the political elites.

Between the boycotted practices that have proven their inability to absorb the genuine concerns related to the present challenges - with the emergence of many demands and aspirations tailored to the measure of the prevailing social, economic and cultural developments - and the ongoing behaviors and mentalities that overlooked these developments, the political scene stood at a standstill. After all, the reforms, regardless of their legal, political and procedural importance, are measured by how likely they are to bring about realistic approaches to change the prevailing structures, whether at the level of determining the role of the state, activating the political parties and benefiting from the experiences and aspirations of the civil society, or in terms of addressing and promoting reality. The coming municipal elections will be a mere test for willpower and capacity.

In such competitions that focus on running public affairs, political backgrounds will certainly come into play. Bygone is the time when the state was an economic actor and a key driver of the development cycles. However, to lift the burdens off the concept of the central state does not necessarily mean absolving it from its responsibilities in comprehensive rehabilitation which gives a space for the private sector and local producers and consecrates the decentralization of administrative decisions. Nevertheless, the global economic and financial crisis can not be overcome if roles are not redistributed. In this sense, new lessons must be learnt vis-à-vis the challenges of local development.

Just like other emerging democracies, Morocco has tried many recipes for state welfare and role of parties. It has also tried to reconcile economic and commercial privatization, benefiting from its revenues. This had taken place to the rhythm of questioned new developments. The importance of the forthcoming elections does not lie in their competitive aspect which is likely to redraw a semi-fixed map, but rather in the opportunity they present for contemplation and revision. Measured by the momentum of popular participation, advanced democracies gain their credibility first and foremost from renewing the ideas and elites and leading change.

Omar Hadrami and how to write a CV in the Sahara

The invaluably irreverent gossip-machine that is Bakchich has an interesting article in its No. 31:

A few days before the publication of Ban Ki Moon's piece of prose, the [Moroccan] interior ministry, locked down by Fouad Ali El Himma, proceeded to create a Sahrawi unit. This will operate in the shadows of the aforementioned ministry, which, eight years after the dismissal of Driss Basri, remains in control of the Saharan dossier. The exact task of this unit remains a mystery, but looking at its composition, one may fear the worst...

By royal decree of Mohammed VI, three Sahrawi walis -- Mohamed Ali El Admi, Mohamed Rachid Duihi and Khalil Dkhil - have been promoted to the rank of extraordinary walis ["walis détachés"] within the concerned minstry. With respect to the origins of the three men, the tribal balance has certainly been respected, but ... because there's always a but with the Makhzen: one of the men, Mohamed Ali El Admi, is a horrible torturer who served in the 80s in the refugee camps of Tindouf before joining Morocco. Known under the name of Omar Hadrami, he has savagely tortured both Moroccan soldiers who had been taken prisoners by the Polisario Front (who would be happy to do him in today) and Sahrawi prisoners of opinon, for whom he built a torture centre in Tindouf. In short, a reprehensible person who's got a CV just as reprehensible and who figures in the "best of" of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
[shoddy translation from french by western sahara info]

What Mr. Hadrami did between 1972 and 1990

The Omar Hadrami case always was something of a litmus test for both Polisario's and Morocco's propaganda. For Polisario, because they pretended that all was well within the refugee camps during the 1980s, while in fact unsavory characters such as Hadrami ran amok amassing personal power and silencing opposition. He was by all accounts widely feared in the camps, by supporters and detractors alike, and his stature was such that the relationship with secretary-general Muhammad Abdelaziz grew increasingly uneasy. He didn't lose power until the late 1980s, after he faced off with Abdelaziz in an attempt to grab power. The coup attempt led to traumatic disturbances in the camps -- of which Sahrawis are still reluctant to speak -- and in the end Hadrami and his collaborators were defeated and thrown in prison. He was however released relatively quickly, and named representative to Washington; still a very prestigeous post, but far from the centre of power in Rabouni camp. From there, he defected to Morocco. He was immediately promoted to governor and lavished with attention by the court and king Hassan II, and has appeared as its loyal Sahrawi face ever since, meeting with countless visiting delegations to tell his ghastly stories about what he saw happen in the Tindouf refugee camps.

But, thing is, as head of Polisario's military security apparatus, he was himself responsible for most of that abuse. This is rarely mentioned in the Moroccan press, just as Polisario would never have mentioned it while he was on their side. In the MAP's official CV, his Polisario years are left out entirely -- there's a curious gap between his 1972 graduation from a Moroccan university and his 1990 installation as wali. Amnesty International's reports on the conflict regularly feature this sour little line:

Those responsible for human rights abuses in the [Tindouf] camps in previous years continued to enjoy impunity. The Polisario authorities failed to hand over perpetrators still resident in the camps to the Algerian authorities to be brought to justice, and the Moroccan government failed to bring to justice the perpetrators of abuses in the Polisario camps present on its territory.

That's a not-too-veiled reference to Hadrami, and the AI has been even clearer:

"In the Polisario camps there was repression until 1992, says [Amnesty International's Donatella] Rovera." "It improved a lot after 1988 when they recognized this and asked forgiveness of their people." Amnesty maintains that Omar Hadrami, chief of internal security in the Polasario camps, actually was given a job at the interior ministry in Morocco after 1988. "If the Moroccans are serious about cracking down on torture, they should bring Hadrami to trial," Rovera says.

Human rights under Polisario

As for the human rights situation in the Tindouf refugee camps, some serious question marks remain. Most observers seem to agree that the repressive structures that were in place under Hadrami have been considerably liberalized by the 1991 structural reforms of Polisario, where the Front also expressly committed itself to multipartyism and other democratic treats -- after independence. A major Human Rights Watch mission that toured the camps extensively in 1995 -- just a couple of years after Hadrami was purged -- found that despite some problems, the situation was now "satisfactory" (the main exception being abuse of Moroccan POWs). The recent UN fact finding mission stated that there were no complaints of human rights abuse in Tindouf, even if a more thorough look at the situation would be necessary. Amnesty now refers to abuse in the camp almost exclusively in the past tense, noting that the Polisario has not -- contrary to Moroccan allegations -- tried to restrict investigations in camps (rather, "they went out of their way to assist us").

Even so, the clique around Muhammad Abdelaziz remains reluctant to share power, and while dissident voices are tolerated, they are neither encouraged nor given any serious chance to affect decision-making. On the grass-roots level in the camps, there is a decently democratic structure of local councils that run day-to-day business, but the sensitive political, military and economic decisions seem to rest in the hands of a select few. This is hardly out of the ordinary in the Maghreb, and by the standards of both liberation movements and refugee camps, the Tindouf exile republic comes off as positively ultraliberal. But nevertheless, the situation on the ground clashes with Polisario's attempts to construct a media image of itself as a shining beacon of uncorrupted desert democracy, and an increasing number of Sahrawi youths are fed up with the stagnated ruling elite.

