CORCAS core cracks?

In the last couple of weeks, infighting within the palace-friendly elite in Morocco’s majority slice of Western Sahara seems to have reached boiling point. At the heart of it lies the continual squabbling within CORCAS, which, as you know, is short for the Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs, but it seems mainly to serve as cover for a set of political, financial and personal rivalries which run all the way into the Moroccan regime elite, the makhzen.

CORCAS, you may recall, was (re-)established in 2006 to provide a reliably controllable voice for pro-Moroccan Sahrawis in the state’s campaign to promote autonomy as an alternative to a referendum. “Here,” the palace would say, “is the legitimate voice of the Sahrawis — it’s not the separatists.” Pretty good idea, if not always a convincing act, given how transparently obvious it is that the group is run on remote control from Rabat. (POLISARIO, which has its own embarrassing credibility issues with regards to its ties to the Algerian deep state, seems like a jolly band of maverick independents in comparison.)

Most problematic, however, is that they are a quarrelsome bunch, this motley of tribal sheikhs, businessmen, go-betweens, POLISARIO defectors, and makhzen clients. It worked for a while, just paying them a fat salary to toe the line, but in the past year or two, rivalries within CORCAS has rendered the group nearly inoperable, with constant bickering and large parts of the membership sometimes boycotting sessions. Far be it from me to claim any deeper insights into Saharo-makhzenite clan politics, but at the core of it all seems to be the hostile relations between CORCAS chairman Khellihenna ould el-Rachid and his brother Hamdi, on the one hand, and the group gathered around another southern strongman, Hassan Derham, on the other.
Khellihenna ould el-Rachid

Khellihenna ould el-Rachid

Khellihenna is a native to the territory, and a veteran politician. He started out as chairman of the PUNS, a Spanish marionette organization which demanded “privileged ties” with Franco’s Madrid; later moved towards demanding independence when that seemed to be the winning bet; only to end up by discovering the Sahara’s eternal Moroccanity in 1975, as the Kingdom’s troops began pulling up on the border. Ever since, he’s been the most well-known Sahrawi face for Moroccan rule, although his fortunes temporarily dipped with the loss of support from regime pillar Driss Basri, who was cast out of power when Mohammed VI took the throne. He then returned in grand style in 2006, as M6’s anointed chairman of the CORCAS, and has since been back in business. In business, incidentally, is also his brother Hamdi, who aside from politics (multiple stints in parliament) acts as the family cashier, and whose privileged ties to the country’s political and military elite has allegedly made him the richest man in the Sahara.
Hassan Derham

Hassan Derham

The other gentleman involved, Hassan Derham, is also a politician-businessman, and also firmly implanted in Morocco’s Saharan patronage and clientèle system* However, he is not himself Sahrawi, but rather of the Aït Ba Amran, a south-Moroccan Berber tribe (with their own grievances against the state). Unlike the el-Rachid brothers, who are aligned with the Moroccan Istiqlal party, Derham now works with its rival leftist offshoot, the USFP, having previously been involved with pro-palace parties MP and RNI. Given the way their respective party affiliates faced off in the 2007 parliamentary elections, it’s obvious there’s little love between them.

It now seems that Derham’s supporters have withdrawn from some CORCAS sessions of late, joining protests against Khellihenna’s impopular and autocratic style of management and his refusal to inform council members of what’s going on (in reality, it may be that he isn’t himself very well informed, since decisions are taken not in CORCAS meetings, but in Rabat; CORCAS serves to provide media and local Big Man endorsement). I wouldn’t be too surprised if it transpires that Khellihenna’s comments about Moroccan mass killings of Sahrawis in 1975, which were published to his great embarrassment and presumably to no help in relations with the government, were also strategically leaked in this context. But what do I know.

The most recent development is that local USFP politicians have complained to Interior Minister Chakib Benmoussa about how some El Aaiún land lots were granted by the municipality to private individuals — in effect, they’re saying that state resources were used for a vote buying scam (which, given the way the Moroccan part of the Sahara is run, appears plausible to the point of goddamn obvious). Hamdi ould el-Rachid is apparently the one targeted, and he promptly shot back through Istiqlal papers with accusations of corruption in the local USFP (meaning Derham’s men). However, it seems the Ministry has decided to start an investigation of the matter. If so, that’s bad news for the el-Rachid brothers, since regime corruption in the Sahara is not something a minor clerk will decide to start digging in on his own — he’d be digging his own grave, more likely. If the courts and the government follow through with this affair, it must presumably mean that Derham has some serious backers for a push to clip the wings of Hamdi and Khellihenna, whose star has for some time been fading again.

At least that’s my guess. To add a note of caution, all of the above is my own interpretation of what I’ve gleaned through the press, not necessarily as accurate and detailed as I’d like, and I’m sure there are all kinds of nuances to add. Obviously, neither CORCAS nor other Saharan politics can or should be reduced to a rivalry between two clear-cut teams, given the vast complexities of tribal and other politics in these areas, and that’s not the impression I want to give either. So, you’re all most welcome to chime in with both comments and corrections.
Mohamed Abdelaziz

Mohamed Abdelaziz

Finally, a couple of closing thoughts:

* Where is POLISARIO in all this? I’m sure they’re doing their very best to fan the flames of discontent, but it seems unlikely they could even hope to rally the losers in this battle, given the extraordinarily strong ties of both factions to Morocco. So maybe Chairman Abdelaziz will just sit back with a bowl of popcorn to watch how the game plays out, casually giving the rumor mill an occasional spin to keep things going?

* And do the Saharan elite scuffles have any relation to the election of another influential pro-palace Sahrawi, Sheikh Biadillah, as leader of the PAM, Morocco’s soon-to-be dominant political party, run behind the scenes by royal confidant Fouad Ali el-Himma? It’s sure to affect the center of gravity in Moroccan Sahrawi politics, wherever that actually lies.

— — —

*) Curiously, he was accused a few years back of double-dealing with Sahrawi nationalists, allegedly having links to a Mauritanian businessman involved with something concerning the POLISARIO oil sales campaign. But since nothing ever came of it, I assume it might have been just political slander, although these kinds of ties across the Berm are probably a lot more common than either side would want to acknowledge.

http://maghrebinenglish.wordpress.com/2009/05/13/corcas-core-cracks/

Countdown to the crackdown

After the recent hostage release by the southern/Saharan wing of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), there has been much political and military movement in Algeria, Mali and the surrounding countries. According to numerous press rumors, a major joint operation in the border areas is about to go into action any day now.

The political arguments have centered around vague but barely concealed insinuations of state support for AQIM’s southern wing, although there’s precious little proof offered by anyone involved. Libya is the state most in the crosshairs, for allegedly funding or/and facilitating the payment of fat ransoms to AQIM, in a deal also involving the Malian state releasing AQIM members in return for someone’s thick wad of cash. Algeria is livid over this, and parts of the éradicateur press is so upset as to appear slightly deranged in its accusations against all and sundry for conspiring to undermine state security.

However, in fact Algeria has good reason to be upset, if one disregards the hyperbole. The government quite rightly believes that ransom payments encourages new kidnappings, and that this — not to mention the prisoners releases — is what keeps the southern AQIM networks running. Algeria also worries, again rightly, that such money will filter up to AQIM’s northern strongholds in the Kabylie, from where the group continues to inflict damage on the Algerian state and military. However, European governments do not seem to give a damn about this, as long as they can bring back their citizens safe and sound; while the poorer local governments are fine with whatever they’re paid most to be fine with, since they don’t stand a chance of securing these areas alone anyway. So the kidnapping circus continues.

