Mapping of the Conflict in Western Sahara

By: Dr. Sidi M. Omar

Introduction

The conflict in Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO has lasted for over three decades, and continues to pose a potential danger for stability and security in the entire region of North Africa. Despite the successive efforts of the international community to resolve the conflict, a mutually agreed solution remains elusive.

Drawing on theories of conflict resolution, I will present in the paper a roadmap of the conflict in Western Sahara by analysing its history and context, primary parties, core issues and the positions and interests of the parties involved as well as the conflict dynamics. The aim of mapping the conflict is to provide a clearer understanding of the root causes, nature, dynamics and the possibilities for resolving the dispute.

Various conflict analysis tools are employed to map out conflicts. However, I will draw on the model of “conflict mapping”, which was proposed by Paul Wehr (1979) and then developed by other peace and conflict researchers.

The paper will begin with the discussion of the history and context of the conflict in order to determine the setting in which it started and evolved. The analysis will focus on the factors that made the conflict emerge in the first place, and then escalate in 1975 to reach varying degrees of violence in the following years.

The primary parties to the conflict in question will be identified and the nature of power relations between them will be analysed. Interested parties and “third parties” will also be considered, with special emphasis on their forms of involvement in the conflict. After identifying the primary parties, the analysis will focus on the core issues around which the conflict has developed and how they are perceived and articulated by the two parties.

The paper will analyse the dynamics of the conflict including the precipitating events and the stages of escalation and de-escalation through which the conflict has passed. Finally, a set of possibilities for resolving the conflict will be outlined.

Before presenting a roadmap of the conflict, it is important to say a few words about the nature of the dispute in question. As will be made clear later, the conflict in Western Sahara is not a societal, communal, ethnic, religious or class conflict. Rather, it is an international conflict of a political nature between a state and a national liberation movement. From a conflict resolution perspective, it is framed within the context of what Edward Rice calls “wars of the third kind” (quoted in Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999:69). This category refers to conflicts in which communities seek to create their own states in wars of national liberation (Holsti, 1996:27). Moreover, the question of Western Sahara is considered by the United Nations as a decolonisation issue. This explains the fact that the territory is still on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories still to be decolonised.

Overall, my main aim in this paper is to demonstrate that the peaceful and sustainable solution to the conflict in Western Sahara necessarily entails the exercise by the people of the territory of their internationally recognised and inalienable right to self-determination through a negotiated, democratic and free process consistent with international legality and norms.

Conflict History and Context

To set the background of the conflict situation, it is important to examine the key historical and political elements that shaped the setting in which the violent conflict emerged and evolved. This contextualisation is also useful in determining the origins and the root causes of the dispute.

One key element of analysis is the existing political and decision-making structures of the parties. It is hence necessary to examine the nature of the political regime ruling in Morocco at the time. As will be made clear later, the nature of this political regime had a significant bearing on how the conflict emerged in the first place.

All Moroccan constitutions[1] stipulate that the country is “a democratic, social, constitutional monarchy”. However, unlike modern constitutional monarchies, where the monarch “reigns but does not rule”, the king in Morocco is the one who appoints the prime minister and other cabinet members and terminates their services. He is also both a temporal and spiritual ruler (Amir Al-Mu’minin or Commander of the Faithful) who rules by decrees, and is not answerable to any state institution. Moreover, the monarchical system of the state is one of the “red zones” that cannot be subject to any constitutional revision.

Because of its authoritarian nature[2], the Moroccan regime oftentimes has had to contain and counter the mounting opposition of many Moroccans who wanted a more democratic system of government. One of the most disturbing examples of the regime’s intolerance of opposition was the 1965 riots in which hundreds of protesters were killed by government forces.[3] The riots symbolised the growing rift between the monarchy and the opposing groups that were calling for an end to the monarchical rule. Opposition to the monarchy continued and developed into other riots in 1981, 1984, 1990 and 1999, which were crushed by state security forces.[4]

To restore its challenged legitimacy, the regime has also resorted to mobilisation techniques by creating the false impression of a “national unanimity” around some “sacred causes” (Hammoudi, 1997: xiv) that serve to saturate the political spectrum and refocus the public attention and resources. One prime example, in this regard, was the expansionist policy that the regime set in motion in the mid-1950s. The significance of this policy lies in the fact that it brought to the surface a latent conflict of interests, which would ultimately develop into a manifest, violent confrontation.

In the historical narrative of the conflict in Western Sahara, the year 1957 has special importance. It was precisely in that year (14 October 1957) that Morocco, for the first time, declared officially at the UN that Mauritania, the then Spanish Sahara and Ifni “were integral parts of the Moroccan territory”, and hence they were not entitled to decolonisation (Soroeta Liceras, 2001:38). As will be discussed later, Morocco’s argument, as explained by King Mohamed V in September 1958, was that the peoples of these territories were historically Moroccans and “will always be part of the Moroccan community” (Villar, 1982: 65).

There is ample evidence that Morocco’s territorial claims to its neighbours originated in the expansionist ideology of the “Greater Morocco”, which was advanced in the late 1950s by Allal el-Fassi, the leader of the ultranationalist Istiqlal party, shortly after Morocco gained its independence from France in March 1956.[5] This ideology, which was fully embraced by the monarchy[6], asserted that the then Spanish Sahara, all of Mauritania, a large part of western Algeria and even St. Louis du Sénégal and a slice of northern Mali (including Timbuktu) all belonged historically to Morocco (Villar 1982; Hodges 1983; Pazzanita 2006—to cite just a few authors).

However, in practice Morocco’s numerous claims were fraught with contradictions. For instance, as early as 1966, Morocco publicly recognised the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination at the UN VI committee. This position was reiterated consistently until 1974. By the early 1960s, Morocco had quietly dropped its claims to parts of Mali and Senegal. The claim to Mauritania was upheld throughout the 1960s, until 1969 when Morocco finally recognised the country as an independent state.[7] As for Algeria, Morocco launched a failed military campaign to take forcefully part of the Algerian western desert in 1963 in what came to be known as the “Sand War”.

After dropping its territorial claims to the other countries, Morocco centred its attention on the then Spanish Sahara. When Spain announced that it would hold a self-determination referendum in the territory by mid 1975, Morocco tried to frustrate the promised referendum. Morocco, who was then joined by Mauritania, requested the UN General Assembly to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 13 December 1974, the General Assembly requested the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on the status of Western Sahara prior to Spanish colonisation, and called on Spain to postpone the referendum. [8]

In its historic advisory opinion on Western Sahara, issued on 16 October 1975, the ICJ very clearly established that there never existed “any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity”. It also endorsed “the decolonisation of Western Sahara” by means of the exercise of “self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory”.[9]

Morocco was hoping that its claim to the territory would be legally endorsed by the ICJ. The advisory opinion, however, dealt a heavy blow to its plans and put the monarchical regime in a very difficult situation. It is significant to note at this point that the rule of King Hassan II of Morocco was challenged by two coup d’état in July 1971 and August 1972. Although the king survived both attempts, the mounting discontent in the country, particularly amid the Moroccan military, made it even more difficult for the monarchy.

Another major element of the historical narrative of Western Sahara was the decolonisation process of the 1960s thanks to which almost all African countries gained their independence form the colonial powers. In the context of this process, the United Nations called on Spain, as early as 1965, to put an end to its colonial domination of the then Spanish Sahara, and to allow its people to exercise their right to self-determination. Obviously, all these elements went against Morocco’s territorial claims to the territory.

Finally, another significant element to take into account was the emergence of the Frente POLISARIO in 1973 as a nationalist and anti-colonial movement representing the Sahrawi people and their collective will to freedom and national independence (Cisteró Bahima and Freixes Sanjuán, 1987: 26; De Piniés, 1990: 62).

In view of the discussion above, it is clear that, by 1975, the monarchy in Morocco was in an increasingly difficult situation and in a dire need for an outlet for its domestic problems. This explains the decision taken by King Hassan II, a few days after the issue of the ICJ ruling, to order a so-called “Green March” of 350,000 Moroccans to “peacefully” march into Western Sahara. Furthermore, by 31 October 1975, Moroccan forces were already advancing and invading the northern part of the territory. Although the “Green March” had been prepared well before the ICJ issued its verdict[10], it was the major event that triggered a set of events that led to the outbreak of the violent conflict in Western Sahara.

The monarchy’s search for a “sacred cause” to divert the attention from its growing domestic problems was therefore the main reason behind Morocco’s decision to invade and annex Western Sahara in 1975 in violation of UN resolutions and the ICJ ruling. Another key factor was clearly Morocco’s increased interest in the abundant natural resources of the territory particularly fish and phosphate. The Cold War geostrategic considerations also had a significant bearing on Morocco’s move into Western Sahara. It is an open secret that, before and after the outbreak of the conflict, Morocco received huge political and military support from major Western powers, particularly the US and France. As some commentators have observed, the support was “an act of political expediency grounded in East–West political alliances” (Franck cited in Mundy, 2006: 291).
In the main, Morocco’s expansionist ideology of the “Greater Morocco” and its political implications on the regional level was the major element that set up the context in which the conflict in Western Sahara emerged and evolved. Other elements have also contributed, in varying degrees, to shaping the conflict context. Conflicts change and their contexts change as well, but it is essential to gain a full understanding of the key elements that constitute the settings in which conflicts emerge in the first place.

Conflict Parties

A key element of conflict analysis is evidently the parties that openly oppose each other and have a direct stake in the outcome of the conflict.

In the case of Western Sahara, the two conflicting parties[11] are: first, the Kingdom of Morocco and mainly the ruling regime that has mobilised the army and security services to carry on its policies and achieve its goals in the conflict. It has also managed to win the support of some political parties and ordinary people for its annexation of Western Sahara. Second, the Frente POLISARIO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people[12], which has equally mobilised its army to carry on the struggle against Morocco. It has moreover gained massive support for its cause among Sahrawis in the territories under Moroccan occupation, in the Sahrawi refugee camps in south-western Algeria and in the diaspora.

As indicated above, the conflict is essentially an international conflict of a political nature between a state and a liberation movement. This fact puts the two parties into a situation of clear asymmetry in terms not only of power and resources but also of international alliances.