The Ould man out

However, there's more in the Bakchich article. It goes on to note that, while we don't know who is behind the appointment of the group -- the inner workings of the Makhzen are no less obscure than, say, the legendarily intransparent Algerian military elite -- it's easy to tell who the move has been directed against. Because there is a name missing from the list: the monarchy's all-time palace Sahrawi, Khelli Henna Ould Errachid.

Now, this could perhaps be because he already has a platform -- the CORCAS council, of which he is the formal head. But, honestly, Khelli Henna never was the one to shy away from salaried titles, was he? No. As Bakchich points out, all three interior ministry Sahrawis are long-standing enemies of Ould Errachid, and this must be interpreted as a move to directly undermine him. Omar Hadrami in particular has long been seen as his main rival, and the two men are said to absolutely loathe each other.

In favor of the favored

A peculiar twist is added by the fact that both Duihi and Dkhil are former members of PUNS, an organization set up by Franco to act as the territory's only legal party in the dying days of Spanish fascist rule. Established essentially to draw support from Polisario, the PUNS faithfully advocated Spain's line down to the letter: it demanded the independence of Western Sahara under Spanish guidance, longed for "privileged relations" with Madrid, and most of all, it hotly contested any Moroccan or Mauritanian ties to the territory -- for such was Spanish policy right up until the Madrid Agreement. As the Green March approached, the PUNS leadership even declared itself ready to fight a Moroccan entry with arms in hand to preserve Sahrawi independence hand in hand with Spain. Who the leader of the party was? Why, a certain Khelli Henna Ould Errachid -- then the most outspoken defender of a Sahrawi-Spanish alliance against the machinations of both "expansionist" Morocco and "communist" Polisario. Once again something that will not figure in the official biographies.

As Spain began to withdraw -- and made clear to Khelli Henna that he was no longer slated to become Western Sahara's first president -- all three of Franco's Sahrawis suddenly discovered their Moroccan roots. And ever since 1975, they've been paraded as proof that the Sahara always was and always will be Moroccan.

However, as the case of Mr. Hadrami makes abundantly clear, a shared past doesn't necessarily mean a shared future. The palace Sahrawis have been at each others throats ever since, competing for power and privilege. Morocco has always had a policy of encouraging Sahrawi tribalism -- divide and rule -- and the fortunes of its Sahrawi finger puppets have shifted with the mood of the Makhzen, not to mention with the fortunes of competing clans within the Moroccan power structure. For long, Khelli Henna appeared to be the king's go-to-guy, and he has been allowed to amass a huge fortune through semi-legit businesses in El Aaiún (he and his brother -- who formally runs the business empire -- are sometimes called the richest men in the Sahara). But given his less than impressive performance as head of CORCAS, perhaps the monarchy has decided it is time for another spin on the wheel of Sahrawi fortune?

But don't worry. Some things never change -- and should Western Sahara one day become independent, there will be few Sahrawis who will celebrate as loudly as these three. By then with a fresh set of inexplicable gaps in their CV:s.

CORCAS core cracks?

In the last couple of weeks, infighting within the palace-friendly elite in Morocco’s majority slice of Western Sahara seems to have reached boiling point. At the heart of it lies the continual squabbling within CORCAS, which, as you know, is short for the Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs, but it seems mainly to serve as cover for a set of political, financial and personal rivalries which run all the way into the Moroccan regime elite, the makhzen.

CORCAS, you may recall, was (re-)established in 2006 to provide a reliably controllable voice for pro-Moroccan Sahrawis in the state’s campaign to promote autonomy as an alternative to a referendum. “Here,” the palace would say, “is the legitimate voice of the Sahrawis — it’s not the separatists.” Pretty good idea, if not always a convincing act, given how transparently obvious it is that the group is run on remote control from Rabat. (POLISARIO, which has its own embarrassing credibility issues with regards to its ties to the Algerian deep state, seems like a jolly band of maverick independents in comparison.)

Most problematic, however, is that they are a quarrelsome bunch, this motley of tribal sheikhs, businessmen, go-betweens, POLISARIO defectors, and makhzen clients. It worked for a while, just paying them a fat salary to toe the line, but in the past year or two, rivalries within CORCAS has rendered the group nearly inoperable, with constant bickering and large parts of the membership sometimes boycotting sessions. Far be it from me to claim any deeper insights into Saharo-makhzenite clan politics, but at the core of it all seems to be the hostile relations between CORCAS chairman Khellihenna ould el-Rachid and his brother Hamdi, on the one hand, and the group gathered around another southern strongman, Hassan Derham, on the other.
Khellihenna ould el-Rachid

Khellihenna ould el-Rachid

Khellihenna is a native to the territory, and a veteran politician. He started out as chairman of the PUNS, a Spanish marionette organization which demanded “privileged ties” with Franco’s Madrid; later moved towards demanding independence when that seemed to be the winning bet; only to end up by discovering the Sahara’s eternal Moroccanity in 1975, as the Kingdom’s troops began pulling up on the border. Ever since, he’s been the most well-known Sahrawi face for Moroccan rule, although his fortunes temporarily dipped with the loss of support from regime pillar Driss Basri, who was cast out of power when Mohammed VI took the throne. He then returned in grand style in 2006, as M6’s anointed chairman of the CORCAS, and has since been back in business. In business, incidentally, is also his brother Hamdi, who aside from politics (multiple stints in parliament) acts as the family cashier, and whose privileged ties to the country’s political and military elite has allegedly made him the richest man in the Sahara.
Hassan Derham

Hassan Derham

The other gentleman involved, Hassan Derham, is also a politician-businessman, and also firmly implanted in Morocco’s Saharan patronage and clientèle system* However, he is not himself Sahrawi, but rather of the Aït Ba Amran, a south-Moroccan Berber tribe (with their own grievances against the state). Unlike the el-Rachid brothers, who are aligned with the Moroccan Istiqlal party, Derham now works with its rival leftist offshoot, the USFP, having previously been involved with pro-palace parties MP and RNI. Given the way their respective party affiliates faced off in the 2007 parliamentary elections, it’s obvious there’s little love between them.

It now seems that Derham’s supporters have withdrawn from some CORCAS sessions of late, joining protests against Khellihenna’s impopular and autocratic style of management and his refusal to inform council members of what’s going on (in reality, it may be that he isn’t himself very well informed, since decisions are taken not in CORCAS meetings, but in Rabat; CORCAS serves to provide media and local Big Man endorsement). I wouldn’t be too surprised if it transpires that Khellihenna’s comments about Moroccan mass killings of Sahrawis in 1975, which were published to his great embarrassment and presumably to no help in relations with the government, were also strategically leaked in this context. But what do I know.