Bouteflika has for some time, after offering amnesty upon amnesty, shown signs of exasperation with this whole AQIM business, and the Algerian army appears to be slowly reverting into extermination mode in its treatment of insurgent holdouts. Presently, then, the country is spearheding efforts to pull together a major pan-Saharan/Sahelian coalition to hit AQIM hard, either to cripple it militarily or to at least establish a steep deterrent cost for fucking with Algeria’s south. Among the other nations coming along for the ride, convinced by a mixture of stick and carrot from Algiers, are of course Mali, but also Niger and Mauritania, the two remaining neighbors to the area of concern. You can count on the US to cheer them on and supply whatever is available of satellite imagery and other expertise. However, it seems that Algeria is steering the bandwagon, quite in line with how it has been asserting itself as the maker-or-breaker of regional security in the last few years, and perhaps also for honestly feeling there’s nothing left to do but shoot its way out of this painful deadlock.

Militarily, things have been progressing quickly. A bunch of army units were just pulled down from the Algerian north towards the border, and high-level military coordination between the countries concerned is proceeding apace. For example, Niger’s chief-of-staff flew up to meet with the Algerian top brass (Gaid Saleh and Guenaizia), and Mali’s defense minister did the same some days ago. At the same time, Algiers has started airlifting military supplies to the Malian army in preparation for the expected assault, and minor manhunts are already running, with claims of an important kill just the other day.

How big this will be is impossible to tell: perhaps just a quick crackdown on the areas under suspicion, and brush-up of border security through reinforcements and coordination? But it seems like bigger things are in the making. In so far as the press can be trusted (a big if, admittedly), a large-scale sweep is more likely, although I guess the key to it all is not scale per se, but rather how long it will go on and what it will leave behind. In any case, one should remember that while the Touareg rebellion in Mali’s north just quieted down, the situation remains unstable and is liable to be affected in some way by any major military offensive. On the other hand, there’s no better time to go at it than now, when there’s no hot war complicating matters; and in fact, decisively settling the Touareg conflict may well be one of the unspoken motives for the push.

Also worth bearing in mind is that two European hostages remain in the hands of AQIM. It has demanded that Britain release Abu Qatada, a Jordanian-Palestinian preacher with longstanding ties to al-Qaida’s core leadership as well as to the Algerian Jihadi movements (he used to be sort of a chief Mufti for the GIA back in the day, and later encouraged the GSPC split which evolved into AQIM). That could turn into some nasty headlines.

Hostage update: anti-Qaida strike postponed

Algeria’s El Khabar reports that the Sahel countries* are “temporarily” postponing their offensive against al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for two weeks. The reason is said to be that unnamed European countries have pressured Algiers to wait until they can get the remaining two AQIM hostages (from the UK & Switzerland) released.

This supposed to happen “within weeks”, and hopefully no later than July, after negotiations with the AQIM group of Yahia Djouadi (Abu Ammar) have “made great progress without substantial concessions to the group holding them”. The negotiations are said to involve tribal mediators and “Salafists from Europe”. Worth recalling, then, that AQIM had demanded the release of Abu Qatada al-Filastini from British jails.

*) Algeria, Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. Oh, and who’s missing?

Morocco don’t worry, Palau stands behind you

Morocco has decided to open diplomatic relations on the level of ambassador with the Republic of Palau, a Micronesian island-state with a population of 21,000 souls.

Will this not be a strain on foreign ministry resources? Not at all, since Morocco recently severed ambassadorial ties with Venezuela and Iran, freeing up two experienced ambassadors for this important mission. Clearly, the men in Rabat are planning ahead.

Previous game-changing diplomatic moves in the region: the Sahrawi Republic establishes relations with Vanuatu.

Come join the party!

Aha, so the ruling party in Mauritania will be called Union pour la république (UPR). It was confirmed Wednesday, when the newly created party elected Gen. Mohamed ould Abdelaziz as its first leader and presidential candidate. Pro-regime parliamentarians have duly stampeded to join the UPR, and it already holds a majority in parliament. You sure can’t accuse Mauritanian apparatchiks and tribal notables of not being principled: they’d rather die than oppose the person currently in control of state salaries.

“The country today has 73 parties”, Gen. Abdelaziz said in his inaugural speech, “and the UPR must distinguish itself by assuming a vanguard position in the struggle against injustice, the diversion of public funds, and to banish regionalism and tribalism.”

Yep. It’s a dirty job, but someone has to do it. In other news, we hear, two Mauritanian lieutenant-colonels were arrested yesterday, while the army leadership suddenly announced that soldiers will be given land for free. Hm. But move along now, or you’ll miss the party.

MINURSO mandate extended, rights proposal buried

The UN Security Council just passed its resolution on the mandate of MINURSO, Western Sahara’s peacekeeping mission, granting it a routine extension for a full year. There was little political input, but three points merit mention:

1. According to the Washington Post, the USA did not, as has been public ritual under the last years of the Bush admin, bring up and specifically endorse Morocco’s autonomy plan. France of course did, but was now alone in doing so. This might have been just a random omission, but a curious one still.

2. The Council did not include a human rights component in MINURSO’s mandate, which Morocco opposes (see MPR & Huffington Post). It did add vague language noting “the importance of making progress on the human dimension of the conflict,” but that means nothing. Even so, again according to the Washington Post, “France initially resisted the word ‘human,’ preferring ‘humanitarian.’” (Me, I’m resisting the use of another word.)

3. Finally, the Council endorsed Special Envoy Christopher Ross’s suggestion for informal meetings before proceeding to round five in the official Manhasset negotiations. Both parties had already agreed, even if POLISARIO has said they don’t really see the point (they want spotlight time, not negotiations). The idea of such meetings is to build negotiator confidence and try to get real talks going, since the previous four rounds were made up of nothing but good wine and uncomfortable silences.

The UN-watchers at Inner City Press were, as usual, on the scene, and had a short chat with Ross in which he diplomatically avoided saying anything at all. ICP also suggests that France’s position on Western Sahara may have been used as a bargaining chip to secure another proposal on Sudan. That’s about it. If you’re interested in the dreary spectacle of both sides celebrating this clinically content-free resolution as an outstanding victory for their own side of the war.

Change We Don’t Believe In

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have both, separately, called for a human rights monitoring function to be added to MINURSO’s peacekeeping mandate in Western Sahara, when the issue comes up for discussion in the Security Council tomorrow.


Human rights have not been part of MINURSO’s mandate so far, although they’re very much part of the Western Sahara question. POLISARIO has for a few years now tried to raise the issue, demanding that MINURSO observers be stationed on both sides of the berm, i.e. both in Tindouf (POLISARIO-ruled) and Western Sahara proper (Morocco-ruled). Such an arrangement would be non-political in its setup, in that both sides would be subject to the same scrutiny, and only the bigger offender would have something to fear. But that is of course the problem, since on human rights, there’s not really any question who is the bigger offender — it’s Morocco. As HRW writes about their recent report:

We found a pattern of violations by Moroccan authorities of the right of Sahrawis to speak, associate and assemble peacefully in support of self-determination. The report describes how security forces arbitrarily arrest demonstrators and suspected Sahrawi activists, sometimes beating them and subjecting them to torture, and force them to sign incriminating police statements, all with virtual impunity; the courts then convict and imprison them after unfair trials.