The mainly interested parties in the conflict are the two neighbouring countries to Western Sahara, Algeria and Mauritania. Algeria’s interest in the conflict is due to a number of reasons. First, it has always supported the internationally recognised right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination, and has remained faithful to this position. This stance is also reinforced by Algeria’s opposition to the use of force to alter the “borders inherited from colonialism”, a principle sanctioned by the African organisation. Second, Algeria was the only neighbouring country that did not take part in Madrid accords that led to the partition of Western Sahara. Third, it hosts over 150,000 Sahrawi refugees who were driven out of their land because of the Moroccan-Mauritanian invasion of the territory. Fourth, it is interested in the restoration of peace and stability in the whole region. As for Mauritania, which was once claimed by Morocco, its interest lies in its concern for peace and stability of a neighbouring country. This is why the two countries are invited, as “neighbouring countries”, to the UN-sponsored negotiations on the future of Western Sahara.

As indicated earlier, Morocco received huge political and military support from Western powers during and after the Cold War. A key power that has unreservedly supported Morocco is France, which was the only external party that intervened militarily in the war in the 1970s on the Moroccan-Mauritanian side. Moreover, it has played a crucial role at the Security Council in support of Morocco’s position.[13]

Another key party is Spain, the former colonial power of Western Sahara and the de jure administering power of the territory. Many observers have indicated that now the US and France may hold the key to resolving the conflict given their close ties with Morocco and their influence at the Security Council. However, Spain still has legal obligations towards Western Sahara and its people ensuing from its failure to decolonise the territory in line with the UN doctrine. According to Ruiz Miguel (2008), Spain is still under the obligation to observe, respect and promote the right to self-determination of the people of the territory and to maintain the separate and distinct character of the latter with a view to avoiding any obstacle to the future self-determination.[14] Yet, all Spanish successive governments have failed to assume their responsibilities vis-à-vis the decolonisation of Western Sahara. Furthermore, the current Socialist-led Spanish government has been lately engaged in diplomatic actions that, despite their rhetoric, have only complicated the situation and cast more doubts over Spain’s role as an impartial facilitator in the conflict resolution process.

Other third parties include the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union) and the United Nations that intervened, at different stages of the conflict, to settle the dispute.

Causes and Core Issues of the Conflict

After identifying the primary parties, the analysis will now focus on determining the causes that underlie the conflict and the core issues around which it has developed, and then how they are perceived and articulated by the two parties. Without doubt, identifying the causes of a certain conflict helps us both to understand the nature of the conflict and to deal with it.

The root causes of any given conflict are typically the situations and factors that make a social conflict escalate and reach varying degrees of violence. Conflicts are obviously never mono-causal, but are underpinned by a variety of causes that dynamically interact over the span of the conflict.

My focus however will be on what I consider the structural causes of the conflict in Western Sahara. By structural causes, I mean the “underlying reasons” of the violent conflict that set the global context in which the parties interact, pursue their goals and use the means to achieve them. As outlined above, the structural direct cause of the conflict in Western Sahara is thus Morocco’s military invasion and annexation of the territory in 1975, which provoked resistance on the part of the Sahrawi people under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO. This situation has led to more than 16 years of outright war and so far other 17 years of war, but by other means.

Goals of the Parties

To understand the nature of the conflict, it is also important to identify the goals of the conflict parties, or their desirable outcomes of the conflict, and to place these issues within the context of the dispute.

In analysing the goals of the parties, it is also useful to make a distinction between their positions and interests, where the first describes the specific demands publicly articulated by the disputants, and the second refers to the underlying needs that drive them.

Positions of the parties

In any conflict situation, the goals of the parties and the way in which they articulate them (positions) are typically described as diametric opposites. As regards the conflict in question, Morocco’s recourse to violence (in the form of invasion and forced annexation) was prompted, first, by its intention to recover what it perceived as a “despoiled” land, and then (in the face of the Sahrawi resistance) to defend the “territorial integrity” of the Kingdom. By contrast, the goal of the Frente POLISARIO is to defend the country (over which Morocco has no legal sovereignty) and liberate it from foreign occupation as a prerequisite for the Sahrawi people to be able to exercise their internationally recognised and inalienable right to self-determination.

The positions of the conflicting parties are usually framed in the form of either a status-quo maintaining or status-quo changing (Sandole, 2007). In this case, Morocco intends to maintain its de facto control of the territory, although no country or international organisation recognises de jure this situation. In contrast, the Frente POLISARIO is engaged in status-quo changing by seeking to put an end to the occupation and institute an independent state as a result of a self-determination referendum.

Interests of the parties

Whilst positions are articulated in visible forms and could be assessed objectively, needs and interests are subjective and hence hard to gauge accurately. However, this does not mean that these self-perceived elements cannot be analysed, but any analysis requires some caution. Caution is essential, not least in the case of third parties that seek to intervene to help settle a given conflict. This is because they have to take into account the parties’ own needs instead of imposing their visions of those needs on the parties.

Unlike the parties’ positions, interests refer to the desires, concerns and fears that underlie those positions. Many theorists contrast interests with positions (Fisher, Ury and Patton, 1991: 40). It is suggested that when framed in terms of positions, conflicts often appear to be highly intractable, since one party may want something that the other party diametrically opposes. It is also argued that redefining the conflict situation in terms of the reasons that underlie the parties’ positions may enable the parties to identify win-win solutions.

Some conflict theorists combine the concepts of interests and needs. However, human needs theorists distinguish between the two, arguing that one of the primary causes of intractable conflicts is people’s unyielding drive to meet their unmet needs on the individual, group and societal level (Northrup, 1989). Interests in this sense may represent tangible things that could be traded and bargained for, whereas needs are intangible things such as identity, security and recognition, which cannot be compromised. Human needs theorists, however, argue that, although needs cannot be traded, they could be addressed in a generally win-win situation (Rothman, 1997) that is beneficial to the parties concerned.

In terms of the conflict in question, the main concern for the Moroccan Kingdom is to preserve the monarchical establishment itself and to sustain its nationalist prestige and, in part, its legitimacy that has inextricably been linked with the issue of Western Sahara. Another key concern lies in maintaining the individual and collective interests of other shareholders that have big stakes in the conflict. These include the military establishment of which bulk is stationed in Western Sahara, and the political and business class that form part of the Makhzen system. [15]

As far as the Sahrawis are concerned, it is their collective feeling that their national identity is being attacked and denied by the Moroccan state that has prompted their involvement in the conflict in the first place. For them, Morocco does not only claim their land, but also denies the existence of a Sahrawi people. The translation of this denial in the realm of politics was the bombardment of Sahrawi civilians with napalm and white phosphorus in 1975, and the scorched-earth policy pursued by Moroccan occupying forces in Western Sahara. It is also reflected in the various forms of violence practiced nowadays against civilians in the territories under Morocco’s occupation, and the deliberate destruction of Sahrawi cultural heritage.

Some commentators describe the conflict in Western Sahara as the case of two nationalisms pitted against each other. However, unlike the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where two national identities fight for establishing themselves on the same land, the Moroccan-Sahrawi conflict was originally triggered by a ruling elite making use of an ultranationalist ideology for rallying support for its cause. It is true that the official discourse of the Moroccan regime about the “morrocanity” of Western Sahara has been embraced and widely diffused by all state apparatuses to the extent that it has purportedly become the first national cause. Yet the realties on the ground demonstrate that, notwithstanding the timid opening taking place under the new king, the question of Western Sahara is still the exclusive domain of the ruling elite. It is little wonder bearing in mind the incalculable consequences that a possible solution to this question may have on the existence of the monarchy itself.

It is this context of confrontation of interests and needs that has largely shaped the way in which the parties have related to each other, which has been characterised by a great deal of hostility and suspicion mainly during the violent stage of the conflict. Even though the feelings of enmity may have been lessened following the cease-fire of 1991, suspicion is still there especially after Morocco unilaterally backed out from the mutually agreed and UN-sanctioned agreements. The persistence of human rights violations in the territories under Moroccan occupation has also sparked strong feelings of resentment and rejection amid Sahrawi population. If these violations continue, they may lead to further violence, and the situation may slide again into the spiral of violent conflict.

Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1990:282) have suggested that when conflicts escalate, the aggressor, rather than taking the blame itself, tends to place the blame on the victim because it challenges its aggression. By doing this, the aggressor shapes its own reality and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that the victim is malevolent. A prime example of this behaviour is the Moroccan official and media discourse that repeatedly describes the Frente POLISARIO as a “secessionist movement” in order to justify its aggressive conduct.

The search for a mutually negotiated solution to the conflict would primarily require restoration of trust between the two conflicting parties. This may involve attempts to break the psychological barriers, which have been erected in the course of the conflict, through incremental confidence-building measures (CBMs). A few initiatives have been made in this regard including, for instance, visits by Moroccan journalists to the Sahrawi refugee camps, and the publication in some Moroccan newspapers of interviews and articles penned by Sahrawi activists and officials of the Frente POLISARIO. The United Nations has also been engaged in a series of CBMs and it is willing to expand those measures, but Morocco is still unwilling to accept the proposed arrangements.[16]

Conflict Dynamics

Conflict is “something ever-changing, ever dynamic” (Galtung, 1996:89). Even if the parties are at a stalemate, aspects of the conflict context keep on shifting. Moreover, the ways in which the parties respond to conflict and the means by which they attempt to achieve their goals influence and direct the course of the conflict. The action of one party determines to some extent the responding action of the other party, and it is this action-reaction pattern that typically shapes conflict dynamics.

As outlined above, the “Green March” and the subsequent invasion by Moroccan forces of the northern parts of Western Sahara in October 1975 were “triggering events” that marked the start of the manifest conflict between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO.

Since its beginning, the conflict witnessed a rapid escalation of violence with destructive consequences for both parties. However, by the early 1980s, the intensity of the conflict was reduced due to the construction of the Moroccan defensive walls (the berm) and the huge cost that Morocco was incurring to continue the war. By that time, the two parties came to realise that neither side was able to achieve a military solution to the conflict. This situation provoked a stalemate, which gave the Organisation of African Unity (now the African Union) and the United Nations an opportunity to intervene by brokering a peace deal that the two parties accepted. With the entry into force of the UN-supervised cease-fire in September 1991, which is still in place, the violent conflict was completely de-escalated. This de-escalation phase, which some would describe as one of “no war, no peace”, is what prevails now and no one is certain of what it may lead to. Will it lead to a final solution, the continuation of the status quo, or, what is worse, the resumption of hostilities? This question cannot be easily answered.

Possibilities for Solution

In the context of the previous discussion, I will now outline the prospects for resolving the conflict and the possibilities to which they may lead. I will mention these possibilities in an order of likelihood.

1. In my view[17], it seems more likely now that the impasse will continue for some time. Given the already known positions of the two parties and the lack of interest by the key powers in the Security Council to press for any solution to this low intensity conflict, there seems to be no way out in the near future. The status quo is likely to continue for many months or years to come. Obviously, the maintenance of the status quo has thus far benefited Morocco, which continues to control three-quarters of Western Sahara, whilst seeking to obtain international recognition for its de facto annexation of the territory.