The most recent development is that local USFP politicians have complained to Interior Minister Chakib Benmoussa about how some El Aaiún land lots were granted by the municipality to private individuals — in effect, they’re saying that state resources were used for a vote buying scam (which, given the way the Moroccan part of the Sahara is run, appears plausible to the point of goddamn obvious). Hamdi ould el-Rachid is apparently the one targeted, and he promptly shot back through Istiqlal papers with accusations of corruption in the local USFP (meaning Derham’s men). However, it seems the Ministry has decided to start an investigation of the matter. If so, that’s bad news for the el-Rachid brothers, since regime corruption in the Sahara is not something a minor clerk will decide to start digging in on his own — he’d be digging his own grave, more likely. If the courts and the government follow through with this affair, it must presumably mean that Derham has some serious backers for a push to clip the wings of Hamdi and Khellihenna, whose star has for some time been fading again.

At least that’s my guess. To add a note of caution, all of the above is my own interpretation of what I’ve gleaned through the press, not necessarily as accurate and detailed as I’d like, and I’m sure there are all kinds of nuances to add. Obviously, neither CORCAS nor other Saharan politics can or should be reduced to a rivalry between two clear-cut teams, given the vast complexities of tribal and other politics in these areas, and that’s not the impression I want to give either. So, you’re all most welcome to chime in with both comments and corrections.
Mohamed Abdelaziz

Mohamed Abdelaziz

Finally, a couple of closing thoughts:

* Where is POLISARIO in all this? I’m sure they’re doing their very best to fan the flames of discontent, but it seems unlikely they could even hope to rally the losers in this battle, given the extraordinarily strong ties of both factions to Morocco. So maybe Chairman Abdelaziz will just sit back with a bowl of popcorn to watch how the game plays out, casually giving the rumor mill an occasional spin to keep things going?

* And do the Saharan elite scuffles have any relation to the election of another influential pro-palace Sahrawi, Sheikh Biadillah, as leader of the PAM, Morocco’s soon-to-be dominant political party, run behind the scenes by royal confidant Fouad Ali el-Himma? It’s sure to affect the center of gravity in Moroccan Sahrawi politics, wherever that actually lies.

— — —

*) Curiously, he was accused a few years back of double-dealing with Sahrawi nationalists, allegedly having links to a Mauritanian businessman involved with something concerning the POLISARIO oil sales campaign. But since nothing ever came of it, I assume it might have been just political slander, although these kinds of ties across the Berm are probably a lot more common than either side would want to acknowledge.

http://maghrebinenglish.wordpress.com/2009/05/13/corcas-core-cracks/

Al-Qaida threatens to kill UK hostage

CAIRO, Al-Qaida in North Africa said Sunday it would kill a British hostage if London does not release an imprisoned radical preacher .

The group said in a statement posted on an Islamist Web site that it will execute a British tourist held by the group since late January if the extremist Muslim preacher Abu Qatada is not freed in 20 days.

Abu Qatada, a Palestinian-Jordanian, was jailed in Britain in 2002 for links with militant groups but was released in 2005. He was re-arrested and is pending deportation to Jordan where he was sentenced to life in prison in absentia.

Britain's lower courts said he couldn't be deported because of his fears he would likely be tortured but the Law Lords ruled there was no proof of a real risk to him.

Four tourists, including two Swiss, a German woman and a British man, were kidnapped by gunmen Jan. 22 in Niger, their tour operator said.

Two of the tourists, a Swiss and German woman, were subsequently released on Wednesday along with a kidnapped Canadian diplomat and his assistant. The kidnappers said they were exchanged for four of their imprisoned fighters.

In addition to the British man, another Swiss tourist remains with the kidnappers.

Al-Qaida in Islamic North Africa, known by the French language acronym AQMI, is an Algeria-based group that joined Osama bin Laden's terrorist network in 2006 and conducts dozens of bombings or ambushes each month. It operates mainly in Algeria but is suspected of crossing the country's porous desert borders to spread violence in the rest of northwestern Africa.

Countdown to the crackdown

After the recent hostage release by the southern/Saharan wing of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), there has been much political and military movement in Algeria, Mali and the surrounding countries. According to numerous press rumors, a major joint operation in the border areas is about to go into action any day now.

The political arguments have centered around vague but barely concealed insinuations of state support for AQIM’s southern wing, although there’s precious little proof offered by anyone involved. Libya is the state most in the crosshairs, for allegedly funding or/and facilitating the payment of fat ransoms to AQIM, in a deal also involving the Malian state releasing AQIM members in return for someone’s thick wad of cash. Algeria is livid over this, and parts of the éradicateur press is so upset as to appear slightly deranged in its accusations against all and sundry for conspiring to undermine state security.

However, in fact Algeria has good reason to be upset, if one disregards the hyperbole. The government quite rightly believes that ransom payments encourages new kidnappings, and that this — not to mention the prisoners releases — is what keeps the southern AQIM networks running. Algeria also worries, again rightly, that such money will filter up to AQIM’s northern strongholds in the Kabylie, from where the group continues to inflict damage on the Algerian state and military. However, European governments do not seem to give a damn about this, as long as they can bring back their citizens safe and sound; while the poorer local governments are fine with whatever they’re paid most to be fine with, since they don’t stand a chance of securing these areas alone anyway. So the kidnapping circus continues.

Bouteflika has for some time, after offering amnesty upon amnesty, shown signs of exasperation with this whole AQIM business, and the Algerian army appears to be slowly reverting into extermination mode in its treatment of insurgent holdouts. Presently, then, the country is spearheding efforts to pull together a major pan-Saharan/Sahelian coalition to hit AQIM hard, either to cripple it militarily or to at least establish a steep deterrent cost for fucking with Algeria’s south. Among the other nations coming along for the ride, convinced by a mixture of stick and carrot from Algiers, are of course Mali, but also Niger and Mauritania, the two remaining neighbors to the area of concern. You can count on the US to cheer them on and supply whatever is available of satellite imagery and other expertise. However, it seems that Algeria is steering the bandwagon, quite in line with how it has been asserting itself as the maker-or-breaker of regional security in the last few years, and perhaps also for honestly feeling there’s nothing left to do but shoot its way out of this painful deadlock.

Militarily, things have been progressing quickly. A bunch of army units were just pulled down from the Algerian north towards the border, and high-level military coordination between the countries concerned is proceeding apace. For example, Niger’s chief-of-staff flew up to meet with the Algerian top brass (Gaid Saleh and Guenaizia), and Mali’s defense minister did the same some days ago. At the same time, Algiers has started airlifting military supplies to the Malian army in preparation for the expected assault, and minor manhunts are already running, with claims of an important kill just the other day.