Human Rights Watch devotes a substantial portion of its report to human rights in the Polisario-run refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. While we did not find systematic violations of human rights at the present time, the concerns we noted, including the absence of open debate on fundamental political issues and the survival, in a limited number of cases, of practices related to slavery, heighten our concern that the rights of the Sahrawis living in these camps are vulnerable due to the camps’ extreme isolation, the lack of regular, on-the-ground human rights monitoring, and the lack of oversight by the host country of Algeria.

Add to that Morocco’s blood-soaked history in the region, with hundreds of “disappeared” in the 1970s and 1980s, and the contrast gets even starker. So, it’s easy to understand why POLISARIO feels this is a win-win issue for them. Either they will embarrass Morocco internationally by publicizing its opposition to human rights monitoring, or they get that monitoring and thereby help protect their relatives in the territory, plus add a burden of international criticism to Morocco.

Still, I’m not sure that equation would hold all the way. POLISARIO’s international support has always leaned very heavily on human rights activism and solidarity movements, and it could potentially come to find this arrangement a good less comfortable than they imagine now. They do have some serious human rights violations of their own to deal with, and their talk about having a functioning democracy in Tindouf is shallow propaganda. While it is true that Morocco will be criticized harder than POLISARIO, and for good reason, it will also hurt much less, since Morocco has virtually no human rights-based support to lose. They do have substantial international backing, of course, but that’s all about realpolitik and lobbying, and neither Riyadh nor the Quai d’Orsay nor the White House is likely to pay any attention to what some MINURSO rapporteur writes about arbitrary detention in Dakhla.

International support for Morocco’s position on this issue (the MINURSO mandate), on the other hand, is pretty weak, but probably sufficient. Banning human rights monitors is a difficult position to defend for democratic nations, and even the Bush admin, at the height of its love-fest with Morocco over Western Sahara, seemed ready to approve them. However, France is as always less squeamish about such things, and public opinion couldn’t care less what they do in Africa. In 2006, the Council debated the issue and ended up deadlocked on a tally of 14-1 (everyone vs. France). At that point the US and other nations folded and let it slide rather than bringing the dispute into the open and risk embarrassing Morocco.

This time around, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is trying to fudge the issue in his report to the Council, by just stating in general terms that everyone needs to be nice to each other, without addressing the specific request for a HR component to MINURSO’s mandate. But, it’s up to the Council to decide — tomorrow. It’s certainly no major international issue, but precisely because of that, it will be interesting to see how the US turns under Obama, who ran much of his campaign on promises of a new deal in foreign policy — Change We Can Believe in and all of that. Will Washington be prepared to confront an ally over what should theoretically be a minor non-political human rights problem? My guess is they won’t, and that no one will notice it either, except this fine blog.

Mauritania Brief

Below is a quick roundup of a few relevant points on Mauritania, readers are encouraged to contribute their thoughts and insights. The presidential “race” appears to be shaping up quite predictably, but how the opposition and wider society responds may yet reveal something more substantial.

1. General Abdel Aziz’s resignation is meaningless. This much anyone even glancing at Mauritania should know. The junta leader resigned from the HCE and from his position as head of state. He did not, however, resign from the military as doing so would have separated him from the crucial BASEP unit, which functions essentially as his personal praetorian guard (authority over which he achieved from Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi). It is the basis of his political relevance and power and he will not give it up, meaning that his candidacy and potential presidency will be illegal, though in his mind and that of those behind behind him this matters very little.

2. A merger of forces between RFD/FNDD towards a boycott of the polls and a massive civil disobedience campaign seems likely. The junta has made efforts to divide the opposition parties, employing familiar tactics (see below), opposition members increasingly see the necessity of a common front against the junta in de-legitimizing it and rendering its ability to carry on. Messaoud discusses his relationships with Abdel Aziz and Sidioca in an interview with Al-Akhbar, where he also describes his meetings with Ahmed Ould Daddah.

3. Efforts at collapsing the opposition were dealt setbacks recently. The Constitutional Council rejected the application of Hamidou Baba for candidacy on the RFD ticket, finding no evidence that he was in fact backed by the RFD, which is, after all, boycotting the process. He will have to run as an independent. In the second place, a member of the Council resigned, a slap in the junta’s face.

4. Libya’s personality cult will not extend into one part of Mauritania, contrary to the ambitions of some. The Nouakchott Urban Council refused to re-name a street after Muamar al-Qadhafi, citing his failure to settle the country’s crisis. This adds to junta’s trouble: The agent of the junta’s current circumstance cannot find Mauritanians to honor him, and it will be likely that down the line the junta will grumble for the same reason. For a discussion of Libyco-Mauritanian relations, see this interview with former Mauritanian minister and ambassador Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Weddady. He also provides insight into the RFD’s position.

Advance information (updated)

To spare you the trouble, and prevent MPR from lapsing into an Algeria blog, here are the results of the June 6, 2009 Mauritanian presidential elections:


Winner:

MAURITANIA-POLITICS-COUP-AZIZ- Mohamed ould Abdelaziz. The leader of the 2008 coup against President Abdellahi, and strongman of ever since. He recently resigned from the junta just to run in the elections, but only an idiot would believe that he has truly cut ties with it. The original plan following the coup was to hold elections quickly and resume business as usual. However, strong foreign and domestic resistance has prevented the legitimization of his rule, and by now opposition to junta-rigged elections is such that this might in fact aggravate the crisis. Gen. Abdelaziz has shown himself an expert at coups — both suppressing them (2003, 2004) and organizing them (2005, 2008) — but distinctly less agile as a politician. Nevertheless, even he can win an election organized by himself and boycotted by the opposition.


Also-rans:

Ibrahima Mokhtar Sarr. Leader of AJD/mr, a Peul-majority party representing the grievances of the South and more particularly the personal ambition of Mr. Sarr. Last time he ran, Sarr, a veteran Black Nationalist, scored 8% in the first round of the 2007 elections. His personal following should guarantee him something similar this time, and then — even if the mainstream opposition will boycott — there might be a a significant add-on for not being Gen. Abdelaziz. But note that Sarr has been in favor of the coup since day one.

Kane Hamidou Baba. Defector from the RFD, Ahmed ould Daddah’s party. The RFD was pro-coup (in alliance with AJD/mr), but soured on the thought of elections once it dawned on Daddah that the military wasn’t interested in helping him win. RFD Vice President Kane Hamidou Baba was then kicked out once it became clear he was allying himself with the army and wanted to present himself in the elections. I don’t know how big a chunk of the party he brought with him, but it won’t be enough to let him win, had that ever been anyone’s intention. Oh, and he once blogged.

— — —

So, three candidates. Have there ever been this few people running in a Mauritanian presidential election before? (Except the single-candidate ones back in Mokhtar ould Daddah’s day.) There’s a little bit of time left for others to sign up, but I guess this looks like Abdelaziz is gearing up for a first-round victory. Can’t honestly see how something so blatantly fraudulent will help solve his legitimacy problem.