2. Another possibility is that the two parties engage in direct negotiations in good faith, without preconditions, to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution as requested by the Security Council in its latest resolutions on Western Sahara. However, given the history of negotiations between the two parties, where agreements were concluded and sanctioned by the UN and then violated with impunity by Morocco, negotiations may not lead to any substantive results unless new factors are brought into play.

2.1. Among these factors may be the intensification of the Sahrawi peaceful uprising in the occupied territories that began in May 2005, which may make the situation much harder for Morocco, compelling it then to consider negotiating for a settlement. However, it is still too early to assess what impact the uprising may have on the situation in Morocco in the long run.

2.2. Another related factor is the possibility of drastic internal changes taking place in one side that may compel it to go to the negotiating table. What happened in Indonesia in 1998 in relation to the case of East Timor is an example of how significant changes in one camp could lead to the settlement of a protracted conflict.

2.3. Another important factor, which has until now been clearly absent, is a stronger involvement by the UN in the resolution of the conflict and a greater interest by key powers in exerting considerable pressure on Morocco to allow the self-determination referendum to take place. For the UN to engage very actively in the issue it may have to resort to Chapter VII of its Charter, which provides for enforcement measures. However, it is very likely that France will oppose any resolution imposing an unfavourable solution on Morocco.

3. Another possibility is that the two parties voluntarily, with or without the assistance of the UN, reach a mutually agreed arrangement leading to a just, lasting, and viable solution consistent with international legality. For this to happen, however, it requires a genuine political will on the part of the elite currently ruling in Morocco that has not yet showed any interest in any solution, not least in the context of international legality and norms.
4. Lastly, should all these factors fail to bring about a solution to the conflict, the likelihood of active hostilities between the two parties would be greater. Obviously, the resumption of violent conflict in Western Sahara will be in nobody’s interest, and it is certain that it will be a source of extreme instability not only in northwest Africa but also in the whole Mediterranean region.

Conclusion

The discussion above has made it clear that the direct, structural cause that underlies the ongoing conflict in Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO is Morocco’s military invasion and annexation of the territory in 1975. The origins of this action, however, lie in the expansionist ideology of the “Greater Morocco” and the subsequent territorial claims that the Moroccan regime has laid on its neighbours. As expected, Morocco’s military invasion provoked a reaction and resistance on the part of the Sahrawi people led by the Frente POLISARIO.

This situation has led to a protracted conflict that has lasted for over three decades, which continues to pose a potential danger for stability and security in the entire region of North Africa. Despite the successive efforts of the international community to resolve the conflict, a mutually agreed solution remains elusive. Yet, for the peoples of the region to achieve their aspirations to integration, development and peace, a rapid, just and sustainable solution to the conflict has become more urgent than ever.

In this context, I believe that a peaceful, just and lasting solution to conflict in Western Sahara necessarily entails the exercise by the Sahrawi people of their internationally recognised and inalienable right to self-determination through a negotiated, democratic and free process that is consistent with international legality and norms. In this process, they could decide their political future, either to be independent, integrate into Morocco or settle for another arrangement. In any case, the final word should be theirs.

I also believe that the success of the UN-led negotiation process will depend not only on the political will on both sides to achieve a mutually acceptable solution consistent with international legality, but also on their ability to think seriously about their relations in the post-conflict context. This process of cooperative thinking will imply, among other things, determining the mutual guarantees in all vital areas, which each party would be willing to grant to the other with a view to achiving not only a win-win solution, but also one that will address the core issues around which the conflict has developed. The proposal presented by the Frente Polisario to the UN in April 2007 contains significant elements to be considered in this regard. What is needed, therefore, is not only a settlement of the conflict that addresses the publically articulated positions of the parties, bus also a transformaion of the root conflict in the first place. In other words, what is needed is a solution that does not only end the hostilities but also seeks to address the structural causes of the violent conflict in order to create the underlying conditions for a sustainable peace in the whole region.

Notas
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[1] Since its independence in 1956, Morocco has had five constitutions promulgated respectively in 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996.
[2] Many works have been written about the authoritarian nature of the monarchical system in Morocco. One important historical study on this subject is done by the Moroccan scholar, Abdellah Hammoudi’s, in his book Master and Disciple: the Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism (University of Chicago Press, 1997).
[3] Patricia Campbell “Morocco in Transition: Overcoming the Democratic and Human Rights Legacy of King Hassan II”. African Studies Quarterly 7, no. 1, , accessed 2 March 2004.
[4] Because of its repressive history, Morocco has often been listed among the world’s most repressive regimes. See, for instance, “Freedom in the World 2003: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties”, A Special Report to the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 2003.
[5] On 7 July 1956, the Istiqlal daily newspaper, Al Alam, published a map of the “Greater Morocco”, and a month later, the expansionist policy was endorsed by the party’s congress.
[6] In 1957, a new department was created at the Moroccan Interior Ministry called “General Directorate for Saharan and Frontier Affairs” and a cousin of Allal el-Fassi, Abdelkebir, was named head of the department (Pazzanita, 2006).
[7] On 8 June 1970, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed in Casablanca between Morocco and Mauritania.
[8] GA resolution 3292 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974.
[9] ICJ (1975) Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975, ICJ 12ICJ, < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum = 323&code = sa&p1 = 3&p2 = 4&case = 61&k = 69&p3 = 5>, accessed 20 November 2008.
[10] In August 1975, two months before the ICJ issued its ruling, King Hassan II stated that “whatever the result, Morocco will recover its rights over its despoiled provinces no later than toward the end of this year” (quoted in Hodges, 1983: 207).
[11] Mauritania joined Morocco in invading and partitioning Western Sahara by virtue of Madrid accords of 14 November 1975. However, in 1979, it formally abandoned its claim to Western Sahara, and signed a peace agreement with the Frente POLISARIO. Morocco immediately moved to annex the portion previously claimed by Mauritania.
[12] See, for instance, A/RES/34/37 of 21 November 1979.
[13] The Frente POLISARIO publicly voiced great concern about France’s position at the Security Council in April 2008, which rejected any reference to human rights in the Council’s resolution on Western Sahara. The position was described as “contrary to the international community’s efforts for peace in the region.” , accessed 14 July 2009.
[14] See Carlos Ruiz Miguel (2008): “Spain’s Legal Obligations as Administering Power of Western Sahara” a paper delivered at the International Conference on Multilateralism and International Law, with Western Sahara as a Case Study, Pretoria, South Africa (4- 5 December 2008), , accessed 20 July 2009.
[15] Makhzen is a specific form of authority that is present throughout the governing class in Morocco with the king as its linchpin, and it is considered the “power behind the throne”.
[16] One case in point was the reluctance of the Moroccan delegation to discuss and accept the package of CBMs proposed during the UN-sponsored negotiations held in Manhasset last year.
[17] Similar views were expressed in my article Omar, Sidi M. (2008): “The Right to Self-determination and the Indigenous People of Western Sahara”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21-1, 41-57.

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Source: http://www.gees.org/articulo/6705/

Extract from President Obama speech before the UN General Assembly 2009

...This Assembly’s Charter commits each of us -- and I quote -- "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." Among those rights is the freedom to speak your mind and worship as you please; the promise of equality of the races, and the opportunity for women and girls to pursue their own potential; the ability of citizens to have a say in how you are governed, and to have confidence in the administration of justice. For just as no nation should be forced to accept the tyranny of another nation, no individual should be forced to accept the tyranny of their own people. (Applause.)

As an African American, I will never forget that I would not be here today without the steady pursuit of a more perfect union in my country. And that guides my belief that no matter how dark the day may seem, transformative change can be forged by those who choose to side with justice. And I pledge that America will always stand with those who stand up for their dignity and their rights -- for the student who seeks to learn; the voter who demands to be heard; the innocent who longs to be free; the oppressed who yearns to be equal.

Democracy cannot be imposed on any nation from the outside. Each society must search for its own path, and no path is perfect. Each country will pursue a path rooted in the culture of its people and in its past traditions. And I admit that America has too often been selective in its promotion of democracy. But that does not weaken our commitment; it only reinforces it. There are basic principles that are universal; there are certain truths which are self-evident -- and the United States of America will never waver in our efforts to stand up for the right of people everywhere to determine their own destiny. (Applause.)

Philippe Mora opens his diary

I was in Sydney’s Chinatown, enjoying delicious steamed lobster with ginger and attending the recent Film Festival, when I got a dramatic phone call. An old friend and cameraman for three of my films, Carlos Gonzalez, was calling from Los Angeles to say that a West Saharan woman, Fetim, from Tindouf refugee camp in Algeria, was flying in to Sydney to denounce a film portraying her as a slave. Carlos was a friend of Fetim, and he asked me would I meet her at the airport. He said the family was very distressed at the allegations and felt betrayed by the Australian film-makers who had lived with them on the pretext they were making a documentary about a family reunion.

Frankly, after decades of battles I have issue fatigue. But I knew Carlos had impeccable credentials on this issue, known as the Forgotten Conflict. He had risked his life in 2006 to go into occupied Western Sahara to film interviews with indigenous children who had been allegedly tortured by the Moroccan occupiers. (Morocco had invaded in 1975.) He was arrested and interrogated for eight hours on 3 June 2006 by Moroccan police and intelligence officers, including the notorious alleged torturer Mohammed El Hassouni, known as ‘Moustache’. He was then promptly deported and denounced in the Moroccan press, to our great amusement, but not to his, as being a spy for Hugo Chavez and Mossad. Since I knew he was neither but a director of children’s shows for Nickelodeon in Hollywood and a generally standup fellow, I agreed to help his incoming ‘slave’ friends.

Fetim and her husband Baba arrived chainless early in the morning and I greeted them with Kamal Fadel, the Australian representative of the Polisario, the political organisation that had flown them out. Charismatic, smart and open, I immediately liked Kamal and his two guests. Slaves with passports! They headed for friends in Glebe, where all slaves hang out when they’re in Sydney.

Then the whole thing blew up. Fetim’s dramatic denunciation of the film Stolen that night at the festival ended up on the front page of the Sydney Morning Herald. The ABC’s 7.30 Report went after the flaws in the film. Stolen received a barrage of blistering criticism for mistranslations, re-enactments, lack of releases from leading participants, Mondo Cane-type sensationalism, blurring of facts, maps and history. One of the film-makers’ aunts vigorously defended the film on blogs. Meanwhile I had re-connected with old mate, wit, great writer and political connoisseur, Bob Ellis, and as an unlikely Poirot and Sherlock Holmes duo we made some inquiries. An angry UN interviewee cried foul at the film, as did a key translator. Ellis and I exchanged opinions on the film way too rude, if not obscene, for publication in this august magazine. The Morocco-Polisario conflict underlying the debate was not a left-right debate as the film-maker’s aunt tried to make out. In fact, James Baker, no pinko, had tried to help the Polisario with vigour in the Nineties.