How big this will be is impossible to tell: perhaps just a quick crackdown on the areas under suspicion, and brush-up of border security through reinforcements and coordination? But it seems like bigger things are in the making. In so far as the press can be trusted (a big if, admittedly), a large-scale sweep is more likely, although I guess the key to it all is not scale per se, but rather how long it will go on and what it will leave behind. In any case, one should remember that while the Touareg rebellion in Mali’s north just quieted down, the situation remains unstable and is liable to be affected in some way by any major military offensive. On the other hand, there’s no better time to go at it than now, when there’s no hot war complicating matters; and in fact, decisively settling the Touareg conflict may well be one of the unspoken motives for the push.

Also worth bearing in mind is that two European hostages remain in the hands of AQIM. It has demanded that Britain release Abu Qatada, a Jordanian-Palestinian preacher with longstanding ties to al-Qaida’s core leadership as well as to the Algerian Jihadi movements (he used to be sort of a chief Mufti for the GIA back in the day, and later encouraged the GSPC split which evolved into AQIM). That could turn into some nasty headlines.

Hostage update: anti-Qaida strike postponed

Algeria’s El Khabar reports that the Sahel countries* are “temporarily” postponing their offensive against al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for two weeks. The reason is said to be that unnamed European countries have pressured Algiers to wait until they can get the remaining two AQIM hostages (from the UK & Switzerland) released.

This supposed to happen “within weeks”, and hopefully no later than July, after negotiations with the AQIM group of Yahia Djouadi (Abu Ammar) have “made great progress without substantial concessions to the group holding them”. The negotiations are said to involve tribal mediators and “Salafists from Europe”. Worth recalling, then, that AQIM had demanded the release of Abu Qatada al-Filastini from British jails.

*) Algeria, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. Oh, and who’s missing?

Morocco don’t worry, Palau stands behind you

Morocco has decided to open diplomatic relations on the level of ambassador with the Republic of Palau, a Micronesian island-state with a population of 21,000 souls.

Will this not be a strain on foreign ministry resources? Not at all, since Morocco recently severed ambassadorial ties with Venezuela and Iran, freeing up two experienced ambassadors for this important mission. Clearly, the men in Rabat are planning ahead.

Previous game-changing diplomatic moves in the region: the Sahrawi Republic establishes relations with Vanuatu.

Distant voices, desperate lives

In his latest column for the New Statesman, John Pilger describes the catastrophe facing the Tamil people of Sri Lanka, whose distant voices have appealed to the world for almost as long as the Palestinians.

In the early 1960s, it was the Irish of Derry who would phone late at night, speaking in a single breath, spilling out stories of discrimination and injustice. Who listened to their truth until the violence began? Bengalis from what was then East Pakistan did much the same. Their urgent whispers described terrible state crimes that the news ignored, and they implored us reporters to “let the world know”. Palestinians speaking above the din of crowded rooms in Bethlehem and Beirut asked no more. For me, the most tenacious distant voices have been the Tamils of Sri Lanka, to whom we ought to have listened a very long time ago.

It is only now, as they take to the streets of western cities, and the persecution of their compatriots reaches a crescendo, that we listen, though not intently enough to understand and act. The Sri Lankan government has learned an old lesson from, I suspect, a modern master: Israel. In order to conduct a slaughter, you ensure the pornography is unseen, illicit at best. You ban foreigners and their cameras from Tamil towns like Mulliavaikal, which was bombarded recently by the Sri Lankan army, and you lie that the 75 people killed in the hospital were blown up quite wilfully by a Tamil suicide bomber. You then give reporters a ride into the jungle, providing what in the news business is called a dateline, which suggests an eyewitness account, and you encourage the gullible to disseminate only your version and its lies. Gaza is the model.

From the same masterclass you learn to manipulate the definition of terrorism as a universal menace, thus ingratiating yourself with the “international community” (Washington) as a noble sovereign state blighted by an “insurgency” of mindless fanaticism. The truth and lessons of the past are irrelevant. And having succeeded in persuading the United States and Britain to proscribe your insurgents as terrorists, you affirm you are on the right side of history, regardless of the fact that your government has one of the world’s worst human rights records and practises terrorism by another name. Such is Sri Lanka.

This is not to suggest that those who resist attempts to obliterate them culturally if not actually are innocent in their methods. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have spilt their share of blood and perpetrated their own atrocities. But they are the product, not the cause, of an injustice and a war that long predate them. Neither is Sri Lanka’s civil strife as unfathomable as it is often presented: an ancient religious-ethnic rivalry between the Hindu Tamils and the Buddhist Sinhalese government.

Sri Lanka as British-ruled Ceylon was subjected to a classic divide-and-rule. The British brought Tamils from India as virtual slave labour while building an educated Tamil middle class to run the colony. At independence in 1948, the new political elite, in its rush for power, cultivated ethnic support in a society whose real imperative should have been the eradication of poverty. Language became the spark. The election of a government pledging to replace English, the lingua franca, with Sinhalese was a declaration of war on the Tamils. The new law meant that Tamils almost disappeared from the civil service by 1970; and as “nationalism” seduced parties of both the left and right, discrimination and anti-Tamil riots followed.

The formation of a Tamil resistance, notably the LTTE, the Tamil Tigers, included a demand for a state in the north of the country. The response of the government was judicial killing, torture, disappearances, and more recently, the reported use of cluster bombs and chemical weapons. The Tigers responded with their own crimes, including suicide bombing and kidnapping. In 2002, a ceasefire was agreed, and was held until last year, when the government decided to finish off the Tigers. Tamil civilians were urged to flee to military-run “welfare camps”, which have become the symbol of an entire people under vicious detention, and worse, with nowhere to escape the army’s fury. This is Gaza again, although the historical parallel is the British treatment of Boer women and children more than a century ago, who “died like flies”, as a witness wrote.

Foreign aid workers have been banned from Sri Lanka’s camps, except the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has described a catastrophe in the making. The United Nations says that 60 Tamils a day are being killed in the shelling of a government-declared “no-fire zone”.

In 2003, the Tigers proposed a devolved Interim Self-Governing Authority that included real possibilities for negotiation. Today, the government gives the impression it will use its imminent “victory” to “permanently solve” the “Tamil minority problem”, as many of its more rabid supporters threaten. The army commander says all of Sri Lanka “belongs” to the Sinhalese majority. The word “genocide” is used by Tamil expatriots, perhaps loosely; but the fear is true.

India could play a critical part. The south Indian state of Tamil Nadu has a Tamil-speaking population with centuries of ties with the Tamils of Sri Lanka. In the current Indian election campaign, anger over the siege of Tamils in Sri Lanka has brought hundreds of thousands to rallies. Having initially helped to arm the Tigers, Indian governments sent “peacekeeping” troops to disarm them. Delhi now appears to be allowing the Sinhalese supremacists in Colombo to “stabilise” its troubled neighbour. In a responsible regional role, India could stop the killing and begin to broker a solution.

The great moral citadels in London and Washington offer merely silent approval of the violence and tragedy. No appeals are heard in the United Nations from them. David Miliband has called for a “ceasefire”, as he tends to do in places where British “interests” are served, such as the 14 impoverished countries racked by armed conflict where the British government licenses arms shipments. In 2005, British arms exports to Sri Lanka rose by 60 per cent. The distant voices from there should be heard, urgently.