UPDATE (I): Taqadoumy, whose correspondents in good journalistic fashion sat outside the gates until the registration deadline had passed, tells us that three others found time to file last-minute candidacies, and Tahalil confirms their names. The names of the three are:

- Sghaïr ould M’Bareck, a former prime minister under President ould Tayaa, from 2003 until the 2005 coup. He is also the only Hartani (ex-slave/”black Moor”) candidate, formerly with a background in the el-Hor emancipation movement (from which, famously, opposition leader Messoud ould Boulkheïr launched his career). Since then, a persistent hanger-on apparatchik who has managed to attach himself to three successive, mutually hostile administrations: ould el-Tayaa, Abdellahi and now Abdelaziz.

- Isselmou ould el-Mustapha, chief of a microscopic party (Parti de la convergence démocratique, no seats in parliament) who ran in 2007 as well and scored 0,24%. But hey, quitters never win, and winners never quit.

- Sidi Mohamed ould Ghaouth (who according to the scrupulous staff of Taqadoumy arrived one minute late) is some random guy working in the port office of Nouakchott. My prediction is he will be working there in July 2009 as well.

UPDATE (II): The last two were rejected for filing deficient candidacy applications.

Point of order

It’s Arab League summit in Doha, and the Qatari Emir is just finishing his opening address when - khhzzzrrk, Brother Leader Qadhafi grabs the mike. As the assembled stare in wonder, he goes off on a long garbled rant (video) accusing the king of Saudi Arabia of being a British-American puppet on his way to the grave, as a belated follow-up to a public spat they had six years ago. Then in the next second he changes his mind and declares that, well, that’s all in the past and he’s now ready to make up. During the whole monologue, the Qatari chairman can be heard chirping in the background: “Oh, Brother Mouammar? Brother Mouammar! Brother Mouammar, a point of order please? A point of order!”

Since Brother Mouammar clearly isn’t listening, the organizers resort to cutting his mike instead. Qadhafi angrily remarks that this is no way to treat the foremost Arab leader, the King of Kings of Africa and Imam of the Muslims; he then storms out of the meeting, and apparently somehow ends up spending his afternoon at the Islamic Art Museum of Qatar. All in a good day’s work.

People sometimes ask, is Qadhafi crazy or is he just acting? There’s something to be said for the theory that he is playing up his eccentricity for political purposes — that he must be, considering how long he’s been in power and how much influence he still has in the neighbourhood. But moments such as these lead me to believe that, granting a certain ruthless instinct of self-preservation, he’s just mad as a hatter.

Iran & Western Sahara (translation)

As you know, Morocco recently cut diplomatic ties with Iran, presumably to curry favor with Washington and Riyadh by appearing their most faithful ally in the power-struggle with Teheran. However, that doesn’t necessarily play well with ordinary Moroccans, who arguably agree more with Iran’s radical foreign policy than with Rabat’s own pro-US variety. So, to remove attention from the sphere of politics and portray Iran as having attacked those quintessentially Moroccan values of God, Country, King, the foreign policy establishment has gone into overdrive trying to conjure up alternate excuses. Reasons cited for the diplomatic rupture include claims of Iranian Shiite subversion of Islam in Morocco, to make it a religious rather than political dispute, and an alleged Iranian project of anti-Arab expansionism (dovetailing nicely with the wahhabi paranoia prevailing in Riyadh). Less prominently, but still, there is the question of Western Sahara, around the Moroccanity of which there is a strong shared consensus of state and people. Consequently, speculation on Iranian ties to the pro-independence POLISARIO Front and its main backer, Algeria, is being played up in the media.

Below the fold is an example, a translated piece from el-Massa’, which brings up the story of an official Iranian visit to POLISARIO in … 1984. Clearly, this Iranian scheme to undermine Morocco has been going on for some time. (The article also, as you’ll notice, highlights POLISARIO’s disgracefully cruel treatment of its former Moroccan prisoners-of-war.)

Khomeini’s foreign minister visited Tindouf
and insulted Morocco’s state and political parties

Ali Nejab met him in 1984 as a prisoner in the Rabouni internment camp

By: Idriss el-Kenbouri

Is it possible that the Iranians, in their attempts to counter Morocco after diplomatic ties were cut, will provide support to POLISARIO? This is a question often heard these days. Some underline the importance of the matter by pointing to the visit that Ahmadinejad, the president of the Islamic Republic, conducted to Algeria in August 2007. The exclusion of Morocco from that trip had a political content that necessitates analysis, and there is a certain distancing towards Morocco among the Iranian functionaries that truly rule the country. Prime among them is the Guardian Council [?], whose members brought the era of Mohammed Khatami and openness, to its end like a passing summer cloud, to come in its stead the opposite, Ahmadinejad.

Iran’s rivalry with Morocco is old. Ali Nejab is a Moroccan pilot who spent 25 years as prisoner-of-war with POLISARIO in the dark prisons of Tindouf between 1978 and 2003. He tells us that Ali Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister in Khomeini’s era, visited the Tindouf camps in 1984 by invitation of the POLISARIO leadership, in the framework of cooperation between the parties that then existed, in defiance of the late King Hassan II. (I)

The POLISARIO leaders brought the Moroccan POWs to the Iranian top functionary as a sort of proof of their victory over Morocco. Nejab had spent eight months of the year 1973 in military flight training in southern Teheran, as part of the coordination with the Shah’s regime. For this reason, the POLISARIO leaders brought him to Velayati as one of the Moroccans who had been trained in Iran before the revolution, which kindled the interest of the former Iranian foreign minister, who asked to meet him. He was accompanied by el-Idrissi Bilali, a former POLISARIO foreign representative who would later join Morocco.

Nejab tells el-Massa’: “When Velayati stood before me he started, without posing any questions, to insult Moroccan institutions and parties and the Moroccan state generally. I lost my cool and cursed at him. One of the men accompanying him told me that we were brothers in religion, to which I responded that I don’t want to be your brother in religion, I want to be your brother in politics. They understood that I wanted to say to him that they should support our position on the Sahara, and I said that if Khomeini is Islam then I will leave Islam. Velayati immediately cut short the visit. As soon as he left the area close to Rabouni (II), and vanished from sight, the POLISARIO men started beating me with kicks and punches, finally leaving me covered in my own blood.”

As punishment he was put in solitary confinement next to Ali Jouhar, one of the Moroccan officers that had been captured by POLISARIO. The two remained there for eleven months, given a small piece of dry bread and a litre of water every 24 hours. After that, says Nejabi, a POLISARIO leader asked him to write a two-page letter “condemning Hassan II’s treatment of the Moroccans”, which he refused. He was punished with 48 hours of torture – like Sisyphus in Greek mythology – by an order to move, together with Ali Jouhar, a pile of rocks each weighing about 15 kilograms, a distance of 200 meter. This was in Rabouni, where Nejab spent his POW years in the Hamdi Ba Cheikh center, the main prison center of POLISARIO, known also by the name of the “Red Center” for being built of red mud. (III)

Some remarks:

(I) Iran began supporting POLISARIO after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, when the Shah’s regime fell, as part of its break with western-backed Arab states and in line with the new regime’s general support for third world liberation movements. The Shah had had good relations with King Hassan, and lived for some time in Morocco after his downfall, contributing to Iranian ill-will towards Morocco. Iranian support for the Sahrawis was never important, however, essentially some verbal political backing and a formal recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, their government-in-exile. However, as Iranian politics turned more realist over the 1980s, the distant Western Sahara issue became a function of Teheran’s relations with POLISARIO’s main sponsor, Algeria. Support for POLISARIO therefore ended in 1992-1993 when Iran’s relations with Algeria broke down, after the Algerian military quashed an Islamic electoral win and blamed Iran for supporting Islamist rebels. After Algerian-Iranian ties were restored, Iran has been more or less neutral on the conflict, trying to please both Moroccan and Algerian officials by tailoring their message to the audience.