Producer Tom Zubrycki announced people were trying to ‘do a job’ on the film. He backed out of an interview with me. We met tyro filmmakers Dan Fallshaw and Violeta Ayala in a bar and complained the problem was that people were jealous of them, that Ellis had fought with his wife (sic), that slavery is a state of mind, and other irrelevant inanities. Ellis, like a cultural Grim Reaper, said to Fallshaw, who blanched: ‘You are going to jail, son.’

The story continued last week when a revamped version, with piquant deletions, was shown at the Melbourne International Film Festival with a disclaimer belatedly added by co-financier Screen Australia. Questions about whether Polisario-haters in Morocco contributed funding to the film remain unanswered.

Other serious queries remain about this film, and as a sometime documentary film-maker I maintain that fakery and fraud, if that is what this is, hurts us all as film-makers, journalists and film-goers. It’s my opinion, for example, that it is either dishonesty, negligence or incompetence not to get releases from people one is portraying in a film making such grave allegations. I am no saint, but certain standards should be de rigueur. Perhaps there was acute First World arrogance in this situation. A few Australians pontificating about alleged slavery and really hurting people in the guise of helping them is a bit rich. An Italian NGO in the camp described Ayala as a ‘mythomaniac’.

By contrast, a recent positive highlight was vicariously going into orbit and repairing the Hubble telescope. My wife Pamela and I met six of the astronauts who fixed it in May at a special event at the Academy in Beverly Hills. The astronaut film-makers took up 30 cameras including an IMAX 3D camera that could only film for eight minutes. At a mission cost of US$1.1 billion to fix the Hubble, the eight-minute film element must be the most expensive movie ever made. The bemused astronauts, dressed in Jetsons-style retro blue overalls, mingled with us Hollywood types over drinks and snacks. We watched extraordinary footage of the mission with the jubilation of being in space popping out of the screen.

I am working on a 3D film about the life of Salvador Dali with producer Fred Bestall of Delux Films in Luxembourg, so I am immersed in notions of surrealism. I don’t think one needs to contrive surrealism because arguably life itself is often surreal. A Daliesque thought: perhaps molecules from the hands of refugees on my hand rubbed off on the Hubble mission astronaut’s hand? The Hubble is searching for the origin of the universe, the refugees search for justice and food for their children. Do these connections mean anything or are they random events? Is all this surreal? Dali himself said: ‘I don’t do drugs. I am drugs!’
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Source: http://www.spectator.co.uk/australia/5289343/diary.thtml

Western Sahara’s "Wall of Shame"

How the longest active military wall continues to divide the Saharawi people
By Timothy Kustusch — Special to GlobalPost
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ARABUNI CAMP, Algeria — It is almost half the size of the Great Wall of China, four times the length of the wall in the West Bank, and 16 times longer than the Berlin Wall ever was, but few have heard of the 1,600-mile-long Moroccan military wall that divides the Western Sahara.

On the western side of the wall, Morocco exerts de facto control over what the Saharawis call the “Occupied Territories.” On the eastern side, the Saharawis’ Polisario Front governs and maintains its military forces.

The Saharawis refer to the Moroccan barrier as the “Wall of Shame,” not only because it divides the 160,000 Saharawi refugees in Algeria from their families and friends in the Moroccan held territory, but also because it threatens the lives and livelihoods of the thousands of Saharawi nomads that still wander through the Western Sahara’s deserts.

Construction of the wall began in 1980. Since 1975, the Saharawi People’s Liberation Army (ALPS) had been battling the Moroccan and Mauritanian armies (until the latter’s defeat in 1979), using lightning-strike guerrilla tactics that exhausted their adversaries’ traditional armies.

In the face of ALPS victories, the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) began work on a long barrier of simple sand embankments meant to slow down the fast-moving Saharawi soldiers. Between 1980 and 1987, five heavily fortified walls were added to the east and south, completely cutting off the Saharawi soldiers and refugees from their home cities, such as Layoune and Smara.

A desert party near Timbuktu Today, despite a ceasefire signed in 1991, both parties actively patrol their respective sides of the wall. Along the western side, Morocco maintains about 160,000 troops, reinforced by heavy military installations every seven miles, which include radar, artillery and tanks.

The Polisario refuses to cite the number of units that patrol its seven military regions on the eastern side of the wall, claiming that if war is resumed, all Saharawis will come to the front lines to fight.

From afar, the Moroccan military wall appears to be a sandy hill with a few helmeted soldiers peering over the top. A more accurate depiction, however, is given by Hamdi, a 24-year-old Saharawi from Layoune who crossed the wall on foot in 2007 to escape imprisonment by Moroccan police for his pro-independence activities:

"First, I cross a small ditch, about one meter deep and one meter across. Then I arrive at a low wall of rocks. These rocks are loose, so when you try cross the berm, they fall and make noise, so the soldiers come. Then there is other, much bigger trench. When I climb out of that, I cross last wall of sand and rock, which is more than two meters up. I pull myself over, jump down to other side, jump over big barbed wire fence, and run across live field of mines in black of night. I am very afraid of step on mines, but I think, ‘If I make it this far, I have to trust Allah that I make it through the field of mines alive.’”

Hamdi is one of thousands of Saharawis who have crossed the wall to flee the Moroccan police and escape to the refugee camps outside of Tindouf, Algeria. Most cross the wall at night with a handful of belongings, a bag of dates, and a few liters of water. After traversing the barrier, they often must spend days walking through the desert before reaching a group of nomads or a Saharawi military company that will take them to the camps.

Of course, that is only if they survive the nighttime trek across the field of anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines. Though the exact number of mines on the eastern side of the wall is unknown, estimates range from one million to over 10 million, and the U.N. consistently ranks the Western Sahara as one of the top 10 territories most contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordinances (UXOs).

In April, the true threat of these mines became very real for more than 1,200 international visitors who were participating in an annual protest march in front of the berm. During the protest, a group of young Saharawis charged towards the Moroccan soldiers on the other side of the wall, hurling both rocks and insults. A 19-year-old charged forward, and although others tried to restrain the youth, he stepped on a mine and blew off his right foot, injuring four others.

A desert party near Timbuktu “You have all seen in a very tangible way how easily Morocco’s wall can convert human life into death,” said Abdelkadar Taleb Omar, a senior member of the Polisario, the following day.

Muhamed Abdelaziz, the secretary general of the Polisario Front, expressed his desire for U.S. President Barack Obama to press Morocco to dismantle its wall, calling it a “grave violation of human rights.”

For the Saharawi people, however, the Western Saharan conflict is shrouded by another wall — what they refer to as “a media blockade.” The Saharawis insist that their decades-old conflict is painfully underreported in the international media. They say that until this media wall is torn down and the international community becomes interested in the Western Saharan conflict, it is likely that Morocco’s 1,600-mile berm will remain standing.

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Source: http://mobile.globalpost.com/dispatch/africa/090808/western-saharas-wall-shame

Por fin un juez se atreve a investigar un crimen de la monarquía marroquí

Es un hecho que la monarquía marroquí tiene un record impresionante de crímenes y violaciones de derechos humanos. Y es igualmente un hecho que el gobierno de Rodríguez Zapatero aplica la "doctrina Moratinos" que se puede formular así: "España debe aceptar cualquier cosa que no ponga en peligro a la tiranía alauita" (ellos dicen simplemente "la monarquía"). Ahora por fin un juez decide tirar del hilo de los crímenes de la monarquía marroquí. Pero ese juez no es el intrépido Garzón. Es un juez francés.

I. LOS CRÍMENES DE HASSÁN II, UN HECHO YA INDISCUTIBLE...

Que la monarquía marroquí es responsable de crímenes y violaciones de derechos humanos no lo digo yo. Lo ha reconocido, nada más y nada menos que Mohamed VI, que montó una llamada "Instancia Equidad y Reconciliación" que se ha dedicado a conceder indemnizaciones a las víctimas de las violaciones de derechos humanos cometidas por su padre, Hassán II, de quien cuando vivía se decían las mismas cosas que ahora se dicen sobre su hijo: Marruecos se está "modernizando", se hacen importantes "reformas", etc., etc.
De momento, eso sí, no hay creada ninguna instancia para indemnizar a las violaciones de derechos humanas provocadas por Mohamed VI. Habrá que esperar a que llegue al trono su sucesor y nuevamente se repita la historia: el "joven" rey será moderno, amante de España, reformista, etc.

II. ... PERO EL CRIMEN MÁS IMPORTANTE SIGUE SIN SER RECONOCIDO

Pero el hecho es que los crímenes de la monarquía marroquí se han reconocido... al menos en parte.
Y digo en parte porque el crimen cualitativamente más importante de la época de Hassán II fue el asesinato del principal opositor a la monarquía, Mehdi Ben Barka.
¿Por qué?
Dos son las razones.
La primera y más importante, es que a diferencia de los demás crímenes que se consumaron en el territorio marroquí, ese crimen se cometió en Francia y con la complicidad, activa o pasiva, del gobierno y los servicios secretos franceses.
La segunda razón es que Ben Barka fue el gran líder carismático que, de no morir, habría conseguido que Marruecos fuera una república.

III. UN JUEZ FRANCÉS HACE LO QUE GARZÓN NO SE ATREVIÓ A HACER

En su día en España se presentó una querella ante el juez Garzón contra Hassán II, entonces reinante, por el genocidio del pueblo saharaui. El "valiente" juez Garzón archivó la querella.
Mucho tiempo después, ya muerto Hassán II, se ha presentado otra querella contra sus principales esbirros que Garzón admitió pero que, una vez admitida, se halla durmiendo el sueño de los justos.
Pero hay un juez en Francia más valiente que Garzón. Se llama Patrick Ramael y está investigando el asesinato de Ben Barka. He escrito "investigando". Lo repito, "investigando". Vamos, algo serio. Y ha ordenado detener al máximo responsable de la Gendarmería marroquí. A un individuo al que el gobierno de Rodríguez Zapatero, el "progresista", concedió la máxima condecoración del Estado Español, la Gran Cruz de Isabel la Católica.
La noticia la ha dado en España El País y en Francia Le Monde. Reproduzco íntegramente la noticia de El País, que considero muy importante, aunque la de Le Monde y la Agencia France Presse contiene otros detalles que también son muy relevantes.