Come join the party!

Aha, so the ruling party in Mauritania will be called Union pour la république (UPR). It was confirmed Wednesday, when the newly created party elected Gen. Mohamed ould Abdelaziz as its first leader and presidential candidate. Pro-regime parliamentarians have duly stampeded to join the UPR, and it already holds a majority in parliament. You sure can’t accuse Mauritanian apparatchiks and tribal notables of not being principled: they’d rather die than oppose the person currently in control of state salaries.

“The country today has 73 parties”, Gen. Abdelaziz said in his inaugural speech, “and the UPR must distinguish itself by assuming a vanguard position in the struggle against injustice, the diversion of public funds, and to banish regionalism and tribalism.”

Yep. It’s a dirty job, but someone has to do it. In other news, we hear, two Mauritanian lieutenant-colonels were arrested yesterday, while the army leadership suddenly announced that soldiers will be given land for free. Hm. But move along now, or you’ll miss the party.

Democracia o Golpismo: Obama y Sarkozy se enfrentan en Mauritania ¿con quien está Rodríguez?

Los cambios de personas en los gobiernos afectan poco a la Geopolítica. La diferencia de personas se traduce en la presencia de distintos argumentos al servicio de los intereses que permanecen. Siempre y cuando, naturalmente, en el gobierno de un país haya personas al servicio de los intereses nacionales. África en general, y el norte de África en particular, es el escenario de tensiones geopolíticas. No es el momento de analizar la actuación de nuevos actores como China. Pero sí podemos detenernos en la pugna entre dos actores clásicos, USA y Francia, en un escenario que por su cercanía a España nos interesa especialmente.

El presidente Obama y el presidente Sarkozy son, sin duda, personalidades diferentes en cuanto a su carácter. Pero también lo son por los tipos de argumentos que utilizan para defender los intereses de sus respectivos países: mientras Obama se muestra especialmente inclinado a defender los intereses americanos sin violar los derechos humanos y la legalidad, Sarkozy está demostrando un absoluto desprecio por los derechos humanos y la legalidad en la defensa de los intereses franceses. La elegante presencia de Carla Bruni sirve así para disimular una política brutal.

Los intereses de USA y los de Francia no sólo son distintos, sino que pueden entrar en colisión.
Lo acabamos de ver en el asunto del Sahara Occidental. Por una parte, USA, bajo la presidencia de Obama, se ha negado a apoyar la propuesta marroquí de "autonomía" en el Sahara y se ha mostrado favorable a que la ONU considere la "dimensión humana" en el conflicto. La 'dimensión humana' es un concepto generado en el ámbito de la OSCE para referirse a los derechos humanos. Por contra, Francia, bajo la presidencia de Sarkozy, continuadora de la de Chirac, se esfuerza en apoyar la propuesa marroquí de "autonomía" en el Sahara, por más que sea fraudulenta y se quedó aislada intercionalmente, al intentar que la ONU no se comprometiera en la defensa de los derechos humanos en el Sahara Occidental.

Pero este enfrentamiento también se ha producido en Mauritania. El hecho es de gran importancia para España, pero ningún periódico se ha dignado hacerse eco de ello.

Los hechos son los siguientes:

1. Tras varios golpes de Estado, en 2006 y 2007 Mauritania protagonizó un modélico proceso de transición política que le llevó a convertirse en una auténtica democracia.
2. El 6 de agosto de 2008, el general Uld Abdelaziz dio un golpe de Estado.
3. Mauritania fue suspendida como miembro de la Unión Africana. La UE y otras organizaciones internacionales condenaron o sancionaron el golpe.

A partir de aquí empiezan las maniobras.
USA desde un primer momento condenó el golpe y decidió reconocer como único presidente legítimo al elegido democráticamente en virtud de la Constitución democrática de 2006.
Sin embargo, Marruecos y Senegal, aliados entre sí y de Francia, apoyaron el golpe desde un primer momento. En ese primer momento, Francia teóricamente lo condenaba... pero poco después se ha ido descubriendo el juego sucio de Francia.

Los datos comprometedores se han ido sucediendo:
1º. El primer dato, gravísimo, fue que el 21 de marzo de 2009, varias tropas francesas llegaron a Mauritania. Francia se disponía, con el permiso de las autoridades golpistas a establecer una base militar en un lugar estratégico cerca de la frontera ¡oh, casualidad! con el Sahara Occidental.

2º. El segundo dato fueron las cínicas declaraciones de Sarkozy en Bamako (capital de Mali) el 27 de marzo de 2009, diciendo que no le constaba que ningún diputado mauritano hubiera protestado por el golpe. Un auténtico escarnio si recordamos que el presidente constitucional del Parlamento mauritano, Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, en una gira internacional para recabar apoyos contra el golpe ¡fue recibido en París por el presidente del Parlamento francés!

3º. El tercer dato ha sido el comunicado de 5 de mayo, de la coalición de partidos opuesta al golpe. El comunicado es inusualmente duro y claro. Extraigo este valiente pasaje:

Es público y notorio que las redes de la Françafrique están implicadas en el golpe de Estado contra el presidente democráticamente elegido, el Señor Sidi Mohamed Uld Cheij Abdalahi; golpe de Estado que han apoyado y continúan apoyando, saboteando a cada paso los esfuerzos de la comunidad internacional para restablecer el orden constitucional emanado de las elecciones libres y transparentes. Fiel a su siniestra reputación de mantener organismos político-comerciales de la mafia neocolonial, la Françafrique sólo prospera bajo los estados de excepción, en economías predominantemente rentistas y donde la libre competencia está excluida, y sobre las ruinas de los proyectos democráticos y de buen gobierno en el continente africano. Haciendo esto, pone en entredicho la imagen de la Francia de los derechos humanos y la democracia y compromete sus intereses estratégicos en el continente.
Sus representantes en nuestro país, agentes colaboradores de la junta militar, ya están desenmascarados y su perniciosa acción es conocida de todos.
Sin duda porque comparten con estas redes el mismo designio antidemocrático y antinacional, los parlamentarios y jefes de partidos golpistas no consideran que las actividades desestabilizadoras de la Françafrique constituyen una injerencia en los asuntos internos del país.

Algo que contrasta con este otro pasaje del comunicado:

El Frente Nacional para la defensa de la Democracia quiere en esta ocasión expresar su más vivo agradecimiento al pueblo americano y al gobierno de los Estados Unidos por su posición constante de rechazo del golpe de Estado de 6 de agosto de 2008 y por su promoción del ideal democrático.