(II) Rabouni is a base camp in the Tindouf province, serving as the main HQ for POLISARIO and housing various government institutions.

(III) The last Moroccan POWs — originally a couple of thousand — were released by POLISARIO in 2005, following increased attention to their case by human rights groups. Numerous people remain “disappeared” in the conflict, however, the vast majority of them Sahrawi civilians abducted by Moroccan police/army forces in the 1970s and 1980s.

Mauritania, Qadhafi, and the Arab world

At The Moor Next Door, MPR’s fearsome strongman, Kal, adds up the results of Muammar el-Qadhafi’s recent visit to Nouakchott, where he tried to mediate the Mauritanian crisis by unreservedly siding with the putschists. This didn’t quite pan out, and his blatant partisanship surprised those who had seen Libya’s previously intensive and consistent effort to come across as a possible bridge-builder — the deposed president Abdellahi was given a head-of-state welcome in Sirte, and so on, to signify that Qadhafi was on good terms with both sides.As Kal argues — and I agree — the end result of Libya’s move from the middle to the fringe seems to be that the US/European position is strengthened. Washington has been militantly against the coup, while Europe under French leadership was equally vocal, but also hinted openly at a search for whatever pragmatic exit existed. If they would pool their resources to push hard for a solution alongside those local players that agree, they could probably make a real difference.


The Arab world, with a couple of prominent exceptions, remains negative or indifferent to the junta. Mauritania has gained some rare popular acclaim among Arabs for cutting ties with Israel, but on balance it didn’t help to swing Arab states. Among the so-called ‘radical’ Arab states, Algeria (not terribly radical, under Bouteflika) was already firmly invested in the anti-coup camp, while Syria and Sudan have been too preoccupied with their own troubles to notice, and are unable to extend any help anyhow. (Yemen is also habitually railing against Israel, but I don’t think Mauritania can expect any financial contributions from there…) It gained some limited applause from Qatar, and now there is this with Libya, although it’s not obvious that the cut ties with Israel were behind Qadhafi’s swing to full-blown partisanship. Among the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states, the non-Qatari Gulf crowd, where the money is, all viewed this radical grandstanding very negatively, since they are presently under KSA leadership engaged in promoting a compromise line on Israel. For Egypt and Jordan, it’s an absolute embarrassment — it increases pressure on them to break their own ties with Israel. In Morocco, the government must have been quietly upset about the cut ties with Israel, given the back-breaking acrobatics that Rabat is presently performing to please Riyadh & Washington. But the government is, like Algeria’s, much too invested in the situation to change sides or even punish the junta for the move.

Summing the Arab scene up, it’s possible that Mauritania’s Israel move was designed only to gain Qadhafi’s total backing. If so, it seems to have succeeded (for what it’s worth). If the embassy closure was designed to break its larger isolation, it’s a failure, since it further alienated the West and a couple of Arab heavyweights, and didn’t bring about change anywhere else. Finally, however, one shouldn’t ignore the domestic factor: the Mauritanian public has opposed Israel’s embassy since the day it opened, and despite the segmented nature of the Mauritanian polity, there’s still a good political buck in wielding the Israel card.

At any rate, Qadhafi’s first international action as head of the African Union ended in a serious anti-climax for him, depriving Libya of the swing role it had hoped for but adding a semi-powerful — if double-edged — support for the junta. With Qadhafi at the head of the AU, its previously stiff legalistic stand on the coup could also be in danger, given the flimsyness of its institutions and the Brother Leader’s general disregard for, precisely, institutions. This could prove important, since the AU has so far been used as the international community’s sanction canary, moving one step ahead of the rest. (About the AU, see also Ibn Kafka on MPR detaling the world of difference between a coup and a coup.)

Now, the ball is in the court of the US and Europe, and the quest to find another mediator is on. Let me guess that someone will sooner or later call on either Qatar, the UN or some African country to step in and work something out. It’s either that or to wait for another coup, which given today’s logjam would risk seriously destabilising the country, and also spoil the slim but intriguing chance that there could actually be a day when an African/Arab coup is overturned peacefully by foreign and internal pressure.

Iran & Western Sahara

As you know, Morocco recently cut diplomatic ties with Iran, presumably to curry favor with Washington and Riyadh by appearing their most faithful ally in the power-struggle with Teheran. However, that doesn’t necessarily play well with ordinary Moroccans, who arguably agree more with Iran’s radical foreign policy than with Rabat’s own pro-US variety. So, to remove attention from the sphere of politics and portray Iran as having attacked those quintessentially Moroccan values of God, Country, King, the foreign policy establishment has gone into overdrive trying to conjure up alternate excuses. Reasons cited for the diplomatic rupture include claims of Iranian Shiite subversion of Islam in Morocco, to make it a religious rather than political dispute, and an alleged Iranian project of anti-Arab expansionism (dovetailing nicely with the wahhabi paranoia prevailing in Riyadh). Less prominently, but still, there is the question of Western Sahara, around the Moroccanity of which there is a strong shared consensus of state and people. Consequently, speculation on Iranian ties to the pro-independence POLISARIO Front and its main backer, Algeria, is being played up in the media.

Below the fold is an example, a translated piece from el-Massa’, which brings up the story of an official Iranian visit to POLISARIO in … 1984. Clearly, this Iranian scheme to undermine Morocco has been going on for some time. (The article also, as you’ll notice, highlights POLISARIO’s disgracefully cruel treatment of its former Moroccan prisoners-of-war.)

Khomeini’s foreign minister visited Tindouf
and insulted Morocco’s state and political parties

Ali Nejab met him in 1984 as a prisoner in the Rabouni internment camp

By: Idriss el-Kenbouri

Is it possible that the Iranians, in their attempts to counter Morocco after diplomatic ties were cut, will provide support to POLISARIO? This is a question often heard these days. Some underline the importance of the matter by pointing to the visit that Ahmadinejad, the president of the Islamic Republic, conducted to Algeria in August 2007. The exclusion of Morocco from that trip had a political content that necessitates analysis, and there is a certain distancing towards Morocco among the Iranian functionaries that truly rule the country. Prime among them is the Guardian Council [?], whose members brought the era of Mohammed Khatami and openness, to its end like a passing summer cloud, to come in its stead the opposite, Ahmadinejad.