Interpol ordena detener al jefe de la Gendarmería de Marruecos

IGNACIO CEMBRERO - Madrid - 01/10/2009

Interpol ha emitido una orden de detención internacional contra el general Hosni Bensliman, de 74 años, jefe de la Gendarmería de Marruecos, según fuentes judiciales francesas. Bensliman es el militar con la más alta graduación y uno de los pilares del régimen monárquico.

Bensliman es reclamado por el juez instructor francés Patrick Ramaël en el marco de la investigación que lleva a cabo sobre el secuestro y posterior asesinato, en París en octubre 1965, del izquierdista marroquí Mehdi Ben Barka. Después de haber sido profesor del rey Hassan II fue su opositor más acérrimo.
La organización policial pidió también el arresto del general Abdelhak Kadiri, ex jefe del servicio secreto exterior marroquí, y sus ex agentes Miloud Tounzi y Abdelhak Achaachi. Tounzi habría formado parte del comando que perpetró el secuestro y Achaachi pertenecía a una unidad de elite del servicio secreto.

Ramaël firmó las cuatro órdenes de detención en octubre de 2007, pero el Ministerio de Justicia francés ha tardado dos años en cursarlas a Interpol. Normalmente el procedimiento no dura más de cinco días. El juez francés esperó a la primera visita del presidente Nicolas Sarkozy a Marruecos, en octubre de 2007, para revelar a la prensa que acababa de firmar los mandatos.

Tras la difusión de la orden de Interpol será difícil que Bensliman viaje al extranjero sin ser detenido. Estuvo en Madrid a finales de enero, formando parte de una delegación ministerial marroquí, y se reunió con el ministro de Interior, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba. Teóricamente debería incluso ser detenido en su propio país, que es miembro de Interpol, pero es harto improbable que suceda.

La Asociación Marroquí de Derechos Humanos publicó en 2001 una lista de 44 miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad, entre los que estaba Bensliman, que presuntamente torturaron durante los llamados "años de plomo" del reinado de Hassan II. La lista fue elaborada partiendo de los testimonios de las víctimas.

El Consejo de Ministros español condecoró a Bensliman, en enero de 2005, con la Gran Cruz de Isabel la Católica en vísperas de la visita de los Reyes de España a Marruecos. La iniciativa dejó atónitas a las asociaciones de defensa de los derechos humanos.

IV. MOHAMED VI TIENE SU CASO BEN BARKA EN ESPAÑA: ¿SE INVESTIGARÁ?

Por fin un juez se atreve a investigar un crimen de la monarquía marroquí. Pero eso ocurre en Francia.
En España, sin embargo, existe una asignatura pendiente. "Nuestro" caso Ben Barka. El 4 de agosto de 2004, fue asesinado de un disparo en la cabeza Hicham Mandari, en un parking cerca de Mijas (Málaga). Opositor y asesinado fuera de Marruecos.
Hicham Mandari era, en ese momento el enemigo político nº 1 de Mohamed VI. Para comprobarlo basta leer la última entrevista concedida por Hicham Mandari antes de ser asesinado (El Mundo, 24-IX-2009). Allí dijo cosas como éstas:

Pregunta.– Asegura que ha salido victorioso de un proceso judicial que le enfrentaba a Marruecos. ¿A qué se debe tal proceso y cuáles fueron las consecuencias?
Respuesta.– El proceso fue iniciado por Palacio, en nombre de Mohamed VI, por unas sumas de dinero que cogí antes de salir de Marruecos. De este modo, al bloquearme financieramente, contaban con obligarme a regresar a Marruecos.

P.– ¿A qué se debe su enemistad con el rey?
R.- (...) Por eso se creó el Consejo Nacional de Marroquíes Libres (CNML, partido de oposición fundado por Mandari en 2003). Su primera carta fundacional era muy dura, porque exigía que el Rey hiciese las maletas. Salma Benani [esposa de Mohamed VI desde marzo de 2002] no puede seguir dirigiendo el país. El es como un muñequito en sus manos...
(...)
P.– ¿Qué relación mantiene con la clase política francesa?
R.– Conozco a todos los ministros franceses. Conozco muy bien a Jacques Chirac. (...)Por lo que a Chirac se refiere, hacía de intermediario para él antes de que fuese presidente. Puedo decirle que he buscado dinero y contribuciones para financiar sus campanas electorales. (...)También sé muchas cosas sobre otros políticos, como Charles Pasqua [ex ministro del Interior con Jacques Chirac y Edouard Baladour] y Jean Pierre Chevènement [ex ministro del Interior con Lionel Jospin]. Incluso inicié un proceso contra este último en EEUU. Lo más bonito de EEUU es que puedes atacar a cualquiera, si tienes pruebas. Y yo tengo pruebas de que Chevènement es y fue siempre un político corrupto. Por ejemplo, recibía financiación de Marruecos, un país por el que siente un gran amor.
(...)
P.– ¿De dónde venía el dinero?
R.– Mire, he escapado a cuatro intentos de asesinato...
(...)
P.– Dicen que tiene en su poder documentos comprometedores para la Familia Real. ¿De qué se trata?
R.– Tengo grabaciones de vídeo y de audio que diversas empresas efectuaron para mí y que están clasificadas como secreto de defensa por EEUU. Lo que más me dolió fue ver a mis medio hermanas comportarse como auténticas putas. Ver el dinero de Marruecos dilapidado en Courchevel [estación de esquí y balneario en Francia donde el rey tiene una residencia]. Si el pueblo supiese que el rey está de vacaciones cuando toda la gente cree que está en el reino... El rey dispone de 38.000 millones de dólares en diversas cuentas colocadas en diferentes lugares de todo el mundo. Es vomitivo.

Hasta donde yo sé, el asesinato de Mandari no ha quedado aclarado. Hasta donde yo sé, la "justicia" española no está investigando el asunto.
Hasta donde yo sé.
Porque quizá el asunto está muy claro. Tan claro como para que los culpables no hayan sido condenados.

Sahrawis Need Bargaining Power

By: Abdelmajid

Manhasset rounds of talks between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front have produced little progress as to the peaceful resolution of the conflict of Western Sahara. New changes and positions emanating from the UN mediation and from the influential powers could create new hope. The ¨small talks¨ be held between a limited number of negotiators in a kept secret location in Vienna have replaced the well publicized meetings of Manhasset, New York. But little has occurred in the positions of the parties first concerned. Should we expect a magic touch that will bring Morocco to respect the will of the international community? Or should we read progress carefully as it occur. Yes, I am also from Missouri.

The appointment of Christopher Ross, as the new UN Envoy for Western Sahara, coincided with the inauguration of the Obama Administration. All over the world, peoples have their eyes fixed on any signals from Washington, which can make a dramatic change in their lives. The people of Western Sahara welcomed the change in Washington, for the Bush Administration was too obsessed by its “anti-terrorist” fight. In its last two terms, the Bush Administration stopped only short from recognizing Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara. It has encouraged Morocco to invent its miraculous solution of autonomy as a substitute to the carrying out of International Law, under UN supervision in Western Sahara. Washington threatened several times the Sahrawis against any resumption of hostilities in the face of Moroccan intransigent attitude. The appointment of Christopher Ross, an Arabist, familiar with the conflict, and the coming into office of an African-American to the White House news that could create a new momentum for a peaceful solution to the conflict. A hand off attitude from Obama is not enough in this conflict that has plagued the region for so long, created unnecessary suffering for the people and paralyzed the function of the Maghreb union for sometimes, delayed many development opportunities of the people of the Maghreb.
Last month, following a second visit to the region by Christopher Ross, UN Envoy for Western Sahara, the Sahrawis and their allies questioned what the mediator achieved since his last visit, and what are his plans and his strategy to move forward? During his public appearances in the capitals of the Maghreb, Ross talked about the need to resolve “the fundamental issue” and to seek ways to proceed forward. He also referred to self-determination for the Sahrawi people, as well as to relevant Security Council resolutions. During his first visit, there were noticeable gaps in his diplomatic itinerary: Ross stopped short of visiting Addis Ababa and Nouakchott. In regards to the Mauritanian capital, he left it out of his schedule due to the absence of an interlocutor.
After an eclipse of three long months, he reappeared on June 24, in the Algerian capital, the first stop during his second visit to the region. He assured everyone that his mission is on the “right track”, reaffirming his determination to continue searching for a solution to the "big conflict”. This time, Ross chose to meet the Secretary General of the Union of the Maghreb Arab in Rabat, certainly at the initiative of Morocco. This ill advised reunion complicates rather than clarify the invisible dimension of this decolonization conflict. Evading the African Union, an early partner in the UN peace process and including the inactive UMA is a penchant towards Moroccan diplomacy.

What is next in the negotiations? Is the new Envoy -- an insider to the political establishment in Washington - backed by the Obama Administration? This is a simple but unanswered question, for it can hold the key to his success or failure.

In its previous sponsorship and performance during the negotiations, the UN pressured only the Sahrawi party to change its stand: to be more “flexible” and “realistic” and to make the concessions considered necessary for the negotiations to go forward. Even though the mediator does not get his direct instructions from Washington, the peace process in Western Sahara, especially since Baker’s mediation, has been swayed by the direction of the winds that blow from the American capital.

This leads to questions pertaining to the Sahrawi stance: Are the Sahrawis going to place their trust fully and maybe last hope for peace in Christopher Ross, as they did with James A. Baker? Are they going to adopt a wait-and-see attitude hoping that Ross will be able to convince Morocco to adjust its stance? Or, will they hope for a dramatic change of mind in Washington in their favor, because an African- American president may be more empathetic to their cause?

It is clear that the Moroccan-Sahrawi conflict has not been on Barak Obama’s top priority list. This was not the case with the former Bush administration, which handled the issue through the aggressive hand of Eliott Abrams , who was Senior Director of the National Security Council for Near East and North African Affairs, and later promoted to Deputy National Security Advisor. Abrams gave firm instructions to the UN, disregarded James Baker´s call for Washington’s support, and directed policies through the unsuccessful mediator Van Walsum.

Obama does not seem to be in a hurry to reveal his State Department’s stance on the issue. The recent nomination of Samuel Kaplan, who is an active AIPAC member and a “lawyer with no diplomatic experience”, as US ambassador to Morocco, plays in the hands of Morocco. The new context, allowed the regime in Rabat to use its Middle East card – as it has always done - to promote its own agenda.