La pregunta, como españoles, es:
¿con quien están Rodríguez y Moratinos? ¿Con Obama o con Sarkozy y Mohamed VI? ¿con la democracia o con el golpe de Estado?
La respuesta está clara. Rodríguez y Moratinos parece que han elegido. Como de costumbre, contra el Derecho. Como de costumbre, mal.

The Crisis of the Opposition in Morocco

The political alliances that drove the Moroccan opposition parties to power have reversed their wager. More than 10 years after their coexistence in power, they seem to be expending their role which was hoped to bring about the desired reforms.

The accusations leveled by Hamid Chabat, the mayor of the city of Fez, against the historic leader of the opposition National Union of Popular Forces, the late Mehdi Ben-Barka, were enough to sparkle a crisis between the grandchildren of the national movement, specifically between the Socialist Union and the Independence Party, on the eve of the municipal elections which also coincided with a protest movement paralyzing the transportation sector.

The mayor of Fez triggered the crisis at a moment of discord between the brothers-enemies who have struggled and coexisted for long periods of the political and trade union history in Morocco. The National Union sprang from the Independence Party amidst an ideological struggle between the elites of the national movement. From the contradictions of the National Union, the Socialist Union came out with a completely different vision that rests on change from within through the ballot boxes. Influenced by these ideas and inclinations, the two Parties (Independence and Socialist Union) fought endless wars among each other and against the authorities for several years.

Only the late King Hassan II could see the whole scene on board an Algeria-bound ship. The political distance between Morocco and its eastern neighbor was much farther. When he realized that nothing could separate countries that are bound to coexist, he whispered to the leaders of the opposition to unite their ranks.

During the first years of King Hassan II’s term in office, fire broke out between the national movement parties and trade unions. Thus Mehdi Ben-Barka paid with his life the price for the power struggle. It was difficult for the opposition parties to cross the desert until Hassan II realized that historic harmony between the parties and the royal palace could protect Morocco against "sunstrokes."

The King found in the socialist leader Abdul Rahman Al-Youssefi the right man to end the struggle. The Independence Party in turn embraced the formula of consensual rotation of power as a prelude to redress some of the historic mistakes. Yet this formula, which started at the end of the 1990s on the backdrop of a regional consensus over the internal struggle in Algeria, and a domestic wager to contain social chaos, does not seem to have closed off all loopholes to vent out steam. 10 years later, this experience does not seem to have exhausted all its political reasons. Yet, it has weakened as a result of faulty mechanisms. Reviving the struggles of the past only portends a faulty vision for the future.

The Independence Party has changed with its leader Abbas Al-Fassi taking office as prime minister. So has the Socialist Union which lost its clout after the 2007 elections. But nothing justifies their return to clashing except if there are hidden hands pulling the strings from behind. It will be regrettable for the two parties to surrender now to the ghosts of the past which haunted them in bygone times, ghosts which do not seem to have left for good.

The mystery still engulfs the identity of who assassinated the Moroccan opposition figure Mehdi Ben-Barka in Paris. Human rights organizations were formed and political trials were held. Yet grey areas remained concerning the tale of the man’s assassination. Only the street named after him in a classy neighborhood in Rabat highlights the official and popular esteem held for this man, even though all the investigations have yet to help his family find his grave to visit it.

What wind is this that diverted the investigation into his death to another issue which concerns the accusations leveled by his political enemies, who hold him responsible for struggles and events? It is no coincidence. History alone can distinguish the good deeds of men from their mistakes. With no doubt, the necessary harmony is not aimed at opening the wounds of the past but at looking towards the future. For there are generations concerned with reading the open pages of history to draw conclusions about what is happening today and what will happen tomorrow on the ground of reality.

Mauritania’s internet media under fire

Abbass Ould Braham, a University of Nouakchott professor and writer for Taqadoumy — the leftist Mauritanian news website often cited here — was arrested this Monday after writing a lengthly piece accosting the junta. Ould Braham was taken into custody in a cafe in the capital, though no official warrant was put out for his arrest: Taqadoumy reports that “When his friend asked why they were taking Abbass away, the police answered that in was in relation to the articles he writes regularly for Taqadoumy“. Reporters held a sit in to show solidarity with Ould Braham, to which the authorities responded with tear gas, beating some protestors with batons. Taqadoumy, likely the second largest news site in Mauritania, has now been blocked and banned by Chinguitel and Mauritel servers, on the orders of the General Prosecutor. The spokesman of junta-leader Mohamed Abdel Aziz apologized today for both the arrest of Ould Braham and the “inappropriate” treatment of journalists’ protest but stopped short of anything else. Ould Braham’s case, he said, was not the president’s responsibility but rather that of the judiciary. In other words, do not expect anything much. The Justice Ministry has said that it pursued Taqadoumy after receiving numerous complaints alleging that “the newspaper published false rumors increasingly detrimental to the public and private interests and the values and morality” and that Taqadoumy has “come so far out of the limits of the freedom of the press law and offers to set the community, security and stability at risk.” There is pressure building.

A few words on Taqadoumy. Taqadoumy’s (”Progressive”) general disposition is left-leaning. Since the August coup it has been especially critical of Mohamed Abdel Aziz and his clique, and was critical of the corruption and mismanagement that characterized Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi’s brief term. It is entirely web-based and is a rather low budget affair from a technological point of view. Since its recent opening it has become one of Mauritania’s leading news sources. It is the brainchild of Hanafi Dahah, and has plowed through with a strong line against the coup.

It also has ties to the underground Consience et Résistance (CR) movement (whose leader became Human Rights minister after the coup, to the grave irritation of the membership). While it cannot be said that Taqadoumy is CR’s mouth piece, one staffer gave me a hyperbolic, though not unbelievable (from anecdotal experience), percentage that indicates at least a great number of Taqadoumy’s staff are members or somehow involved with CR. CR is known for being the most effective opposition group outside of Mauritania, and for driving the anti-slavery agenda, as well as for being among the most vociferous opponents of the Ould Taya regime. It is widely disliked by the authorities and many in traditional society because of its radicalism and its secularism: Its battle cry is, after all, لنفرض التغير ”Let us impose change”. Not only were the groups members heavily persecuted in previous years, but so were those with even the slightest association. So there is a history of opposition both on Taqadoumy and within it.

The junta — and this must not be forgotten — has its own roots from within Ould Taya’s apparatus, and fully understands this context. It attempted to set up a website soon after taking power, which was met with shrugs. Having lost the internet media war — most of the online Mauritanian news is critical of the junta — the junta is lashing out at those who have won. It took early swipes at Sahara Media and Anbaa, as well. The junta is less and less popular as General Abdel Aziz’s naked ambition for power becomes more apparent, and as its international efforts continue to be ineffective in allowing the regime to muster any legitimacy in African, European or Arab circles. There are few, if any, internet laws on the books in Mauritania, and as one Taqadoumyista asks, “who is next?”

Update: Ould Braham was released shortly after detention, and Taqadoumy allowed back online.