Iran’s rivalry with Morocco is old. Ali Nejab is a Moroccan pilot who spent 25 years as prisoner-of-war with POLISARIO in the dark prisons of Tindouf between 1978 and 2003. He tells us that Ali Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister in Khomeini’s era, visited the Tindouf camps in 1984 by invitation of the POLISARIO leadership, in the framework of cooperation between the parties that then existed, in defiance of the late King Hassan II. (I)

The POLISARIO leaders brought the Moroccan POWs to the Iranian top functionary as a sort of proof of their victory over Morocco. Nejab had spent eight months of the year 1973 in military flight training in southern Teheran, as part of the coordination with the Shah’s regime. For this reason, the POLISARIO leaders brought him to Velayati as one of the Moroccans who had been trained in Iran before the revolution, which kindled the interest of the former Iranian foreign minister, who asked to meet him. He was accompanied by el-Idrissi Bilali, a former POLISARIO foreign representative who would later join Morocco.

Nejab tells el-Massa’: “When Velayati stood before me he started, without posing any questions, to insult Moroccan institutions and parties and the Moroccan state generally. I lost my cool and cursed at him. One of the men accompanying him told me that we were brothers in religion, to which I responded that I don’t want to be your brother in religion, I want to be your brother in politics. They understood that I wanted to say to him that they should support our position on the Sahara, and I said that if Khomeini is Islam then I will leave Islam. Velayati immediately cut short the visit. As soon as he left the area close to Rabouni (II), and vanished from sight, the POLISARIO men started beating me with kicks and punches, finally leaving me covered in my own blood.”

As punishment he was put in solitary confinement next to Ali Jouhar, one of the Moroccan officers that had been captured by POLISARIO. The two remained there for eleven months, given a small piece of dry bread and a litre of water every 24 hours. After that, says Nejabi, a POLISARIO leader asked him to write a two-page letter “condemning Hassan II’s treatment of the Moroccans”, which he refused. He was punished with 48 hours of torture – like Sisyphus in Greek mythology – by an order to move, together with Ali Jouhar, a pile of rocks each weighing about 15 kilograms, a distance of 200 meter. This was in Rabouni, where Nejab spent his POW years in the Hamdi Ba Cheikh center, the main prison center of POLISARIO, known also by the name of the “Red Center” for being built of red mud. (III)

Some remarks:

(I) Iran began supporting POLISARIO after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, when the Shah’s regime fell, as part of its break with western-backed Arab states and in line with the new regime’s general support for third world liberation movements. The Shah had had good relations with King Hassan, and lived for some time in Morocco after his downfall, contributing to Iranian ill-will towards Morocco. Iranian support for the Sahrawis was never important, however, essentially some verbal political backing and a formal recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, their government-in-exile. However, as Iranian politics turned more realist over the 1980s, the distant Western Sahara issue became a function of Teheran’s relations with POLISARIO’s main sponsor, Algeria. Support for POLISARIO therefore ended in 1992-1993 when Iran’s relations with Algeria broke down, after the Algerian military quashed an Islamic electoral win and blamed Iran for supporting Islamist rebels. After Algerian-Iranian ties were restored, Iran has been more or less neutral on the conflict, trying to please both Moroccan and Algerian officials by tailoring their message to the audience.

(II) Rabouni is a base camp in the Tindouf province, serving as the main HQ for POLISARIO and housing various government institutions.

(III) The last Moroccan POWs — originally a couple of thousand — were released by POLISARIO in 2005, following increased attention to their case by human rights groups. Numerous people remain “disappeared” in the conflict, however, the vast majority of them Sahrawi civilians abducted by Moroccan police/army forces in the 1970s and 1980s.

Morocco breaks off with Iran - some background and speculation

More than a month ago, seasoned Morocco observers raised an eyebrow or two over Morocco’s decision to break off diplomatic relations with close down its embassy in Venezuela - ostensibly on account of a visit in Tindouf made by Venezuela’s ambassador in Algeria to Mohamed Abdelaziz el Marrakchi, Polisario’s long-time leader and “president” of the “Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic“, a break-away entity recognised by Venezuela… twenty-seven years earlier, in 1982. Outside Morocco, and even among critically minded Moroccans, the move was seen as a way for Morocco to ingratiate itself with its US and Israeli patrons - Venezuela had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel over the war on Gaza just a few days earlier (for a fuller account of these events, see “Maroc/Venezuela: Honni soit qui mal y pense“, “Maroc, Algérie & Vénezuela: let me get this straight…” and “Morocco out of touch with the emerging left-wing Latin America“)…

The turn has now come to Iran. The pretext has been the Bahraïn-Iran border feud. As you may remember, an adviser to Supreme Leader grand ayatollah Ali Khameneï (his official website is quite slick), ayatollah Ali Akbar Ategh al Nouri, allegedly declared, on February 11, that Bahraïn used to be Iran’s fourteenth province. The initial source having been fiercely pro-Saudi and anti-Iranian Asharq al Awsat, some caution is perhaps called for as to the real extent of al Nouri’s declarations - he has predictably claimed to have been misunderstood. That claim may not be totally unfounded: Nouri alleges that he simply compared the Islamic Republic’s record on territorial losses (none so far) to that of the shah régime - under which the British departure from Bahraïn in 1971 didn’t imply its return to Iranian sovereignty (as had been the case in the 18thy century) but rather its independence under a sunni dynasty, the Al Khalifa (Bahrain’s population is two thirds shia):

“My purpose in presenting Bahrain issue was restating the history to compare the Islamic Republic era and Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties,” he noted on the sidelines of the international conference on Palestine when asked about the remarks.

“I believe the two dynasties of Qajar and Pahlavi gave parts of the country to foreigners out of incompetence, but during 8 years of war and resistance we did not allow even one handful of the country to fall under enemies’ control.”

Be that as it may, the Iranian leadership quickly went into damage control mode - as it drew massive fire from not only the usual sunni suspects but also from Russia and Turkey - with Ahmedinejad personally reassuring Bahrain that Iran had nothing but the most brotherly and friendly feelings towards it. Before the end of February, the feud had apparently petered out, with both countries vowing eternal friendship and brotherhood. All fine then?

Er, not really. As almost all other Arab (and sunni) countries, Morocco lost no time in condemning Iran - rightly so, as few other Arab countries have staked so much on their defense of territorial integrity. Furthermore, Morocco’s close connections with most Gulf States made a stern Moroccan reaction a diplomatic necessity - you may recall that Morocco in 2008 alone received 800 million dollars in public donations from the United Arab Emirates (300 million dollars) and Saudi Arabia (500 million dollars) - i.e. three times more than it received that year from the EU (228 million euros) and more than it is due to receive from the US Millenium Challenge Account over five years (697,5 million dollars).

The turns and twists of the Morocco-Iran spat deserve a proper timeline. Here are the main events, as far as I have been able to track them:

February 11: Nouri makes his comments on Bahrain, causing widespread condemnation - Morocco joins the chorus.

February 20: Iran summons Morocco’s chargé d’affairesin Teheran, Mohamed Darif, over “the stances taken by the Moroccan king“. In a message to his Bahraini counterpart, Mohammed VI had described Nouri’s declarations as “abject” as well as “absurd“: «Ces déclarations abjectes à l’endroit d’un pays arabe frère et membre actif dans son environnement régional et au sein de la communauté internationale ont suscité notre fort étonnement et notre profonde inquiétude (…) Nous considérons de même que ces déclarations absurdes sont en contradiction flagrante avec les principes et les règles du droit international, ainsi qu’avec les valeurs de coexistence et de bon voisinage auxquelles incite Notre religion islamique tolérante». The Moroccan chargé d’affaires allegedly took a low profile during that meeting, replying that “Morocco is interested in expanding relations with Iran, which he called a regional power with an ancient civilization“. A communiqué by the official Iranian press agency IRNA is allegedly published (I haven’t found it though), evoking that call-up and criticising Morocco for its reaction.