However, it would be naïve to ignore the fact that the ultimate goal for all US administrations remains to serve American interests in this volatile North African region. Historically, Washington’s policy oscillated between open military and diplomatic support for Morocco’s “stability”, and the need to promote other US priorities. During G.W. Bush’s administration, the aim was to “fight terrorism” and advance American economic ventures in the oil rich countries. In this context, there are two possible policy approaches or scenarios that the Obama Administration might adopt in regards to the Moroccan-Sahrawi conflict.

The first is that there could be a slight shift in the American stance away from a too close alliance with Morocco, which is stubbornly and aggressively mobilizing around its “autonomy” solutions. This implies a public support for the new mediator and a more sensitive stand as to the plights of the Sahrawi people.

The second scenario is a low profile, with no real change in the policy or major adjustment in the US policy towards Morocco as far as Western Sahara is concerned. People who subscribe to this view consider Washington’s policy on long-standing issues such as the case of Western Sahara, as unchanging and a continuation of policies adopted by previous administrations.

In other words, they believe in a pragmatic Obama who will disengage from previous Administration positions but will pay little attention to the question of decolonization in Western Sahara, or to the plight of the Sahrawi refugees in the desert, and will not recognize or see the political merit in the Sahrawi non-violent resistance in the occupied territories. Obama, according to this view, will not consider any initiative on this matter, while Morocco will count on its friends in the Middle East to ensure that no such positive initiative sees the light of day. This was the case with former US administrations, which only sporadically showed interest in the UN-sponsored peace proposals and Resolutions regarding the Sahrawi conflict, sometimes very late in their last year in office.

Conflicting interests and pressures can generate a middle ground, often assumed by the Sahrawi negotiators. The Sahrawis base their policy on the hope that the US administration might become an honest broker, thereby facilitating Moroccan-Sahrawi negotiations without taking a stand and without siding with one party against the other.
In such a scenario, the difficulties facing the new mediator unambiguously lie with the official Moroccan stance. Putting aside the French and Spanish enthusiasm for the Moroccan proposal, and assuming the Obama administration opts for a neutral position, means that negotiations will unfold according to the balance of power between the negotiating parties.

Here one may ask: What cards do the Sahrawis and their supporters hold that can tip the scales in their favor?

Since 1975, Morocco has been occupying two-thirds of Western Sahara by sheer force and arming itself to the teeth in order to ensure its military superiority. During the last few months, the situation on the military front has been escalating. The cease-fire is precarious and has been threatened by Morocco’s repressive administration. While denying the people of Western Sahara their basic right to self-determination, Morocco is holding the UN mission in the territory hostage in an endless and expensive game, namely by delaying the holding of a free and fair referendum.

The territory of Western Sahara and its population are kept at bay and besieged by a Moroccan blockage. No media representatives or foreigners are allowed to visit, unless escorted by government officials. The regime in Rabat keeps the population under its tight control and suppresses any opposition or serious challenge to its authority. The peaceful Sahrawi resistance in the occupied territories is repressed through coercive means, including the use of the military which camp in every street to deter any protest or demonstration. Peaceful demonstrators are crushed, and activists thrown in jail, with no consideration for their legal rights. Furthermore, the Sahrawi population is divided by a long and formidable wall built by Morocco in the eighties. The wall, guarded by thousands of Moroccan soldiers, intensifies the suffering of the Sahrawi people by tearing families and communities apart. It also depletes the UNHCR’s meager resources, used to arrange for family visits, which requires transporting people across the prohibitive wall.

Since 1991, the failure of the UN to carry out its peace plan has created an abnormal situation on the ground. The UN is kept silent and stands impotent, even while human rights violations are being committed at its door steps. The various peace plans that were generated in this longest peace process have deepened the frustration of the Sahrawis; their situation remains grim.

In accepting the Baker Plan II, the Sahrawi negotiators acquiesced to Morocco’s request to temporarily administer the territory, but did not recognize any legal and permanent rights to the territory. However, the substitution of the UN Settlement Plan with the Baker Plan, which was accepted by the Sahrawis and rejected by Morocco, has certainly weakened the Sahrawi negotiating position and restricted their ability to maneuver in subsequent negotiations. The Sahrawis were further restrained by major concessions they made to put aside, even temporarily, armed struggle as a means to resist occupation, and perhaps more detrimental to de facto de-link the cease-fire from the political solution.

Currently, the Sahrawis do not have the negotiating leverage to counter Morocco’s maximalist position. Meanwhile, Morocco’s friends are attempting to put an end to all forms of armed resistance against the Moroccan occupation, and are concurrently pressuring Sahrawi allies and supporters to normalize their relations with Rabat.
The new mediator’s strategy to the negotiations is to ensure they creep like a snail. This approach could further decrease the visibility of the Western Sahara conflict and reduce international pressure on the parties. It will encourage Morocco’s defiant attitude, mainly to impose conditions, while the Polisario will be required to offer new concessions.

In any case, if the negotiations continue with no progress in sight, the lapse of time and political inertia will further weaken the Sahrawi bargaining position. Further vulnerability in the Polisario position will set the stage to an unexpected return to war.
Negotiations for a peace settlement could commence seriously only when Morocco recognizes that its autonomy plan is obsolete. Furthermore, cooperation with the UN should be contingent on a comprehensive road map which provides for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people. In this case, self-determination must mean full conformity with UN Resolutions and international legal principles and standards and not as Morocco wishes it to mean or to be defined.

In the next round of negotiations, Christopher Ross must not lose time and credibility, and he should avoid obfuscating the issues, or eclipsing his mandate by seeking to “reinstate confidence” between the parties through never-ending so-called informal and non-binding talks. Such an approach will entrench the schisms and differences between the parties. More importantly, private consultations with each party separately, as Ross proposes, will diminish international pressure on them to cooperate, and will produce false impressions, especially since they are focused on resolving unsubstantial issues.
In this context, the Polisario Front must concentrate its efforts on urgent objectives: it must demand a freeze on all colonial policies and activities Morocco is pursuing in the territory, including an end to political repression of Sahrawi peaceful forms of resistance and to the plundering of Sahrawi national resources. The Polisario must remind and urge the United Nations to comply with its central responsibility, namely to provide protection to the Sahrawi people. It must demand of the UN to play a more active role in improving the social and humanitarian situation in the territory, while pursuing more vigorous negotiations in order to implement its own Resolutions that call for the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination.

The Sahrawis face precarious conditions and a watershed in their history. Consequently, they are required to re-evaluate their bargaining cards and potential in regards to the negotiations and their strategies of resistance.

The Sahrawi demands are legitimate. The protection of the civilian population in the territories should not be subject to progress at the negotiating table. This objective is critical and must be pursued within a given time frame by the mediator.

The success of the Sahrawi-Moroccan talks cannot and should not be measured by “confidence-building” indicators; rather by concrete improvements on the ground. The outcome of such negotiations must be felt by the Sahrawi population in their daily confrontation with the occupier. Christopher Ross early optimism about holding new talks is a misplaced note.

During the last eighteen years, the Sahrawi population seems to have lost confidence in the UN-sponsored negotiations. Christopher Ross’s first six months have done very little to change that.

25.06.09

Obama, Sarkozy et l’Afrique : Un constat et deux approches différentes

Pr Chems Eddine Chitour

Ecole Polytechnique Alger

«Le développement de l’Afrique dépend d’une bonne gouvernance...L’Afrique n’a pas besoin d’hommes forts mais d’institutions solides.»

Barack Hussein Obama, le 11 juillet 2009 à Accra

Deux ans presque jour pour jour, deux présidents se sont adressés à l’Afrique avec des approches diamétralement opposées sur la forme mais non sur le fond. L’une se référant à la doxa occidentale depuis près de deux siècles et qui a commencé avec Hegel en 1830 (l’année de l’envahissement de l’Algérie) et s’est poursuivie avec pourrait-on dire les idéologues, du calibre de Renan, Cecil Rhodes voire de Victor Hugo dont les écrits font froid dans le dos. L’autre le président Obama qui, d’une façon ou d’une autre a un patrimoine génétique affectif avec la patrie de ses ancêtres, a su trouver les mots qui admonestent sans blesser.

La position la plus radicale à cet égard est celle qui consiste à dire que l’Histoire de l’Afrique (Noire) n’existe pas. Dans son Cours sur la philosophie de l’histoire en 1830, Hegel déclarait : «L’Afrique n’est pas une partie historique du monde. Elle n’a pas de mouvements, de développements à montrer. De mouvements historiques en elle. C’est-à-dire que sa partie septentrionale appartient au monde européen ou asiatique ; ce que nous entendons précisément par l’Afrique est l’esprit ahistorique, l’esprit non développé, encore enveloppé dans des conditions de naturel et qui doit être présenté ici seulement comme au seuil de l’Histoire du monde.» Coupland, dans son manuel sur l’Histoire de l’Afrique orientale, écrivait (en 1928, il est vrai) : «Jusqu’à D. Livingstone, on peut dire que l’Afrique proprement dite n’avait pas eu d’histoire. La majorité de ses habitants étaient restés, durant des temps immémoriaux, plongés dans la barbarie. Tel avait été, semble-t-il, le décret de la nature. Ils demeuraient stagnants, sans avancer ni reculer.»

«Donc, deux races humaines habitant l’Afrique ont seules joué un rôle efficient dans l’histoire universelle : en premier lieu et d’une façon considérable, les Egyptiens, puis les peuples du Nord de l’Afrique». En 1957, c’est P. Gaxotte qui écrit sans broncher dans la Revue de Paris : «Ces peuples (vous voyez de qui il s’agit..) n’ont rien donné à l’humanité ; et il faut bien que quelque chose en eux les en ait empêchés. Ils n’ont rien produit, ni Euclide, ni Aristote, ni Galilée, ni Lavoisier, ni Pasteur. Leurs épopées n’ont été chantées par aucun Homère.»

"(...)Un grand historien comme Charles-André Julien, va jusqu’à intituler un paragraphe de son ouvrage sur l’Histoire de l’Afrique «L’Afrique, pays sans Histoire», dans lequel il écrit : «L’Afrique Noire, la véritable Afrique, se dérobe à l’Histoire.»(2)

Voilà pour les fondements du discours prononcé le 22 juillet 2007, à l’université de Dakar par le président français Nicolas Sarkozy. Morceaux choisis : «Le drame de l’Afrique, c’est que l’homme africain n’est pas assez entré dans l’histoire. Le paysan africain qui, depuis des millénaires, vit avec les saisons, dont l’idéal de vie est d’être en harmonie avec la nature, ne connaît que l’éternel recommencement du temps rythmé par la répétition sans fin des mêmes gestes et des mêmes paroles. Dans cet imaginaire où tout recommence toujours, il n’y a de place ni pour l’aventure humaine, ni pour l’idée de progrès. (...) Dans cet univers où la nature commande tout, l’homme échappe à l’angoisse de l’histoire qui tenaille l’homme moderne mais l’homme reste immobile au milieu d’un ordre immuable où tout semble être écrit d’avance. Jamais l’homme ne s’élance vers l’avenir. Jamais il ne lui vient à l’idée de sortir de la répétition pour s’inventer un destin.»