The Qadhafi Virus Strikes Mauritania

Some points in the wake of Qadhafi’s visit to Mauritania.

1. The opposition is increasingly united in it irritation with Qadhafi’s mediation, which has been characterized variously as biased, “reckless,” and “dangerous”. His speech was in typical fashion: Harkening to Fatimid glory, the role of Mauritania in spreading Islam through Africa, the folly of democracy and the Mauritanian project in particular: “There is no difference between elections and coups” claiming that “elections lead to undermining the stability of countries, which is the most important thing in nations’ lives”. Opposition leaders Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, Ahmed Ould Daddah and others walked out. Mauritanians appear to have dismissed Qadhafi’s seven point plan for the resolution of the crisis: His remarks in support of the junta have rendered it without credibility. Instead of resolving the crisis, Qadhafi’s arrival seems to have brought opposition elements closer together in their opposition to the junta and to Libya’s attempt to move in. Despite his own appeals to the contrary it is widely believed that the visit was intended to aggrandize Qadhafi rather than to solve anything in Mauritania. According to elements from the opposition who were contacted by Qadhafi, Aziz told the Brother Leader flat out that he intends to run for president in this year’s election. Irritation with the junta’s external backers — at present Libya is the strongest — has turned a great deal of opinion, both within the opposition and among the people, against the junta. Factions within Ould Boulkheir’s party (e.g. Nasserists) have been working to bring the APP to Abdel Aziz, with little luck.
2. The American policy holds increasing relevance in Mauritania, especially in the wake of the visit. Opposition figures wonder what the American position is, how or if it will change. A general sense is growing that the Europeans will compromise for a legal return to the status quo ante, without a resolution or reform of the country’s structural problems, that the African Union has let the country down (and that that it is incapable of doing anything else with Qadhafi at its head), and that the Arabs have used the country as a means of displaying their recurrent irrelevance (a former Mauritanian diplomat involved with the Arab League described the body as “an empty shell”). The United States’ uncompromising position that some Mauritanians are beginning to associate with a way out of the crisis and with a stand for legitimate rule. More on this in a later post, however. If this visit is any indication of how Qadhafi will handle crises as AU chairman going forward, the African Union is in for serious trouble: Like a certain virus, Qadhafi’s strategic ambitions generally require a host body (or institution) — be it of Arab nationalist or pan-Africanist form — and once the course has been run, the host institution dies, with chaos in its wake.
3. Ironically, the country’s most fiercely anti-US political organization, the Islamist Tawassoul, is one of the prime beneficiaries of the stand against the junta. It should also be mentioned that the junta, having aped one of Tawassoul’s main issues — relations with Israel — has taken away much of its relevance from a populist standpoint. It is also notable that the responses to the closing of the Israeli embassy from the eastern Arabs — KSA, Jordan and Egypt — were especially muted. Even leftists seem to have ignored the move. The point was firstly for domestic consumption and secondarily a means of securing support from the better monied radical states like Libya and Iran. The Israeli Foreign Ministry, for its part, has blamed Algeria, Libya and Iran for Mauritania’s sour attitude: Naming Algeria does little to help their cause, as Algiers has been active in working to undermine the junta in Africa and abroad.
4. A note on turn out. It must be said that Qadhafi’s personnel took over security in the Nouakchott’s Olympic Stadium during the visit. A Mauritanian related a story in which he was asked somewhat gruffly by a Libyan security guard if he wanted to enter the stadium to see Qadhafi’s speech. He said no. Others were invited in, and many went on their way. Those who were in attendance, aside from the regular political jumble, were mostly poor locals, often paid to show up to [state-sponsored] political rallies or to greet foreign dignitaries in throngs at the airport or roadside. The mood was not described as hot with wonder at the robbed Libyan’s arrival. Rather, his arrival was described in terms of indignation — how dare the Libyans come into Mauritania with their guards and soldiers, try to impose a solution in support of an illegitimate military regime. “Another foreigner trying to outsmart us” is how one termed the visit. As for why Qadhafi turned in Nouakchott and not Azougui as was originally planned, the best bet is that he changed his mind at the last minute (Libya’s foreign policy seems to be made half from rational calculation and half on the basis of Qadhafi’s mood), considering the harshness and obscurity of that locale (a Mauritanian grumbled that “he is no real bedouin”) and that the capital would deliver his message more clearly.

Security Council adopts resolution 1871 (2009), extending mandate of United Nations Mission for Referendum in Western Sahara

Security Council

6117th Meeting (PM)


The Security Council today extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by one year, until 30 April 2010.

Unanimously adopting resolution 1871 (2009), as orally amended, the Council called upon the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Council welcomed the parties’ agreement with the Personal Envoy’s suggestion to hold small, informal talks in preparation for a fifth round of negotiations, recalling its endorsement of the previous report’s recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties were essential to achieve progress in negotiations. It called upon the parties to continue to work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations.

After adoption, speakers expressed satisfaction with the unanimity of the vote, which sent a message to the parties that progress in negotiations should be made. In that regard, they expressed support for the Special Envoy’s proposal to hold small, informal talks before a fifth round of negotiations in Manhasset would begin.

Some speakers emphasized the importance of respect for human rights and welcomed in that regard preambular paragraphs 7 and 8, as orally amended. The representative of Costa Rica, however, emphasizing that political will to reach results was the foundation of mediation, which must be based on absolute respect for the United Nations Charter and for human rights, expressed regret that his proposal to ask for a report on the efforts of the High Commissioner of Human Rights in Western Sahara had not been reflected in the text. That proposal was based on the Secretary-General’s recommendations in his last two reports.

France’s representative, stressing that was no solution to the situation in Western Sahara other than a negotiated political settlement that was inclusive of the concerns of the parties and benefited the whole of the Maghreb region, said that Morocco’s 2007 proposal deserved serious consideration by the parties.

Statements were also made by representatives of United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Austria and Mexico.