February 22: Morocco’s foreign minister, Taïeb Fassi Fihri, travels to Bahrain to convey a personal message from King Mohammed VI to King Hamad Ibn Aissa Al Khalifa, a gesture widely publicised in Moroccan media as well as on the Moroccan foreign ministry’s website.

February 23: Taïeb Fassi Fihri meets with Bahraini prime minister Sheikh Khalifa Ben Salman Al-Khalifa.

February 25: On his return from Bahrain, Taïeb Fassi Fihri summons Iranian ambassador to Morocco, Vahid Ahmadi, to convey him Morocco’s displeasure at Iran’s call-up of Morocco’s chargé d’affaires and strong rejection of the wording of the IRNA communiqué mentioned earlier. Morocco’s chargé d’affaires is called back for consultations in Rabat for one week on the same day.

February 26: Taïeb Fassi Fihri reiterates Morocco’s “astonishment” at being allegedly singled out by Iran over its support for Bahrain’s territorial integrity - Morocco’s chargé d’affaires would apparently have been the only foreign head of mission to have been summoned to the Iranian ministry of foreign affairsover the issue, despite the many other Arab and non-Arab countries taking a similar stance - at least if we are to believe Morocco’s MAEC.

March 6: Morocco decides to break off diplomatic relations with Iran - if the diplomatic spat over the Bahrain affair is still mentioned, the sectarian aspect is given much larger proeminence - Iran’s embassy is accused of having meddled in internal Moroccan affairs by proselytising - claims that had never been raised previously on an official level. The spat has continued thereafter, with Iran chiding Morocco over its decision, and Morocco asserting its sovereign right to break off diplomatic relations with whomever it wants.

Some remarks are in order: while Iran initiated this diplomatic tit-for-tat, Morocco upped the ante considerably by recalling its chargé d’affaires - a step no other Arab country (1) has taken over this dispute, not even Bahrain. This is quite an escalade in diplomatic terms. It may be recalled that Morocco undertook the same step - recalling its ambassador - when Spain’s Juan Carlos made an official visit in November 2007 to the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Sebta and Mlilia, over which Morocco claims sovereignty. Bahrain’s territorial integrity - if one accepts that Nouri’s statements could reasonably be perceived as a threat - would thus appear as equally worthy of diplomatic action as Sebta and Mlilia, which might come as news to Morocco’s public - not that anyone bothered to consult them over this issue…

What then? Well, Morocco’s troops being tied down in the Sahara, it resorted to the next best alternative to declaration of war, namely breaking off diplomatic relations. The official communiqué from the MAEC mentions the perceived slights over Iran’s reaction to Morocco’s declaration of support to Bahrain, and ads on, for good measure, an alleged Iranian plot to “convert” Moroccans to Shia islam:

Le Maroc décide de rompre ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Iran

Rabat le : 06/03/2009

Le Royaume du Maroc a décidé la rupture, à partir de ce vendredi, des relations diplomatiques avec la République islamique d’Iran, indique un communiqué du ministère des Affaires étrangères et de la coopération. Le 25 février dernier, le Royaume du Maroc avait rappelé, en consultations pour une semaine, son chargé d’affaires par intérim à Téhéran, rappelle le communiqué. La même source précise que le Maroc avait également demandé des explications aux autorités iraniennes qui ont cru devoir singulariser le Maroc, dans le cadre d’une démarche inamicale, et publier un communiqué comprenant des expressions inacceptables, à la suite de la solidarité exprimée par le Maroc, à l’instar de très nombreux pays, à l’intégrité territoriale et la souveraineté du Royaume de Bahreïn. Le délai d’une semaine ayant expiré, le Royaume n’a reçu aucune explication à ces actes, ajoute le communiqué.

Selon le ministère, cette attitude inadmissible, dirigée contre le seul Maroc, est doublée au demeurant, d’un activisme avéré des autorités de ce pays, et notamment de sa représentation diplomatique à Rabat, visant à altérer les fondamentaux religieux du Royaume, à s’attaquer aux fondements de l’identité ancestrale du peuple marocain et à tenter de menacer l’unicité du culte musulman et le Rite Malékite Sunnite au Maroc, dont est le Garant SM le Roi Mohammed VI, Amir Al Mouminine. Ce type d’actions structurées et soutenues, ajoute le ministère, constituent une ingérence intolérable dans les affaires intérieures du Royaume et sont contraires aux règles et à la déontologie de l’action diplomatique. Pour l’ensemble de ces considérations, conclut le communiqué, le Royaume du Maroc a décidé la rupture, à partir de ce jour, des relations diplomatiques avec la République islamique d’Iran.



This beggars belief.

Breaking off diplomatic relations over such a slender slight would seem to me to be a première in diplomatic practice, at least in modern, post-colonial times (the French allegedly invaded Algeria in 1830 over the infamous “fan affair” three years earlier). You do not break off diplomatic relations because you’ve had your chargé d’affaires summoned to the ministry of foreign affairs, even if a critical communiqué is issued at the end of that meeting.

As for an ultimatum not being answered in time - ultimatums are a big no-no in normal diplomatic intercourse. The latest ultimatums I can remember are those adressed to Iraq in 1991 and 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001 - and they were framed in such a way as to guarantee rejection and war. Even if Morocco’s ultimatum - the Iranians were given one week to respond from the day of Morocco’s chargé d’affaires’ departure from Teheran on February 25 - wasn’t made public, its drafters knew or should have known that Iran would not be submitting to it. None of this makes any sense.

To get an idea of what countries usually break off diplomatic relations over, Egypt and Iran broke off their diplomatic ties in 1979 when then president Sadate hosted the exiled and deposed Shah in spite of the Khomeiny’s objections - and relations have remained brokenon account of Iranian statements hailing Sadate’s assassin. More recently, Bolivia, Venezuela and Mauritania broke off their diplomatic relations with Israel in light of the atrocities committed by the latter in Gaza; Georgia broke off its diplomatic relations with Russia after last summer’s small-scale war between the two countries. Ecuador broke off relations with Colombia after a hot pursuit by Colombian military against Colombian rebels based in Ecuador, and Nicaragua broke off its relations in solidarity with Ecuador. Tiny St Lucia broke off its relations with China as a consequence from establishing relations with Taïwan, as China considers Taïwan a Chinese province. Ethiopia apparently broke off its relations with Qatar over Al Jazeera’s coverage of Ethiopia’s occupation of Somalia. Rwanda cut off its diplomatic ties with France over criminal investigations launched in France against Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame. Chad broke off its relations with Sudan in 2008 over armed incursions in its territory.