Pendant qu’à Accra, Obama exhortait les parlementaires ghanéens a persévérer sur le chemin des réformes démocratiques, de l’Etat de droit et de la bonne gouvernance, à Brazzaville, au Congo, une élection contestée d’avance par l’opposition la plus représentative était sur le point d’accoucher d’un mal élu. Sarkozy se murait dans un silence coupable sur une telle parodie de la présidentielle que M.Sassou Nguesso s’apprêtait à organiser et remporter au Congo. Pourtant, les populations du Congo auraient voulu avoir le soutien du président français qui avait lui-même promis pendant la campagne électorale française une rupture de la politique française en Afrique.

Pour Emmanuel Semanou, responsable de Survie 13, la Francafrique est toujours présente malgré les promesses du candidat Sarkozy d’y mettre fin. Ecoutons-le répondre à la question de savoir si la Francafrique est un mythe dépassé, il répond : «Pas du tout. C’est encore une réalité aujourd’hui dans toute l’Afrique de l’Ouest. J’en veux pour preuve la très importante présence militaire française dans de nombreux pays d’Afrique. Mais au-delà, songez que la monnaie de 15 pays d’Afrique s’appelle le ´´franc CFA´´, qui voulait dire ´´franc des Colonies françaises d’Afrique´´. Il faut savoir que c’est la Banque de France qui détermine la parité de ces monnaies avec l’euro. Toutes les banques privées de l’Afrique francophone sont des filiales des banques françaises, les banques nationales sont étroitement liées à la Banque de France, qui prélève une part importante, entre 50% et 65% des revenus générés par les placements d’État. (...) Il y a toute une génération de dirigeants africains liés à Paris, qui ont fait du mal à leurs peuples et qui ont empêché la création d’une vraie Unité africaine, contraire aux intérêts de la France.(...) Je dirai que les entreprises chinoises prennent ce que la France a accepté de leur laisser, notamment dans le secteur du bâtiment et des travaux publics. La France s’est concentrée sur ses intérêts stratégiques, le pétrole, l’uranium...Au Niger, Areva n’a laissé que des miettes aux Chinois qui exploitent l’uranium.»(3)

Un plaidoyer lumineux de Achille Mbembe permet de comprendre la mécanique coloniale et l’assujetissement des élites françaises de tout bord à la nostalgie de l’empire. Ecoutons-le : «Dans sa ´´franchise´´ et sa ´´sincérité´´, Nicolas Sarkozy révèle au grand jour ce qui, jusqu’à présent, relevait du non-dit..(...) Ainsi, pour s’adresser à ´´l’élite de la jeunesse africaine´´, Henri Guaino se contente de reprendre, presque mot à mot, des passages du chapitre consacré par Hegel à l’Afrique dans son ouvrage La Raison dans l’histoire - et dont j’ai fait, récemment encore et après bien d’autres, une longue critique dans mon livre De la postcolonie (pp. 221-230). Selon Hegel, en effet, l’Afrique est le pays de la substance immobile et du désordre éblouissant, joyeux et tragique de la création. Les nègres, tels nous les voyons aujourd’hui, tels ils ont toujours été. Dans l’immense énergie de l’arbitraire naturel qui les domine, ni le moment moral, ni les idées de liberté, de justice et de progrès n’ont aucune place ni statut particulier.»(4)

«À côté de Hegel existe un deuxième fonds que recyclent sans complexe les ´´nouvelles élites françaises´´. Cet amas de préjugés, Lévy Brühl tenta d’en faire un système dans ses considérations sur ´´la mentalité primitive´´ ou encore ´´prélogique´´. Dans un ensemble d’essais concernant les ´´sociétés inférieures´´ (Les Fonctions mentales en 1910 ; puis La Mentalité primitive en 1921), il s’acharnera à donner une caution pseudo-scientifique à la distinction entre ´´l’homme occidental´´ doué de raison et les peuples et races non-occidentaux enfermés dans le cycle de la répétition et du temps mythico-cyclique. (...)

(…) Il y a aussi le legs des expositions coloniales, la tradition des zoos humains analysée par Pascal Blanchard et ses collègues, et celle des récits de voyage les uns toujours plus fantastiques que les autres. C’est tout cela qui nourrit à son tour un habitus raciste, souvent inconscient, qui est ensuite repris par la culture de masse à travers les films, la publicité, les bandes dessinées, la peinture, la photographie, et, conséquence logique, la politique ´´Y’a bon banania´´ et ´´Mon z’ami toi quoi y’en a´´.»(4)

« (...) Comment peut-on se présenter à l’université Cheikh Anta-Diop de Dakar au début du XXIe siècle et s’adresser à l’élite intellectuelle comme si l’Afrique n’avait pas de tradition critique propre et comme si Senghor et Camara Laye, chantres respectifs de l’émotion nègre et du royaume de l’enfance, n’avaient pas fait l’objet de vigoureuses réfutations internes?"

(...) Quant à l’antienne sur la colonisation et le refus de la ´´repentance´´, voilà qui sort tout droit des spéculations de Pascal Bruckner, Alain Finkielkraut et autres Daniel Lefeuvre. Mais à qui fera-t-on croire qu’il n’existe pas de responsabilité morale pour des actes perpétrés par un État au long de son histoire? À qui fera-t-on croire que pour créer un monde humain, il faut évacuer la morale et l’éthique par la fenêtre puisque dans ce monde, il n’existe ni justice des plaintes, ni justice des causes? Afin de dédouaner un système inique, la tentation est aujourd’hui de réécrire l’histoire de la France et de son empire en en faisant une histoire de la ´´pacification´´, de ´´la mise en valeur de territoires vacants et sans maîtres´´, de la ´´diffusion de l’enseignement´´, de la ´´fondation d’une médecine moderne´´, de la mise en place d’infrastructures routières et ferroviaires. (..) »

« Si donc la France veut jouer un rôle positif dans l’avènement de ce monde commun, il faut qu’elle renonce à ses préjugés. Il faut que ses nouvelles élites opèrent le difficile travail intellectuel sans lequel les proclamations politiciennes d’amitié n’auront aucun sens. On ne peut pas, comme à Dakar, parler à l’ami sans s’adresser à lui. Etre capable d’amitié, c’est, comme le soulignait Jacques Derrida, savoir honorer en son ami l’ennemi qu’il peut être Pour l’heure, et s’agissant de l’Afrique, il manque tout simplement à la France le crédit moral qui lui permettrait de parler avec certitude et autorité.»(4)

Dans son discours d’Accra, Obama fustige les dictateurs africains qui modifient notamment leurs Constitutions, pour se maintenir au pouvoir. Pendant ce temps, le président français, lui, les reçoit en grande pompe ou, leur rend visite sans vergogne. Obama a appelé l’Afrique à prendre en main son propre destin en combattant les pratiques antidémocratiques, les conflits et la maladie et en l’assurant du soutien américain dans cette vaste entreprise. Barack Obama a ravivé le slogan de sa campagne électorale : ´´Yes, you can´´. M.Obama a expliqué qu’il y a cinquante ans, quand son père a quitté Nairobi pour étudier aux Etats-Unis, le Kenya avait un PNB par habitant supérieur à celui de la Corée du Sud. ´´On a parlé d’héritage du colonialisme et d’autres politiques mises en place par les pays riches. Sans vouloir minimiser ce facteur, mon propos est de dire que la Corée du Sud, en travaillant avec le secteur privé et la société civile, a réussi à mettre en place des institutions qui ont garanti la transparence et la responsabilité.´´ Alors que dans beaucoup de pays d’Afrique, ´´si vous voulez avoir un job ou créer une entreprise, vous devez payer des pots-de-vin´´. ´´Une partie de ce qui a empêché l’Afrique d’avancer est que, pendant des années, on a dit que c’était la conséquence du néocolonialisme, ou de l’oppression occidentale, ou du racisme... Je ne crois pas beaucoup aux excuses, a-t-il dit dans son entretien à Allafrica.com. Les cartes coloniales qui ont été tracées ont favorisé les conflits, mais nous sommes en 2009. L’Occident et les Etats-Unis ne sont pas responsables de la situation de l’économie du Zimbabwe depuis quinze ou vingt ans.´´»

Theophile Kouamou s’interroge si les deux interventions sont-elles radicalement opposées? Non, pas vraiment, dit-il. Les thématiques se rejoignent à plusieurs reprises. Sarkozy affirme : «L’Afrique a sa part de responsabilité dans son propre malheur.» Obama dit : «Dans de nombreux endroits, l’espoir de la génération de mon père a cédé le pas au cynisme, souvent au désespoir. Il est facile de pointer du doigt les autres et de les blâmer pour ces problèmes.» Barack et Sarko s’adressent tous les deux à la jeunesse africaine, à qui il revient de relever les défis de demain. Et pourtant, ses propos ont été perçus de manière très positive sur le continent, alors que ceux du président français ont suscité une polémique. (...) Obama, président d’une Amérique qui sait faire rêver comme aucune grande puissance, est «un enfant du pays». Son histoire et l’histoire de sa famille font qu’il est difficile de faire peser sur lui le passé impérialiste que partagent la France et les Etats-Unis...«Obama est, lui aussi, dépositaire des souffrances de l’Afrique, ce qui n’est pas le cas d’un Nicolas Sarkozy, qui a longtemps été vu comme l’ex-ministre préposé à l’expulsion des étrangers.»