The meeting started at 4:47 p.m. and adjourned at 5:12 p.m.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 1871 (2009) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

“Reaffirming its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007) and 1813 (2008),

“Reaffirming its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

“Reiterating its call upon the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations and with each other to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,

“Taking note of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,

“Taking note of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General, and welcoming the progress made by the parties to enter into direct negotiations,

“Stressing the importance of making progress on the human dimension of the conflict as a means to promote transparency and mutual confidence through constructive dialogue and humanitarian confidence-building measures,

“Welcoming in this context the agreement of the parties expressed in the Communiqué of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara of 18 March 2008 to explore the establishment of family visits by land, which would be in addition to the existing programme by air, and encouraging them to do so in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

“Welcoming the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through United Nations-sponsored talks,

“Noting the Secretary-General’s view that the consolidation of the status quo is not an acceptable outcome of the current process of negotiations, and noting further that progress in the negotiations will have a positive impact on the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

“Welcoming the appointment of the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara Ambassador Christopher Ross, and also welcoming his recent visit to the region and ongoing consultations with the parties,

“Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 April 2009 (S/2009/200),

“1. Reaffirms the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) with regard to the ceasefire;

“2. Welcomes the parties’ agreement with the Personal Envoy’s suggestion to hold small, informal talks in preparation for a fifth round of negotiations, and recalls its endorsement of the previous report’s recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to achieve progress in negotiations;

“3. Calls upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 (2007), 1783 (2007) and 1813 (2008) and the success of negotiations; and affirms its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context;

“4. Calls upon the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;

“5. Invites Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;

“6. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on a regular basis on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices and expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his report;

“7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;

“8. Urges Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund confidence-building measures that allow for increased contact between separated family members, especially family visits, as well as for other confidence-building measures that may be agreed between parties;

“9. Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2010;

“10. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including pre-deployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

“11. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Background

The Security Council had before it the report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara (document S/2009/200), which covers developments since his report of 14 April 2008 (document S/2008/251) and in which he recommends a mandate extension for the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2010.

According to the report, the situation in the Territory remains calm. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) marked its thirty-fifth anniversary on 20 May 2008, and on 22 January 2009, it declared an exclusive economic zone for Western Sahara, extending 200 nautical miles from the coast to protect the Territory’s permanent sovereignty over its natural resources. Polisario Front called for the suspension of a 2005 fisheries agreement between Morocco and the on the European Union, whose Commissioner for External Relations met with the leader of the Polisario Front for the first time in December 2008.

The report states that Christopher Ross, the newly appointed Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, met with several high-level representatives of the parties, and with the King of Morocco and the President of Algeria. All his interlocutors confirmed their commitment to cooperation with the United Nations with a view to reaching a solution as soon as possible. However, the Personal Envoy informed the Secretary-General that the positions of the parties have not changed since the fourth round of negotiations, held in Manhasset, New York, from 16 to 18 March 2008, and remain far apart on ways to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution leading to self-determination for the people of Western Sahara.

Welcoming the parties’ commitment to continuing the negotiation process, the Secretary-General recommends that the Council reiterate its call upon Morocco and the Polisario Front to negotiate in good faith, without preconditions, show the political will to enter into substantive discussions and ensure the success of the negotiations.

According to the report, the Secretary-General welcomes the progress made in mine clearing and encourages the parties to continue working with the Mission to establish direct cooperation and communication through a joint military verification commission so as to facilitate their work on mine clearance and other issues of common interest. The continuing exchanges of family visits between the Territory and the refugee camps in the Tindouf area are also welcome, and the parties should continue to work with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and MINURSO to explore the possibility of expanding the confidence-building programme.

Strongly urging the donor community to contribute funds to expand the programme, the Secretary-General concludes by observing that, given the existing circumstances on the ground, and in light of the Personal Envoy’s continuing efforts, the presence of MINURSO remains indispensable for the maintenance of the ceasefire in Western Sahara.

Statements

SUSAN RICE ( United States) said her country fully supported the Secretary-General and his new Personal Envoy in their efforts to find a solution to the question of Western Sahara. The problem had gone on for too long, and as a consequence, poor relations between Morocco and Algeria had prevented cooperation on issues of urgency for North Africa. On the Personal Envoy’s recent trip to the region, all interlocutors had confirmed their commitment to cooperate with the United Nations and concurred with his assessment that informal preparatory talks might help pave the way for formal and more substantive talks. Given the current situation on the ground, the presence of MINURSO remained indispensable.

JEAN-MAURICE RIPERT (France) said there was no solution to the situation in Western Sahara other than a negotiated political settlement that was inclusive of the concerns of the parties and which benefited the whole of the Maghreb region. France would call on the parties to return to the negotiating table as soon as possible in a spirit of realism and compromise, and with the political will finally to reach a just and lasting decision. Morocco’s 2007 proposal deserved serious consideration. France backed the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, as well as the idea of a round of informal talks ahead of formal negotiations.

VITALY CHURKIN ( Russian Federation) said the unanimous adoption of the resolution sent a message to the parties of the need for progress in the negotiations and it could help assist the Personal Envoy’s endeavours to give new life to the peace process. The Russian Federation attached great importance to direct dialogue in the negotiations.

JOHN SAWERS ( United Kingdom) welcomed the unanimous adoption of the resolution as it sent an important message of support for Personal Envoy Ross as he embarked on his new role. The fresh approach provided a real opportunity for the parties to take an equally fresh approach. The United Kingdom strongly urged all the parties to seize the opportunity and undertake talks in the sprit of openness. They should work towards a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution that would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Regarding the resolution’s reference to the “human dimension” of the situation, the United Kingdom firmly believed that an expansion of humanitarian confidence-building measures would do much to restore trust between the parties.

JORGE URBINA ( Costa Rica) said that, while he had voted in favour of the resolution because it was important to lend unanimous Council support to the plan presented by the Personal Envoy, he was not satisfied with the text. As an active advocate of the peaceful settlements of disputes, Costa Rica was sorry that its delegation’s proposals and concerns were not reflected in the text, in particular a proposal to ask for a report on the efforts of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Western Sahara, as requested in the Secretary-General’s last two reports. Unfortunately, the Council had not endorsed the Secretary-General’s conclusions.

PATRICK MUGOYA ( Uganda) said he had voted in favour of renewing the mandate but remained concerned by a number of issues raised in the Secretary-General’s report regarding the human rights situation in the Western Sahara. One of the key areas of concern for the United Nations was human rights, and Uganda was aware that MINURSO’s mandate contained no human rights mechanisms. Uganda, therefore, welcomed the Secretary-General’s reference to the “human dimension” of the situation in Western Sahara and looked forward to concrete action to address the issue on the ground.

PAUL ROBERT TIENDRÉBÉOGO ( Burkina Faso) said the Council should pursue clear objectives and spare no effort to promote a rapid resumption of the Manhasset process. Those objectives were reflected in the resolution, which was the best possible compromise at the present stage.

THOMAS MAYR-HARTING ( Austria) said he hoped a new approach to the Western Sahara question would lead to progress in the Territory and in the refugee camps. To that end, Austria supported the recommendation on consultations between the parties and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the promotion of confidence-building measures.

Council President CLAUDE HELLER (Mexico), speaking in his national capacity, said he was gratified by the adoption of the resolution, in particular the unanimity of the vote, which reflected support for MINURSO’s work and for the initiatives taken by the new Personal Envoy. Mexico also supported the Personal Envoy’s suggestion that small preparatory meetings be organized before a fifth meeting in Manhasset was convened, and trusted that the parties would attend in good faith and without preconditions. Because the Council could not neglect the topic of human rights in its consideration of the situation, Mexico welcomed preambular paragraph 7 of the resolution, which stressed the importance of progress in that regard.