Granted, from a legal point of view, every country is free to decide by itself which other countries it wishes to entertain diplomatic relations with - from that point of view, Morocco’s decision is unassailable. Furthermore, the lack of diplomatic relations between two countries does not necessarily imply a situation of enmity between the two - it may simply indicate that the two countries are far away from each other or/and lack bilateral commercial and personal (immigration, tourism) relations - the fact that Morocco has no diplomatic relations with Iceland must probably be interpreted this way…

In the present case, cutting off relations is a markedly hostile gesture on Morocco’s part. The reason usually invoked by Morocco when breaking off or downgrading its diplomatic relations with other countries is unsurprisingly related to its claims to territorial integrity. When Moroccan ambassador to Madrid Omar Azziman was recalled to Rabat in November 2007, it was over Spanish King Juan Carlos’ official visit to the Spanish enclaves in Northern Morocco, Sebta and Mlilya (he returned two months later). When Morocco improbably recalled its ambassador to Dakar - a long-time ally on the Sahara issue - just a few weeks later, it was over a Senegalese opposition politician’s presence at a Polisario meeting. More recently, when Morocco closed its embassy in Venezuela (contrary to what I believed previously, Morocco merely closed its embassy in Caracas, with Morocco’s embassy in Dominica now in charge of defending the Kingdom’s interests in Venezuela).

None of that here: no mention has been made by Morocco of any Iranian action or declaration that could be construed as hostile to Morocco’s territorial integrity. With very good cause: on February 13, less than three weeks before the rupture of diplomatic relations, the Iranian ambassador to Morocco had made very positive statements about his country’s relations to Polisario. In an interview given to the state-run Moroccan news agency MAP, he stated that Iran had no longer any whatsoever relations with the separatist movement for seventeen years (that would be 1992) (2):

“Nous n’entretenons aucune relation ou lien avec le ‘polisario’“, a indiqué le diplomate iranien, ajoutant que cette position constante “émane de notre considération pour le peuple et le gouvernement du Royaume chérifien“.

That interview is significant: the MAP usually gives sycophancy a bad name and is not known - to put it mildly - to interview persons hostile or even reserved towards the Moroccan government’s policies. That interview was furthermore given a proeminent place in Saudi-owned “Le Matin du Sahara“, the Palace’s unofficial mouthpiece. What this means is that on February 13, no signs existed that Iran proved a threat to Morocco’s religious monochromy (the unfortunate Jewish exodus has made the sunni demographical dominance nearly all-embracing - and contrary to Tunisia and Algeria, all Moroccan sunni are nominally maliki), as has been alleged by Moroccan officials and mainstream media after the diplomatic rupture.

Some claims had been made previously by security sources, and given some credence in mainstream media, as to the alleged security threat - never explained fully - of Sunni Moroccans turning Shia - the late King Hassan II had famously spoken of the bloody 1984 riots as a “Zionist-Khomeinist plot“. The 1971 census is the last one where people’s religious affiliation was part of the questionnaire - and then only for Moroccans, whose only choice was between “Jewish” or “Muslim” - and for the latter, no choice of affiliation was fiven. In fact, all Muslim Moroccans are presumed to be Sunni of the maliki school - see for instance article 400 of the Family Code(formerly known as Moudawana):

Article 400For all issues not addressed by a text in the present code, reference may be made to the Malikite School of Jurisprudence and to ijtihad (juridical reasoning) which strive to fulfil and enhance Islamic values, notably justice, equality and amicable social relations.



Media sources - citing US government sources (!) - put the figure of Shia “converts“ (the term is arguably improper) in Morocco at around three thousand (others speak of several hundred), mostly former students in Iran and admirers of the Iranian Revolution, and lately of Hezbollah (possibly the most popular political movement in Morocco). Their alleged “leader”, or rather spokesperson, is Driss Hani, who has publicly argued that Morocco is Shia country. Of course, the Moroccan government, with its closeness to the USA, Saudi Arabia and Israel, has tried, in isolated cases, to capitalise on the anti-Iranian sentiments of its allies. One recent exemple was the alleged Belliraj terror network- some of its alleged members were initially said to have links with the Hezbollah, and one of its alleged members is a Moroccan Shia, correspondent in Morocco for Hezbollah’s Al Manar TV channel. Slightly loony Iranian opposition sites alleged that Iran was involved in this murky affair. But Interior minister backtracked early on, refuting any attempt to involve either the Hezbollah or Iran in the alleged plot.

Overall then, the reasons publicly advanced to justify Morocco’s dramatic decision make no sense, whether we look at those relating to the diplomatic spat between Morocco and Iran over Bahrain, or at the supposed security threat posed by proselytising Iranian diplomats in Rabat. It is therefore necessary to look beyond the official version.

As with the closure of Morocco’s embassy in Venezuela, many have been tempted to look at Morocco’s Washington and Tel Aviv ties for some guidance. While Morocco will certainly not suffer from either decisions - the Caracas closure or the Teheran break-off - with its Washington and Tel Aviv friends, it is exceedingly improbable that this latest step has been taken on their prompting. Granted, neither Obama nor Netanyahu will cry tears of blood over this sudden downturn in Moroccan-Iranian relations. Times have changed however, and we’re no longer in 2003 nor even 2008: while Israel is still foaming at the mouth against Iran, the White House, while still ambivalent, is no longer warmongering against Iran.

As for Israel - the difference between Netanyahu, Livni, Olmert and Barak is of nuance and degrees here - such a decision certainly reinforces the fanciful narrative of the Sunni/Shia conflict overtaking the Arab/Israeli, but with Israel having been under a caretaker government for months and with Netanyahu not yet in power, it is very unlikely that Israel was the driving force behind Morocco’s decision.

I see two explaining factors standing out: the Saudi/khaleeji (3) link, and possibly a perceived personal slight to Mohammed VI. While Morocco has always had close relations with khaleeji countries - on a personal level as well, since King Fahd and Sheikh Zayed were close to the late Hassan II - these links seem today to be the only relations of substance between Morocco and other Arab states. The evident disinterest of Mohammed VI for the foreign policy ventures which his father reveled in mean that Morocco’s contemporary foreign policy is run exclusively along the lines of personal likes and dislikes.

These are very substantive relations: as mentioned above, in 2008 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates gave more than the US plans to give over five years, and more than three times more than what the EU has granted Morocco that same year. It is therefore not surprising that Morocco was one of the so-called “moderate Arab countries” (shorthand for US and Israel allies) participating in a meeting with EU and US officials at Sharm el Sheikh last November, expressing their “fear” of Iran and pressing the US to stay firm. Being more Bahraini than Bahrain on Nouri’s declarations fits in quite well with this

Another intriguing detail could also explain the violent Moroccan reaction. In his public message to Bahrain’s ruler, Mohammed VI had used very strong and unusual words for messages of such a dignity - “abject” and “absurd” characterising in his words Nouri’s declarations, seen as representing the Iranian leadership’s views. It was at that stage that Iran summoned Morocco’s chargé d’affaires, and issued a communiqué explicitly criticising the King’s “stance“. This might be the “inappropriate” language later denounced by the Moroccan foreign ministry. And this perceived personal slight - prompted by the King’s extremely strong language - is probably what carried the day.

See also my previous post, “Le Maroc rompt ses relations diplomatiques avec l’Iran“, on my blog.

(1) Egypt has no diplomatic relations with Iran since many years ago.

(2) Admittedly, Algerian El Moudjahid had published a statement attributed to the Iranian ambassador to Alger on February 6 - one week prior to Ahmadi’s interview with the MAP - in which he maintained that Iran still recognised the Polisario: “A propos du problème du Sahara occidental, M. Abyaneh dira que l’Iran a reconnu la République arabe sahraouie démocratique et reste sur cette position“.

(3) Qatar of course excluded…