«De plus, alors que Sarkozy à Dakar n’a pas su rompre avec la rhétorique du clivage et de l’affrontement, qu’il affectionne tant, et s’est posé en grand professeur qui sait tout -disant à plusieurs reprises "le problème de l’Afrique, c’est que..."-, Obama a su utiliser l’art de la nuance, dénonçant l’Afrique de la honte pour mieux mettre en valeur, à travers de nombreux exemples, l’autre Afrique. Chez Sarkozy, il s’agit du "paysan africain, qui, depuis des millénaires, vit avec les saisons, dont l’idéal de vie est d’être en harmonie avec la nature", et qui ne connaît que l’éternel recommencement du temps rythmé par la répétition sans fin des mêmes gestes et des mêmes paroles.» Obama, lui, évoque les «braves Africains» qui sont du bon côté de l’histoire : le pouvoir et l’opposition ghanéens qui cohabitent harmonieusement, des policiers incorruptibles, des membres de la société civile engagés dans la fin des violences électorales au Kenya, etc. En bon «storyteller», Obama raconte, dans une sorte de roman d’anticipation, l’histoire d’une renaissance dont les Africains sont les héros.(5)

En définitive, seul le ton est différent, l’Afrique attend les sauveurs qui lui permettront de tordre le coup à une doxa qui dure pratiquement le temps du Code Noir...Ce que nous avons pointé du doigt dans notre ouvrage : L’Occident à la conquête du monde.(6)

1.Hegel Leçons sur la philosophie de l’histoire, 1830

2.Joseph Ki-Zerbo http://www.refer.sn/ethiopiques/article.php3?id_article=507 &artsuite=1

3.Emmanuel Semanou, Le néocolonialisme mène au rejet de la France 5 juillet : Mlle babords

4.Achille Mbembe http://www.africultures.com/php/index.php?nav=article&no=6784

5.Théophile Kouamou : De Sarkozy ou Obama, à l’Afrique? Rue 89 13/07/2009

6.Chems Eddine Chitour : L’Occident à la conquête du monde.Editions. Enag 2009

Pr Chems Eddine Chitour

Ecole Polytechnique Alger

Le mouvement amazigh et le Sahara Occidental

Il y a quelques jours, nous avons contacté un militant du Rif pour lui demander d'exprimer son opinion sur le sujet du Sahara Occidental dans son blog. Sa réponse fut la suivante : "En tant qu'Amazighs et tous les marocains mécontents , nous devons beaucoup au Polisario dans la mesure où c'est grâce à lui que le Maroc propose l'autonomie du Sahara sous la souveraineté marocaine et le mouvement amazigh va , tôt ou tard , si ce n'est déjà fait , je pense ici au mouvement autonome du Rif, exiger sa généralisation dans le pays , ce qui favorisera le développement de notre langue et culture et la prise en chage de nos régions respectives dans un Etat de droit.L'histoire vous reconnaitra cette victoire qui profite pour l'ensemble des marocains (...) Mais force est de constater que la reconnaissance de la langue et de la culture amazighes et la proposition de l'autonomie du Sahara sont des choses impossibles à envisager sous le régne de Hassan II : c'est un grand pas vers le Maroc dont nous rêvons tous et nous espérons que d'autres actions plus avantageuses seront bientôt entreprises.J'attends avec impatience le discours de la Fête du Trône fin juillet 2009 dans l'immédiat."
La première fois dans son histoique le mouvement amazigh fait référence dans ses débats, et souligne, même en des termes pas très clairs, qu’il s’oppose à la constitution d’un Etat propre au Polisario. Le mouvement amazighe le fait, non pas parce qu’il défend l’unité territoriale, mais parce qu’il défend l’unité de "tamazgha" (zone d’habitation des berbères). Une trentaine d’associations amazighes marocaines, le Congrès Mondial Amazigh, présidé par l’algérien Lounèss Belkacem, des associations installées en Europe ont soulevé cette question lors d’un débat à propos de la transition démocratique, organisé du 16 au 18 février 2006 à Al Hoceima... Les participants se sont prononcés contre l’installation d’un Etat autonome au sud du Maroc. Le premier argument mis en avant par ces amazighes c’est que le Polisario veut installer une république arabe (RASD).
En avril 2007, me gouvernement marocain présentait son plan d'autonomie pour le Sahara. L'annonce est immédiatement exploitée par des militants associatifs amazighespour mettre la réclamation de l’autonomie du Rif au devant de la scène. "Le mouvement culturel amazighe dans le Nord du Maroc réclame l’autonomie pour le Rif". C’est là l’appel écrit en gros caractères que comportait une banderole brandie le 1er mai 2007 dans la plus grande artère de la ville de Nador par des jeunes qui défilaient aux côtés des travailleurs affiliés à l’UMT. Cet acte revendicatif est le premier du genre dans cette région. Ses revendications se résument à :
Article 1. Le plan du Maroc pour un statut d’autonomie pour la région du Sahara, tel que remis aux Nations Unies pour servir de base de négociation, est une initiative sérieuse et louable à même de permettre de répondre aux aspirations légitimes des populations concernées qui pourront concrétiser leur droit à la libre et authentique autodétermination.
Article 2. L’autonomie des régions, au Maroc, est à même de renforcer l’unité et l’intégrité territoriale du Maroc par le recouvrement de ses frontières authentiques.
Article 3. En cas d’échec des négociations avec l’Algérie et le Polisario, le Maroc doit sans tarder, en toute souveraineté, décider de mettre en place l’autonomie des régions sur l’ensemble du territoire national.
Article 4. L’option d’autonomie ne doit en aucun cas être comprise comme la réponse politique de conjoncture à un problème précis, en l’occurrence celui du Sahara. Le choix de l’autonomie des régions provient de la conviction qu’il s’agit là d’un instrument juridique et politique à même de répondre aux contraintes du sous-développement, de l’exclusion, de la marginalisation, de la pauvreté et de l’ignorance, ainsi qu’aux aspirations des populations à une vie meilleure et au plein exercice des principes démocratiques.
Pour la concrétisation du principe de l’autonomie des régions du Maroc, le peuple marocain doit être appelé à voter par voie de référendum pour l’insertion de l’autonomie des régions dans la constitution marocaine.
Article 6. Le Grand Rif, dans le sens géographique du terme, depuis l’Atlantique jusqu’aux frontières avec l’Algérie doit bénéficier d’un statut d’autonomie en rapport avec ses spécificités historiques, géographiques, linguistiques et culturelles, et en rapport avec les contraintes qu’il subit depuis l’indépendance du Maroc ainsi que les aspirations légitimes de ses populations.
Article 7. Afin de sortir le Rif du sous-développement, il est urgent de définir et exécuter un plan d’urgence de reconstruction et de mise à niveau économique, sociale et culturelle. Ce plan d’urgence pour la reconstruction et le développement, dont l’idée avait été exprimée par le souverain en mars 2004 n’a toujours pas vu le jour.

Leur requête est jugée inadmissible. Chakib El Khyari, président de l’association du Rif pour la défense des Droits de l’Homme s’attaque aux jeunes qui ont brandi la banderole à Nador. Il qualifie leur revendication d’inadmissible. "Ce n’est vraiment pas sérieux que la réclamation de l’autonomie pour le Rif tombe au même moment où l’on parle d’autonomie du Sahara », regrette-t-il. Et d’ajouter : « C’est là à l’évidence du chantage". El Khyari précise qu’il n’est pas du tout de l’intérêt du Rif de demander, même dans le cadre d’une régionalisation, une gestion autonome de ses affaires. "La région manque encore de tout", insiste-t-il. De nombreux Rifains estimaient que la demande d’autonomie dans les circonstances actuelles n’est qu’un coup d’épée dans l’eau de la part de jeunes excités.
Les extrémistes du MCA se disent contre "la création d’une entité panarabe raciste et fasciste sur un territoire amazigh et combattra le Polisario et le makhzen si ce dernier complote contre les intérêts légitimes et historiques du Maroc sur ce territoire qui est le Sahara dit occidental. Les soient disant étudiants sahraouis sont des marocains, ils doivent servir les intérêts du Maroc. Ceux qui pensent être des séparatistes doivent quitter le Maroc et rejoindre le Polisario aux camps de Tindouf. Ils doivent réclamer leur droit de partir à Tindouf et les autorités actuelles du Maroc doivent les refouler après avertissement de leurs familles. Tous ceux qui complotent contre le Maroc doivent le quitter et rejoindre l’Etat fantoche de la RASD créé à Tindouf. Le Sahara est un territoire amazigh et si les petits arabes de ben Maaqil veulent créer un Etat arabe raciste ils n’ont qu’à revenir chez eux dans la péninsule arabique. Le Maroc est un pays amazigh dont les frontières s’étendent de la méditerranée jusqu’au fleuve Sénégal. Le pouvoir actuel à Rabat doit agir avec force contre les étudiants séparatistes qui doivent être refoulés à l’enfer de Tindouf. Sinon le MCA ne cessera jamais de les combattre."
Le plan d'autonomie marocain n'était qu'une manoeuvre dilatoire et une façade pour amener la communauté internationale à reconnaître la souveraineté du Maroc sur le territoire sahraoui. Deux ans après, personne n'ignore que ce plan a échoué après le départ de Bush, et avec lui, le fonctionnaire onusien Peter Van Walsum et le retour de l'instance onusienne au principe sacré du droit à l'autodétermination. A la fin du mois de juillet, auront lieu les premiers contacts informels entre marocains et sahraouis. L'Etat sahraoui indépendant n''est plus qu'une question de temps. L'autonomie recherché par les amazighs n'était qu'un mensonge dont on ne parle plus. Le rêve amazigh d'autonomie après le Sahara s'est dissipé dans les montagnes de Nador. Ils ont sacrifié les aspirations du peuple sahraoui pour s'aligner à côté de son oppresseur dont le but de "profiter" de cet alléchant cadeau appelé autonomie. Chakib Khayari a fait confiance à Mohamed VI. Actuellement, il paie sa faute avec trois ans de prison et une amende de 753.930 DH (soit 68000 €)
La question d'or est : Que feront les militants amazighs maintenant que l'autonomie n'est qu'un mirage qui s'est dissipé au désert du Sahara Occidental? Demander l'indépendance? C'était pourtant le rêve de leur brave ancêtre, Abdelkrim Khattabi. Après la victoire spectaculaire d’Anoual, 21 juin 1921, Abd el-Krim renforça son pouvoir en créant un Etat, la République du Rif, avec un gouvernement et une administration centralisée. Cette question est restée taboue dans le Maroc d'aujourd'hui. Feu Mohamed V avais donné son approbation à l'intervention des français pour appuyer les espagnols qui etaient mis en échec. Lors de la réintégration du Maroc espagnol à l'indépendance, des soulèvements eurent lieu au motif de revendications républicaines et démocratiques qui furent atrocement réprimées.
Le combate d'Abdelkrim a été porté comme exemple par les combattants vietnamiens et malgaches et tous les mouvements de libération des années 60 et se sont inspirés de ses méthodes de guerrilla. Partout dans le monde, on a suivi son exemple, sauf dans son fief, dans les montagnes du Rif. Les militants amazighs n'ont pas embrassé l'esprit d'Abdelkrim et se sont allignés avec le régime de MOhamed VI en oubliant ce que son père fait à leur ancêtres.
Le peuple sahraoui sera toujours solidaire de ses frères Rifains qui sont les premiers à avoir connu le vrai visage de la monarchie marocaine bien avant les sahraouis.